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Abstract 
This thesis examines whether the introduction of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 
and the establishment of Strategic Coordinating Groups (SCGs) within an integrated 
emergency management framework provides Scotland with an effective crisis 
response structure and resilience. A key aspect of resilience is the ability of the SCGs 
to learn from previous experiences. This research will consider the organisational 
learning of the SCGs to determine whether it is as effective as it could be. It first 
focuses on the organisational structure of the SCG and analyses it in terms of network 
management to determine its crisis management effectiveness. It then considers 
whether the SCGs are suitably adaptive to crises and learn from the experience of 
managing them and thereby enhance their preventative capability, as envisaged by the 
resilience policy. The principal argument is that the current structure does not ensure 
effective organisational learning and therefore Scotland’s resilience is diminished. 
 
Design/Methodology/Approach 
A qualitative approach is used. Data is gathered through interviews and non-
participant observations, and interpreted by a combination of inductive and deductive 
approaches. The use of triangulation of data enhances its validity. Systems theory 
provides analytical frameworks to examine the SCG structure and processes, and to 
determine whether SCGs successfully achieve the desired outcome of resilience and 
effective crisis management. 
 
Findings/Practical Implications 
Using the systems approach identifies that real world SCGs have a number of 
variances from the ideal state. The current SCG structure is complex which makes 
communication and coordination challenging, which undermines the SCG crisis 
response. The absence of a dynamic monitoring mechanism within the SCG makes it 
difficult to learn lessons from previous crises and adapt to environmental changes. 
The thesis concludes by making a number of recommendations for improving SCG 
crisis management effectiveness and resilience. 
 
Keywords: crisis management; resilience; integrated emergency management; 
systems theory   
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Introduction 
 
This introduction sets out the problems that led to the demands for a policy network 
capable of improving UK resilience and resulted in the establishment of the Strategic 
Coordinating Groups in Scotland. It also introduces the theoretical and conceptual 
frameworks applied to the research.     
 
The fuel crisis and floods of 2000 and the foot and mouth crisis of 2001 exposed 
serious weakness in capability across England, Wales and Scotland, particularly when 
dealing with wide area emergencies (Cabinet Office, 2004; Walford, 2009). The 
subsequent terrorist attacks of 9/11, Bali, Madrid and London bombings of July 2005 
further emphasised the need to re-examine emergency planning arrangements and to 
restructure them where necessary (Buckle et al., 2006).These events are illustrative of 
the array of potentially devastating threats society faces which typically will require 
government intervention (Boin et al., 2010). Not only is the scope and magnitude of 
such events increasing (Mitroff, 2004), but their consequences are more problematic 
because of the complexity and interdependency of technological systems (Rosenthal 
& Kouzmin, 1997). Society’s ability to manage such extreme events depends on its 
ability to understand, anticipate, prepare for, and respond to them (Comfort, 1999).  
 
The UK Government’s response to its perceived capability deficit in relation to its 
“experience of severe emergencies in the UK and the changing threat from 
international terrorism” (Civil Contingencies Bill para 2), was the introduction of 
legislation and a national ‘resilience’ policy1. The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 
formally established Scotland’s Strategic Coordinating Groups (SCGs), while the 
policy of resilience incorporated not just planning, preparation, maintenance, response 
and recovery but also prevention of such extreme events (Cabinet Office, 2004). This 
thesis examines the SCGs to determine whether they provide Scotland with 
effective crisis management capability and resilience as envisaged by 
Government.   
 
                                                 
1
 Resilience – a full discussion about the term resilience is included in Chapter 1. The UK Resilience 
Policy intends through planning and preparation to enable communities to detect, prevent and, if 
necessary, to handle and recover from disruptive challenges.  
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The Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) is the focal point for local resilience and the 
principal local forum for multiagency cooperation working across organisational 
boundaries. The Act established an SCG for each Scottish police force area (note that 
Highland & Islands SCG is in Northern Constabulary area, all other SCGs have the 
same name as the local police force). There are currently 8 SCGs in Scotland shown 
on the map below: 
 
 
Figure 1 (Source: Scottish Government www.readyscotland.org) 
 
The SCG is expected to provide clear direction and leadership in developing, 
maintaining and continuously improving local emergency arrangements, which 
involves two broad functions. First, SCGs are multi-agency strategic crisis 
management teams activated to deal with crises which are beyond the capability of 
individual organisations. The second function of the SCG is, in the absence of crisis, 
to routinely work to implement the UK Government’s resilience policy. The intended 
outcome of which is the capability "at every relevant level to detect, prevent and, if 
necessary, to handle and recover from disruptive challenges" (Scottish Executive 
2007: 15).  
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The specific meaning of the term crisis
2
 is subject to ongoing debate but it is typically 
used as a catchall concept relating to situations that are unwanted, unexpected, 
unprecedented, and almost unmanageable and that cause widespread disbelief and 
uncertainty (Rosenthal, Boin & Comfort 2001). Crisis can be defined more precisely 
as “a serious threat to the basic structures or the fundamental values and norms of 
a social system, which under time pressure and highly uncertain circumstances 
necessitates making critical decisions” (Rosenthal et al., 1989:10). The primary role 
of the SCG is to deal with such crises. 
 
A key aspect of resilience in general and crisis prevention in particular is the ability of 
organisations to learn from previous experiences. Therefore, in this study particular 
attention is given to organisational learning within the SCGs. Specifically whether 
lessons identified during crises are actually learned and subsequently reflected in 
changes of behaviour, beliefs and culture within the SCGs.  
 
A crisis offers a reservoir of potential lessons for contingency planning and training 
for future crisis. The crucial challenge is whether it feeds back into pre-existing policy 
networks (Boin & ‘tHart, 2007). However, organisations often appear to fail to learn 
(Turner, 1978; Lagadec 1997; Perrow 1999; Clarke 1999; Toft & Reynolds, 2005; 
Smith & Elliott, 2007) or only learn enough to return to the pre-crisis state, rather than 
learning how to prevent crises from occurring (Argyris 1982).  Wise (2006) suggests 
information sharing and collaboration would improve organisational learning and 
facilitate adaptation and improvisation. This research will consider the organisational 
learning of the SCGs to determine whether it is as effective as it could be. 
 
Focusing on the two functions of the SCGs, namely crises management and 
improving resilience, the core question this research asks is: are the SCGs fit for 
purpose or are they simply an example of ‘mock bureaucracy’3. To answer the 
question this research first focuses on the organisational structure of the SCG and 
analyses it in terms of network management to determine its crisis management 
effectiveness. It then considers whether the SCGs are suitably adaptive to crises and 
                                                 
2
 A full discussion on the various terms related to crisis, such as emergency and disaster are included in 
chapter 1 
3
 Rules are ignored or not enforced because they are seen as illegitimate or imposed from an outside 
agency. Concept from Gouldner, A.W (1954) Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy is detailed in thesis 
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learn from the experience of managing them and thereby enhance their preventative 
capability, as envisaged by the resilience policy.  
 
Rationale & Context of the Research into the Effectiveness of the SCGs 
 
The establishment of the SCGs and related legislation and non-statutory guidance 
marked a profound shift in Government policy. Before the creation of the SCGs the 
UK’s crisis management policy and associated legislation evolved in a piecemeal 
manner; mainly based on civil defence, national emergencies including responding to 
terrorist attacks, health and safety legislation, and international collaboration. 
(Appendix A details the evolution of the relevant legislation, powers and duties). 
 
During the 1930s, in the approach to World War II, the focus was on hostile attack by 
an external enemy. However, by the 1980s and 1990s the aim was on promoting 
improved planning for peacetime emergencies, such as localised flooding and major 
transport accidents, while achieving best value for money. The outcome was a shift to 
a multiagency coordinated response to emergencies and the introduction of Integrated 
Emergency Management (IEM
4
).  
 
However, by the 21
st
 Century there was a recognition that crises, such as the fuel 
strike and severe flooding in 2000, and the outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease in 
2001, were becoming increasingly complex and beyond the boundaries of any single 
organisation (Cabinet Office, 2004). Collaboration was necessary to effectively 
manage such problems (Milward & Provan, 2006), which were difficult to 
conceptualise and analyse because of their complexity (Chisholm, 1998). The crises 
were no longer linear single cause events but ‘ill-structured messes’, forming complex 
systems of interactive problems (Ackoff 1974; Mitroff et al, 2004). Recent examples 
faced by the UK Government include cyber attacks, financial infrastructure collapse, 
climate change and health scares. Each example has the potential to impact on 
Government legitimacy and undermine the state’s crisis management capability 
(Boin, 2004).  
 
                                                 
4
 IEM is an approach based on a generic framework applicable to any event, irrespective of size, nature 
or cause. It focuses on effects rather than causes, and ensures the multiagency response is coordinated 
and mutually supporting 
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Consequently, the UK Government recognised the need: (i) for a single framework 
for civil protection in the United Kingdom designed to meet the challenges of the 21
st
 
century; (ii) to improve the UK’s ability to deal with the consequences of major 
disruptive incidents by improving the planning process at a local level, building better 
contacts between agencies and improving the link between local areas and central 
government; and (iii) clearly identifying the roles and responsibilities of local 
responders, ensuring consistency in civil protection activity and enhancing 
performance (Cabinet Office, 2004). (Appendix B details the roles, responsibilities 
and borders of the SCG member organisations). 
 
The new framework resulted in a move from hierarchical structures, characterised by 
top-down management and command and control relationships (Goldsmith & Eggers, 
2004), towards networks characterised by a horizontal style of management, shared 
leadership and decisions made on the basis of expertise rather than positions. This 
shift reflected the view that rigid, bureaucratic command and control structures led to 
an ineffective crisis response; whereas flexible, malleable, loosely coupled, 
organisational configurations were more effective (Neal & Phillips, 1995).  
However, building effective networks is difficult in dynamic environments, especially 
in response to crisis (Comfort 2002a; Comfort & Kapucu 2006; Waugh & Streib 
2006). Network limitations include the difficulties of process, obstacles to 
performance, and the relationship between bureaucracy and multi-organisational 
arrangements (McGuire & Agranoff, 2011). Not only were such network structures 
different from bureaucratic hierarchies but they also had different governance 
structures (O’Toole, 1997). Therefore in considering whether a network, such as the 
SCG, is effective or not it is important to consider the nature of inter-organisational 
relationships, which can be affected by problems of control and coordination, 
communication, and complex individual and leadership behaviours (Kapucu, 2005).  
 
A key element of a successful network is trust. In this research trust is defined as the 
“accepted vulnerability to another's possible but not expected ill will (or lack of 
good will) toward one” (Baier, 1986: 235). Trust involves a cognitive leap beyond the 
expectations that reason and experience alone would warrant. Moreover, it is 
reciprocal, so when people see others acting in ways that imply that they trust them, 
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they become more disposed to reciprocate by trusting them more. Conversely, people 
come to distrust those whose actions appear to violate their trust or to distrust them 
(Lewis & Weigert, 1985). Bartolme (1989) offers six elements for building and 
maintaining trust: communication (keeping people informed, giving honest and 
candid feedback); support (through being available and approachable); respect (by 
delegating and actively listening); fairness (by giving credit and recognition where 
due); predictability (being consistent); and competence (by demonstrating ability and 
professionalism). These are essential because trust is a notoriously vulnerable good, 
easily wounded and not at all easily healed (Baier, 1991).  
 
In addition to establishing trusting relationships, understanding the dynamics of the 
inter-organisational networks and the patterns of interaction are important for both 
policy makers and those responsible for implementation (Gidron et al, 1992). The 
SCG activities in crisis management and its implementation of resilience are 
outcomes of complex political interactions. The effectiveness of such networks is 
dependent on the personnel working within the system having a clear understanding 
of the various inter-organisational relationships and how these affect outcomes. 
Having such an understanding enables personnel to adapt their activities to ensure 
they are appropriate to achieve the desired outcome such as resilience. Waugh and 
Streib (2006) link performance with comprehension. They state: 
“improved performance depends to a great extent on the 
ability of public officials to fully comprehend the complexities  
of the policy networks operating in the areas in which they work 
and to think strategically about how to use or alter them” 
(Waugh & Streib, 2006: 138).  
 
This research examines these complexities to determine the effectiveness of the 
current organisational form of the SCG in relation to its primary functions, namely 
crisis response and enhancing resilience. A detailed examination of the SCGs 
structure and debate regarding hierarchies and network coordination is outlined in 
Chapter 4.2. The following section sets out the theoretical and conceptual framework 
of the SCG. 
 
Theoretical & Conceptual Framework of the SCG 
 
The purpose of SCGs is to establish and maintain formal partnerships capable of 
delivering a joint response to any crisis (Scottish Executive, 2007). SCGs are 
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integrated multi-agency networks through which the UK Government’s policy of 
resilience is implemented. Such policy networks have been described as 
representative of the British government, in that they set out the parameters of 
government policy within which local decisions can be based (Rhodes, 1991). Policy 
networks have been defined as “(more or less) stable patterns of social relations 
between interdependent actors, which take the shape around policy problems and/or 
policy programmes” (Kickert, Klijn & Koppenjan, 1997: 6).  
 
In the case of the UK, the policy problem was the increased threats the country faced. 
The policy solution was to counter such threats by enabling improved resilience 
across the public, private and voluntary sectors. However, because each network 
member organisation lacks the individual capability to achieve the policy goal there is 
a need to share information and resources, and to coordinate action. Therefore, 
interdependency is an essential element in addressing the policy problem and 
achieving the outcome of resilience. The concept of resilience is further developed in 
Chapter 1. 
 
Collaborative policy networks, such as the SCGs, are ideally characterised by 
reciprocity, representation, equality, participatory decision making, and collaborative 
leadership (deLeon & Varda, 2009). The success of such networks depends on the 
ability of their leaders to organise structures, resources, and interactions when 
bringing together participants with different authority, motivations, interests, skills, 
and access to information (Moynihan, 2005).  
 
These collaborative characteristics are reflected in the SCG, the effectiveness of 
which rests upon every member's awareness of not only their own role and 
responsibility, but also the roles, responsibilities and capabilities of network partners. 
However, the SCG is not a statutory body and has no legal personality, nor powers to 
direct its members, replace individual responder’s management mechanisms or the 
authority to issue executive orders. Each network participant retains their own 
responsibilities; consequently the SCG has to rely on a process of coordination and 
consensus to secure consistency in delivering the overall strategic intent (Scottish 
Executive 2007). The outcome is, therefore, dependent on effective organisational 
structures and collaborative leadership, highlighted by Moynihan (2005) above. 
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By applying network theory to the SCG it is possible to discern a greater 
understanding of the effectiveness of its organisational form. Network theory 
highlights difficulties of process, obstacles to performance, and the relationship 
between bureaucracy and multi-organisational arrangements, which may undermine 
SCG effectiveness in delivering resilience. Thereafter, the overarching analytical 
framework adopted in this research is systems theory, especially the systems approach 
developed by Checkland (1979; 1993, 2000), which is used to examine the SCGs. 
 
At the core of the General System Theory (Bertalanffy, 1950) is the notion that the 
whole is made up of interdependent and interacting parts. The interactions of such 
complex systems are non-linear and asymmetric, so small inputs can produce large 
results (Dekker, 2011). There is also an inherent unpredictability in the evolution of 
such complex systems; the synergy and emergent properties
5
 may lead to unforeseen 
outcomes, and the emergent wholes and their component parts are different and 
cannot be meaningfully compared (Richardson, 2004).   
 
The Systems Theory contrasts with the previously dominant scientific Newtonian 
worldview of linear causality and rigorous determinism, where the concept in 
experiments of ‘all other things being equal’ created artificial and simplified realities, 
as well as an increase in specialisation and reductionism in science (Francois, 2000). 
Whereas, Systems Theory emphasises that real systems are open to, and interact with, 
their environments and that in an entity of interacting parts no part can be changed 
without triggering changes over the whole. Consequently, such systems evolve with 
the emergence of new properties from the interactions between the system 
components and their relationship with each other and the environment.  
 
Checkland (1993) built on this and argues that the Systems Approach should not be 
considered as a separate discipline but rather a meta-discipline that can be applied 
within virtually any other discipline. In his book Systems Thinking, Systems Practice 
                                                 
5
 Emergence – refers to an entity arising out of another, such as in the process of reproduction. 
Emergent entities, such as offspring, can influence their parents, i.e. emergence may possess feedback 
features, but the offspring is a distinct entity from its parents and is therefore irreducible to them  
 
 
17 
 
 
(1993), Checkland highlights the conscious use of the concept of ‘wholeness’ 
captured in the word system, which can be applied to ill-structured problems of the 
real world. Such application of systems concepts help to develop tools for thought and 
the generation of insight, especially to real world problems within organised 
complexity (Fortune & Peters, 1995).  
 
The systems approach has been applied to crises which can be considered as both 
social and technical failures within organisational systems (Turner, 1976; 1978; 
Horlick-Jones, 1990). This research builds on Turner’s (1976, 1978) and Checkland’s 
(1993) approach (see Chapter 2 Organisational Resilience and the Effect of Systemic 
Crises). So rather than seeking to reduce the entity under examination that is the SCG, 
to the properties of its parts or elements, this research analyses the SCG structure and 
interrelations between the parts which connect them into a whole, using systems 
models (Formal Systems and Viable Systems).  
 
Fortune and Peters (1995) Formal Systems Model was adapted from Checkland 
(1981) who had developed the concept of a formal system and ‘other systems 
thinking’ to check the robustness of the conceptual models for use in his Soft Systems 
Methodology (SSM). Fortune and Peters (1995) suggested that the Viable System 
Model could be an additional feature of the Formal System Model. Like the Formal 
System Model, the VSM applies systems concepts to the organisation. Any deficiency 
in the functioning of the organisation can be traced back to inappropriate or 
inadequate subsystems or linkages. These models are further developed in Chapter 2.8 
and used to analyse the SCGs in Chapter 6. 
 
The first model, the Formal Systems Model (FSM) (Fortune & Peters, 1994 & 2005), 
focuses on common areas of failure within systems. By taking a holistic approach it is 
used to describe failure and explain why it occurred (White, 1995). Thereafter, the 
Viable Systems Model (VSM) (Beer, 1979, 1981 & 1985) is used as an additional 
level of organisational analysis of the key processes, communications and information 
flows within the SCG structure and relationships between them.  
 
Finally, the concept of Mock Bureaucracy (Gouldner, 1954) is used as an analytical 
lens through which to understand and explain why aspects of the policy and 
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legislation in relation to organisational learning are not as effective as they could be. 
Gouldner found that despite organisational rules enforcing regulations, many were not 
complied with because staff did not consider them legitimate as they were imposed 
from ‘outside’ rather than being initiated within the organisation. Therefore the rules 
were not valued and non-compliance actually enhanced the status of staff who did not 
comply. Moreover, there were few consequences for failing to comply. Gouldner’s 
findings highlight the importance of organisational culture in achieving and 
maintaining compliance through shared values embedded at an individual and 
organisational level. Such a culture is essential in overcoming barriers to learning. 
Gouldner’s (1954) Mock Bureaucracy is considered in relation to systemic crises in 
Chapter 2 and then used as an analytical lens in Chapter 7. 
 
Therefore the insight of both network and systems theories helps us understand how 
SCGs, as inter-organisational networks, respond to crises. The former enables a 
greater understanding of the effectiveness of the SCG as a policy network. The latter 
provides an analytical framework to analyse structure and processes, and to determine 
whether SCGs can successfully achieve the desired common outcome of improved 
local resilience and effective response.  
 
Research Aim & Approach 
 
The research aims to examine the capability of SCGs to determine whether the current 
civil contingencies infrastructure, including the Integrated Emergency Management 
framework and training arrangements, are effective in ensuring that the SCGs are best 
prepared for crises. Particular attention is given to the organisational learning ability 
of the SCGs and whether lessons learned are reflected in changes of behaviour, beliefs 
and culture. In essence the research asks and explores whether the SCGs are fit for 
purpose or are they an example of Mock Bureaucracy. 
 
The methodology uses a qualitative approach, with data gathered through interviews, 
non-participant observations, and related documentation. The data is interpreted by a 
combination of inductive and deductive approaches. The use of triangulation of data 
enhances its validity. 
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The research focuses on a number of specific areas, namely, the various SCG policies 
in relation to risk, crisis and business continuity management necessary to achieve the 
outcome of resilience; the organisational structure of the SCG, and its coordination 
and communication; and the organisational culture of the SCG, and the influence of 
leadership and decision-making. All of which are underpinned by the provision of 
training and exercising to enable members to enhance their competencies in dealing 
with crises.  In doing so it seeks to identify whether the SCG adaptive capability is 
such that it learns lessons from crises experience. If not the research will seek to 
explain why it does not learn such lessons and what could be done to ensure that it 
does so in the future.  
 
Thesis Outline & Structure 
 
Chapter 1 - provides the theoretical concepts which underpin the SCG, namely crisis 
management, resilience, adaptive capability and organisational learning. Using 
Pauchant & Mitroff’s Onion Model (1992), the chapter highlights the importance of 
organisational culture in relation to successful crisis management and resilience. It 
emphasises that learning from crisis is one of the most underdeveloped aspects of 
crisis management, and that there are a number of barriers to learning which must be 
overcome to ensure organisations become crisis prepared.  
 
Chapter 2 – explores systems approaches which can be used to analyse 
organisational crises and improve organisational crisis preparedness. Gouldner’s 
(1954) concept of mock bureaucracy is linked to the systems approaches, highlighting 
that rule compliance in relation to safety culture is an important element of an 
organisation being crisis prone or crisis prepared. The Formal Systems Model and the 
Viable Systems Model used in chapter six to analyse the SCG are also examined.  
 
Chapter 3 – explains the adoption of qualitative research methodology used in this 
research. It highlights that by using an exploratory and flexible approach, together 
with interviews; observations and documents rich data was gained from which a 
number of emerging themes were identified.  
 
Chapter 4 – examines the SCG using first 3 levels of Pauchant & Mitroff’s Onion 
Model (1992), namely the strategies and policies, the structure, and the culture. The 
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linkages between risk, crisis and business continuity management within the SCGs are 
explored, and it is argued that resilience is an outcome of these activities. It goes on to 
consider the literature around policy networks and inter-organisational coordination in 
crises; highlighting the distinction between the hierarchical organisational form 
associated with command and control and those of network management. The SCG 
network structure and mandatory tasks, including information sharing and 
cooperation, risk assessment and management and business continuity planning and 
management, are explored. Thereafter, the elements of organisational culture essential 
to effective crisis management are discussed. The chapter concludes with a summary 
of the emerging themes identified from the literature in the preceding chapters. 
 
Chapter 5 – considers the inner core of Pauchant & Mitroff’s Onion Model (1992), 
namely the individual perceptions of those within the organisation in relation to the 
strategies and policies, the structure, and the culture of the SCG. The data from 
interviews, observations and the relevant crisis management and resilience literature 
is brought together and examined. The emerging themes from the data are analysed 
and variances between the theory and reality highlighted and explained.   
 
Chapter 6 - applies the Formal System and Viable System models to the SCG. In 
essence this chapter asks, what is the theoretical solution to the policy problem of 
creating resilience? In particular it applies ‘ideal’ systems models to ‘real’ world 
evidence of the SCG practice and identifies a number of variances which may result 
in constraints or even failure.  
 
Chapter 7 - brings together the emergent themes from the literature (chapters 1, 2 and 
4), the interviews and observations (chapter 5) and the systems analysis of the SCG 
(chapter 6). It uses Gouldner’s (1954) Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy (Mock 
Bureaucracy) as an analytical lens to explain why there are variances between the 
‘ideal’ systems models and the ‘real’ world findings of the SCG in practice. 
Recommendations to improve the SCGs crisis management and resilience capability 
are made. The chapter concludes with my reflections on learning from the research 
process.  
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Chapter 1 – The Theoretical Underpinnings of Crisis and Resilience  
 
This chapter explores the key conceptual themes in relation to crisis, organisational 
learning and resilience. It distinguishes crises from emergencies and disasters, and 
also highlights the importance of organisational culture in relation to effective crisis 
management. In particular how leadership and decision making are essential in 
managing crises. The importance of learning from crisis as an element of resilience is 
also introduced, together with those barriers that prevent organisations and individuals 
learning from the crisis experience. Such barriers to learning diminish resilience, a 
concept which is explored in detail; especially the importance of an organisation’s 
ability to adapt to its changing environment and willingness to have trained resources 
to ensure that it is crisis prepared. 
 
1.1 What is it we are dealing with - Emergency, Disaster or Crisis? 
 
In considering crises the concepts emergency, crisis and disaster are rarely defined 
adequately or distinguished from each other (Borodzicz, 1996). Smith (2006a) 
suggests that ‘crisis’ is one of the most misused words in modern society, highlighting 
that there is ambiguity about the processes which underpin it. Therefore, clarification 
is necessary otherwise we will “really be talking of somewhat different phenomena” 
(Quarantelli, 1995: 224). Based on previous research a distinction is drawn between 
emergency, crisis and disaster.  
 
An emergency is a complex and urgent problem, bound in place with no ripple effect, 
which is routine business for the emergency services that are trained to deal with them 
(Boin, 2010). Therefore, emergencies can be defined as situations requiring a rapid 
and highly structured response where the risks for critical decision makers can, to a 
relative degree, be defined (Borodzicz, 2005). An example would be the response of 
the emergency services to a dwelling house fire. Their roles are clear-cut, structured 
and congruent with a command and control model (HMSO, 1994). The inference is 
that emergency services will have foreseen the risk and planned accordingly.  
 
A disaster, on the other hand, is typically, but not universally, defined in terms of an 
episode that is collectively construed as very harmful (Perry & Quarantelli, 2005). 
Disaster has also been described as “a crisis with a bad ending” (Quarantelli et al 
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2007: 23). But not every crisis necessarily turns into disaster (Boin & ‘tHart 2007). A 
disaster is as an overwhelming situation, where response requirements exceed 
resources and capability. The Scottish Government document Dealing with Disaster 
Together defines disaster as “any event (happening with or without warning) 
causing or threatening death or injury to property or environment or disruption to 
community which because of the scale of its effects cannot be dealt with by the 
emergency service and local authorities as part of their day-to-day activities” 
(SOHD, 1998: 2). A key element of this definition is that there were insufficient 
resources to deal with the circumstances. In this context, the disaster can be seen as 
lack of capacity (Dombrowsky, 1995).  
 
In contrast to emergencies and disasters, the causes and consequences of crises are 
unknown and therefore more difficult to manage (Boin, 2010). Moreover, the plethora 
of events that are routinely labelled crisis makes research into them problematic. 
Richardson (1994) highlights that there remains confusion and overlap on the issue of 
crisis types and that the very ‘messy’ and interactively complex nature of the world is 
a major problem in dealing with potential crises. Crises are becoming more complex 
in nature and increasingly interconnected and cross boundary (Boin & Lagadec, 
2000).  For organisations trying to identify and manage such risks, the complexities 
and interdependencies become evermore challenging. But there is no agreed 
definition of crises. McMullan (1997) examined various meanings of crisis from 1972 
onwards and concluded that a universally accepted definition of crisis had not been 
developed. This has been described as “problematic at best” (Runyon, 2006: 13). 
However, for a situation to be considered a crisis three elements must be present: a 
triggering event, which causes significant change or has the potential to cause 
significant change; the perceived inability to cope with this change; and a threat to the 
existence of the foundation of the organisation (McMullan, 1997).  
 
Crisis has been described as the occurrence of impossible conditions for those seeking 
to manage response operations, and for these individuals to have to make urgent 
decisions while essential information about causes and consequences remains 
unavailable (Boin & ‘tHart 2007). LaPorte (2006: 138) terms crises as “wicked 
problems”, because of the scale and adverse nature of potential consequences together 
with their vagueness of cause and dynamic nature, which make understanding and 
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solving them challenging, especially with the media interest that such crises generate. 
Previously such ‘wicked’ problems or crises were seen as the consequence of luck or 
divine intervention, but this is no longer the case (Bovens & ‘tHart, 1996; Quarantelli, 
1998; Steinberg, 2000). There are, however, many other suggestions as to what 
constituted a crisis. For example, Heinzen (1996) describes a crisis as a series of 
events with a diffuse origin rather than a single entity. Lagadec (1993: 45) says that 
what is missing from a crisis is “a clear trace that would justify triggering the 
warning procedures”. Parsons (1996) introduces a time element when describing 
crisis as immediate, emerging or sustained. Similarly James and Wooten (2005) refer 
to sudden and smouldering crises, and comment that the former is usually perceived 
as being outwith management control, while the cause of the latter is seen as a failure 
of organisational leadership. Smith (2006a) describes crises as complex non-linear 
events that have both a sense of space and time and displays emergent properties 
which, over time, expose organisations’ cultural problems and inherent 
vulnerabilities. In other words crises over-turn organisational cultural norms and 
assumptions which had previously been taken for granted.  
 
Others consider that virtually all crises are caused by the simultaneous breakdown in 
interactions between technology, people and organisations (Pearson & Mitroff, 1993; 
Mitroff, 2004). Likewise Shrivastava, et al., (1988) describe crisis in the organisation 
as affecting multiple stakeholders through complex social, organisational and 
technological processes. In relation to organisational crisis, Pollard and Hotho (2006) 
highlight that crisis can be either a positive or negative ‘turning point’ for an 
organisation. Pearson and Clair (1998) describe crises as low probability high impact 
events that threaten an organisation’s viability. Causes and solutions are ambiguous, 
but there is a need for quick decisions.  
 
In addition to organisations, the term crisis has also been applied to broader 
communities of people, such as towns and even nations (Rosenthal, Boin & Comfort, 
2001), as well as systems (Boin & McConnell, 2007). Given this research adopts a 
systems perspective (see Chapter 2), a particularly appropriate definition of crisis is:  
 
“a serious threat to the basic structures or the fundamental values 
 and norms of a system, which under time pressure and highly  
uncertain circumstances necessitates making vital decisions”  
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(Rosenthal, Charles & ‘tHart, 1989: 10) 
 
This definition reflects the role of the SCG in relation to the large scale and serious 
potential impact of crises it deals with. The SCGs only deal with crises that are 
beyond the capabilities of a single response organisation and require extraordinary 
management structures to be temporarily established to deal with them. Crises of that 
scale generate extensive media and bring political pressures for swift resolutions, to 
ensure that government’s legitimacy and competency are not undermined as a 
consequence of the crisis. Therefore the SCGs need to be able to coordinate an inter-
agency response involving multiple organisations, as well as manage the media and 
government demands that crises of that scale generate. To be effective, such crisis 
management capability needs rapid decision making, necessitating decisions being 
made by SCGs without full information being available (Scottish Executive, 2007).   
 
The discussion here has made a distinction between emergency, disaster and crisis. It 
is argued that crises are becoming more complex, ‘messy’ and ‘wicked’, especially in 
relation to integrated systems that bring the potential for cross-boundary 
consequences separate in both time and place from the source. To deal with such 
crises effective organisational crisis management is required. 
 
1.2 Organisational Crisis Management & the Influence of Culture 
 
In their description of crisis management, Pearson and Clair (1998) recognise the 
need for organisations to have a systematic approach designed to prevent the crisis 
from occurring in the first instance, and if that is unsuccessful, enabling them to 
respond effectively. Such an approach is proposed by Mitroff and Pearson (1993) who 
argue that there are five phases to virtually every crisis: signal detection - in which 
the challenge for organisations is to accurately identify the signal indicative of crisis 
from the day-to-day noise of the organisation; preparation / prevention – recognising 
that complete prevention of all crises is impossible so organisations need to prepare to 
manage those that will occur; containment / damage limitation - where organisations 
seek to prevent an extant crisis escalating; recovery - when organisations invoke plans 
for business continuity and longer term restoration of normality; and learning - when 
organisations conduct a post crisis critical examination of those factors which went 
well and those which were less successful, in a no blame/no fault environment. The 
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results of the learning phase are then linked back to signal detection to continue the 
crisis management cycle within the organisation. The absence of such an approach 
will increase the likelihood of crises occurring in the organisation. The SCGs crisis 
management approach is detailed in Chapter 4.1. 
 
Crisis management covers activities rooted in organisational structure, culture and 
policies (Carmeli & Schaubroeck, 2008). This research adopts the concept of the 
crisis prone and crisis prepared organisation developed by Pauchant and Mitroff 
(1992). Between the crisis prone and crisis prepared organisations is a continuum 
where an organisation’s crisis orientation can be described. The crisis prone and the 
crisis prepared organisations exhibit different characteristics (Weick & Sutcliffe, 
2001). Those who manage “crisis prepared organisations are more able to confront 
the anxiety triggered by crises and to act decisively” (Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992: 5), 
while those from crisis prone organisations deflect their anxieties and the need to deal 
with crisis through defensive strategies. Crisis prepared organisations invest in both 
crisis prevention and response capability, whereas crisis prone organisations focus on 
response, not prevention (Mitroff & Alpaslan, 2003). Moreover, crisis prepared 
organisations have integrated crisis planning, flexible and adaptive structures and low 
rationalisation and denial about the likelihood of crisis impacting the organisation. 
Crisis prone organisations, on the other hand, have few, if any, plans, inflexible 
structures and high rationalisation and denial about the impact of crisis on their 
organisation (Mitroff et al., 1989). Examples of rationalisations that hinder 
organisational crisis management include ‘our size will protect us’, ‘certain crises 
only happen to others’ and ‘crisis management and crisis prevention is a luxury’ 
(Mitroff & Pearson, 1993).  
 
To determine where an organisation sits on the continuum, Pauchant and Mitroff’s 
Onion Model (1992) identifies 4 sequential layers of an organisation that can be 
peeled away. The two outer layers represent the visible elements of the organisation, 
while the two inner layers represent the invisible and unconscious aspects. The outer 
layer consists of organisational strategies, programmes and procedures to deal with 
crises; the next layer is organisational structures, which may or may not inhibit the 
organisation responding effectively in crisis; then there is the organisational culture 
layer, consisting of the organisation’s unwritten rules, codes of conduct and beliefs; 
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and the final layer is the core of the organisation,  namely the subjective experiences 
of individuals and their anxieties and defence mechanisms in relation to crises. The 
layers are not separate and distinct; rather each layer influences the others. “The 
strategies implemented in an organisation influence, and are influenced by, the 
organisation’s structure and culture and the psyche of individuals” (Pauchant & 
Mitroff, 1992: 52). To ensure successful crisis management an organisation must 
perform well through all layers (Mitroff et al., 1989). Chapter 4 applies the first three 
layers of the model: strategies; structure; and culture in the context of the SCGs. 
 
The effectiveness of an organisation’s crisis management is influenced by its culture 
(Mitroff et al., 1989), which is vital in dealing with crises because no organisation can 
plan for every eventuality (Sheffi, 2005). Schein (1985) refers to perception in culture 
as the basic assumptions through which organisational members are taught to see 
problems. Hofstede (1991) considers culture in terms of the collective programming 
of the mind; whereas, Robbins (2005) opines culture represents the common 
perception held by the organisation’s members. Pearson and Clair (1998) argue that 
executive perceptions about risk have a considerable impact on the mindset of the 
organisation and its approach to crisis management. Turner (1978) refers to cultural 
and institutional factors and the danger of vital factors being left outside the 
organisational perception as causes of disruption. Perception is also an important 
element for Toft and Reynolds (2005), who suggest that work experiences inform 
perceptions. In essence, not only does culture define the rules of the organisation but 
it also reinforces perceptions through its assumptions, understandings and implicit 
rules which govern workplace activity. Therefore, every organisation is marked by its 
own distinct internal culture, encompassing philosophy, values, beliefs and 
assumptions, social structure and artefacts, behavioural norms and expectations (Ott, 
1989). Failure to comply has an adverse effect on individuals within the organisation 
because:  
“Until newcomers learn the rules, they are not accepted as full-fledged 
members of the organisation. Transgressions of the rules on the part 
 of high-level executives or front line employees result in universal 
disapproval and powerful penalties” (Deal & Kennedy, 1983: 501) 
 
However, in the concept of crisis prone and crisis prepared organisations, an 
organisation is not seen as a separate entity from its people. Individuals and their 
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actions influence the organisation’s crisis management efforts and the organisation’s 
perspective on crises. Therefore, changing the individual’s perspective in relation to 
crisis management can lead to the change of an organisation’s position on the crisis 
prone – crisis prepared continuum. It follows that an organisation’s crisis orientation 
can be changed from that of crisis prone to that of crisis prepared. However, planning, 
spending and resourcing on mitigation will be ineffective “if the espoused resilience 
culture is only visible within the readily accessible corporate values” (Elwood, 
2009: 247). It is not enough just to have plans, procedures, policies and structures in 
place. Effective crisis management must also be embedded in the core organisational 
values, beliefs and identity, and be reflected in the defensive mechanisms of an 
organisation. It is insufficient for organisations to have achieved some but not all of 
these.  
 
A key component in establishing a crisis prepared culture within an organisation is 
leadership (Smits & Ally, 2003). An important responsibility of organisational leaders 
is to ‘institutionalise’ crisis preparedness throughout the organisation (Kelly, 2007). 
This can be achieved by overtly demonstrating executive commitment to a safety 
culture while providing sufficient resources, including trained and competent staff 
(Frederickson & LaPorte, 2002). The combination of safety culture and competent 
staff enables organisations to empower personnel to take independent action in 
relation to crisis (Perrow, 1984), which is critical when dealing with the high tempo of 
crisis demands (Frederickson & LaPorte, 2002). Mitroff (2004) argues that crisis 
leadership is proactive, attempting to indentify crises and prepare the organisation as a 
whole before a crisis occurs. In his view crisis leaders need to be proactive before, 
during and after crises; ensuring organisation readiness through vulnerability audits, 
the development of skills and capabilities to manage a crisis, which can be enacted 
during the crisis, and after the crisis reassessing crisis performance to design and 
implement new procedures.  
 
The design and implementation of new procedures following a crisis is indicative of a 
crisis prepared organisation, which should be able to learn from crises. Mitroff (1988) 
suggests that crisis management should consist not only of the design and 
implementation of key plans, procedures and mechanisms to prepare for crises; but 
having prepared, organisations should have the ability to detect and contain crises 
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when they occur; and finally make a full recovery, including learning from the 
experience. Learning from failure can also go beyond the immediate organisation or 
system that the crisis occurred in. Toft and Reynolds’s (2005) view is that failure in 
one system or organisation will have the propensity to recur in a ‘like’ system, which 
although superficially different, if it contains the same or similar components, it too 
will be susceptible to common modes of failure. Being aware of the likelihood of 
common modes of failure in similar systems (or organisations) would enable pre-
emptive remedial action to be taken to mitigate potential failure.  
 
The double loop learning process associated with such ‘isomorphic’ learning has been 
defined as “the detection and correction of error that requires change in the 
governing values” (Argyris, 1980:17). In other words it involves a fundamental shift 
or movement of mind (Senge, 1992). The first loop occurs when following a crisis 
lessons are identified by the organisation. The second loop occurs when, as a 
consequence of the lessons identified by the first loop, the organisational culture is 
fundamentally changed to take cognisance of them. In other words, as a consequence 
of the organisation identifying the lesson and then learning from it there will be a 
manifest a change of norms and operating practices, which not only change but embed 
the change in the organisation’s values, beliefs and defence mechanisms. In contrast, 
single loop learning only focuses on the technical or structural aspects of the crisis, 
excluding the social or cultural elements.  
 
It is suggested that the isomorphic approach to crises could improve organisational 
learning, leading to changes to the organisational practices and a full cultural 
readjustment (Turner, 1978). However, for an organisation to learn it must have an 
organisational culture focused on continuous improvement that will reward error 
discovery and reporting (Frederickson & LaPorte, 2002). Elliott et al, (2002) argues 
that for such an approach to be successful it requires availability of information and a 
culture that encourages norms and operational practices to be challenged. If such an 
organisational culture is absent then explicit knowledge or lessons learned from crises 
will not lead to changed behaviour. In other words learning will not take place.  
 
The view of organisational learning described (Turner, 1978; Mitroff, 1988; 
Frederickson & LaPorte, 2002; Toft & Reynolds, 2005) opines the need for 
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organisations to anticipate, prepare for and respond to crises, and thereafter adjust 
their practices to reflect the lessons learned from the crisis to ensure greater resilience 
in future. This approach reflects the UK Government’s policy of resilience, which 
incorporates not just planning, preparation, maintenance, response and recovery, but 
also prevention through learning from previous experiences (Cabinet Office, 2004). 
The inference is that failure to incorporate those components essential to effective 
crisis management will undermine an organisation’s resilience. Boin et al. (2005) 
summarise five critical tasks for effective organisational crisis management, namely 
sense making, decision making, meaning making, terminating, and learning. 
 
Sense making is the crucial process where those initial signals, which may be weak, 
ambiguous or even contradictory, are picked up, analysed and recognised as possibly 
indicative of a potential threat that requires action by the organisation. Being able to 
interpret the weak signals and to gain an understanding of what it means has been 
described as situational awareness (Endsley et al., 2003). Organisations that create an 
awareness of vulnerability by seeking out signals that may indicate unexpected 
activity are more resilient (Weick &  Sutcliffe, 2001). In such resilient organisations 
situational monitoring and reporting is a notable characteristic (Hale et al., 2006). 
Failure to heed these signals may result in the incubation of crisis (Turner, 1976) and 
drift towards failure (Woods, 2005). But successful monitoring is dependent on risk 
and business continuity management processes being well established; together with 
an ‘attitude of wisdom’ that means that although staff may not initially understand the 
situation immediately, because they have never seen it in that particular form before, 
they are aware that the situation may be improvised (Weick, 1993).  
 
In the event of a threat or crisis situation being detected, there will be a need for the 
crisis manager to instigate organisational action. An important aspect of this action 
will be to take critical decisions that ensure the effective coordination of all 
stakeholders (Frederickson & LaPorte, 2002; Grigg, 2003; Kelly, 2007).  
 
There are several models of decision making each is based on a different set of 
assumptions (Kreitner & Kinicki, 2001). For example, the Rational Model is based on 
the premise that decision makers optimise when they make decisions. Optimising 
involves solving problems by producing the best possible solution. Optimally decision 
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makers want to choose the alternative with the greatest value, in other words 
maximise the expected utility of the outcome (Huber, 1980). But values are subjective 
and people vary in their preference for safety or risk when making decisions (Melers 
et al, 1998). Moreover, evaluating alternatives assumes: that they can be judged 
according to some criteria; that valid criteria exist for each alternative to be compared 
against; and that the decision maker will actually use the criteria.  
 
Another problem with the Rational Model is the potential of information asymmetry. 
This occurs when one party to the transaction has more or better information than the 
others, the imbalance in power can distort the transaction and lead to inefficiency in 
the decision making process. An example of such decision inefficiency is moral 
hazard. That is, where one person makes the decision about how much risk to take, 
while someone else will bear the cost if the decision goes badly (for example 
Krugman, 2009). Notwithstanding these problems, ideally with the Rational Model 
decision-makers have complete knowledge of all possible alternatives and their 
consequences, together with a set of preferences for these consequences, and the 
computational ability to compare and decide which one is actually preferred 
(Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992).  
 
However, such classical decision making strategies deteriorate when confronted with 
time pressure, they simply take too long (Klein & Klinger, 1991). Moreover, Simon 
argues that decision makers do not actually follow these rational procedures in reality: 
 
“The assumptions of perfect rationality are contrary to fact.  
It is not a question of approximation; they do not even remotely  
describe the processes that human beings use for making decisions in 
 complex situations” (Simon, 1979: 510). 
 
Simon (1957; 1979) highlights that, in reality, decision makers’ experience ‘bounded 
rationality’. He describes this as those constraints that restrict decision making, such 
as personal or environmental characteristics. Examples of ‘bounded rationality’ 
include the limited capacity of the human mind, problem complexity and uncertainty, 
amount and timeliness of information at hand, criticality of the decision, and time 
demands. Consequently, Simon (1979) suggests that decision making is characterised 
by the limited information available to the decision maker, that to simplify complex 
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situations decision makers will make use of heuristics and draw on previous 
experience or training, and that rather than make optimal decisions will satisfice. That 
is, choose a solution that meets a minimum standard of acceptance; one that is ‘good 
enough’ rather than optimal. 
 
In terms of actual decision making in crisis, Klein (1993) found that incident 
commanders concentrated on assessing and classifying the situation and once they 
had done that they applied a typical response from their previous knowledge. Klein 
(1995) developed this into the Recognition Primed Decision Making Model, which 
consists of three stages. First, the decision-maker recognises the type of situation 
knows the appropriate response and implements it. Second, if the problem is more 
complex the decision maker will consider several interpretations based on a 
situational assessment before deciding. Third, in cases when the decision maker is less 
sure of the option before an action is implemented a mental evaluation will be 
undertaken to determine its viability (Klein & Crandell, 1995). Grint (2005) describes 
a similar process of moving from command, which is enforcing the answer on 
followers because the leader has the power and resources to deal with the problem, 
through management of the problem by organising the processes needed to resolve it, 
to finally displaying a more sophisticated level of leadership by asking questions of 
others. Grint (2005) argues that as leaders move along the continuum towards 
problems of increasing complexity they need to be more collaborative. In other words, 
as the certainty of the resolution decreases the need for collaboration increases. Given 
the nature of crises that the SCG is activated for, it is collaborative decision making 
that is appropriate for its activities. 
 
Another critical decision for the crisis manager will be when to move from crisis 
mode back to routine operating. Terminating the crisis is closely tied to the 
organisation being able to provide an acceptable and credible account of the crisis 
(Boin et al. 2005). However, multiple perspectives in crisis make it difficult to 
construct common ‘event narratives’ (Vaughan, 1996). Moreover, because causal 
factors of the crisis may be more obvious post-crisis key actors may seek to protect 
themselves and generate disinformation as the process of scapegoating begins (Smith, 
1990). 
 
 
32 
 
 
The final strategic task in crisis management is identifying lessons to be learned at 
both the political and organisational level. Cho (1996) identifies how organisations 
use information to make sense of their operating environment and generate 
organisational learning. Elements that contribute to an organisation’s learning ability 
include a recognition of an interconnectedness (systems view), the ability to change 
how the world is viewed (generative learning) and the ability to adapt to changed 
environments (adaptive learning) (Murray, 2002; Schein, 1996; Senge, 1990).  
 
Organisations that do not recognise and adapt to threats by changing their procedures 
and policies experience ‘failure of hindsight’ (Toft, 1992). To avoid these failures, 
organisations should learn from their own crisis and the experience of others. Such 
learning should shape the precautionary norms the organisation has in place and help 
generate organisational resilience (Smith & Elliott, 2007). In other words the 
organisation will not just change its processes and procedures at the superficial level 
of the organisation, reflecting single loop learning. The organisation should 
experience second loop learning. That is embed the lessons identified during the crisis 
by ensuring that, at both the individual and organisational level, beliefs, values and 
defence mechanisms are changed to reflect the new understanding of the potential 
threats now faced and the necessary response capability. These fundamental changes 
to organisational culture demonstrate that the organisation has actually learned from 
the lessons identified. 
 
However, learning lessons is one of the most underdeveloped aspects of crisis 
management (Lagadec, 1997; Stern, 1997) and the challenge is to feedback into pre-
existing policy networks and public organisations (Boin et al., 2007). In reality many 
organisations do not actually address issues identified as critical during the crisis or 
post-crisis phase or only deal with the most superficial aspects of technical and 
procedural matters (Elliott & Smith, 2006a; Birkland, 2009). Instead, organisations 
produce post-crisis debrief reports which purport to identify lessons learned but which 
in reality are more symbolic (Clarke, 1999). For example, Mitroff (2005) found that 
despite the impact of 9/11 organisations failed to take lessons from the event. 
Furthermore, there has been no change in organisational attitudes in relation to the 
need for crisis management as part of their daily business.  
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The challenge for effective crisis management is to ensure that any barriers to 
learning are overcome. Smith (2006b) identifies 3 levels of barriers to early 
recognition of crisis potential within an organisation. The first level relates to 
individual issues, such as perceptions, assumptions, core beliefs and processes that 
shape behaviour and inhibit individual’s ability to ‘make sense’ of the situation. The 
second focuses on the cultural or group aspects of organisations which create cultural 
norms and behaviours, such as group dynamics, management style and operating 
environment. The third exists at the systems level and includes a range of structural 
and environmental pressures and constraints which the management and organisation 
operate within.  
 
In their review of organisational learning and crisis Smith and Elliott (2007) collate a 
number of other barriers to learning that have been identified by a number of authors 
(including Pauchant & Mitroff, 1988, 1992; Turner, 1976, 1978; Smart & Vertinsky, 
1977; Smith, 1990; Toft & Reynolds, 1992, Senge, 1990; Argyris, 1999; Weick, 
1988, 1993, 1995 who are referred to elsewhere in this research). The barriers to 
learning are: 
 
 Rigidity of core beliefs, values and assumptions 
 Ineffective communication and information difficulties 
 Denial, centrality of expertise and the disregard of outsiders 
 Peripheral inquiry and decoy phenomenon 
 Cognitive narrowing and fixation (reductionist) 
 Maladaption, threat minimisation and environmental shifts 
 Lack of corporate responsibility 
 Focus on single loop learning 
 
Smith and Elliott (2007) suggest that many of the barriers to learning are associated 
with rigid core beliefs, which may result in erroneous assumptions leading the crisis 
being attributed to another cause in error; in other words a decoy. Or ineffective 
communications such as incomplete data capture, jargon or impenetrable language 
used by experts to exclude others. Other barriers to learning include the consequence 
of organisational culture which shape how managers view threats and respond to 
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them; an aspect of which could be the rejection or minimisation of the likelihood of a 
crisis impacting on that particular organisation, and the minimum compliance to 
safety regulations. Finally, organisations that do not change their core assumptions, 
beliefs and defence mechanisms to reflect the lessons from crises will not experience 
double loop learning. They will remain crisis prone because they only consider the 
superficial aspects of the organisation such as the plans or procedures, rather than 
experience any cultural readjustment.    
  
One explanation for individuals and organisations failing to comply with 
organisational rules and regulations, which could ensure effective crisis management, 
is proposed by Gouldner (1954). Gouldner found that despite organisational rules 
enforcing regulations, many were not complied with because staff did not consider 
them legitimate as they were imposed from ‘outside’ rather than being initiated within 
the organisation (Jermier et al., 1991; Hynes & Prasad, 1997; Elliott & Smith, 2006b). 
Therefore the rules were not valued and non-compliance actually enhanced the status 
of staff who did not comply. Moreover, there were few consequences for failing to 
comply. He termed this ‘mock bureaucracy’. Gouldner’s findings highlight the 
importance of organisational culture in achieving and maintaining compliance 
through shared values embedded at an individual and organisational level. Such a 
culture is essential in overcoming barriers to learning.   
 
It is argued here that a key element of crisis management is learning from experience 
and therefore organisations should ensure that a critical review is undertaken post-
crisis. For an organisation to be truly crisis prepared such crisis management activity 
needs to reach beyond the superficial aspects of the organisation through to its core 
identity and defence mechanisms. This requires an organisational culture which 
values crisis management activities, together with leadership which proactively 
promotes them throughout the organisation, ensuring the appropriate arrangements 
and resources are in place before a crisis occurs. Moreover, that the organisational 
leadership is ready to lead an organisation through crisis and ensure that the 
organisation as a whole learns from the experience. However, there are organisational, 
structural and political challenges to ensuring that organisations are able to learn 
lessons, which may reduce resilience.  
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1.3 What Does ‘Resilience’ Mean In The Context Of Crisis Management? 
 
The term resilience has many meanings in academic discourse (de Bruijne et al., 
2010). It has been described as a theoretical concept, a metaphor, a result of 
interactions between people and the environment, a property of a dynamic system  
(Carpenter et al., 2001), a measurable social and cultural construct (Mallak, 1998) and 
a paradigm (Paton  & Johnston, 2001). Furthermore, the first use of the term 
resilience is contested but it can be attributed to ecology, physics or psychology 
(Manyena, 2006).  
 
Ecologists identified resilience as a way to cope with the dynamics, surprise and 
complexity in the biological environment (de Bruijne et al., 2010). For example 
Holling (1973) described resilience as a measure of persistence by which systems 
were able to absorb changes to the environment while maintaining existing 
relationships or structure. In physics and engineering, resilience refers to the ability of 
an entity to rebound to original shape after deformation that does not exceed its elastic 
limit (Sheffi, 2005). Therefore, resilience may be seen as a measure of a system’s 
stability or “the ability of a system to return to an equilibrium state after a 
temporary disturbance” (Holling, 1973: 17). In psychology resilience is seen as a 
personal trait enabling individuals to adapt and overcome adversity (Coutu, 2002).  
 
Traditionally in civil emergencies resilience is viewed as the qualities that enable the 
individual, community or organisation to cope with, adapt to and recover from a 
disaster event (Buckle et al, 2000). Resilience has also been described as an 
organisational characteristic displayed in response to change or pressure, and a tool in 
crisis management (Hills, 2000). Likewise, Walker and Broderick (2006) describe 
resilience as the ability of a system or organisation to recover easily and quickly from 
adversity. The view of resilience as the ability “to cope with unexpected dangers 
after they have become manifest, learning to bounce back” (Wildawsky, 1988: 77) 
infers that resilience simply means the system will return to the original shape and 
function after the disturbance. Thus, what is considered resilient in civil emergencies 
reflects a limited reactive view of resilience, as coping and recovering are both 
reactive activities.  
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Defining resilience in such terms as coping or recovering a stable state after a major 
mishap or event stresses the reactive nature of resilience (Hollnagel, 2006). Moreover, 
focusing on the ability to recover after an upset suggests that resilience can only be 
demonstrated after a crisis (Somers, 2009). In addition, highlighting the reactive or 
‘bounce back’ capability exposes tensions in at least three dimensions (Boin & van 
Eeten, 2007), namely the moment of resilience, the severity of the disturbance, and 
the state of return.  
 
In reviewing each of these dimensions in turn, Boin et al., (2010) point out that in 
relation to the moment of resilience, in disaster studies resilience is situated after the 
event with the focus on preventing structural demise, whereas in organisational 
studies resilience is in place before the event and enables the organisation to adapt and 
survive. Thus the spectrum of resilience is a continuum from speedy recovery and 
timely adaptation (Westrum, 2006). With regards to the severity of the event, Boin et 
al., (2010) indicate that the focus of resilience could apply only to rare events which 
can be identified as being beyond the design of the system, or more broadly to routine 
and foreseeable disturbances. Finally, in considering whether resilience should mean 
the state of return, Boin et al., (2010) highlight that this could mean simply bringing 
the organisation back to its pre-disruption state (which is impossible as recovery takes 
an organisation to a new state), or only for the organisation to function again or even a 
new improved state. They opine that the desired state of return is actually dependent 
on the organisation’s view of resilience and the severity of the event. Taking the 
centre ground of each dimension discussed above Boin et al., (2010) define resilience 
as: 
 “the capacity of a social system (e.g., an organisation, city or 
  society) to proactively adapt and recover from disturbances 
 that are perceived within the system to fall outside the range  
 of normal and expected disturbances” (Boin et al., 2010: 9)  
 
Others, such as Leveson et al. (2006), also take a wider view of resilience and include 
prevention, which is incorporated in the system’s capability to proactively adapt to 
disturbances. In their view a resilient system or organisation must try to avoid failures 
from occurring but be able to respond appropriately if they do. They describe 
resilience as:  the ability of systems to prevent or adapt to changing conditions in 
order to maintain (control over) a system property” (Leveson et al., 2006: 95), in 
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which the property is safety or risk within the organisational system. The resilience 
definitions which include a proactive element and adaptive capability reflect the UK 
Government’s concept of resilience. It is envisaged that the UK policy on resilience 
will be achieved through prevention, planning, preparation, maintenance, response 
and recovery from crises (Cabinet Office, 2004). Therefore, for the purpose of this 
research, Boin et al’s (2010) definition will be adopted.  
 
In summary the concept of resilience has quite different meanings across many 
disciplines which makes research challenging. The two key aspects in relation to 
resilience are whether it is about simply responding to a change in the environment 
when it actually happens with the aim of ‘bouncing back’ to the pre-disruption state, 
or whether resilience means being pro-actively alert to potential disturbances and 
either preventing them from occurring or adapting to them before they occur. It is 
argued that traditionally civil emergencies tended to adopt a reactive stance. But now 
it is the intention of the UK Government’s resilience policy to develop both proactive 
and adaptive capability to enable effective crisis response. Having broadly described 
the concept of resilience the following section will consider resilience in the context 
of the organisation. 
 
1.4 What is Organisational Resilience? 
Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, and the Madrid and London 
bombings, organisational resilience has been given greater prominence which has  
increased its use within emergency planning and management (Drennan & 
McConnell, 2007; Coles & Buckle, 2004). Nevertheless research has found that the 
majority of organisations, even those that were directly affected by 9/11, were still 
unprepared for crisis (Hurley-Hanson, 2006). In the UK there were similar findings. 
For example, Buckle et al., (2006) suggested further research into SCG capability to 
consider how they could be enhanced. Furthermore, a lesson from the terrorist events 
in London on 7
th
 July 2005 was the need for common training for those in strategic 
roles (London Resilience, 2006). Currently, while organisational resilience has been 
identified as an important challenge for future crisis research (Smith 2006), the study 
of organisational resilience is fragmented (Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003).  
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But what is organisational resilience and how would we know whether it was there or 
not? To ensure resilience, Mitroff (2001) suggests organisations focus primarily on 
the response to, and management of, man made events or situations that are caused 
by, or affect organisations; in other words ‘crises’. Organisational resilience has been 
described as a continuously moving target which contributes to performance during 
routine business-as-usual and crisis situations (Mitroff, 2005) and requires 
organisations to be adaptive and highly reliable (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007), which 
enables them to be capable of managing disruption (Durodie, 2003). To achieve such 
resilience capability, organisations must anticipate and mitigate threats to their 
existence and primary goals (Hale & Heijer 2006; McDonald, 2006). Therefore, 
resilient organisations are those that quickly capture and adapt to environmental 
information by changing their behaviours and structures, and are able to disseminate 
the changes to others and mobilise networks of expertise and support (LaPorte, 2006).  
 
Gibson & Tarrant (2010: 7) argue that “resilience is an outcome and not a process, 
management system, strategy or predictive measurement”. They see organisational 
resilience as an outcome influenced by a dynamic complex combination of 
environmental factors. One factor affecting the outcome is the organisation’s risk 
culture, which may range from being reactive to adaptive to potential threats. 
Therefore, good risk management, which includes assessment, treatment, monitoring 
and communication of risks, is the essential foundation needed to ensure 
organisational resilience (Gibson & Tarrant, 2010). Likewise, Comfort et al., (2010) 
describe resilience as an outcome of an institutionalised approach. In their view 
resilience is “a balancing act between risk and resources, between vulnerabilities 
and escalating or unmanageable catastrophe” (Comfort et al., 2010: 273), which 
organisations can achieve through anticipating and preparing for crisis and their 
consequences through knowledge, social collaboration and innovation. 
 
Having determined that organisational resilience is an outcome of many 
environmental factors, key to which is risk management, a challenge for organisations 
is to establish whether they are resilient or not. One suggested measure of resilience is 
the ability of organisations to create foresight, in other words, that organisations are 
able to anticipate and adapt to the changing shape of risk, before failure and harm 
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occurs (Woods, 2005). A four-phase model is suggested as analytically useful 
(Comfort, 1988; Rosenthal, Charles & t’Hart, 1989; Boin et al., 2010):  
 
 Mitigation/Prevention – this phase incorporates the systematic assessment of 
risks and implementation of preventative measures; and recognises there is 
tension between these components as not all crises can be foreseen and 
prevented  
 Preparation – this phase examines the policies, structures and resources 
essential to deal with unforeseen crises  
 Response/Consequence Management – this phase recognises that coordination 
and communication in the response network is essential to cope with and 
prevent crisis escalation 
 Recovery/Aftermath Politics – the final phase explores the return to normal 
and the beginning of the learning process. There is a deeply political aspect to 
this phase 
 
These phases reflect the components of Integrated Emergency Management: 
Assessment; Prevention; Preparation; Response; and Recovery (Scottish Executive 
2007), and the five phases of effective crisis management (Mitroff & Pearson, 1993) 
discussed previously. It is argued that organisational resilience is an outcome of 
multiple environmental factors, including effective risk management, collaboration 
and innovation, which to be effective requires an organisation to be able to adapt to its 
environment.    
 
1.5 Organisational Resilience & Adaptability  
  
An organisation’s ability to adapt is at the heart of its ability to display resilient 
characteristics and therefore ensure effective crisis management. The adaptive 
capability of an organisation or system can be described as:  
 
“…the  ability  of  the  system  to  respond  to  changes  in  its   
external environment, and to recover from damage to internal  
structures within the system that affect its ability to achieve its  
purpose” (Dalziell & McManus, 2004:6)  
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However, adaptive capability is not a static feature of any system; the components 
change over time (Folke et al., 2002; deVries, 1985). Kauffman (1993) observed that 
some biological systems maintained sufficient order for information exchange and 
storage, while having flexibility of structures and procedures to quickly adapt to 
environmental changes. Building on this, Comfort (2002b) suggests four conditions 
for effective adaptive response:  
 
 Articulation of commonly understood meanings or understanding of the threat 
between a system and its members 
 Sufficient trust among leaders, organisations, and citizens to overcome 
uncertainty and enable members to accept directions 
 Sufficient resonance or support of the community between the emerging 
system and its environment to gain support for action, and 
 Sufficient resources to sustain collective action under varying conditions 
 
These attributes are similar to those which are necessary for effective collaborative 
policy network management, which include reciprocity, representation, equality and 
participation of those with different skills and experiences (deLeon & Varda, 2009; 
Moynihan, 2005). In other words, effective adaptive response and collaborative policy 
networks are dependent on: shared situational awareness among all participants; 
relationships built on trust and a belief by stakeholders that their activities are for the 
greater good of the agreed outcome; recognition and support that flexibility is 
essential to deal with emerging issues which may have been unforeseen; and 
sufficiently trained resources for all tasks they are expected to carryout under both 
routine and crisis states. Thus, sharing information, willingness to collaborate, and 
shared values are important factors for networks (Kapucu, 2006) and the key to 
successful adaptation is a move towards network organisation that uses many inter 
and intra-organisational links (Barabasi, 2003).  
 
The network attributes detailed above are essential to achieving an effective adaptive 
response. Not only is it important to have shared vision within the organisation to 
ensure an effective crisis response (Weick, 1993; Horne & Orr, 1998) but 
commitment and productivity during a crisis will be dependent on relationships 
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(Gittell et al., 2006). Consequently, in complex organisations, such as the SCG, there 
is a need to have a common and shared view, which Schien (1996) described as 
culture, to ensure that the organisation’s ability to adapt is not adversely affected by a 
change in personnel:  
 
“…[an] organisation’s capacity to maintain itself and grow, to  
continue to act effectively in the face of changing circumstances,  
depends upon the creation of a set of shared assumptions that …  
survive in spite of changes in individual membership of  
subsystems, i.e. the culture” (Schein, 1996: 4)  
 
Organisations that do not have a shared holistic view could be said to have a silo or 
stovepipe mentality. At an inter-organisation level, silo or stovepipe mentality exists 
where organisations focus internally and exclude any building of external 
relationships (Fenwick et al. 2009); whereas, at an intra-organisation level, silo 
working may result in departmental or personal self-interest taking precedence over 
the wider organisational goals (Wisner, et al., 2004; Stone, 2004). In this research the 
SCG is considered as a single entity and therefore its holistic view should be shared 
by all members, even though they are drawn from different organisations. The 
absence of a shared holistic view in organisations has been described in cultural terms 
as the opposite of a communication culture (Powers, 2004). The consequence of 
having no shared holistic view in an organisation like the SCG is a lack of effective 
communication, which is a common cause of failure in crises (Smith, 1990). During 
crises, when communications are inadequate, personnel and resources are inefficiently 
used and activities duplicated (Adams, 1969). Therefore, existence of a silo mentality 
in the SCG is likely to be a significant barrier to preparedness (Guelke, 2005).  
 
In contrast, Weick (1993) highlighted that to achieve resilience there needs to be 
‘respectful interaction’ between those involved in the organisation. Such partnerships, 
based on honesty, trust and self-respect, would enhance the conditions for adaptation 
and innovation. Mulford (1984) suggests that individuals act as ‘boundary spanners’, 
linking the various organisations within the network by encouraging and promoting 
participation and the recognition of mutual benefits, which can result in effective 
outcomes. Granot, (1999) states that effective boundary spanners need to be 
systematic and involve the active participation of policy making personnel. Without 
such partnerships and understanding, there is potential tension because of the 
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emergent demands of crisis and the bureaucratic procedures of the typical emergency 
response agencies (Schneider, 1992). Such events usually require inter-organisational 
cooperation in order to meet the unusual demands of crisis response, which are 
frequently marked by competition and rivalry over available resources (Sanders, 
1966; Warren, 1963). While such disputes can often be left unresolved in normal 
times, in crisis the conflicts may prevent coordination (Quarantelli, 1982: Mulford, 
1984). Comfort (1990) opines that, conflict among organisations seeking to respond 
to the sudden, extraordinary demands in crisis is a recurring and well-recognised 
problem. In some cases the cause of the problem is that organisations lack the skill 
and experience in collaborating (Granot, 1999).  
 
Here it is argued that network attributes, such as effective communication and 
interactions are essential in achieving an effective adaptive response. However, 
adaptive capability does not remain static rather it is a dynamic concept, the 
components of which change over time. Essential elements include shared situational 
awareness and relationships built on trust, agreed outcomes achieved through flexible 
approaches by trained staff. Furthermore, resilience can be enhanced through training 
and exercising people appropriately. 
 
1.6 Improving Resilience through Training & Exercising  
 
Effective training and exercising can improve an organisation’s adaptive capability 
and ensure that people are sufficiently innovative to deal with unforeseeable and 
unexpected elements of crisis. However, to be effective training and exercising 
requires motivated individuals and organisations that value the experience and 
appreciate how essential training is to learning and improving overall capability.  
 
As previously discussed, a key element of collaborative networks and adaptive 
capability is having sufficient trained resources. Crises are characterised by disruption 
and uncertainty affecting the availability of existing organisational resources (Boin & 
Lagadec, 2000; Pearson & Clair, 1998; Mallak, 1998). Stress, surprise, restricted 
amount of time for response, and threats to high-priority goals characterize a crisis 
situation (Hermann, 1972), which adversely impact on the effectiveness of 
performance. To alleviate this crisis teams should use scenario building and exercises 
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(Smart & Vertinsky, 1977). Resilience can, therefore, be enhanced through adequate 
resources appropriately trained in the various roles they may be called to perform. 
According to Weick (1993), if everyone knows the roles and responsibilities of all in 
the partnership, resilience will be enhanced because even in the event of a crisis the 
role system remains intact in the individual mind. He referred to this as a ‘virtual role 
system’ (Weick, 1993).  
 
Dynes (1986) suggests that crises provide the best opportunity to examine the 
functioning of roles. Likewise Smith (2005) comments on the importance of crises in 
assessing team performance; but highlights that such teams must have experience of 
working together and trained in advance to be effective in containing a crisis. As an 
example of how training and exercising in a role can lead to improved performance, 
Ginnett (1990) studied aircraft crew and found that three strangers assigned to fly 
together for the first time quickly became a high performing group. This is because 
the strong organisational context and previous training surrounding their tasks 
provided the rules, task definitions, information and resources needed for the group to 
perform. Consequently they did not need to develop plans, assign roles, determine and 
allocate resources, resolve conflicts, and set norms as would be expected with a newly 
formed group. Conversely failure to have clearly defined and understood roles and 
responsibilities may result in errors and redundant effort (Crichton, et al., 2005; 
Cotton, 1993).  
 
In organisations like the SCG, it is expected that all parties understand their respective 
roles in the combined response and the ‘fit’ between their organisation and the co-
ordinating management structure. This approach is to ensure the flexibility to deal 
with disparate crises and is achieved through a regular programme of training and 
exercises (Scottish Executive 2007). The most common means of training UK 
emergency services is through simulation and role play exercises (Borodzicz, 2005). 
Such exercises help individuals develop personal skills specific to certain types of 
incidents (McDonald et al., 1992). They have also been recognised as a means for 
multi-agencies to practice together and provide “the opportunity for the development 
of liaison arrangements in a less stressful situation” (LESLP, 1992: 37).  
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However, unlike Ginnet’s (1990) research which involved resources undertaking 
specific tasks in a known environment there are challenges in developing training for 
crisis responders because crises: 
 
 “...are complex events taking place within complicated environments  
and resulting in diverse responses. To present those conditions  
adequately extensive preparation has to be undertaken to provide a  
training situation in which learning, understanding and added 
competence can result” (Rolfe, 1998: 14-15) 
 
The challenge in providing inter-organisational training programmes is that the skills 
required for emergency and crisis response are both distinct and different (Rosenthal, 
1996). Smith (2005) notes that teams that can cope with an organisation in routine or 
‘steady’ state may not be best placed to deal with it in a crisis. In addition, the ways in 
which organisations perceive and deal with their risks will differ (Borodzicz, 2005). 
Crisis requires a level of flexibility in management and decision-making skills distinct 
from problems associated with ordinary events, so in relation to training ‘clarity of 
goals’ is essential (Turner, 1994a; 1996). Furthermore, because of the unique nature 
of crises, innovation and creativity are critical skills for crisis response (Kendra & 
Wachtendorf, 2003; Hamel & Välikangas, 2003). Weick (1993) opines that 
improvisation and bricolage are important elements of resilience. He suggests that 
bricoleurs are able to remain creative under pressure because they routinely act in 
chaotic conditions. Therefore, they are able to improvise and create solutions with 
available resources. Those that are successful have a high adaptive capability and are 
able to cope with change and respond to it quickly and effectively (Denevan, 1983). 
Such adaptive learning centres on the ability of an organisation to change 
simultaneously and align itself with its environment (Daft & Weick, 1984; Murray, 
2002). 
 
As discussed earlier, a major influence on training crisis management teams and their 
effectiveness in dealing with crises is organisational culture (Turner, 1978; Mitroff, 
1988; Frederickson & LaPorte, 2002; Toft & Reynolds, 2005). In addition, effective 
training must have clear goals, be relevant, reflect current practice (Roffe, 1997; Storr 
& Hurst, 2001; Fox, 2002), and incorporate critical self-reflection (Farrugia, 1996). 
Not only will organisational culture and the environment have a strong influence 
(Fredrickson & Monsen, 1999), so will the individual’s confidence and motivation 
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(Blair, 2003; Seifert, 2004). More important, though, is ensuring participants are 
actively involved in the learning process. This allows them to build on their 
experience and discover the usefulness of the skills themselves (Hickie & Sawkins, 
1996; Hughey & Mussnug, 1997). To enable this it is argued that effective crisis 
training should be modelled on ill-structured and complex events, so participants 
experience tension, uncertainty, time pressure, a sense of inadequate information and 
the frustration they would in a genuine crisis (Turner, 1978; Gredler, 1992).  
 
However, it is important to recognise that simulations are not self-teaching (Gillespie, 
1973; Petranek, 2000). In addition to realistic crisis simulations, critical feedback is 
essential to improve training (Black & William, 2002; Schunk, 1990). According to 
Flin (1996) feedback is important for increasing self-awareness and improving 
leadership capability. Thus procedures should be developed to include feedback from 
trainees, which reflect quality, effectiveness and performance in relation to learning 
outcomes (Glasner, 1997). The feedback mechanism is normally a two-way process 
involving trainers and trainees enabling individuals to increase their own knowledge 
as well as contribute to the organisation’s (Shaw & Green, 1999). It is usually 
achieved via formal debriefs. Debriefing is a means of gaining formalised feedback 
from individuals and organisations in relation to the tasks undertaken and the 
achievement or otherwise of the learning objectives of the simulation or exercise. The 
debrief links the exercise realities with real world practicalities: 
 
 “Debriefing allows parallels to be drawn between simulations  
 realities and ‘real’ realities; it allows realities to be examined 
 in a new, more ‘realistic’ light. Participants are then able 
 to export the learning and insights gained from their experience 
 in the simulation exercise to their other ‘real’ (non-simulation) 
 world” (Crookall & Saunders, 1989: 18) 
 
There are two reasons for provision of critical feedback through debriefing. First, it 
allows individuals to learn from their mistakes and extend their range of experience. 
Second, it results in procedures being improved (Horner, 1976). Nevertheless it 
should be recognised that debriefs can also have an adverse effect at both an 
individual and organisational level. For example, participants who perceive personal 
criticism may blame the unrealistic nature of the exercise (Borodzicz, 2005). At an 
organisational level, difficulties with holding and acting upon debriefs may be 
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indicative of a deeper organisational problem indicating that the organisation may be 
more crisis prone rather than crisis prepared (Lagadec, 1995). Despite these issues and 
Quarantelli’s (1996) warning that past disaster, crisis and emergency trends cannot be 
extrapolated to predict the future, it is argued that mistakes from the past can be 
incorporated into new organisational arrangements to deal with crises: 
 
“What is needed is the proclivity to analyse the performance 
 of the organisation in reacting and responding to the events 
that it tackles, and an inbuilt self-critical learning process  
whereby mistakes in the past are used constructively to inform 
future policy shifts and operational arrangements”  
(Penning-Rowsell, 1996:135)  
 
 
1.7 Chapter Conclusion 
 
In this chapter it was argued that there is no universally accepted definition of what 
actually constitutes a crisis; although three elements are generally present: an 
overwhelming, triggering event, which threatens the very existence of organisation. 
Effective crisis management requires a systematic process, a key element of which is 
learning from experience and therefore organisations should ensure that a critical 
review is undertaken post-crisis. Moreover, for an organisation to be truly crisis 
prepared such crisis management activity needs to reach beyond the superficial 
aspects of the organisation through to its core identity and defence mechanisms. 
 
In relation to the concept of resilience, it was found that it has quite different 
meanings across many disciplines which makes research challenging. An important 
aspect in relation to resilience is whether an organisation is reactive or proactive. 
Currently, organisational resilience research indicates that organisations need to be 
highly receptive to changes in the environment to mitigate threats. It was also argued 
that organisational resilience is an outcome of multiple environmental factors, 
including effective risk management, collaboration and innovation, and that adaptive 
capability is a key characteristic of organisational resilience. Other essential elements 
include shared situational awareness and relationships built on trust. Finally, effective 
training and exercising can improve an organisation’s adaptive capability and ensure 
that resources are sufficiently innovative and creative to deal with unforeseeable and 
unexpected elements of crisis. 
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In the next chapter organisational resilience is considered using a systems approach. 
This approach enables threats to be identified and pre-emptive action taken to mitigate 
them before they impact on the organisation. 
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Chapter 2 - Organisational Resilience and the Effect of Systemic Crises 
This chapter introduces a systems approach to crises generation within organisations. 
It describes organisational resilience as an emerging systemic property, which results 
from a complex interaction of social, technical and managerial aspects of the 
organisation. Common threats to resilience include organisational cultures which 
diminish the potential risks faced by the organisation, rather than accepting that 
failure is the likely outcome of complex tightly coupled systems. Furthermore the 
underlying similarities of crises are explored and identified as opportunities for 
organisations to learn and take pre-emptive action to mitigate threats to the 
organisation. Gouldner’s (1954) concept of Mock Bureaucracy is linked to the 
systems approaches. It is highlighted that the development of mock bureaucracies can 
precipitate crises. The feasibility of a number of preventative strategies is then 
considered, together with the potential for High Reliability Organisations; a contrary 
view to those suggesting crises is ‘normal’ in complex systems. Tasks considered 
essential for effective crisis management in resilient organisations are outlined.  
It is argued that unless a systems or holistic view of the organisational crisis is taken 
there is a danger that opportunities to learn from crisis will be missed. Moreover, the 
use of systems models illustrates that in many cases the strategic decisions and design 
of an organisation can provide the potential environment for the occurrence of crisis. 
Adopting a systems approach provides an opportunity for organisations to gain a 
greater understanding of crisis and, through learning from previous crises, enables 
organisations to take pre-emptive action to minimise the likelihood of future crisis.  
The chapter concludes by introducing the two systems models that will be used to 
analyse the SCGs, namely the Formal Systems Model and the Viable Systems Model. 
2.1 The Potential for Organisations to Incubate Crises and Learn From them  
Crisis management and organisational resilience are dominated by systems thinking 
and a general systems approach (Stead & Smallman, 1999). It has been argued that in 
adopting a crisis management approach, “an organisation accepts that failure is a 
basic property of systems and the failure is an outcome of the complex interaction 
between system elements” (Swartz et al., 1995: 17). A general systems approach has 
been suggested as appropriate to assess and measure organisational resilience 
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(Dalziell & McManus, 2004; Horne, 1997; Starr et al., 2003). In relation to systems 
theory, organisational resilience has been described as an emerging property of 
complex systems (Paries, 2006) that enables an organisation to survive crises (Seville 
et al., 2008). The central concept of systems thinking is to view the properties of the 
whole system rather than the properties of its component parts (Checkland, 1993). In 
other words, “a system has holistic properties not manifested by any of its parts and 
their interaction” (Skyttner, 2001: 92). For example a car has the property of speed, 
but only when assembled as a system; none of its components have speed on their 
own (Hoverstadt, 2008). Likewise system safety can be characterised as an emergent 
property. Safety is something that cannot be predicted on the basis of the components 
that make up the system (Dekker, 2011). Senge (2006) advocated the systems 
approach as one where it was possible to see the ‘big picture’. A systems approach, 
therefore, provides a useful technique to analyse the structure and processes of 
complex organisations in dynamic environments (Foster et al, 2001).  
 
In his book Systems Thinking, Systems Practice (1993) Checkland highlights how 
systems can be applied to ill-structured problems. In dealing with real world problems 
within organised complexity, application of systems concepts help to develop tools 
for thought and the generation of insight (Fortune & Peters, 1995). Moreover, the 
systems approach has been applied to crises, which can be considered as both social 
and technical failures within organisational systems (Turner, 1976; 1978; Horlick-
Jones, 1990).  
 
Dynes and Quarantelli (1968) were among the first to focus on organisational 
responses, as opposed to individual reactions to disaster, but it was Turner (1976; 
1978) who made the first theoretical analysis of organisational vulnerability to crisis 
emphasising the role of organisational norms and values. According to Turner (1978) 
disasters
6
 were man-made systems failures with long term incubation periods where 
risks were created in layers across technical, managerial and social contexts. In other 
words these were organisational crises. He refuted the notion that such crises were 
unique and caused by singular chains of events. Moreover, Turner (1978) opined that 
failures provided an opportunity for organisational learning.  He stated that: 
                                                 
6
 Man-made disasters described by Turner are referred to as crisis in this research 
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“It is gradually becoming clear that many disasters and large-scale  
accidents display similar features and characteristics, so that the 
 possibility of gaining a greater understanding of these disturbing  
events is presented to us” (Turner, 1978: 1) 
 
In this sense, failure represents a disruption in how people believe their system 
operates; a breakdown of their own norms about risk and how to manage it. That is 
the collapse of precautions which had previously been culturally acceptable as 
adequate (Turner, 1978). Their belief that the systems precautions were adequate to 
manage the threats it faces enables unseen vulnerabilities to develop. This is how a 
successful system produces failure as normal; the imperfect organisational-cognitive 
processes which conceal growing organisational risks that incubate crises. The crisis 
is a form of organisational failure. The system vulnerability arises from unintended 
and complex interactions between seemingly normal organisational, managerial and 
administrative features (Turner & Pidgeon, 2000). 
 
Turner (1978:85) developed a six-stage model that included an incubation phase, 
during which inherent small failures in the system would not be recognised as 
warnings for subsequent catastrophe. These would accumulate and eventually be 
triggered by an incident within the system resulting in the disastrous event. The 
incubation phase, in other words the circumstances that had preceded the actual event, 
was a key element of Turner’s systems approach. Previously, analysis focused on the 
immediate incident and its aftermath, treating each as a unique event that did not 
consider the interaction between the social and technical aspects. Consequently crises 
were described either as solely the result of a technical defect or human error. In 
contrast Turner examined large scale crises to identify organisational patterns which 
preceded them in an effort to gain greater understanding of them. His view was that 
this foresight or prediction of failure would enable organisations to take pre-emptive 
actions to avoid similar failures in future.  Organisations that did not do so would 
suffer from a ‘failure of foresight’.  
 
However, it should be acknowledged that the variety of perturbations and other 
emergent properties from complex organisations is extensive and difficult to predict.  
Moreover, in hindsight it may be possible to identify potential warnings that pre-event 
were not taken seriously or were not understood because they were ‘weak signals’. 
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Reasons for failing to recognise such weak signals include organisational hierarchy 
leading to distrust of the source of the warning and difficulty in separating out the 
important information-providing event from the mass of irrelevant material and 
surrounding ‘noise’ (Turner, 1978).  
 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Turner (1978) suggested that following an inquiry 
into organisational failure organisations would experience a full cultural readjustment, 
which would lead to a change of beliefs, norms and precautions, to ensure that they 
were aligned with the organisation’s revised understanding of the world. In doing so, 
Turner (1976) identified that organisational culture and faulty assumptions were 
significant preconditions for crisis generation: 
 
“Common causal features are rigidities in institutional beliefs, 
 distracting decoy phenomena, neglect of outside complaints, 
 multiple information handling difficulties, exacerbation of the  
hazards by strangers, failure to comply with regulations and a  
tendency to minimise emergent danger”  (Turner, 1976: 378) 
 
A precondition to some organisational crises was ‘sloppy management’ (Turner, 
1994b). Examples of which included communication failures, blinkered outlook and 
groupthink (Janis, 1982), complacency and neglect, together with inadequate 
assumptions about the vulnerability of the organisation. Turner argued that these 
management inadequacies and examples of unprofessional behaviour could be 
addressed by the development of a safety culture, with commitment from the top, 
which would mitigate the incubation of hazards. However, other organisational crises 
were outwith the province of management, instead were a consequence of the failures 
of the normal system (Turner, 1994b). He suggested that instead of trying to design 
perfect systems, human failings should be taken into account during the design phase 
of the system.  This was a recognition that due to the interaction between extensive, 
complex technological systems and people there were often unforeseen interactions 
resulting in organisational failure. Perrow (1984) referred to such events as ‘normal 
accidents’.  
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2.2 ‘Normal7’ Organisational Crises - is Failure Inevitable in Complex Systems? 
 
Like Turner (1978), who refuted the notion that such crises were unique and caused 
by singular chains of events, Perrow (1984; 1999) also eschewed the view that system 
failures could be explained by single causal factors such as operator error, design 
faults or inadequate training.  
 
Instead of looking for simple single cause explanations, Perrow (1984) focused on the 
properties of the systems, in particular the way failures emerged from interactions 
within the system. He highlighted that new technology increasingly used ‘common 
modes’ serving at least two other components, which meant that systems were 
becoming increasingly complex. The results were complex interactions of unfamiliar 
sequences, or unplanned and unexpected sequences, which were either not visible or 
immediately comprehensible. Consequently, those systems with interactive 
complexity which were tightly coupled would be more prone to failure because there 
would be no slack in terms of time, resources or alternative route in the system to 
limit its impact:  
 
“If interactive complexity and tight coupling – system characteristics – 
inevitably will produce an accident, I believe we are justified in calling 
 it a normal accident, or system accident. The odd term normal accidents 
 is meant to signal that, given the system characteristics, multiple and 
unexpected interactions of failure are inevitable. This is an expression 
 an integral characteristics of the system, not a statement of frequency” 
(Perrow, 1984:5) 
 
Furthermore, Perrow (1984) highlighted the contradiction within tightly coupled and 
complex organisations. The safety procedures developed for such systems, many of 
which have been developed in response to a previous system failure, tend to be 
controlled from the centre of operations and require operators to adhere to them.  
However, the potential for unexpected interaction and emergent property require 
operators to interpret the situation and respond flexibly to resolve it appropriately.  
For interactively complex and tightly coupled system such operator requirements are 
inconsistent.  
                                                 
7
 Perrow (1984) defined accidents as a ‘normal’ characteristic of systems interaction rather than in 
terms of frequency of occurrence  
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A decentralised approach is effective for operators researching and resolving 
disruptions in complex systems, but when they are also tightly coupled the speed of 
the unseen interactions and lack of redundancy within the system will result in 
emergent properties which were unpredicted and difficult for the controller to 
effectively manage. Therefore, there is an inherent contradiction in the human and 
technical aspects of such systems (Perrow, 1984: 332). This reflects Ashby’s (1957) 
Law of Requisite Variety which argues that because of the incomplete knowledge 
managers have of the whole system they cannot have the requisite variety to control 
it. Control can be obtained only if the variety of the controller is at least as great as the 
variety of the situation to be controlled. 
 
2.3 Resident Pathogens or Latent Conditions in Organisations 
 
A difficulty of such complexity and the Law of Requisite Variety within current 
technological systems is that operators have become increasingly remote from the 
processes which they nominally control. Reason (1990) refers to this as the ‘Catch 22’ 
of human supervisory control. There is increased variety within the system but 
reduced variety for the operator. Because operators no longer have familiarity and 
direct interaction with the system they cannot fall back on mental models gained 
through previous experience. Reason (1990) argues that the “active errors of stressed 
controllers are, in large part, the delayed effects of system design failures” (Reason, 
1990: 183). 
 
However, Reason (1990) distinguishes between active failure, which are unsafe acts 
committed by people, that include slips, lapses, mistakes and procedural violations, 
and latent conditions or ‘resident pathogens’, such as decisions made by designers, 
procedure writers and strategic decision makers within the system. The former have 
direct and usually short lived impact on the system, whereas the latter have been 
integrated into the system and have two kinds of adverse effect. They can translate 
into error provoking conditions within the workplace; examples include understaffing 
or inadequate equipment. Or they can create weaknesses in organisational defences, 
such as unworkable procedures or design and construction deficiencies which may lie 
dormant in the system for years before being triggered. 
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Reason (1990) describes how an organisation’s defences are in a constant state of flux 
but may be penetrated by an accidental trajectory through a window of opportunity, 
caused by an alignment of ‘holes’ in the system. However, in highly protected 
systems the various layers of defence will only be breached by the adverse 
conjunction of several different causal factors, such as latent failures at managerial 
levels and local triggering events. In crises prepared organisations, the complex 
interaction between latent failures and local triggers means the likelihood of such a 
trajectory of opportunity is limited and difficult to foresee. But, Reason (2000) argues 
that whilst organisations might have difficulty in preventing active failures because 
‘their specific forms’ are hard to foresee, they should be able to foresee latent 
conditions and remedy them before the defences are penetrated. To achieve this, 
organisations must take a proactive rather than reactive approach to risk and crisis 
management. 
 
Importantly, Reason (1990) highlights the difficulties in judging the circumstances 
after the crisis event, as the knowledge of outcome profoundly influences the way the 
past is viewed. He cites ‘hindsight bias’ (Fischoff, 1975; Slovic & Fischoff, 1977), 
which has two aspects. The first where observers exaggerate what others should have 
been able to anticipate in foresight. The second that historical judges are unaware of 
the affect that knowledge of outcome has on their perceptions. This is particularly 
relevant to those who would suggest the failure of foresight or the failure of hindsight.  
  
2.4 The Crisis of Management – How Management Decisions May Generate 
Crises  
 
Smith (1990) also highlights the potential for organisational activities to generate 
crises. He proposes that a crisis has three phases: crisis of management; operational 
crisis; and crisis of legitimation. Where the potential for organisational failure is 
incubated in the pre-crisis phase he terms crisis of management. In this phase 
decisions taken may make an organisation more or less vulnerable to crisis. These 
include the design of the system itself or decisions that result in inappropriate staffing 
levels or ignoring safety reviews. In other words management decisions generate 
conditions in which controls are by-passed and conditions for incubation established. 
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This is similar to Turner’s (1978) incubation period and Reason’s (1990) latent 
conditions.  
 
The next phase is the operational crisis or crisis incident, which is where the 
characteristics of the crisis will be most visible. Contingencies may have been put in 
place to deal with the most likely potential disruptions or consequences. However, 
many in the organisation will fail to realise that it is the ‘way we do things around 
here’, that is the organisational culture, which contributes to crisis generation. 
Richardson (1995) referred to this as Paradox Management of Crisis Generation; he 
found that managerial–come organisational beliefs and behaviour were major causal 
ingredients of organisational crises. In other words complex and tightly coupled 
systems, together with latent errors in the design stage, will combine and manifest 
themselves as an opportunity for crisis.  
 
The final phase is the crisis of legitimation or post-crisis incident. The processes in 
this phase are visible and often attract external media coverage. Failure to deal with 
these effectively may push an organisation back into crisis. It is suggested that at this 
point the organisation re-positions itself after the disruption and begins the process of 
organisational learning. That is from the post crisis phase of recovery there will be a 
learning feedback loop to the next crisis of management (Elliott et al., 2005). This 
would be similar to Turner’s (1978) cultural readjustment.   
 
However, the interactions between the phases are not strictly linear and become more 
complicated and ill-defined over time. Organisations may move quickly through some 
phases and take longer in others; consequently the process can take place over many 
years, span different periods of leadership and ownership and therefore become a 
difficult process to manage (Smith, 2005).   
 
2.5 Systems Approaches & Gouldner’s ‘Mock Bureaucracy’ 
 
The systems approaches describe how crises pathways are generated and incubated, 
and may emerge through a number of strategic or latent errors that are made by senior 
managers over time. These may include the generation of a culture in which near 
misses are not reported, in which communication throughout the organisation is 
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constrained or where there is a tendency to blame failure on those further down the 
organisational hierarchy. Each will allow gaps in defences to go unchecked and may 
under certain conditions actually generate the conditions that will spawn the initiating 
event for the crisis.  
 
In relation to an organisation’s safety culture, Smith (1990) argues that organisations 
that ignore safety reviews and take actions to by-pass controls experience a crisis of 
management, which makes them more vulnerable to crisis. Turner (1994b) refers to 
the failure to comply with regulations and lax safety culture as examples of 
management inadequacies and unprofessional behaviour that incubates crisis. 
Similarly, Reason (1990) opines that a lax safety culture results in latent conditions 
which have the potential to create crisis. Furthermore, Perrow (1984) argues that, due 
to the complexity of systems and Ashby’s (1957) Law of Requisite Variety, managers 
cannot have complete knowledge to ensure that a safety culture is established and 
maintained. Therefore, organisations that fail to comply with safety regulations, 
especially when there are few consequences for non-compliance, may generate 
conditions for crisis incubation. Moreover, such organisations will fail to realise that it 
is their culture of non-compliance that contributes to the crisis generation. It is argued 
here that the elements identified in the foregoing systems approaches are encapsulated 
in the concept of Mock Bureaucracy (Gouldner, 1954).  
 
Gouldner (1954) studied a gypsum plant to determine variations in bureaucratic 
patterns. He focused on ‘no-smoking’ regulations which were reinforced by 
bureaucratic cues, such as signs, posters and inspections. However, despite the rules 
and reminders, most personnel disregarded the no-smoking regulation. Gouldner 
termed the pattern of overt organisational non-compliance as ‘mock bureaucracy’. 
The reason for non-compliance was due to the lack of legitimacy attaching to the 
rules. Importantly the legitimacy of the rules determines whether an organisation is 
crisis prone or crisis prepared (Hynes & Prasad, 1997). Therefore, the means by 
which rules are introduced and enforced influence how managers and workers 
respond to them (Elliot & Smith, 2006). For example, in Jermier et al’s (1991) study 
of a police organisation it was found that top management was unable to impose 
organisation-wide conformance with the traditional command bureaucracy because of 
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resistant subcultures in the organisation. They subsequently describe mock 
bureaucracy as “an organisation with a counterfeit front deceitfully designed to 
impress key stakeholders with appropriate principles and well-ordered practices, 
while hiding internal fragmentation and ad hoc operations (Jermier et al., 1991: 
189). Hynes and Prasad (1997) argued that the formal rules were subordinate to the 
workplace norms. Moreover, they considered that “the development and enactment 
of mock bureaucracies can have serious consequences for organisations, and can 
easily precipitate industrial crises” (Hynes & Prasad, 1997: 606).  
 
Therefore, Gouldner’s (1954) findings highlight the importance of organisational 
culture in achieving and maintaining compliance through shared values embedded at 
an individual and organisational level, similar to the inner layers of Pauchant and 
Mitroff’s Onion Model (1992). Such a culture is essential to achieve effective crisis 
management and in overcoming barriers to learning. Consequently the concept of 
mock bureaucracy is used in chapter 7 as an analytical lens to determine and explain 
SCG compliance with the rules and regulations necessary to establish resilience. 
 
2.6 The Feasibility of Creating High Reliability Organisations 
 
An alternative view to failure being a ‘normal’ emergent feature of a complex system 
described in the systems approaches above (Turner, 1976, 1978; Perrow, 1984, 1999; 
Reason, 1990, 2000; Smith, 1990) is High Reliability Theory. The High Reliability 
Theorists argue that the presence of distinctive organisational features can prevent 
failure from occurring in a system. High Reliability Theory is based on studies of 
nuclear industry, nuclear aircraft carriers and air traffic control centres, organisations 
in which because of the potential catastrophic consequences of failure, it must be 
deterministically precluded. In other words failure simply must not happen (Boin & 
Schulman, 2008). Those who consider the possibility of developing High Reliability 
Organisations (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991; Roberts, 1993; Rochlin 1996; Schulman, 
1993) consider that it is possible to prevent system failure, which is contrary to 
Perrow’s ‘Normal Accident Theory’. 
 
The view of High Reliability Theorists is that if appropriate organisational design and 
management techniques are in place safe operations are possible even when using 
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extremely hazardous technologies (Sagan, 1993). On the other hand Perrow (1999) 
argues that serious accidents with complex technology systems are inevitable and that 
organisational efforts to change the risks rooted in complex socio-technical systems 
will always be ineffective. Eventually the system will experience failure because it is 
a ‘normal’ system characteristic. Consequently no amount of successful system 
performance can falsify the theory of ‘normal accidents’. The system is only as 
reliable as the first future catastrophic failure, not the many operations already 
undertaken without failure (Boin & Schulman, 2008).  
 
High reliability is a desirable trait in resilient organisations (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2008) 
and Weick (1987) argues that organisational culture determines whether or not high 
risk organisations can transform into High Reliability Organisations. In such high 
reliability organisations, Rochlin suggests that safety culture is more important than 
controlling or mitigating unforeseen or unexpected events (Rochlin, 1999). 
Furthermore, according to Boin and Schulman (2008), reliability is dependent on 
organisational norms, which guide decision making throughout the organisation. 
Moreover, leaders are responsible for cultivating and protecting those norms and 
ensuring that the organisational mission is institutionalised in the political setting it 
must operate in. There are similarities between crisis prepared organisations and those 
that are reliable. A key element in both is the organisational culture which is proactive 
in ensuring the safety of the whole organisation.   
 
The research of different High Reliability Theorists has produced similar explanations 
for positive safety records. In their study of High Reliability Organisations, Weick 
and Sutcliffe (2001) found HROs experience fewer problems because they have 
developed ways of acting and styles of leading that enable them to manage the 
unexpected better than most other kinds of organisations. HROs were able to maintain 
reliable performance because of certain key characteristics: 
 
 Preoccupation with failure – treating any lapse as a symptom that something 
is wrong with the system, encouraging reporting of errors, learning lessons 
from near misses and being wary of complacency 
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 Reluctance to simplify interpretations – knowing that the world is complex, 
unstable and unpredictable, they encourage individuals to look beyond their 
own boundaries and to be sceptical towards received wisdom 
 Sensitivity to operations – scrutinising normal operations in order to reveal 
deficiencies in supervision, safety procedures and training , hazard 
identification etc., and encouraging continuous adjustments that will prevent 
errors from accumulating and enlarging, encouraging people to speak out 
about their concerns 
 Commitment to resilience – developing capabilities not only to detect 
problems but also to be able to continue working when things go wrong 
 Deference to expertise – decisions are delegated to those on the front line and 
with the most expertise (not necessarily the most experience) in that field 
(adapted from Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001: 10-17) 
 
Together the five processes produce a collective state of mindfulness. That is a rich 
awareness of discriminating detail and enhanced ability to discover and correct errors 
that could escalate into crisis. However, it is important to note that an organisation 
cannot calibrate its degree of reliability by choosing some features and omitting 
others; these attributes are a consequence of an evolutionary process. They cannot be 
imposed on an organisation from outside, as they are tightly knit into the fabric of 
organisational culture and work processes (LaPorte, 2006).  
 
However, a criticism of HRO theory is that few organisations have the extremely 
complex technology that is evident in these organisations; therefore the lessons to be 
learned from them are limited and not necessarily applicable to mainstream 
organisations (Luo Carlo et al., 2004; van den Eede & van den Walle, 2005). Boin 
and Schulman (2008) outline other limitations of the High Reliability Theory, 
including that the research is based on a snapshot of a small number of particular 
types of organisations. That our knowledge of the origins of the characteristics 
attributed to HROs is limited and currently it is unclear whether they are imposed by 
regulatory environments, the outcome of institutional evolution or the product of 
leadership; but importantly the characteristics have not been conclusively tied to the 
reliability of their performance. Furthermore, it is not clear how HROs evolve the 
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capability to avoid catastrophic failure, especially as the opportunities to learn through 
trial and error are constrained. Therefore, in their view HRT “stands not as a theory 
of causation of high reliability but rather as a careful description of a special set of 
organisations” (Boin & Schulman, 2008: 1053).  
 
Sagan (1993) also eschews the term ‘theory’, preferring the expression schools of 
thought.  In his review of US nuclear weapons system safety he considers both High 
Reliability and Normal Accidents and compares them through four critical causal 
factors attributed to HROs:  
 
 The prioritisation of safety and reliability as a goal by political elites and the 
organisation’s leadership 
 High levels of redundancy in personnel and technical safety measures 
 The development of a “high reliability culture” in decentralised and 
continually practised operations, and 
 Sophisticated forms of trial and error organisational learning 
 
Sagan (1993) highlights the preoccupation of failure within HROs may result in 
conflicting organisational objectives. Because of the costs in maintaining significant 
levels of redundancy and continual operational training, organisations may be less 
efficient than they could be. Moreover, according the NAT, the structural factors of 
interactive complexity and tight coupling significantly increase the likelihood of 
accidents in such organisations, regardless of the intent of leaders.  
 
In relation to high levels of redundancy in personnel and technical safety measures, 
Sagan points out this would include multiple and independent channels of 
communication, decision-making and implementation, which according to HRT can 
produce a highly reliable overall system even when system components are subject to 
error. However, according to NAT increasing redundancy means more interactive 
complexity and common mode failure. Moreover, the increased complexity reduces 
system transparency and understanding allowing latent problems to accumulate over 
time. Finally, redundancy does not improve reliability but rather encourages 
management to maximise production to dangerous levels. As Perrow observes: 
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“Fixes, including safety devices, often merely allow those in charge to run the 
system faster, or in worse weather, or with bigger explosives” (Perrow, 1984: 11) 
 
The development of a ‘high reliability culture’ is dependent on strong cultural norms, 
decentralised decision making and constant training. The result, according to the HRT 
will enable self-regulating work units empowered to address risks directly. However, 
NAT argue that this infers a homogeneous organisational culture in which everyone 
will identify, understand and respond in the same way to an unexpected and unknown 
situation. Moreover, when a system is both interactively complex and tightly coupled 
the requirements for decentralisation are incompatible because of time dependent and 
invariant production processes. Furthermore, it is impossible for an organisation to 
develop organisational training and experience for every unanticipated and 
undesirable circumstance. Therefore, potential scenarios that have not been imagined 
will not be practised and training of extremely dangerous operations will be limited 
because of the hazards involved. What’s more, organisational politics influence what 
will be subject to training scenarios because it is implicit in undertaking such training 
that potential catastrophic outcomes are possible.  
 
Finally in relation to the sophisticated forms of trial and error organisational learning, 
Sagan (1993) highlights that HROs cannot learn from trial and error to the extent a 
normal organisation could because of the limited occurrences and catastrophic 
outcomes of the failures that would present the learning opportunity. Consequently,   
“rather than wait to learn from experience whether their precautions were 
adequate, researchers and regulators chose to speed up the learning process” 
(Marone & Woodhouse, 1989: 137) by introducing simulations. However, restrictions 
on learning include the lack of clarity around causes of accidents and near accidents 
initially. That investigations and findings are subject to ‘hindsight bias’ because of the 
politicised environment such accidents occur in. Moreover because of the potential for 
blame to be apportioned faulty reporting occurs making it difficult for organisations to 
assess performance accurately. This is exacerbated by secrecy within and between 
complex organisations which limits the opportunity for ‘isomorphic’ learning. 
 
Sagan (1993) broadly summarises the conflict between both HRT and NAT as being 
around the degree of predictability that is possible in complex organisations. He 
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acknowledged that HRT provided useful insights but concluded that “historical 
evidence provides much stronger support for the ideas developed by Charles Perrow 
in Normal Accidents and by other authors writing in that intellectual tradition” 
(Sagan, 1993: 252). Sagan reached this conclusion as a consequence of having 
identified “a long series of close calls with US nuclear weapons systems: serious 
accidents or near-accidents that could have lead to catastrophes had they occurred 
in somewhat different, but nonetheless plausible, circumstances” (Sagan, 1993: 
252). 
 
In contrasting High Reliability Theory with Normal Accident Theory, a number of 
common characteristics of HROs were found but when considered in detail 
limitations were identified. In particular was the inability of HROs to learn from trial 
and error because of the consequence of catastrophic failure in such organisations. 
The findings were that Normal Accident Theory is supported by stronger evidence 
than the High Reliability Theory and that there are similarities between crisis prepared 
organisations and those that are reliable. A key element in both is that the 
organisational culture is proactive in ensuring the safety of the whole organisation. 
There are a number of practical lessons for organisations seeking to enhance 
resilience. 
 
2.7 What Practical Lessons are there for those Organisations Seeking Resilience?  
 
Having identified organisations can fail in crises because of latent or incubated errors 
in the organisation’s socio-technical system, it follows that overcoming organisational 
barriers to learning will go some way to preventing organisational failure and ensure 
greater resilience.  By applying a systems approach an organisation is able to 
understand how crises pathways are generated and potentially incubated over time 
only to emerge as an organisational failure. Therefore organisational culture and 
learning from crises are closely related. However, there are barriers to learning, which 
increase an organisation’s vulnerability to crises (Smith, 2005), including rigid 
institutional beliefs, the tendency to scapegoat or blame something else for the 
circumstances, the minimisation of danger and the disregard of complaints or signals 
which may in hindsight be early warnings (Turner, 1978). 
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To overcome barriers to learning organisations need to be proactive in adopting a 
‘safety culture’. An organisation needs to be aware that it is part of a wider system, 
accept that failure within the system is likely and be prepared to manage its way 
through the crisis. To do this it should adopt a number of strategies including 
providing feedback on previous incidents, setting up a formal safety organisation, 
inculcating safety culture norms and beliefs about the importance of safety, devolving 
decision making, and providing training and awareness (Davis & Walters, 1998; 
Shaluf et al., 2002).  
 
However, the training will be based on what the organisation knows at the time. In 
other words the workplace’s taken for granted assumptions about the world and 
systems (Hopfl, 1994). These beliefs and norms may be based on erroneous 
assumptions (Smith, 2005). Furthermore, while devolving decisions to the lowest 
level commensurate with skill may be desirable, in many organisations it is rank 
rather than expertise that determines who makes decisions (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). 
With regards to decision making it must also be recognised that crises destroy formal 
structures, communication generally degrades, and the ‘rule book’ becomes defunct 
(Smallman & Weir, 1999). While the provision of feedback will assist in identifying 
underlying trends and assist with isomorphic learning, it requires a no-blame culture 
to encourage honest reporting and this can be severely constrained by cultural and 
political factors (Horlick-Jones, 1996). Consequently, there will be some 
organisational challenges to implementing such strategies.  
 
Moreover, whilst establishing a no-blame culture might prevent risk factors being 
driven ‘underground’ it’s rarely enough to ensure adequate feedback and proactive 
risk management (Johnston, 1996). Also while the creation of a formal safety 
infrastructure may lead to clarity of functions and assist in embedding appropriate 
norms, leading to changed behaviour, it must be recognised that it is easier to change 
organisational plans and procedures rather than changing individual and group beliefs. 
Furthermore, unless the rules in relation to safety culture are considered legitimate 
non-compliance may result in a ‘mock bureaucracy’ (Gouldner, 1954). Individual 
defence mechanisms can be used to ‘distort the external reality’ and resist 
organisational change (Mitroff et al., 1989). It is also difficult to change 
organisational behaviour if a particular form of hazard has not been experienced 
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before because the lack of previous evidence in relation to the risk will mean it has no 
validity (Smith, 2005).  
 
2.8 Introduction of the Systems Models Used in this Research 
 
Having argued that the adoption of a systems approach is a useful means to examine 
whether an organisation is crisis prone or crisis prepared, two systems models are 
introduced, namely the Formal Systems Model (Fortune & Peters, 2005) and the 
Viable Systems Model (Beer, 1979, 1981 & 1985). These are used in chapter 6 to 
analyse the SCG. 
 
Fortune and Peters (2005) FSM combines the core systems concepts, which are 
necessary if a set of activities is to comprise a system capable of purposeful activity 
without failure. It takes a holistic approach to describe a failure and explain why it 
occurred (White, 1995). The approach has been widely used to study failures in a 
number of systems (Fortune & Peters, 1990), including design of national curriculum 
for science (Fortune, Peters & Rawlinson-Winder, 1993), quality management 
(Fortune & Peters, 1994), risk prevention (Stewart & Fortune, 1995), policing 
command and control (Pearce & Fortune, 1995), learning (Fortune & Peters, 2001), 
project management (Fortune & White, 2006), and partnership problems (Ellis, 
Fortune & Peters, 2007).  
 
In their book Learning from Failure Fortune and Peters (1995) suggest that the VSM 
could be viewed as an additional feature of the Formal System Model. Beer’s VSM 
(1979, 1981 & 1985) models the structures of the organisation and the relationships 
between them, including key processes, communications and information flows. The 
criteria of viability require that organisations are capable of adapting appropriately to 
their chosen environment, or adapting their environment to suit themselves.  
 
The VSM has been used extensively as a conceptual tool for understanding 
organisations, redesigning them where appropriate, and supporting the management 
of change (Espejo & Gill 1996). Not only does it provide a model to distinguish right 
from wrong in an organisation, while being able to cope with the complexity and 
dynamics of the 21
st
 century (Pfiffner, 2010), but it can be applied to different types 
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of organisations. For example Walker (2006) applied it to cooperatives and 
federations, while in 1970 Beer himself applied the model to the social economy of 
Chile (Medina, 2006). More recently it has also been used to analyse the role of 
leadership in viable organisations (Rowe, 2010). 
 
The use of these systems models assist in gaining a greater level of understanding of 
complex situations. It enables the comparison of the ‘real world’ problems with the 
‘ideal’ paradigm, which is capable of purposeful activity without failure or problem. 
The comparison between both states engenders a level of understanding that enables 
the critical assessment of the real world system.  
 
2.9 The Formal Systems Model (FSM) 
 
The Formal System Model consists of a system, which comprises a decision-making 
subsystem, a performance-monitoring subsystem and a set of subsystems that carry 
out tasks of the system and effect its transformations by converting inputs into 
outputs. The FSM is fractal
8
 and each level contains the components listed above. 
 
The decision-making subsystem manages the system and makes its expectations 
known to the performance monitoring subsystem. It is responsible for decisions about 
how the purpose of the system is to be achieved, such as which transformations are to 
be carried out and by what means, as well as providing resources to enable this to 
happen. This exhibits choice and demonstrates that it is a purposeful system.  
 
The performance-monitoring subsystem observes the transformation processes. It 
reports deviations from the expectations to the decision making subsystem, so that it 
can initiate corrective action where necessary.  
 
The wider system, which represents the next hierarchical level up from the system, 
defines its purpose and sets its objectives. It influences the decision makers within the 
                                                 
8
 Mandelbrot (1982) coined the term fractal. He emphasised the use of fractals as realistic and useful 
models of many rough phenomena in the real world; highlighting their common properties, such as 
self-similarity and scale invariance. A fractal structure means that the same mechanisms are replicated 
at each level and in each of the subsystems. The repetition of patterns and relationships in a self-similar 
way at different levels within an organisation is called recursion. 
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system, while monitoring the performance of the system as a whole. It also provides 
the resources that the system needs in order to function. The environment, which is 
beyond the system, disturbs the system directly, as well as indirectly through the 
wider system (Fortune & Peters, 2005). An example of the paradigm is shown in 
figure 10 below:  
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Figure 2 The Formal Systems Model (Source Fortune & Peters, 2005: 121) 
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Fortune & Peters (2005) highlight two aspects of the Formal System Model, which 
are relevant to this research, namely control and communication. Control is the 
system actions that cause or maintain a desired state and is achieved either by 
modifying activities or changing inputs. Effective control relies on a number of 
preconditions, including adequate communication between the measuring mechanism 
and the decision taker, and that the decision taker has an appropriate level of 
sophistication for the activities and/or processes being controlled. It is suggested that 
the absence of controllability means that the system is not learning and thus 
susceptible to failure. The other important element is communication, especially the 
communication between the system and the environment, the flow of information 
from the wider system, via the system, to the subsystems and vice versa, and the 
numerous communication links within the system and subsystems. An advantage of 
using the Formal System Model is that it is possible to compare the systems 
representations to ascertain whether the communication links exist or how effective 
they are.  
 
The strengths of the FSM include that it unites most core systems concepts. It was 
adapted by Checkland (1981; 1993), who in turn drew on the ideas of Churchman 
(1971) and Jenkins (1969). It has been used successfully over a long period of time to 
investigate failures (Fortune & White, 2006). In addition, the FSM is a model of a 
robust system. By representing an ideal system the FSM can be used to form the basis 
for comparison with a real system. Thus the FSM can be used to determine the extent 
to which the components, links and other features necessary for purposeful activity 
without failure are present (Fortune & White, 2006). Moreover, because the FSM is 
concerned with the relationships between its components, as well as the components, 
it is able to deal with the dynamic nature of organisations. It allows the identification 
of strengths and weaknesses and can, for example, ascertain whether communication 
links exist or how effective they are. In addition, it shows disturbances from and 
attempts to influence (or control) the environment (Pearce & Fortune, 1995). 
 
Weaknesses associated with the FSM include the top down influence of its structure. 
There is also an assumption the wider system will formulate the initial design of the 
system. However, this may not happen in practice. It is possible for the blurring of 
boundaries between wider system and subsystem. Moreover, because a 
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communication structure is in place it is assumed that the system communication is 
effective. In addition the importance of organisational cultures is not explicit. 
 
However, using this paradigm Fortune & Peters (1994: 248) identified a number of 
common features of failure in relation to systems, which will be used in this thesis as 
an analysis framework. The common features of systems failures can be summarised 
as: 
1. Deficiencies in organisational structures 
2. Lack of clarity of purpose 
3. Deficiency of performance by subsystem(s) 
4. Ineffective communication between subsystems 
5. Inadequately designed subsystems (which in this research will be applied to 
training input) 
 
2.10 The Viable System Model (VSM)  
 
In the VSM the organisation is seen as a series of interacting levels of systems which 
provide a useful template against which to consider alternative structures and 
challenges a system is facing. The VSM deals with the complexity of organisations by 
unfolding them in a fractal structure, which means that the same mechanisms are 
replicated at each level and in each of the subsystems. The repetition of patterns and 
relationships at different levels within an organisation is called recursion, which 
enables the same functions to be mapped and compared. Any deficiencies in the 
capability or functioning of the organisation can be traced back to inappropriate or 
inadequate subsystems or linkages. The Viable Systems Model represents a viable 
organisation; one that adapts to its environment to maintain its viability or existence. 
The model is illustrated in Figure 3 below: 
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Figure 3 The Viable Systems Model (Source: Leonard, 1999) 
 
 
The VSM contains 5 systems which can be applied to any organisation to determine 
its viability by identifying the communication and control systems. A feature of the 
VSM is that its structure and communications channels are repeated from the smallest 
productive unit to the largest. This allows for a great deal of economy in the analysis 
as well as easy comparisons among System 1 through 5’s activities along both 
horizontal and vertical lines. The organisation’s systems 5/4/3 represents the 
metasystem of the present activities. The VSM is summarised in Table 1 below: 
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System Description Purpose  
One Implementation ‘primary activities’ which the organisation exists to 
provide 
Two Coordination Ensures different primary activities do not conflict 
with each other and dampens oscillations.  
Three Control/Cohesion Builds the primary activities into a greater whole by 
linking subsystems with the system of which they are 
a part.  
Three* Monitoring By-passes unit management and engages with the 
reality of the unit’s activities. 
Four Intelligence Intelligence looks outside the organisation and into the 
future.  
Five Policy The organisational ethos and distinctive identity. 
Strategic decision making is a process of matching 
current reality to future needs. 
Table 1 Summary of the Viable Systems Model 
 
Hoverstadt and Bowling (2002) outline a modelling process which starts with system 
1, the identification of an organisation’s ‘primary activities’. That is those products or 
services the organisation exists to provide. By unfolding the complexity it is possible 
to analyse where an organisation makes decisions and allocates resources. To comply 
with the VSM, each System One should contain all of the Systems 1 to 5. But to 
ensure that each system 1 does not conflict with each other, system 2 coordination, 
dampens oscillations. Typical coordination mechanisms include common standards, 
protocols, operations and production scheduling, as well as a common language and 
shared cultures to ease communication between operational units.  
 
The management processes that build the primary activities into a greater whole are 
represented by system 3, the ‘inside and now’ of an organisation, which links the 
various subsystems with the system of which they are a part. To determine whether 
the activity is effective it is monitored by System Three*, which to be effective has to 
be sporadic, in-depth activity that bypasses unit management and engages with the 
reality of the unit’s activities. In other words, system 3* ensures that what managers’ 
think is happening is actually happening.  
 
The ‘inside and now’ of the organisation, represented by system 3, is balanced by 
system 4 intelligence that looks outside the organisation into the future. The balance 
between the ‘here and now’ and ‘the future’ is maintained by the three/four 
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homeostat. Strategic decision making is a process of matching current reality to future 
needs. To alert the system of a threat or opportunity which has implications for the 
whole there is an ‘algedonic’ signal. It signals the need for a rapid response and can 
come from any part of the system at any level of recursion. Strategic decision making 
is the responsibility of system 5. Policy reflects the organisational ethos and its 
distinctive identity. Both are powerful and necessary attenuators of variety for 
organisations (Hoverstadt & Bowling, 2002). 
 
The strengths of the VSM include its suitability for application to a variety of 
organisations. This demonstrates evidence of its practicality and usefulness as a 
diagnostic tool. Moreover, by portraying the organisation as an open system 
interacting with its environment, the VSM is able to capture the dynamics and 
determine whether the organisation is adapting sufficiently to maintain its viability.  
 
Furthermore, according to Beer (1979) the organisation is not only influenced by the 
environment but is also able to influence it. This enables the organisation’s process in 
relation to learning and adaptation to be examined. The success or otherwise in this 
regard is key to a successful viable organisation. The VSM is also able to consider the 
entire organisation because of its recursive structure and capture the variety in the 
control channels. The VSM not only captures the information flows between the 
organisational parts, but also those between the parts and the environment. 
Consequently the model enables a holistic view of the entire system. 
    
However, it is important to recognise that that there are limitations with the VSM. 
While the VSM allows the diagnoses of the current and desired state, it does not 
provide support on how to move from the former to the latter. Moreover, being set at 
a higher level of abstraction it does not assist in the design of detailed organisational 
infrastructures regarding personnel, communication and information. Nor does it deal 
with the content of organisational activity, such as what policies are likely to lead to a 
certain desired outcome (Schwaninger & Rois, 2008). It has also been suggested that 
it does not provide ways of engineering the process of negotiation between the 
different viewpoints of the organisation (Checkland, 1993) and that it could be 
exploited by an elite group in the organisation (Ulrich, 1981). 
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2.11 Chapter Conclusion 
 
A number of constraints in organisational resilience were identified and the systems 
approach useful in analysing organisational crises was introduced. It is argued that 
organisational resilience is an emergent property or outcome from multiple 
environmental factors, but that resilience can be undermined by latent or resident 
pathogens caused by ‘sloppy management’, which may incubate in the system over 
lengthy periods before manifesting themselves as crises. It is also argued that 
although difficult to foresee, organisations have the opportunity to learn from crises, 
and could demonstrate adaptability by changing their culture to reflect the lessons 
identified and learned from crises; thus ensuring they were more crises prepared. By 
taking a proactive approach to potential risks and ensuring personnel were suitable 
trained and capable of taking immediate action to tackle crises it is possible to 
increase organisational resilience. The chapter concludes by introducing the systems 
models used in this research. It is argued that these systems models enable the 
comparison of the ‘real world’ SCG with an ‘ideal’ paradigm, which engenders a 
level of understanding and critical assessment of the real world system of the SCG. 
The following chapter explains the methodology used in the research. 
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Chapter 3 – Research Methodology 
 
This chapter examines how, by using qualitative methodology, I was able to take an 
exploratory and flexible approach to the research. According to Morison (1986) 
research is a complex enterprise involving a dynamic interplay between personal 
values, theories and practical data gathering skills. By adopting a qualitative research 
methodology, incorporating interviews, observations and documents, I was able to 
gain rich data from which I was able to identify a number of emerging themes. 
Moreover, by using a number of interviewees and observations at a number of 
different types of exercises and training events, as well as reviewing documents, I was 
able to ‘triangulate’ the data obtained to address potential concerns about its ‘validity’ 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 1994; Gilbert, 1999; Robson, 2002). I then used a flexible 
approach to integrate the themes with a number of systems models which enabled a 
greater level of understanding and analysis in relation to whether the introduction of 
SCGs has improved crisis management capabilities and the government policy of 
enhancing resilience is being achieved.  
 
3.1 Research Aim 
 
The research aims to examine the capability of SCGs to determine whether the current 
civil contingencies infrastructure, including the Integrated Emergency Management 
framework and training arrangements, are effective in ensuring that the SCGs are best 
prepared for crises. Particular attention is given to the organisational learning of the 
SCGs and whether lessons learned are reflected in changes of behaviour, beliefs and 
culture. This thesis examines the SCGs to determine whether they provide Scotland 
with effective crisis management and resilience capability as envisaged by 
Government.   
 
3.2 Research Strategy 
 
My research strategy defines how I tackled the whole project and the source data 
obtained (Trochim, 2000). In this research into the effect of introducing SCGs in 
relation to their crisis management capabilities and the delivery of resilience, there 
were no fixed elements or specific hypothesis or propositions to be tested; rather it 
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was exploratory in nature. I intended to gather data using qualitative methods, 
interviewing key participants involved in the SCGs, taking observations of members 
at training and exercises, and analysing related documentation. From my analysis of 
the data I would identify emergent themes, to which I would apply a number of 
systems models and subject them to closer analysis in relation to the current theory 
and concepts associated with crisis management and resilience. My research strategy 
was, therefore, to explore the topic using a flexible and adaptable approach, and seek 
to interpret and explain the meaning of the emerging themes from the data.  
 
3.3 Why Qualitative Research Data? 
 
Before initiating the research I considered which theoretical perspective would be 
most suitable. There are a number of perspectives available to the researcher and each 
of them may result in widely differing findings. Therefore, it was important that I 
used the most appropriate perspective and matched the mode of enquiry to my 
research strategy (Adams & Schvaneveldt 1985). However, I was also aware that the 
role of the theory is to make things that were hidden visible, to define some patterns 
and give some meaning to the sorts of observations that researchers continually make 
when investigating society. Therefore,  
 
“…by shifting theoretical perspective the world under investigation 
 also changes shape. The components of the world being investigated 
 combine and recombine into new patterns as they are viewed through 
different theoretical perspectives. Different theories bring different  
aspects of the world into view” (Gilbert 1999:11) 
 
Because I sought to understand the processes and organisations associated with SCGs, 
I focused on the meanings of the interviews and observations to obtain different 
perspectives of the SCG. In other words, I was attempting to understand how people 
interpreted the social world of the SCG that they inhabited and the meanings it held 
for them. This interpretive approach has been described as phenomenology which, 
“rests upon careful descriptions and analyses of consciousness, with a focus on the 
subjects’ life world” (Kvale, 2007: 148). It has had a major influence on general 
qualitative methodology and “has much to offer in answering certain kinds of 
research question about subjective experience which may be highly relevant to 
some real world studies” (Robson, 2002: 196).  
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According to Kvale (2007: x) qualitative research is intended to approach the world 
“out there”, that is in the real world rather than in laboratory settings. It seeks to 
explain social phenomenon “from the inside” by deconstructing people’s 
understanding of their world, actions and experiences. This was what I sought to do 
with the SCG. Therefore, I considered that qualitative methods would allow flexibility 
in the research process and thus the opportunity to pursue emerging insights. With 
such flexibility I would be able to employ methods “in response to the changing 
nature of the context” (Cassell & Symon, 1994: 4).  
 
Furthermore, Kvale (2007: 19) suggests that the interviewer’s approach to new 
knowledge will depend on whether the role of miner or traveller is adopted. The 
former considers knowledge as ‘nuggets’ uncovered by the miner but unpolluted by 
any leading questions. The latter explores unknown domains and asks local 
inhabitants questions, the meaning of which he then interprets. The knowledge is 
therefore either “objective real data or subjective meaning”. In this research I felt 
that the traveller approach was most appropriate because I was seeking to interpret the 
meanings and emerging themes identified. From which I would gain a comprehensive 
understanding of the SCG from multiple perspectives. 
 
An alternative and contrasting approach I considered was the positivist perspective, 
which assumes that there are patterns in society that can be measured, and data about 
these patterns can be collected in an unbiased and value-free way, preferring 
quantitative to qualitative data gathering methods (Robson, 2002). However, I was of 
the view that because the research was exploratory and the research question 
unknown or ill-defined, qualitative research methods would bring sufficient 
adaptability for me to respond to any emerging themes from the research. Therefore, 
the qualitative perspective underpinned my research. 
 
3.3.1 Deductive & Inductive Approaches Used to Research the SCGs 
 
In seeking a comprehensive understanding of the SCG, I used a combination of 
deductive and inductive approaches. This reflected Mills (1970) who said the 
researcher should: 
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“…try to think in terms of a variety of viewpoints and in this way  
let your mind become a moving prism catching light from as many 
angles as possible” (1970:235-6) 
 
Deductive research starts from the more general and works towards the more specific 
(Trochim, 2000). The process begins with a general theory, problem or question 
which needs to be investigated. It is refined to a hypothesis which can be tested 
(Robson, 2002). Drawbacks of deductive research include the subjective nature of 
theory which influences the hypothesis and research results, and the need for 
specificity means the research cannot react to external or unforeseen factors, which 
were not considered at the start of the process. 
 
On the other hand, inductive research can be seen as a reversal of the process 
undertaken in deductive research. Inductive research is from the ground up and 
describes the process of making observations from the research area of interest. From 
these patterns emerge which can be developed into hypotheses that can be explored 
before finally ending with the development of general theory (Gilbert, 1999).  
 
Inductive research is also flexible because the research question may change during 
the study to reflect the types of questions needed to understand the research problem 
(Creswell, 2007). Reservations about inductive research include the difficulty in 
drawing conclusions from the observations. To counter these concerns the number of 
observations can be increased. However they can never be entirely eliminated. 
Therefore, all inductive research has to come with a caution that its conclusions apply 
over the period of observation and within the context of that observation (Gilbert, 
1999). 
 
In practice deduction and induction often get intertwined and a combination of 
inductive and deductive reasoning can be used effectively. Initial identification of 
issues using an inductive and exploratory approach can then be tested against some 
data using deduction (Gilbert, 1999). This was the approach that I used during this 
research. The starting point was the introduction of the SCGs and what their effect 
had been according to those that inhabited that social world. The data I obtained via 
interviews, observations and documents indicated general themes. My intention was 
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to identify these emerging themes and subject them to closer analysis in relation to the 
current theory and concepts associated with crisis management and resilience. 
Consequently, in line with Miles and Huberman (1994), my research design was 
neither highly inductive nor highly deductive, rather it was intended that I would 
incorporate both approaches because:   
 
“Much qualitative research lies between the two extremes.  
Something is known conceptually about the phenomenon, but  
not enough to house a theory. The researcher has an idea of the  
parts of the phenomenon that are not well understood and knows  
where to look for these things - in which settings, among which  
actors” (Miles & Huberman, 1994:17) 
 
3.3.2 Ensuring Reliability and Validity when Gathering Data 
 
I was aware of the debate regarding the data collection methods that researchers 
should adopt. Some argue that any single research project should focus on as few data 
collection methods as possible, preferably one; whereas others are for using diverse 
collection methods to prevent the data being skewed or adversely affected by any 
single collection method (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994).  
 
In this research I decided that I would use qualitative methods of interviews and 
observations from a number of sources, as well as related documentation. My view 
was that using data from a number of separate individuals and a number of separate 
observations would lend validity and reliability to the findings and counter the 
concerns highlighted previously by Gilbert (1999). Validity is concerned with 
whether the research findings are really about what they appear to be about. Whereas 
reliability relates to the consistency of the results, that would it be repeated if some 
one else undertook the research. Generally the concern about validity and reliability 
are the effect that I, as the researcher, would have on those being observed or 
interviewed. In particular, the distorting effects of selective perception and 
interpretation, as well as my limitations, as the observer, to witness all relevant 
aspects of the phenomena in question.  
 
To ensure reliability, it is suggested that procedures should aim to make the data and 
interpretation more transparent (Flick, 2007). A standard way in which this form of 
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reliability is assessed is through triangulation of methods. In this research, 
triangulation was achieved through interviews, observation and document sources. 
Such data triangulation is a valuable and widely used strategy which helps to counter 
threats to validity and reliability (Robson, 2002).  
 
3.3.3 Field Work – Accessing Participants 
 
In field work one of the first challenges of the research is access. It has been 
suggested that this is a two part process (Hornsby-Smith, 1993; Cassell, 1988) of 
getting in (achieving physical access) and then getting on (achieving social access). 
Cassell also provides some useful advice to the researcher in what is actually required 
to successfully access a group:  
 
“among the characteristics needed to penetrate a closed access  
group are brute persistence and blind compulsivity…and a certain 
imperviousness to rejection” (Cassell, 1988: 93-5). 
 
One reason preventing access may be that for some closed groups research may be 
ideologically anathema (Hornsby-Smith, 1993); whereas others may see it as a threat 
to operational routines or the potential for damaging disclosures (Lee, 1992). 
Importantly to me as the researcher, where distrust among different parties exists, 
bargaining about access could take considerable time (Form, 1973). However, this can 
be overcome by using an appropriate sponsor who can act as a ‘bridge’, ‘guide’ or 
‘patron’ to the community (Kvale, 2007) or alternatively, the researcher should spend 
time in the community forging links to overcome fears of researcher manipulation, 
that is, “one should cease to be a stranger” (Wagstaffe & Moyser, 1987: 193-5).  
 
Gaining access is therefore an important process that needs to be actively managed by 
the researcher. Brannen (1987) describes the management of access as a political 
process, in which: 
 
“The observer…has to enter the symbolic world of those he is to 
 observe: he must learn their language, their customs, their work  
patterns, the way they eat and dress and make himself respectable.  
There is an initial period when he must understand what expectations 
 are held of him and when he is taught how he can behave. But he 
also has to teach respondents so he can carry out his observer role  
effectively” (Brannen, 1987: 169) 
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In my case gaining access was eased because I was a serving police officer and 
therefore already a member of one of the organisations that formed the closed group. I 
was also trained and experienced in Integrated Emergency Management and was well 
aware of the response structures of the SCG, having been involved in developing 
training and exercises for them, as well as participating in them too. Therefore I 
understood the language and customs, and was also known in other organisations 
because of my past involvement in emergencies planning and attendance at numerous 
training events. Not only had I ceased to be a stranger but because of my previous 
experience I could never have represented myself as a ‘professional stranger’. For me 
the challenge was not getting access but in ensuring that when ‘writing it up’, I was 
able to balance or otherwise negotiate, what Van Maanen (1988) describes as a tale of 
two cultures, namely mine and the research subject.  
 
3.3.4 Research Ethics & Confidentiality 
 
Having established access, it was important that I considered the ethics of the methods 
to be adopted before continuing with the research. I was aware of contrasting views to 
research ethics. Some consider it unethical to conduct any research not giving the 
subjects the right to refuse to be studied, while at the other extreme are those who 
maintain that “any investigation that does not deliberately damage the reputation of 
those studied is ethically justified” (Denzin, 1970: 33). Moreover, interview research 
is saturated with moral and ethical issues and the importance of the researcher as a 
person is magnified because the interviewer is the main instrument for obtaining 
knowledge (Kvale, 2007).  
 
I was of the view that addressing ethical concerns was essential because of the 
complexities of “researching private lives and placing accounts in the public 
domain” (Mauthner et al., 2002: 1). To guide me in my research I was able to draw 
on my experience as a police officer; as such I was personally subject to the Scottish 
Police Service Code of Ethical Practice, which requires my personal commitment and 
observance of the following principles: integrity, transparency, accountability, 
responsibility and impartiality (ACPOS, 2009). Therefore, I used this code as my 
ethical framework during the research. 
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The sensitive nature of my research meant that the confidentiality of interview data 
and the anonymity of the interviewees were essential. Not only would they be 
discussing potential weaknesses in their own organisational responses to crisis but 
possibly partner organisations too. The confidentiality meant that private data 
identifying the interviewee would not be reported (Kvale, 2007). Moreover, to avoid 
any ethical dilemmas relating to disclosure, all participants were given an assurance 
that their responses would be completely confidential, limited to use for research by 
the researcher only.  
 
To counteract any fears about deception I provided full information about the research 
design and purpose to every subject (Kvale, 2007). It was an important part of my 
research process that interviewees had complete trust in my integrity and could be 
confident of my intentions.  
 
Finally I obtained informed consent from each of the interviewees and provided each 
with a summary of the research and obtained a signed consent form which detailed the 
conditions of participation and the protection that each would have. (Appendix C 
details the research summary and consent form).  
 
3.4 Qualitative Research Interviews 
 
Having put in place and assured the interviewees of the ethical nature of the research, 
I then prepared the interviews. The qualitative research interview is a construction site 
for knowledge and has been defined “as an interview with the purpose of obtaining 
descriptions of the life world of the interviewee with respect to interpreting the 
meaning of the described phenomena” (Kvale, 2007: 8). 
 
However, with interviews it is also recognised that the “interview setting, skill, and 
training of the interviewer, openness and frame of mind of the respondent, the 
subject under study, and a host of other mood situational factors enter into the 
process of collecting data via the interview” (Adams & Schvaneveldt, 1985: 213). 
Moreover, “for most researchers, the day-to-day demands of fieldwork are fraught 
regularly with feelings of uncertainty and anxiety” (Shaffir & Stebbin, 1991: 1-2).  
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In my case, I was fortunate to have benefited from extensive professional training and 
experience in conducting many types of interviews. As part of my professional 
development I have been trained in conducting investigative interviews, selection 
interviews, counselling interviews and research interviews, as well as cognitive 
interview techniques to enhance the quality of information obtained. I have also been 
trained in taped recorded interviews, the training for which included accurate noting 
and transcription of the information obtained during the interview. This minimised 
any anxiety I may have experienced in relation to the interview process. My 
experience also contrasted with the view that “a weekend course and an introductory 
interview textbook may be considered sufficient to embark on a PhD project based 
on interviews” (Kvale, 2007: 47). 
 
I considered that the use of qualitative interviews allowed the interviewees to respond 
personally to the questions posed, which gave me the opportunity to note any non-
verbal signs apparent during the interview. Additionally, because the interview was 
mutually arranged with me and respondent there was face-to-face contact allowing 
more complicated questions to be put. Consequently I felt that this method added 
depth to the research. Moreover the personal interviews ensured there was scope for 
the interviewee to locate records and documents as supplementary evidence before 
my arrival for the interview. 
 
However, I was aware that there are disadvantage with all interviews. For example, 
the lack of standardisation of personal interaction in any interview raises concerns 
about comparability and interviewer biases are difficult to rule out. Moreover, the 
time taken to conduct a face-to-face interview may be problematic. Finally the rich 
data collected may result in lengthy data analysis (Robson, 2002). However, I felt that 
these could be countered by the degree of professionalism in the conduct of the 
interview itself, setting out the guidelines of the interview discussion, and finding 
ways in which to allow the participant scope without drifting too far off topic.  
 
Having decided upon interviews to obtain data, I then considered which format the 
interviews should take. The three main varieties, which can be differentiated by the 
degree of structure imposed on its format, are the standardised or structured interview, 
 
83 
 
 
the semi-standardised and the non-standardised also called an unstructured or focused 
interview, are illustrated in Figure 4 below: 
 
3.4.1 The Verbal Data Dimension 
 
 
Unstructured 
  
Structured 
‘Open-ended’ interviews; 
just a few key open 
questions 
Semi-structured interviews, 
i.e. open & closed 
questions 
Structured questionnaires: 
simple, specific, closed 
questions 
(Figure 4 – The Verbal Dimension. Source: Based on Gillham, 2000: 6) 
 
There are advantages and disadvantages with each and these are discussed in more 
detail below. 
 
3.4.1.1 Unstructured  
 
In the unstructured interview there are no set questions or schedule but rather broad 
topics are used and the discourse dependent on interviewee. The topics covered 
during the interview are driven by participant and content rather than set questions. 
This form of interview can collect very rich and detailed data from the sample group 
which can contain very expressive and enlightening information (Wengraf, 2001). 
However, allowing participants too much freedom to talk through subjects of their 
choice can mean the topic of interest in the research study can be marginalised 
(Trochim, 2000). It can also be criticised for the lack of standardisation it results in 
(Robson, 2002). Moreover, because an unstructured interview is difficult to repeat it 
becomes difficult to compare the content from different interviewees. Consistency, 
therefore, becomes highly reliant on the professionalism of the interviewer. 
  
3.4.1.2 Structured 
 
The fully structured interview has predetermined questions with fixed wording and 
usually in a pre-set order. This type of interview is characterised by a staccato flow of 
answers and is question driven (Trochim, 2000). The fixed nature of the questions 
means that its content is consistent and comparisons can be made across interviews. 
However, there are disadvantages. It may not allow a respondent to provide rich data 
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which may have been triggered from a more open unstructured approach. The 
interviewer’s use of supplementary questions or probes is curtailed (Robson, 2002). 
Consequently the useful data or emergent topics may be missed and this can negate 
the usefulness and exploratory ability of interviewing (Trochim, 2000). 
 
3.4.1.3 Semi-structured 
 
The semi-structured interview has a set of predetermined questions and the interview 
process is loosely governed by those. However, there is flexibility to cover emergent 
subjects as and when participants’ raise them (Trochim, 2000).  The interviewer has a 
more proactive role in starting and guiding the interview and can identify emergent 
areas of interest not previously considered. The order of questions can be modified 
dependent on the interviewer’s perception of what seems most appropriate. Moreover, 
wording can be changed and explanations given to ensure that the interviewee 
understands the interviewer’s intention and meaning. In addition, if necessary the 
interviewer can omit questions or add new ones (Robson, 2002). 
 
For the purpose of this research I decided to use the semi-structured interview. This 
allowed me to gather more subjective views from the interviewees, and enabled 
greater flexibility and the opportunity to clarify any ambiguity.  It also meant that the 
interviewees could define their own situation and freely express their own opinions 
and understanding. Moreover, it allowed me, having previously studied the situation, 
to be alert and sensitive to inconsistencies and omissions of data that might be 
required to clarify the problem. I was able to change the order of the questions, if 
necessary to ensure appropriateness to the interview subject; “as there is evidence to 
suggest that the order of questions may affect the response rate” (Moser & Kalton, 
1971: 346).  
 
3.4.1.4 Telephone Interviews 
 
However, due to logistical difficulties in being able to arrange mutually suitable times 
and venues, two of the interviews were conducted over the telephone. These 
interviews followed exactly the same procedure as the others. Discussions had taken 
place to arrange access and the subjects were provided with a research summary and 
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consent form. However, I was aware that during these interviews I would not have the 
benefit of visual cues. The other disadvantage usually associated with telephone 
interviews, building rapport, was not a factor in this case. I knew both of the subjects 
and had discussed the research project with them while making the initial 
arrangements for the interview, which had the advantage of cutting down on the time 
required by me and more importantly for the interviewee (Wengraf, 2001). 
 
3.4.1.5 Pilot 
 
Before commencing any of the interviews I decided to pilot the question set. I felt that 
this would allow me to refine my data collection plans with respect to both the content 
of the data and procedures to be followed (Yin, 1994). I did this by identifying a 
number of subjects who worked in the SCG but would not be taking part in the 
research and having the question set reviewed by someone with knowledge of multi-
agency working and Integrated Emergency Management but who had never been a 
member of an SCG to determine whether the questions would be easily understood 
and elicit appropriate data. I intended that the pilot would: 
 
“…see how it works and whether changes are necessary before 
 the start of the full-scale study…It may also indicate the need for  
additional questions or the elimination of others”  
(Kidder, 1981: 162). 
 
In this case the pilot tested the quality of the questions to determine any inadequacies 
or misinterpretation of questions. In particular, whether they could be easily 
understood in terms of wording and instructions, and how the questions linked 
together in the interview setting. The pilot also provided me with an opportunity of 
using the question set and rehearsing the interview structure.  
 
Having piloted the question set the decision of who would form the research sample 
for interview and observation was taken. 
 
3.4.1.6 Sample 
 
The use of sampling is dependent on the purpose of the research. Probability samples 
are best for description of sample characteristics and explanation of the testing of 
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empirical hypotheses. On the other hand, purposive samples are best when the project 
includes exploration or theory development, developing and testing survey research 
instruments and selection of small number units (Arber, 1993). 
 
However, in this research I had no intention of making statistical generalisations to 
any population beyond those surveyed. Therefore I decided to use a purposive sample, 
rather than a probability sample. Small-scale surveys commonly employ non-
probability samples and they typically involve the researcher using his judgement to 
achieve a particular purpose. In doing so a sample is built up which enables the 
researcher to satisfy the specific needs of the project (Robson, 2002). In this case I 
sought to gain a wider understanding of the social processes and actions related to the 
SCGs, so using a probability sample would be unrealistic. Therefore, a purposive 
sample strategy was deemed more appropriate (Arber, 1993).  
 
Consequently I selected the interviewees specifically because of their membership of 
the SCGs. My selection ensured that Scotland’s 8 Strategic Coordinating Groups 
contributed. The sample included 11 types of organisations, reflecting Category 1 and 
2 responders, as well as the military and government, which ensured that the views 
from each of the partner agency were represented. Table 2 details the sample: 
 
SCGs: 8 Organisations: 11 Interviewees: 41 
Strathclyde 
Lothian & Borders 
Tayside 
Grampian 
Central 
Fife 
Highland & Islands 
(Northern Constabulary 
area) 
Dumfries & Galloway 
 
Police (inc BTP) 
Fire & Rescue Service 
Scottish Ambulance Service 
Maritime & Coastguard 
Agency (MCA) 
Health Service 
Local Authorities 
Scottish Environment 
Protection Agency 
Utilities 
MOD 
Scottish Government 
SCG (coordinator/advisor) 
11 
2 
2 
3 
 
2 
4 
1 
 
2 
1 
3 
10 
 
Table 2 – The Sample Distribution 
 
A total of 41 interviews were conducted lasting between 45 minutes and 2 hours each. 
Ironically the 45 minute interview was due to the subject being called to an SCG 
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meeting in relation to the ongoing pandemic flu. The locations of the interviews were 
mostly at the interviewee’s place of work, with 38 being held there and 1 at a 
mutually convenient hotel (for a subject with responsibility for Scotland and NI). Due 
to logistical difficulties in arranging personal interview 2 others were conducted over 
the telephone. Of the 42 subjects contacted originally only 1 declined to participate 
because he had only recently taken up the post which brought with it automatic 
membership of the SCG. The subject felt he would not be in a position to contribute 
to the research because he had not yet been involved in an SCG.  
 
3.4.1.7 Interview Schedule 
My initial consideration was to use Pauchant and Mitroff’s (1992) attitudinal study as 
the basis of the question set. They developed a questionnaire for each level of the 
Onion Model, strategies, structure, culture, and core beliefs and defence mechanisms, 
with the intention of enabling organisations to compare themselves to an ideal crisis 
prepared organisation.  However, these totalled 100 questions for all four layers, in 
addition to another 37 questions to make the comparison. Apart from the length and 
complexity of the questionnaire, I was concerned that the terms used in the attitudinal 
questions would lead the interviewees in their responses. For example ‘we can handle 
any crisis’, crisis management is someone else’s responsibility’, ‘is there a well-
established structure for crisis management?’ and ‘is crisis management integrated 
into the overall strategic management process?’ My objective was not to determine 
whether each member considered their own organisation was crisis prepared, rather it 
was to gather a breadth and depth of rich data based on the interviewee’s own 
perceptions of the SCG. This would include not only the component parts of the SCG, 
but also how they interacted as a system and delivered outcomes.  
The key issue with SCG membership is that it post-specific rather than based on crisis 
management or resilience expertise. Membership of the SCG rests with the chief 
executives or equivalent of the various member organisations. A condition of the 
SCGs membership is that they must be able to make executive decisions and commit 
resources on behalf of their own organisation to support the SCGs response to crisis 
(Scottish Executive, 2007). Therefore, the question set that was developed sought to 
elicit data on subjects’ experience and knowledge of crisis management and SCGs, 
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their views on training and skills necessary for effective crisis response, and any other 
related issues considered important by the interviewees. 
 
I was particularly interested in how the members would describe themselves and their 
role within the SCG. What their understanding was of the SCGs functions and 
processes, together with their knowledge of the other members and organisations. 
Because according to Weick (1993), if everyone knows the roles and responsibilities 
of all in the partnership, resilience will be enhanced because even in the event of a 
crisis the role system remains intact in the individual mind (Weick, 1993). Moreover, 
it is an expectation that all parties understand their respective roles in the SCG and the 
‘fit’ between their own organisation and the SCG (Scottish Executive 2007). 
 
The nature of the relationships in the SCGs was important because conflict among 
organisations responding to crises is a recurring problem (Comfort, 1990). But 
conflict can be mitigated through ‘Boundary Spanners’ that is those who link the 
various organisations within the network through encouragement and promotion of 
mutual benefits (Mulford, 1984; Weick 1993). Therefore, I hoped to elicit information 
from members describing their personal and organisational relationships with the 
other SCG members.  
 
In addition, I was interested in how they perceived the current SCGs structure and 
whether they would make any changes to it; and their views on the strengths and areas 
for improvement more generally of the SCGs. Not only their personal experience, but 
also their views of what Turner (1994b) described as ‘sloppy management’; examples 
of which include communication failures, groupthink and complacency.  
 
The final element of the question set was in relation to training and barriers to 
learning. A key element of collaborative networks and adaptive capability is having 
sufficient trained resources and learning lessons from crisis. Learning takes place at 
an individual and organisational level. At an individual level crisis training should be 
modelled on ill-structured and complex events (Turner, 1978; Gredler, 1992). While 
at an organisational level a number of barriers to learning have been identified, 
including rigid core beliefs, ineffective communications and defence mechanisms 
(Smith & Elliott, 2007). The questions around training sought to elicit data from the 
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interviewees on the value and effectiveness of training at an individual and 
organisational level, as well as whether there were any barriers to learning. These 
questions revealed a rich seam of data (Appendix D details the question set).  
 
The question as to whether the interviews should be taped was raised during the pilot. 
The consensus was that there was a reluctance to be taped, given the sensitivity of the 
material being discussed, which may include criticism not only of the respondent’s 
own organisation but also of other organisations and possibly individuals within them. 
This together with two separate high profile cases of data loss involving respondent 
organisations, which had recently been reported in the media, led to the decision not 
to tape the interviews. Therefore, rather than ask each respondent on a separate 
interview-by-interview basis I took the decision to adopt a standard approach with 
every interview and instead of recording them, extensive notes were taken. A similar 
approach was used by Van Maanen (1983) in his study of the Union City police 
department during which he used observations and interviews, together with informal 
interactions, which were not tape recorded.  
 
While it could be argued that to inexperienced interviewers tape recording would 
ensure everything was captured, accepting the loss of body language and visual cues, 
and therefore be the more beneficial approach. In my case because of my experience 
of conducting interviews I decided to use extensive notes, which I personally 
transcribed within 6 hours of the interview. Kvale (2007: 94) highlights that while 
interviewer bias may be present, the interviewer’s active listening and remembering 
skills also had the advantage of working as a ‘selective filter’ where the interviewer 
could “potentially retain those very meanings that are essential for the topic and the 
purpose of the interview”. My training meant that I was better placed to overcome 
interview bias and use my experience in retaining meanings and issues mentioned in 
the interview.  
 
In addition to the interviews observations were taken at a number of SCG training and 
exercising events. 
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3.5 Non-participant Observation 
 
Observations have been described as exceptional for studying processes, relationships 
among people and events, and the organisation of people and events (Jorgensen 
1989). Since I was interested in the activities and behaviour of people, and not just 
what they may have to say in relation to the SCG, I considered non-participant 
observations to be a highly useful form of data collection, because they centre on the 
ability to view what the individuals or groups do, record their actions and then find 
some way to describe their activities and analyse what is observed (Robson, 2002).  
 
I was someone who took no part in the activity under observation but whose status as 
a researcher was known to the participants. However, this in itself was not 
problematic as most SCG events have a parallel observer’s programme, which is used 
for shadowing and learning by others. At each of the events I attended there were at 
least two other observers present.  
 
Observations were taken at a number of events, which were selected to ensure a 
geographical spread across different SCGs and include different types of events. 
There was some overlap between interviewees and observations, with many of the 
interviewees participating in one or more of the exercises. However, given the scale 
of the exercises observed, there were many more participants involved in them that 
had not been interviewed. For example, Exercise Castle Rock involved 3 SCGs and 
almost 1000 people including UK Cabinet level ministers. The New Salesman 
Exercise involved 160 strategic representatives from across Scotland together with 
those from the military and Scottish and UK Government. Almost the entire chief 
police officer cadre in Scotland attended the ACPOS Counter Terrorism Command 
and Control Workshop. Furthermore, I was conscious that I could not possibly see 
absolutely everything that happened at the exercises. But I took the view that my 
collective observations would balance this and provide a realistic representation of all 
the issues that arose. These observations, together with the interviews and related 
documentation including exercise debriefs, provided sufficient rich data to make 
comparisons with the ideal or theoretical position and the real world as experienced 
by those involved in the SCGs. Unfortunately 2 exercises which I had arranged to 
observe were cancelled because of the demands on resources in dealing with the 
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ongoing flu pandemic. Ironically one was a national exercise with a flu pandemic 
scenario due to take place over 27 April to 22 May 2009. The other a maritime 
exercise hosted by Dumfries and Galloway SCG scheduled for 6 - 7 October 2009. 
However, those exercises and events that I took observations at are summarised in 
Table 3 below: 
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Observation Summary Table 
 
 
Exercise 
 
 
Subject/Type 
 
Date 
 
Exercise Aim 
National 
Ex Ancient 
Mariner 
Environment 
/weather 
2 & 3 March 
2009  
Aim: evaluate responders capabilities 
to deal with the challenges resulting 
from a severe weather incident 
impacting on regulated CNI 
National 
Ex New Salesman 
Terrorism 7 May 2009 Aim: preparation for forthcoming 
exercise. Crisis Management phase  
Fife 
Ex Double Six 
Pipeline 13 May 2009 Aim: Joint Test of Contingency Plans  
Strathclyde 
Ex Short Sermon 
CBRN 2 & 3 Sept 
2009 
Aim: compliance with the Radiation 
(Emergency Preparedness and Public 
Information) Regulations 2001  
National 
Ex Green Gate 
Decontamination 
Integration 
16 Sept 2009 Aim: consider Scotland wide 
arrangements for managing a CBRNE 
decontamination incident, specifically 
decontamination, mobilisation, 
deployment & coordination 
ScoRDS Strategic 
Crisis 
Management 
(Pilot) 
SCG Consequence 
Management in 
Terrorism Incident 
7 September 
2009  
Strategic manager: to ensure top-level 
managers responsible for their 
organisation plans can respond to 
emergencies effectively 
ScoRDS Strategic 
Management 
(Strathclyde) 
SCG Consequence 
Management in 
Terrorism Incident 
29 September 
2009 
Using a simulated emergency scenario 
exercise as a core structure with 
specific facilitated discussion, 
direction and learning aimed at key 
issues. 
ScoRDS Strategic 
Management 
(Strathclyde) 
SCG Consequence 
Management in 
Terrorism Incident 
30 September 
2009 
As above but with different 
participants.  
ACPOS  
CT C&C 
Workshop 
Counter-terrorism 
command & control 
21 January 
2010 
Aim: to develop a command and 
control structure for counter terrorist 
operations in Scotland, which can be 
tested during Exercise Castle Rock 
 
UK Government  
Ex Castle Rock 
Counter-terrorism 7 – 9 
September 
2010 
Aims: to test and evaluate:  
(i) Command & Control (C2) 
arrangements within a multiagency CT 
structure;  
(ii) the efficiency of information & 
intelligence flows;  
(iii) the interoperability across partner 
agencies in covert and overt terrorist 
investigations/incidents; and  
(iv) regional preparedness in response 
to a terrorist attack, in particular the 
consequence management and civil 
contingency issues 
Table 3 Observation Summary 
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3.6 Data Gathering and Analysis 
 
As well as being a police officer with experience of investigating and reporting 
complex cases, I am also an accredited project manager and have managed large-scale 
multiagency projects involving many people, documents and tasks. Therefore, my 
approach to data gathering and analysis was based on my police and project manager 
experience. I used the same techniques in the collation and management of interviews 
as I did as a police officer obtaining multiple witness statements. I sought to allow the 
interviewee to provide me with information, without it being distorted by my 
knowledge or even writing style; as in a police statement the interviewee’s words 
were noted as spoken, without changing the grammar or correcting slang. Every 
action was recorded as I would do in an investigation to ensure that there was no 
break in the evidential chain and that my actions could withstand judicial scrutiny in a 
court of law.  
 
In managing the interviews, having identified the interview sample set, I contacted 
each of them personally and made arrangements for the interview. I provided them 
with as much information as I could to ensure that they could prepare and be 
comfortable for the interview. The intention was not to surprise them or make the 
interview difficult but to obtain their interpretations of an environment that they knew 
intimately. I was conscious that my knowledge of the SCG was different to theirs 
because I did not share their experiences, culture and perceptions. So while I could 
broadly understand the environment and the context of their responses I knew their 
view was unique to them. Therefore, at each interview I assumed that the interviewee 
had information at deeper level that they may not even be aware of and my role was 
to obtain as much of it as possible without distortion, using the question set as a 
framework to keep the interview reasonably focused.   
 
In relation to the observations that I undertook, my approach was to maintain a 
continuous log of all activity that I could see. This reflected my training as a police 
officer dealing with major incidents. I noted everything I could whether it appeared 
relevant or not. I assumed that what I saw at any particular point may later become 
relevant but at the time of noting it I could not know. This is similar to dealing with 
large enquiries, where numerous sources of materials are initially gathered from 
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which closer inspection later may reveal a nugget of evidence. Other documentary 
sources used during the research included the legislation, formal guidance including 
Preparing Scotland, exercise briefings and debriefing reports. These enabled me to 
triangulate the data obtained from the interviews and observations, and highlight 
variances between the theoretical ideal world and the real world occupied and 
experienced by the interviewees and observed by me. All my activity and data 
gathered was managed as if it was part of a large scale project, which the research 
essentially was. 
 
One of the key characteristics of qualitative research is that data gathering and 
analysis should be concurrent activities (Coffey and Atkinson 1996). Consequently 
my analysis began after the first interview. The starting point for analysing the data 
was my transcription of the interviews and observation notes immediately after the 
interview or event. In every case the transcripts were completed within 6 hours. 
Having completed this process, I re-read the transcriptions highlighting topics or 
phrases that struck me as interesting or unusual without looking for anything in 
particular. This allowed me to identify ‘what went with what’ and ‘what was there’ or 
indeed was absent. Having undertaken a first cut of the data I then began making 
comparisons to identify underlying relationships and consider any emerging themes. 
Having worked through the data, I would disagree with the first part of Lee’s view 
that once qualitative data is collected it is a relatively simple process of analysis, 
while agreeing with the second part that it is characterised by being time consuming 
and with the emphasis on the process being clear, concise and repeatable (Lee, 1999). 
 
Rather than adopt a systematic analytical mode such as categorization and 
conversational analysis, the interview analysis was conducted without following any 
specific analytical method. This allowed me to move freely between different 
techniques. Kvale referred to this approach as bricolage, that is, “the use of a 
multiplicity of ad hoc methods and conceptual approaches” (Kvale, 2007: 115). The 
process reflected Figure 5 below, Carney’s (1990) Ladder of Analytical Abstraction, 
cited by Miles and Huberman (1994: 92): 
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Figure 5 - Carney’s (1990) Ladder of Analytical Abstraction 
 
3.6.1 Data Gathering - When to Stop? 
 
The difficulty with gathering qualitative data where there is no pre-determined sample 
size or number of observations, is deciding when to stop gathering data. In this case 
when it became clear that the interviews and observations were not yielding any new 
data, I decided to stop gathering data. However, before finally deciding to do no 
further data collection, I reviewed the empirical evidence which had emerged during 
the fieldwork phase with documentation such as the Preparedness Scotland Report 
and Audit Scotland, for example, which indicated that there were no obvious 
omissions from this study and that the sample was not uncharacteristic. 
 
3.7 The Use of Systems Models as Frameworks of Analysis 
 
Having gathered the data and identified a number of emerging themes I then used 
systems models as frameworks of analysis. The first model I used was the Formal 
Systems Model (FSM) (Fortune & Peters, 1994 & 2005), which focuses on common 
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areas of failure within systems. It combines the core systems concepts, which are 
necessary if a set of activities is to comprise a system capable of purposeful activity 
without failure. I used this model because it enables the researcher to take a holistic 
approach and describe a failure and explain why it occurred (White, 1995). 
Thereafter, I applied the Viable Systems Model (VSM) (Beer, 1979, 1981 & 1985) as 
an additional level of organisational analysis of the key processes, communications 
and information flows within the structure and relationships between them.  
 
The use of these systems models assisted me in gaining a greater level of 
understanding of complex situations. They enabled me to draw a comparison of the 
‘real world’ problems associated with the SCG with an ‘ideal’ paradigm, which is 
capable of purposeful activity without failure or problem. The comparison between 
both states engenders a level of understanding that enables the critical assessment of 
the real world system. The analysis is outlined in full in chapter 6. 
 
3.8 Chapter Conclusion 
 
This chapter highlighted that my research strategy was exploratory in nature, without 
fixed notions, using a flexible and adaptable approach to consider, interpret and 
explain emerging themes from the SCG. A qualitative approach was adopted, which 
utilised interview and observation techniques in order to understand the roles and 
relationships from the point of view of the subjects. It was argued that the qualitative 
methodology was flexible, allowing emerging themes to be pursued and 
organisational complexities and changes to be accommodated. Furthermore, because 
the analysis was both inductive and deductive drawing on an interpretative 
framework, it enabled themes to be generated from the empirical data. These could 
then be considered against current crisis management theory.  
 
Importantly, the use of data triangulation through interviews, observations and 
documents sought to address any concerns regarding data reliability and validity. 
However, given the sensitive nature of the research and data obtained, a firm ethical 
framework was established to ensure that no information disclosed by the participants 
would be attributed to them and would be treated in the utmost confidence. In 
addition, detailed notes were maintained regarding the purposive sample. Finally the 
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systems approach used for further analysis of the data was outlined. The systems 
context of the SCG is considered in the following chapter and emergent themes 
summarised.
 
98 
 
 
Chapter 4 - The Systems Context of the SCG  
 
This chapter examines the SCG using the first 3 levels of Pauchant & Mitroff’s Onion 
Model (1992): strategies; structure; and culture. It firstly considers the strategies and 
policies of the SCGs, namely risk, crisis and business continuity management, and the 
linkages between them, highlighting that resilience is an outcome of these activities. 
The structure of the SCG is then explored and the literature around policy networks 
and inter-organisational coordination in crises expanded. It highlights the distinction 
between the hierarchical organisational form associated with command and control 
and those of network management. In particular it identifies why managing a network 
is different from a hierarchical organisation and introduces specific tasks associated 
with effective network management. It also considers the challenges of measuring 
performance within an inter-organisational network. Finally, this chapter considers 
the culture of the SCG and what is required to deliver resilience through the SCGs 
network structure and strategies, which include information sharing and cooperation, 
risk assessment and management and business continuity planning and management. 
 
4.1 Strategies, Policies and Functions that enable the SCG to deliver Resilience  
 
The Civil Contingencies Act sets out policies and functions of the SCG. To achieve 
the outcome of resilience, the SCG adopts an Integrated Emergency Management 
approach to its planning, which reflects the phases necessary for effective crisis 
management (Comfort, 1988; Rosenthal, Charles & t’Hart, 1989; Mitroff & Pearson, 
1993; Boin et al., 2010). The IEM approach does not solely focus on response but 
includes: assessment; prevention; preparation; response; and recovery. It builds on 
risk assessment and business continuity planning to ensure crisis response capabilities 
and the outcome of resilience. The 5 elements of IEM are set out below: 
 
The assessment phase forms the basis of common planning and response; although 
the duty to assess risk rests with each category 1 responder in accordance with their 
functions. Importantly the SCG is not compelled to take action to reduce the 
likelihood of threats and hazards. They are only required to maintain plans to deal 
with the consequences of an emergency caused by the risk. In addition each SCG is 
required to publish a Community Risk Register setting out its assessments of the risks 
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it faces. A detailed examination of risk and business continuity management process 
is in the following section. 
 
The second phase is prevention, where agencies identify risk areas and these are 
addressed with the aim of eliminating or at least minimising the potential outcome. 
The guidance indicates that SCGs should consider prevention in terms of crises being 
‘nipped in the bud’ in the way that fire fighters stop a fire from spreading or highways 
authorities close a road or a bridge in the face of imminent collapse (Scottish 
Executive 2007). These particular examples indicate a focus on operational crisis, as 
opposed to strategic level crisis that the SCG would be activated for, the consequence 
of which will be considered later. In any event not all crises can be prevented, as this 
would require a level of foresight and understanding that governments do not have 
(Wilensky, 1967; Turner, 1978; Kam, 1988; Parker & Stern, 2005). Therefore, there is 
a need for strategies to deal with uncertain and unforeseen crisis. Here the “call for 
resilience increases as managers seek to balance the shortcomings of existing 
policies with the reality of increasing exposure to risk” (Boin et al., 2010: 5). 
However, SCGs cannot be compelled to act or undertake remedial works, such as 
flood defences, which might prevent a possible emergency at some future date.  
 
The third stage, preparation, is where agencies ensure that individually and 
collectively their systems and structures are sound enough to provide an effective 
response to any incident. Responders must be trained and facilities ready. This 
includes the preparation and testing of contingency plans for specific sites and events, 
as well as readiness for those incidents that are unforeseen, which is the real challenge 
(Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). Such planning is an important component of an effective 
response (Banerjee & Gillespie, 1994; Pearson & Clair, 1998). It not only reduces 
organisational vulnerability, but assists crises managers to cope with the challenges of 
response (Chong, 2004). But the existence of a plan is not enough to guarantee 
success (Paraskevas, 2006), other components required include leadership, 
competence, preparation, a healthy organisation, equipping of staff, strong 
relationships and financial commitment (Grigg, 2003).  
 
The fourth phase is response. An important aspect of successful response is 
communication and a clear understanding of roles and responsibilities. But 
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uncertainty as to the cause of crises, time pressures and confusion about who should 
make decisions will make coordination a challenge (Brecher, 1979; Drabek, 1985; 
Janis, 1989). Moreover, conventional policy-making and bureaucratic organisations 
are not well designed to manage threats that emerge rapidly in unforeseen and often 
undetectable ways (Boin et al., 2010). During the response phase the SCG will work 
towards a set of common objectives. These are to preserve life, property and the 
environment; to minimise the harmful effects of the event; to prevent its escalation; 
and to facilitate the investigation into its cause. While the initial response aims to deal 
principally with immediate effects, the response will incorporate suitable 
collaboration arrangements. The response phase is normally coordinated by the 
police. However, in the event of slow onset or less localised emergencies other 
organisations may be required to take the lead, e.g. pandemic would likely be led by 
health agencies.  
 
The fifth and final stage, recovery, addresses the broader impact of the event. During 
the recovery phase the human, physical, environmental and economic aspects are 
considered. Lessons must be learned about the causes and effects of the response 
(Stern, 1997). However, the ‘politics of crisis management’ may affect the learning 
process (Boin et al., 2010).  This phase should not be considered as a discrete and 
linear element but rather an integral part of the combined response. The aim of the 
recovery stage is for the agencies to enable a return to normality as safely and rapidly 
as possible (SECG, 2002).  
 
Having considered the SCG’s 5 stage approach to achieving resilience, key to which 
is the assessment stage, the following section considers risk assessment and business 
continuity management in more detail.  
 
4.1.1 An Examination of Risk and Business Continuity Management by the SCG 
 
The Civil Contingencies Act places risk assessment duties on all Category 1 
responders. Each SCG must publish a Community Risk Register, reflecting the 
individual assessments of the members. The Act also requires Category 1 responders 
to maintain business continuity plans to enable them to perform their functions in the 
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event of an emergency and that the impact of the emergency is minimised (Scottish 
Executive 2007).   
 
4.1.2 Risk Assessment and Management  
 
It is said that “…risk is ubiquitous and no human activity can be considered risk 
free” (Hood et al. 1992:35). Organisational activity can incubate and create the 
potential for systems failure or crisis (Turner, 1978). One of the main reasons that 
crises occur is organisations fail to recognise risk warning signs or their significance 
(Fink, 2002). Consequently, crises are usually preceded by periods where the 
organisation drifts towards states of increasing risk until the disruptive events occur 
(Rasmussen, 1997). It is when organisations do not have effective risk management 
that crises can occur.  
 
Unfortunately, there is no clear and commonly agreed definition of what the term 
‘risk’ actually means. It has been described as the exposure to the chance of loss 
(Leiss & Chociolko, 1994); as a combination of the probability of a defined hazard 
and the magnitude of the consequences of the occurrence (Warner, 1992); the chance 
that somebody will be harmed by a hazard (HSE, 2002); as uncertainty of outcome 
(whether positive opportunity or negative threat) from the combination of the chance 
of an event and its consequences (OGC, 2001); something that might happen and its 
effect(s) on the achievement of objectives (Draft BS 31100, 2007); and the 
combination of the probability of an event and its consequences (AIRMIC 2002). 
Finally in the official guidance issued by the Scottish Government, Preparing 
Scotland, risk measures “the significance of a potential event in terms of likelihood 
and impact; where in the context of the Civil Contingencies Act, the events in 
question are emergencies” (Scottish Executive, 2007: 246). 
 
In sum, there is no single definition of risk and it cannot be considered as if it were a 
single uniform substance (Watson, 1981).  According to Turner “we are now in a 
situation where no single view of risk can claim authority or is wholly acceptable” 
(Turner, 1994b:148). Beck goes further by claiming “There is no expert on risk” 
(Beck, 1992:29). Different cognitive approaches, mental models of risk and 
communications about risk, all reflect implicit assumptions and convey different 
 
102 
 
 
impressions. These collective or shared assumptions have been described as culture 
(Schein, 1992; Hofstede, 1990; Mitroff et al., 1989), which in relation to risk are those 
organisational norms, roles, beliefs, attitudes, and social and technical practices 
concerned with minimising danger to individuals (Toft & Reynolds, 2005). Culture 
can institutionalise risk in different ways. For example, it has been highlighted that 
although Public Sector Organisations face the same threats and classification of risks 
as private and not-for-profit sectors, they are accountable to a wider range of 
stakeholders and are exposed to greater political and social dimensions in decision 
making (Drennan & McConnell, 2007).  
 
4.1.3 Risk Management Process 
 
Not only is there a variety of definitions of risk, but the term risk management may 
mean different things to different people. Risk management within organisations has 
been described as the establishment of culture, processes and structures to manage 
potential opportunities and adverse effects (PAS 56:2003). The key elements of a risk 
management programme are to: communicate and consult with stakeholders, establish 
the context, identify, analyse, evaluate and treat the risks, thereafter continually 
monitor and review the findings (AS/NZS 4360, 2004; Scottish Executive, 2007).  
 
Figure 6 below outlines the risk management process advocated by the Scottish 
Government. The process is consistent with the risk management process used at 
various levels of government. It is suggested that adopting this process will promote 
better communication of risk between different levels of government and between 
local areas (Scottish Executive, 2007:118).  
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Generally the purpose of the risk management programme is to provide a 
comprehensive appreciation of all the factors that may have an influence on the ability 
of an organisation to achieve its intended outcomes. Following evaluation of the 
severity of the risk a number of treatment options may be considered. These options 
would include transferring the risk perhaps through insurance, accepting the risk and 
doing nothing, treating the risk by designing it out or reducing it, avoiding the risk by 
doing something differently, and when strategically viable developing business 
continuity plans for the residual risks. The risk management strategies adopted will 
vary depending on the nature of the organisation, including management style and 
organisational goals (Archbold, 2004). 
 
Smallman (1996) discusses risk management in terms of reactive and proactive. The 
former identifies current threats using statistical models and past experience. The 
latter relies on risk assessment based on the situation awareness of the assessor to 
identify current and potential threats. A key element of the risk management debate is 
the appropriate point on the continuum between the two. Wildavsky (1988) views 
Figure 6 The Risk Management Process. Source: Preparing Scotland 2007: 111 
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resilience and anticipation as separate and proposes that strategies of anticipation 
work best against known problems, whereas strategies of resilience work best against 
unknown ones. Each strategy is appropriate to specific conditions: resilience when 
there is greater uncertainty and anticipation when the environment is steady state and 
predictable. However, Comfort et al. (2001) argue that they are complementary. 
 
Boin and Lagadec (2000) also combine both strategies. They acknowledge that 
resilience is the key to coping but that it is important for organisations to plan and 
prepare accordingly; thus achieving resilience through an anticipatory approach. Boin 
and Lagadec (2000) emphasise that preparation not only means planning but requires 
anticipation of crises and the creation of organisational resilience strategies. In their 
view organisational preparation should consist of a continuous programme of training, 
testing and learning from experience, thus ensuring that crisis management becomes 
embedded in core organisational processes and values. In relation to resilience, 
organisations require monitoring systems for detecting warning signals together with 
processes and communication channels to quickly activate appropriate response units 
with strategic authority to act in all crisis situations.  
 
Having set out the risk assessment and management processes, highlighting how they 
are integrated in a wider crisis management approach, BCM is examined in detail and 
placed as part of the risk treatment stage of the risk management process. In the 
following section BCM is considered in terms of organisational resilience. 
 
4.1.4 Business Continuity Management 
 
Business Continuity Management is part of the ‘risk treatment’ stage of the risk 
management process. It depends on the outcomes of a rigorous process of risk 
identification, analysis and evaluation without which organisational threats would be 
unclear and plans deficient. Importantly it is acknowledged that the risks could be 
external to the organisation, such as power outages or severe weather, or from an 
internal source, such as systems failure or loss of key staff. The Scottish Government 
defines BCM as  
 
“a management process which helps manage the risks to  
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the smooth running of an organisation or delivery of a service  
by ensuring that it can continue to operate, as necessary to the  
extent required, in the event of a disruption”  
(Scottish Executive, 2007: 141)  
 
Waterer (1999) describes business continuity as an ongoing process ensuring the 
continual operation of critical business processes through the evaluation of risk and 
resilience and the implementation of mitigation measures. Likewise the British 
Standard describes business continuity as the capability of an organisation to plan for 
and respond to disruptions. Its definition of business continuity management 
addresses broader issues now required to ensure resilience in organisations:  
 
“a holistic management process that identifies potential impacts  
that threatens an organisation and provides a framework for building  
resilience and capability for effective response that safeguards the  
interests of its key stakeholders, reputation, brand and value creating 
activities” (BS25999, 2006:1). 
 
In terms of the Act, responders are expected to adopt simple generic planning which 
builds on their day-to-day activity. To assist responders in developing business 
continuity for their organisations the five-stage process developed by the Business 
Continuity Institute and subsequently incorporated into the British Standard BS 25999 
is recommended by the Scottish Government. The components of which are: 
understanding the organisation; developing strategies; implementing response; 
maintenance, exercise and reviewing; and embedding BCM in the organisation’s 
culture. This is illustrated in Figure 7 below. 
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Figure 7 – The BCM Lifecycle (Business Continuity Institute, 2008) 
 
A key component of understanding the organisation is identifying and evaluating the 
perceived threats that could disrupt the delivery services and identifying the activities, 
assets and resources, including those outside the organisation, that support their 
delivery (BS25999). The risk assessment activity within this element helps to identify 
potential causes of interruption to the organisation, the probability of occurrence and 
the impact of the threat being realised and when conjoined with the business impact 
analysis, which assesses the impact over time, enables the focus to be on the inherent 
risks identified as most urgent (BCI, 2008). This is similar to establishing the context 
within a risk management programme, which includes the examination of the internal 
and external environments, the critical infrastructure and interdependencies of an 
organisation, the key strategic objectives and the major stakeholders (HB 223, 2006).  
 
At the heart of business continuity is the advance planning and preparations which are 
necessary to identify the impact of potential losses and formulate viable recovery 
strategies (Hiles & Barnes, 2001). By thoroughly assessing the threats to it, an 
organisation will be able to identify the business areas that are important to secure 
(AXA, 2004).  The need for preparation and planning is spelled out by the Scottish 
Government, which considers BCM to be  
 
“a continuous process which will help organisations anticipate, 
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 prepare, prevent, respond and recover from disruptions, whatever 
 their source and whatever aspect of the business they affect” 
 (Scottish Executive, 2007: 146). 
 
Although the finished plan is important it has been suggested that the actual process 
of creating the plan is the really important part, as serious thought will have been 
given to the business and the possible effects on it (Savage, 2002). Notwithstanding 
that, the aim of the finished plan is to ensure that not only does the organisation 
survive a disruption, but so far as possible continue normal operations in the event of 
a crisis. BCM therefore must go beyond the writing of a plan or of a simple process. It 
must become embedded in the daily activity of the organisation. This requires all 
levels of an organisation to appreciate that risk is inherent in every decision and 
activity and has the potential to cause disruption. This understanding, together with 
the training of staff, exercising plans and reviewing procedures is necessary for 
effective BCM activity.  
 
It is argued that BCM is part of an organisation’s risk treatment and that the BCM 
process provides organisations with the ability to plan for and manage disruptions. It 
also enables prioritisation of resources to implement measures to reduce the 
likelihood or mitigate the threats which could cause disruption. Therefore, an 
organisation will be able to gather the necessary data to formulate and implement a 
coherent strategy for managing risk, if the organisation’s BCM exists in a tightly 
bound interrelationship with risk management (HB221, 2004). Such a strategy will 
mitigate the key strategic risk for any organisation that it would be unable to continue 
with its core functions. In other words, the combination of risk, business continuity 
and crisis management capability is sufficient to ensure organisational resilience.  
 
4.1.5 Do Risk, Business Continuity & Crisis Management Equal Resilience? 
 
The relationship between risk and business continuity management is subject to 
debate. The Department of Trade & Industry (DTI) see a firm link between risk and 
BCM, but makes the distinction that BCM is more concerned with those threats and 
risks that can cause corporate catastrophes (DTI, 1999). Others suggest that BCM 
should be seen as a parallel activity to risk management (Norrman & Jansson, 2004). 
However, both the BCI Good Practice Guidelines (2008) and the British Standard 
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BS25999 (2006) describe the relationship as complementary. Likewise Halls (2006), 
states that risk management at its simplest means identifying the risks to a business, 
analysing them and managing them. He argues that risk management underpins all of 
business continuity planning. Therefore risk and BCM could be described as being 
about managing all types of risk, building resilience into all aspects of an 
organisation, and having solutions in place when things do not go according to plan 
(Graham & Kaye, 2006). It is therefore suggested that risk management and BCM 
should be considered as part of an integrated whole, with BCM being seen as an 
outcome from the risk management programme. 
 
However, Gibson and Tarrant (2010) highlight that early concepts of organisational 
resilience, tended to consist of the ‘re-badging’ of business continuity management. In 
their view, this was a highly prescriptive approach, which had the potential to reduce 
resilience. Because of the limitations of business continuity plans being based on 
known potential risks, their concern were that organisations would be unable to 
respond to ‘black swan’ events (Taleb, 2007). The key difference in dealing with ill-
defined and unexpected incidents, such as ‘black swan’ events, is the organisational 
ability to respond beyond any existing plan. It has, therefore, been suggested that a 
complete organisational resilience strategy would incorporate a preventative (risk 
management), coping (crisis management) and recovery (BCM) dimension (Then & 
Loosemore, 2006). Such a combination of emergency, risk and business continuity 
management will enable organisations to deal with crisis through enhanced resilience 
(Scottish Executive 2007). This is similar to the Integrated Functions Model, which 
based on effective risk management can “be major contributors to organisational 
resilience” (Gibson & Tarrant, 2010: 8).  
 
In practice establishing the context of the risk programme would be the basis for the 
BCM. Similarly the initial anticipation and analysis would be the starting point for a 
crisis management programme. Therefore, crisis management should be seen in the 
context of a wider risk management programme. In effect business continuity and 
crisis planning would be directly linked to the treatment of risks within the risk 
management programme. For example, an appropriate treatment for a risk would be to 
implement strategies designed to reduce the likelihood of events occurring that could 
 
109 
 
 
lead to the disruption of the operations and produce plans of action for 
implementation should the disruption happen (HB221, 2004).  
 
In a risk management programme the risk assessment helps to identify potential 
causes of interruption to an organisation, the likelihood of occurrence and its affect on 
business objectives. In contrast, BCM uses a Business Impact Analysis (BIA) to 
identify the urgency of each business activity or process and assesses the impact of its 
disruption. This information is used to identify the timescale of appropriate continuity 
and resumption strategies for each activity individually and in relation to each other 
(BCI, 2008). In other words it provides a means of identifying and prioritising the 
types of events that could cause disruption to the processes of an organisation. 
Similarly crisis management anticipates early warning signals and analyses the related 
scenarios and associated risks in preparation of counter-action plans to use when 
responding. 
 
There is, therefore, a clear distinction between the risk management programme focus 
and that of the BCM programme. However, risk, business continuity and crisis 
management all reinforce the view expressed by Graham & Kaye (2006) that as risk 
management can lead to a better understanding of an organisation and its business, so 
BCM (or crisis management) can provide the strategic framework to review the way 
an organisation provides its services, while increasing its resilience to disruption. 
 
To summarise the debate about risk, business continuity and crisis management it can 
be broken down into the management of the risk to the organisation while maintaining 
the continuity of business. Ultimately an organisation’s strategies and decisions are 
based on an assumption of business continuing. Any event that violates this 
assumption is a significant occurrence affecting its ability to fulfil its business 
objectives. As Graham & Kaye colourfully described it,  
 
“if an organisation allows itself to die during a risk incident –  
the best continuity (or crisis) planning will provide nothing 
more than a mechanism for trying to revive an already dead 
horse” (Graham & Kaye, 2006:iii).  
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4.2 The Structure of the Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) 
 
The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 provides a single framework for civil protection 
and will “reinforce partnership working at all levels” (Scottish Executive 2007: 56). 
It recognises that interrelated systems provide essential services in Scotland and as 
networks have become more complex the range of challenges in maintaining 
resilience has broadened. Such complexity requires collaborative partnerships 
working towards common outcomes. Thus the expectation of the Act is that local 
authorities, the emergency services and the health sector, along with other key service 
providers, will collaborate and be able to provide normal services in crises, so far as is 
reasonably practicable. It is also expected that organisations not detailed in the 
legislation, such as the Procurator Fiscal and military, or specific organisations within 
the voluntary and business sectors, will be fully involved as necessary. The Act 
divides local responders into two categories: 
 
 Category 1 responders are the emergency services, local authorities, health 
boards, the Maritime & Coastguard Agency and the Environment Agency 
 Category 2 responders are the utilities, telecommunications, harbour 
authorities, rail operators and the Health & Safety Executive 
 
The policy of resilience is predicated on the implementation of specific tasks by the 
SCG, which are: 
 risk assessment  
 business continuity management (includes training & exercising) 
 emergency planning (includes training & exercising) 
 warn, inform and advise the public 
 promotion of BCM for business and voluntary organisations 
 co-operation and  
 information sharing 
Exercises must include procedures for evaluation, identifying lessons, establishing 
improvement programmes, if necessary, as well as monitoring progress on actions 
taken. The outcomes of all joint exercises are reported to the SCG. The duties of the 
SCG are illustrated in diagram below: 
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Figure 8 - A Systems Model of how the duties of the Act fit together to deliver 
Resilience: 
Cooperation
&
Information 
Sharing
Public 
Communication
Business & 
Voluntary 
Sector Advice
Emergency Planning
&
Business Continuity Management
Risk Assessment
 
(Adapted from Scottish Executive 2007: 52) 
This research will focus only on those activities of the SCG related to its crisis 
management, namely cooperation and information sharing, risk assessment, 
emergency planning and business continuity management. Excluded from the 
research is the public communication of the risks in relation to emergencies because 
that responsibility is discharged by the SCG publishing its Community Risk Register. 
The advice to the business and voluntary sector is the responsibility of the local 
authority alone and is also excluded from the research. 
The foundation of the Government's crisis management is the concept of resilience. 
This is defined as the ability "at every relevant level to detect, prevent and, if 
necessary, to handle and recover from disruptive challenges" (Scottish Executive 
2007: 15). According to the guidance, resilience consists of several key activities: 
assessment, prevention, preparation, response and recovery; complemented by review 
of plans and arrangements based on experience of emergencies and exercises.  
 
112 
 
 
Scottish resilience is aligned with the principles of Integrated Emergency 
Management (IEM), which establishes a common multiagency planning framework 
linking the management of the emergency services with local authorities and other 
agencies. Such integration brings effective coordination between and within 
organisations and tiers of response; although the guidance Preparing Scotland 
specifically states that the framework is “generally not a hierarchy” (Scottish 
Executive 2007: 109), rather it is functionally based framework, with an ascending 
order of operational (bronze), tactical (silver) or strategic (gold) responsibility 
depending on the scale of the crisis. The principle of ‘subsidiarity’ is applied, that is, 
control of operations is exercised at the lowest practical level and the highest 
necessary for the coordination and support of local activity (Scottish Executive 2007). 
The operational level refers to the on scene coordination of tasks by the Police 
Incident Officer (PIO), located at the Forward Control Point (FCP). The command of 
resources belonging to any agency is retained by that agency, which allows them to 
concentrate on specific tasks within their area of responsibility; although each agency 
must liaise fully and continually with others employed within the same area to ensure 
efficient and combined effort. For more serious incidents it may be necessary to 
establish a tactical level of management to determine priorities in allocating resources, 
to plan and coordinate when a task will be undertaken, and to obtain other resources 
as required. The tactical level of management will be situated apart from the incident 
at the Incident Control Post (ICP). The tactical commander should not become 
involved in the activities being discharged at the operational level; although the 
establishment of inter-service communication infrastructure will be established to 
support the running of the incident at the scene. If it becomes apparent that resources 
or expertise beyond the tactical level is required, or should there be a need to 
coordinate more than one incident or scene, a strategic level of management will be 
implemented. Situated at a Strategic Coordinating Centre, the purpose of the Strategic 
Coordinating Group (SCG) is to establish a bespoke framework of policy relevant to 
the current crisis and plan for the return to normality. Tactical decisions are not the 
responsibility of the SCG and it should not attend the scene (SOHD 1998). 
The SCG role also encompasses government interests and media demands. The SCG 
is not subordinate to central government but if the incident escalates beyond a single 
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SCG and remains in Scotland, the Scottish Government may activate Scottish 
Government Resilience Room (SGoRR) to provide an overall coordinated response. 
In a case which requires the coordination and support from a number of UK 
Government departments or has other UK implications, the Cabinet Office Briefing 
Room (COBR) would be opened to provide collective decision making and 
communication; formal communication channels with the Scottish Government would 
be maintained through SGoRR (Scottish Executive 2007). Figure 9 below illustrates 
the various management levels, related components and the linkages between them 
that form an Integrated Emergency Response to a crisis in Scotland.  
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Figure 9 A Schematic Representation of Integrated Emergency 
Management in Scotland. Source: SOHD 1998:11 
 
Outer Cordon 
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4.2.1 An Examination of the SCG Structure 
Currently there is an ongoing debate about what is an appropriate organisational 
structure to deal with crisis (see Drabek, 2007). The SCG is described as ‘generally 
not a hierarchy’, although the emergency services normally operate with ‘command 
and control’ structures which are hierarchical and rank based. This is a key aspect of 
the research and raises the question, how does the SCG deliver the UK Government’s 
policy on resilience; operating hierarchically or as a network. The following section 
will consider both hierarchies and networks as coordinating mechanisms and highlight 
that in dynamic environments, networks are seen to be more adaptable and therefore 
appropriate to managing crisis. However, there are considerations that need to be 
taken into account in relation to network performance.  
4.2.2 Which Structure Provides the Most Effective Means of Coordination in a 
Dynamic Environment - Hierarchies or Networks?  
 
A traditional hierarchical structure clearly defines each employee’s role within the 
organisation and the nature of their relationship with other employees. Hierarchical 
organisations generally have narrow spans of control and centralised decision-making 
by senior management, which restricts the autonomy of those lower in the hierarchy 
(Peters, 1998). Hierarchy is closely linked to bureaucracy. Weber (1924) saw the 
bureaucratic organisation as logical, rational and technically superior to all other 
forms (Gerth & Mills, 1948). Therefore, he considered bureaucracies to be highly 
efficient systems of coordination and control (Pugh & Hickson, 1989). The defining 
characteristics of hierarchical bureaucracy are systematic administration involving the 
specialisation of functions, objective qualifications and qualities of office, acting only 
according to a fixed set of rules and a hierarchy of authority; with the process of 
bureaucratic operation to coordinate the tasks (Frances et al., 1993).  
 
There are clear advantages of hierarchical bureaucracies. Complex problems can be 
broken down into manageable and repetitive tasks, coordinated by a command 
structure (Beetham, 1993). Therefore, properly structured it can release energy and 
creativity, rationalise productivity and actually improve moral (Jaques, 1993). Its 
rules reduce arbitrariness in decision by treating each the same. It sets out clear lines 
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of responsibility of management which should assist in consistency of decision 
making. It can also coordinate large scale complex actions successfully (Frances, et 
al., 1993). Moreover, it is the only form of organisation that can enable an 
organisation to employ a large number of people and preserve unambiguous 
accountability for what they do (Jaques, 1993). 
  
However, hierarchical bureaucracy is often criticised. It lacks flexibility because 
issues are referred up the hierarchy for decisions to be made by more senior 
management. In addition, those on different tiers of the hierarchy may have different 
understandings further diminishing communications (Carroll, 1998). One 
consequence of such demarcation is that information flows have unnecessary time 
lags (Ackoff, 1967). It is also suggested that hierarchical bureaucracies are at their 
worst in unusual situations requiring initiative (Granot, 1999). The criticism being 
that the use of standardised rules and procedures brings a lack of flexibility in 
dynamic situations. Furthermore, conformity to the norms of the bureaucracy 
supersedes the needs of other departments and organisations (Frances et al., 1993). In 
other words the formal rules of the organisation become subordinate to the workplace 
norms and ideologies (Hynes & Prasad, 1997). Gouldner’s (1954) study of 
organisational bureaucracy identified a number of bureaucratic patterns in relation to 
rule compliance. Of particular interest in this study is the term ‘mock bureaucracy’, 
by which he describe the collapse of rules in an organisation. The concept of mock 
bureaucracy is used in chapter 7 as an analytical lens to explain the variances between 
theory and practice in relation to the SCGs.  
 
Bureaucracies have also been criticised because they do not consider informal aspects 
of organisations, such as the development of groups with their own goals or internal 
conflicts: 
 
 “Weber's model of organisational efficiency assumes that all  
aspects of the individual personality which are not relevant to  
the strict performance of his or her duties will be cast off as the  
individual enters the organisation, or suppressed through effective 
socialisation” (Beetham, 1993: 133).  
 
However, this does not consider the reality of relationships, which do not exist in such 
depersonalised, rigid and predictable terms. In reality individuals have personal needs 
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and expectations and the way in which they interact socially will impact on their 
performance. Because of these criticisms it has been suggested that  
 
“The organisations that get things done will no longer be  
hierarchical pyramids … they will be systems – interlaced webs 
 of tension in which control is loose and power diffused” 
 (Cleveland, 1972: 13)  
 
Cleveland’s (1972) description above portrays inter-organisational networks. 
Networks are often thought of as ‘flat’ organisational forms, which contrast to the 
vertically organised hierarchical forms associated with bureaucracies (Frances et al, 
1993). In contrast to bureaucracies, networks consist of low formalisation, have a 
comprehensive information network throughout the organisation and involve high 
participation in decision making (Burns & Stalker, 1961). Networks are generally 
defined as a type of relation linking a defined set of persons, objects or events 
(Aldrich & Whetten, 1981; Scharpf, 1978); where mutual dependency is the key 
(Benson, 1982; Hakansson & Johanson, 1993). Therefore, networks are characterised 
by mutuality, complementarity, reciprocity, conflict and collaboration and these exist 
within the totality of connections between various participants (Knoke & Kuklinski, 
1993). 
 
In the context of crisis, inadequate resources create powerful motivations for 
cooperative effort (Granot, 1999). Cooperation requires trust between the networks 
participants, which Granovetter (1985) argues is most effective at an individual rather 
than institutional level. The cooperation enhances the organisational development of 
knowledge (Johanson & Mattsson, 1993) and strengthens individual capabilities, as 
well as their organisations (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). The network interactions allow 
members to jointly consider challenges and create solutions, within their own 
individual and collective capabilities. Key to this activity is the reciprocal knowledge 
inherent within network relations. The benefits include increased knowledge, research 
and innovation; and these justify the continued participation of members within the 
network. Therefore networks not only integrate diverse and disparate pieces of new 
knowledge but “allow the combination of different kinds of expertise” (Alter & 
Hage, 1993: 28). So not only is the interaction between networks an adaptation 
process it is also a learning process (Johanson & Mattsson, 1993). 
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However, the effectiveness of a network as a learning process, as well as its general 
activity, can be influenced both positively and negatively by the nature of the 
relationships.  Too little may expose networks to an erosion of their supportive tissue 
of social practices, whereas too much may pervert networks into cohesive coalitions 
against more radical innovations (Grabher, 1993). Therefore it is important to note 
that while networks are cooperative they are not characterised solely by collaboration, 
harmony and concord (Granovetter, 1985; Powell, 1993; Hakansson & Johanson, 
1993). Network interactions provide the potential for both areas of common interest 
and conflict. In this sense network relations could be a cooperative means for dealing 
with and resolving conflicts between participating members (Hakansson & Johanson, 
1993). But the structure of relations among participants and their location in the 
network has important behavioural, perceptual and attitudinal consequences both for 
the individual units and for the system as a whole (Knoke & Kuklinski, 1993). So the 
resolution of such disputes needs the mutual adjustment of at least part of the 
perceptions of those involved and this may prove difficult because their perceptions 
are related to their basic beliefs, which define their identity and guide how they select 
information (Termeer & Koppenjan, 1997).  
 
Another important element in network performance is cohesion. Ouchi (1980) found 
that highly cohesive groups had lower communication and coordination costs and 
could thus apply greater attention to problems under time pressure. Cohesion is 
engendered when members have spent a great deal of time together or the group has 
experienced external threats that have brought the members close together. However, 
a danger of extreme cohesion is groupthink (Janis, 1982), a phenomenon in which the 
norm for consensus overrides the realistic appraisal of alternative courses of action. 
This can dramatically hinder performance and seems to occur most often when there 
is a clear group identity; when members hold a positive image of their group that they 
want to protect; and when the group perceives a collective threat to this positive 
image (Turner & Pratkanis, 1997). It can also lead to groupshift, when there’s a more 
extreme shift in position within the group than the member would make individually. 
More often the shift is toward greater risk (Kogan & Wallach, 1967). Causes of such 
groupshift include membership familiarisation leading them to be bold and daring; 
although the most plausible explanation is that the group diffuses responsibility so 
greater risks can be taken because should it fail no single member will be held 
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responsible (Clark, 1971). 
 
Determining responsibilities and powers in network situations can be problematic. 
The complexity of networks means it is not always possible to establish cause and 
effect connections with individual members. Therefore, it is desirable that 
responsibilities should be allocated as clearly as possible (Bruijn & Ringeling, 1997).  
Although once a network is established it does not remain static. Ross (1980) 
considered the dynamic nature of crises and identified emergent factors which could 
influence interagency networks and relations. First, the number of participating 
organisations decreases over time. Second, leadership involvement diminishes and 
responsibility devolves to someone for whom it is just one more responsibility. Third, 
contacts become less innovative and ever more routine. Fourth, over time there is a 
tendency to develop greater specialisation with specific aspects of emergency 
response, rather than considering the overall response. Therefore, effective network 
management needs to ensure that commitment to the network by the various 
organisation leaders remains in the long run, even when the network is dealing with 
routine business. 
 
Notwithstanding, the network performance issues highlighted above, the crisis 
response in modern society is still best characterised in terms of a network (Boin & 
‘tHart, 2007), because crisis decisions are not taken by individual leaders or by small 
informal group of senior policy makers, rather they emerge from various alternative 
loci of decision making and coordination (‘tHart, Rosenthal & Kouzmin, 1993; 
McConnell, 2003). Although it has been suggested that political leadership is essential 
for sustaining the appropriate degree of attentiveness to the problem of coordination 
across many organisations (LaPorte, 2006).  
 
In terms of the SCG, the most closely matched type of network is the Policy Network. 
These networks are characterised by stability of relationships, continuity of a highly 
restrictive membership, vertical interdependence based on shared service delivery 
responsibilities and insulation from other networks (Rhodes, 1991). Klijn defines a 
policy network as:  
 
“more or less stable patterns of social relations between  
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interdependent actors, which take shape around policy  
problems and/or policy programmes” (Klijn, 1997: 30)  
 
Policy Networks have been described as representative of the all pervasive 
functionalism in the organisation of British government, in that they set out the 
parameters of government policy within which local decisions can be based (Rhodes, 
1991). However, crisis management should not be viewed just in terms of the coping 
capability of governmental institutions and public policies; it should be considered a 
deeply controversial and intensely political activity (Habermas, 1975; Edelman, 1977; 
‘tHart, 1993). Peters (1998) concludes that reform of government structures is not 
enough to improve coordination. Active and sustained intervention by political 
leaders will be necessary to achieve lasting results.  
 
The policy network approach builds on the tradition of political science of analysing 
policy processes as complex multi-agency interactions with multiple goals and 
strategies of participants and uncertainty about information and outcomes (Alison, 
1971; Cohen et al., 1972; Lindblom & Cohen, 1979). However, using goal attainment 
as criteria to judge interaction processes within networks has been described as a 
fallacy. Goals are appropriate on the operational level, where clearly formulated goals 
and problems are addressed. Interactions within policy networks, such as the SCG, are 
strategic; therefore, goals are not given but sought. Consequently it makes no sense to 
use ex ante formulated goals or policies of the participants, even government, as a 
measure (Kickert, Klijn, & Koppenjan, 1997). A more suitable success criterion for a 
policy network is the realisation of collective active action in order to establish a 
common purpose or avert common threats (Kickert, et al., 1997; Scharpf, 1978; 
Glasbergen, 1995).  
 
Network management can, therefore, be judged by the extent to which it enhances the 
conditions for ‘favourable’ interaction and the degree to which the network supports 
these processes. Thus network management may be seen as “promoting the mutual 
adjustment of behaviour of actors with diverse objectives and ambitions with regard 
to tackling problems within a given framework of interorganisational relationships” 
(Kickert & Koppenjan, 1997:44). So how can the SCGs ensure ‘favourable’ 
interaction leading to effective network management? 
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4.2.3 What Action Must the SCG take to ensure Multiagency Cooperation and 
Information Sharing? 
In Scotland, SCGs promote resilience and enhanced preparation, response and 
recovery from crises through effective partnership. To deliver resilience civil 
protection arrangements need to be integrated both within and between organisations. 
Multiagency cooperation and information sharing is essential; therefore, local 
responders must work in collaboration with each other in areas of common interest 
(Scottish Executive 2007).  
Coordination has been defined as “…those sets of behaviours through which the 
complex network of interrelated events are maintained” (Haas & Drabek, 1973: 
103). Crisis coordination has been described as the degree to which there are adequate 
networks for intra and inter-organisational communication to accomplish goals 
(Dynes & Quarantelli, 1977). A basic process of inter-organisational coordination is 
communication (Yamamoto, 1981), which can determine the success or failure of a 
crisis response (Agranoff & McGuire, 1998). However, when public authorities try to 
impose a sense of order in response to crisis, coordination and cooperation is nearly 
always lacking (La Porte, 2006). Peters (1998) argues that lack of coordination arises 
from different responsibilities and legal requirements that place significant barriers 
between organisations. Drennan and  McConnell (2007) identify five difficulties: 
different political control brings potential conflict of agendas and priorities; individual 
specialisms such as police and health may bring bureaucratic politics and vested 
interest protection; coordinating non-government organisations such as voluntary 
services, who may not have been involved in the planning; bringing together 
organisations with different values, cultures and goals, especially when dealing with 
private versus public sector; and involving the local communities in pre-planning. 
These highlight that whilst an integrated approach is attractive, the difficulty in 
overcoming professional and cultural barriers, as well as confusions over 
accountability, make it difficult in practice (Ling, 2002). Rosenthal et al. (1991) refer 
to this as bureau-politics, which in their view will manifest itself in most crises. 
Hillyard (2000) argues that bureau-politics can be minimised by establishing a 
common purpose and culture, together with effective inter-organisational structures 
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with clear divisions of authority; although, for effective coordination, these need to be 
planned and exercised before they are actually needed (Granot, 1999).  
 
If successful network coordination is achieved it improves organisational resilience 
and enables network survival, even in “unfavourable conditions” (Ehrhardt, et al., 
2008: 2). However, to achieve such network resilience the network’s member 
organisations must be capable of understanding the network (Granatt & Paré-
Chamontin, 2006). Furthermore, important components of such networks are 
‘boundary spanners’ who link their own organisation with its external environment, 
including partner agencies (Burt, 1992; Williams, 2002). Creating an effective 
communication network for emergencies is challenging because it may conflict with 
the organisational structure developed during routine times (Kapucu, 2006) and 
complex information makes bureaucratic communication dysfunctional (Brown & 
Miller, 2000). Manoj and Baker (2007) identify three categories of communication 
challenges in crisis; technological, sociological and organisational. To overcome these 
challenges, effective crisis coordination requires interoperability, which is having 
appropriate structure and technology that allow agencies to communicate using a 
common language and system (Kapucu, 2006).  
 
In relation to the SCG, its effectiveness rests upon every member's awareness of the 
role, responsibilities and capabilities of its partners. However, the SCG is not a 
statutory body and has no legal personality. Furthermore, the SCG does not have 
powers to direct its members or replace individual responders' management 
mechanisms. Nor does it have the authority to issue executive orders, so each 
responder retains its own responsibilities. Because of these conditions the SCG has to 
rely on a process of coordination through consensus to secure consistency in overall 
strategic intent. Consequently, in the SCG, UK and Scottish Governments there has 
been a realisation that effective cooperation must be founded on collaborative 
partnerships (Scottish Executive 2007).  
 
The recognition that a cooperative and collaborative approach is important in 
delivering resilience reflects the fragility of hierarchical structures in dynamic 
environments. Moreover, the coordination function is increasingly implemented by 
those who have come to realise the limited usefulness of “command and control” 
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(Drabek 2007: 228). While hierarchical communication systems can work efficiently 
during routine operations, in a dynamic environment such as a crisis they do not 
(Granot, 1999). A key difficulty with hierarchical command structures is that if top 
nodes fail, they will isolate large networks from each other (Kapucu, 2006). For 
example, Dawes et al (2004) argues that the disruption of communications during the 
initial stages of the response to 9/11 attacks required many to act without information, 
coordination or leadership. Consequently, the conventional command and control 
structure used by the emergency services in routine business is inappropriate in 
emergent environments (Dynes, 1983; 1994, 2003; Neal & Phillips, 1995; Schneider, 
1992). Evident in such environments, is likely to be ambiguous authority and 
responsibility (Waugh, 2000) leading to use of informal ad hoc channels for exchange 
and communication (Granot, 1999). Therefore effective crisis coordination requires a 
participative and consensual approach to decision-making. This is reflected in the 
structure of the SCG, which is capable of not only coordination but also resolving 
jurisdictional disputes and reducing duplication of efforts: 
 
“…[T]he coordination model is becoming more popular than 
the traditional command and control structure…The coordination  
model is also often better for negotiating turf battles among agencies  
and nongovernmental organisations providing overlapping services” 
(Haddow & Bullock, 2003: 88) 
 
The SCG presents several conceptual challenges. Firstly, it must be understood as a 
network of organisations. Secondly, the elements of the network are heterogeneous 
comprising public and private sector organisations with differing goals and objectives, 
variable operating environments and funding structures as well as differing degrees of 
politicisation in the decision making process. As such, understanding the SCG 
requires both a holistic (or systems) perspective, and an ability to consider the 
individual elements (organisations) that comprise the network. It is argued that the 
SCG is a policy network which enables multi-agencies with individual areas of 
responsibilities to come together and work collaboratively to enhance resilience. The 
network approach allows the UK Government Policy parameters to be actioned at the 
local level within each SCG. However, it is recognised that there could be 
performance issues within a network, which must be addressed through effective 
network management. Moreover, there are significant advantages in adopting a 
network approach in dealing with crisis. Networks are less susceptible to disruption of 
 
124 
 
 
top nodes that could disable a hierarchy through loss of the decision-making or 
command chain. Furthermore networks enable multiple channels of communication 
throughout the organisation which if conjoined with a shared holistic view and shared 
situational assessment improves understanding and awareness of partner organisation 
capabilities and constraints. Such levels of understanding enable negotiation and 
reduce the likelihood of jurisdictional conflicts. In addition, the involvement of 
multiple partners increases the knowledge available to solve any crisis, and thereby 
boosts the individual and organisation level of learning. Consequently, the SCG as a 
network facilitates information sharing, cooperation and coordination  
 
4.3 Organisational Cultural Components Influencing the SCG  
 
An essential element of effective network management of the SCG is the 
organisational culture, the role of leadership in crisis and the process of decision 
making, and how crisis decision making differs from decisions made in a routine or 
steady state environment. Furthermore, leaders’ perceptions will influence whether an 
organisation is crisis prone or prepared. Moreover, organisational performance in 
relation to crisis management is linked to having processes and trained staff in place 
to ensure pro-activity in identifying and mitigating risks before they manifest 
themselves and disrupt the organisation, and is able to learn lessons from crises 
experience. 
 
4.3.1 Leadership and Resilience in the SCG 
 
The SCG is expected to provide clear direction and leadership, and leadership is often 
identified as a critical component of successful crisis management (Smith, et al., 
2005; Sheffi, 2006). However, leadership is a socially constructed concept (Grint, 
2005) and what is considered effective in one organisation may not be in another. 
Within the SCG, in addition to providing direction in developing, maintaining and 
improving crisis arrangements, there are two other aspects of leadership. Firstly, the 
chairing of routine meetings, the responsibility for which is determined locally by the 
members and secondly, providing leadership during crises. Where responsibility for 
chairing the SCG falls during the crisis is determined by the nature of the event 
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(Scottish Executive 2007). This reflects that steady state and crisis management are 
distinct (Turner, 1994; 1996; Rosenthal, 1996; Smith, 2005; Borodzicz, 2005).  
 
There are organisations, such as the military and police that routinely operate in 
dynamic and dangerous environments so develop capabilities to manage crises (Flin 
1996; Klein, 2001). They recognise the dynamic nature of crises so continuously 
review their situational assessments and as new information or evidence becomes 
available assessments are amended or replaced (Weick, Sutcliffe & Obstfeld, 1999). 
Such organisations have the organisational culture which enables them to switch from 
routine steady state management where they are controlled by conventional 
hierarchical authority and standard operating procedures to crisis management where 
more informal organisational norms including greater latitude in decision making and 
communication are appropriate (Reason, 2000; LaPorte, 1996; Rochlin et al., 1987).  
 
The reason that such organisations as the police and the military are able to 
successfully manage crises lies in three characteristics safety awareness, 
decentralisation, and training (Rochlin, 1996). Therefore, leaders of organisations, 
such as the SCG, should seek to ensure that there is a culture of continuous 
improvement that recognises that safety awareness is not about preventing isolated 
failures but rather “…converting these occasional setbacks into enhanced resilience 
of the system” (Reason, 2000: 770); that for decentralisation staff must have the skills 
to deal complex task demands in their system (Roberts, 1989); and are trained to be 
resilient (Flin, 1996; 2006). 
 
4.3.2 Leadership Decision-Making in Crisis 
 
In Scotland, it is recognised that crisis response brings the need for rapid decision 
making and coordination across multi-agencies by the SCG (Scottish Executive 
2007). Therefore, the context for crisis decision making within the SCG is a ‘real 
world setting’ characterised by time pressure, uncertainty, ill-defined goals, high 
personal stakes, and other complexities (Orasanu & Connolly, 1993; Lipshitz, et al 
2001). Crichton et al. (2005) opines a key leadership skill is gathering information to 
enable effective decision making. In the context of crisis management, much of the 
literature discusses decision making as a potential source of error (Pearson & Clair, 
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1998) because it is timely and often hurried (Smits & Ally, 2003).  Moreover, one of 
the complexities is that in a group setting such as the SCG, individuals differ in their 
preference for risk when making decisions (Melers et al, 1998) and research suggests 
that both the cost of information and one’s accountability for a decision affect the type 
of analysis used to solve a problem (Gilliland et al., 1992).  
 
In relation to the SCG, the rapid implementation of arrangements for collaboration, 
coordination and communication is considered vital in allowing optimum decision 
making. The SCG consists of those with detailed knowledge of their organisations 
empowered to make executive decisions in respect of their organisation’s resources 
and activity (Scottish Executive 2007). Therefore, it should be capable of making 
decisions based on multiple options. Eisenhardt (1989) found those with deep 
knowledge of their business can maximise decisions within time constraints by 
considering several alternatives simultaneously, especially when the entire team was 
conditioned to work with each other in turbulent situations, like SCG members who 
regularly come together in both routine and crisis response.  
 
The activities and influences on the SCG crisis decision making process are reflected 
in Flin’s (1996) model of command team decision making in emergencies. Flin 
developed the model by combining components of group behaviour (McGrath, 1984) 
and decision making (Klein, 1995; Orasunu, 1994; Salas, Cannon-Bowers & 
Blickensderfer, 1995). The three elements of the model which echo SCG decision 
making are: first, the input factors comprising of the leader, team and team 
characteristics, together with the context including organisational culture and task 
demands; second, transformation processes such as decision making, communication 
and coordination; and third, output resulting from the combination of the other 
elements. Notably, a key part of Flin’s model is the feedback loop which will improve 
future performance. Flin’s (1996) model of command team performance in 
emergencies is shown in Figure 10 below.  
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In relation to decision making, the SCG must consider a number of potential issues. 
For example, a group is superior to an individual when making decisions (Hill, 1982: 
535) and groups who know each other are more likely to make better decisions 
(Winquist & Larson, 1998; Gruenfeld et al., 1996). This highlights the importance of 
developing and maintaining relationships both informally and formally.  
 
Furthermore, Salas and Cannon-Bowers (1995) found that high performance teams 
monitor their own performance and remain self-critical, correcting and adjusting their 
methods as necessary. Therefore, the SCG should continually re-assess its 
performance against the crisis. In other words continually review its shared situational 
assessment. However, overall group performance may be affected by the number of 
participants. Too large a group may result in social loafing, countering the common 
stereotype that the sense of team spirit spurs individual effort and enhances the 
group’s overall productivity (Kravitz & Martin, 1986). Social loafing could be a 
consequence of dispersed responsibility or a reduction in efficiency when individual’s 
think their contribution cannot be measured (Robbins, 2005).  
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Another aspect which may influence the SCG decision making performance is status, 
which tends to be derived from one of three sources: the power a person wields over 
others; a person’s ability to contribute to a group’s goals; and an individual’s personal 
characteristics (Feldman, 2001). High status individuals are often given more freedom 
to deviate from norms than are other group members as long as the activities are not 
severely detrimental to group goal achievement (Robbins, 2005). Status also 
influences group interaction. High status people tend to be more assertive, speak out 
more often, state more commands, and interrupt more often. This can stifle creativity 
as lower status members tend to be less active participants in group discussions and 
their expertise may not be fully utilised. Therefore, to be effective the decision 
making group will require to be genuinely collaborative, ensuring reciprocity and 
equal representation to engender participatory decision making (deLeon & Varda, 
2009).  Achieving such collaboration is a leadership skill, ensuring participants 
representing different organisations work together to achieve the desired outcome 
(Moynihan, 2005).  The achievement of the outcome of resilience and the conditions 
for adaptation and innovation is dependent on ‘respectful interaction’ (Weick, 1993), 
together with the necessary policies and practices. 
 
4.4 Chapter Conclusion 
 
The introduction of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 brought with it the statutory 
duty of responders to introduce risk assessment and business continuity into their 
emergency planning process with the intention of making communities more resilient. 
Consequently, it is argued that there is a clear relationship between Risk, Business 
Continuity and Crisis Management within Integrated Emergency Management, and 
that when combined these functions contribute to achieving resilience as an outcome, 
especially if based on sound risk assessment. However, there are long standing 
difficulties in defining risk and the underlying assumptions related to its assessment, 
which are dependent on an individual’s experience and values and an organisation’s 
culture. In an effort to overcome such professional and organisational barriers 
responder agencies need to embed Risk Management and Business Continuity 
Management into their organisation through exercising and training. Furthermore, the 
efforts to increase resilience may be constrained unless there is an appreciation that 
resilience is not specific and measurable, but rather a multidimensional fluid trait, 
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based on effective risk management and influenced by changes in the organisational 
environment.  
It was also argued that the SCG should be considered as a policy network, rather than 
a hierarchical structure. The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 intends to provide a single 
framework for civil protection and will “reinforce partnership working at all levels” 
(Scottish Executive 2007: 56). Therefore, local responders must work in collaboration 
with each other in areas of common interest (Scottish Executive 2007). To deliver 
resilience civil protection arrangements need to be integrated both within and between 
organisations. This is achieved through the establishment of the SCG, a policy 
network. The use of a network form recognises the fragility of hierarchical structures 
in dynamic environments and that the coordination function is increasingly 
implemented by those who have come to realise the limited usefulness of “command 
and control” (Drabek 2007: 228) 
Moreover, it was argued that an organisational culture which encourages the 
continuous review of situational assessments and the amendment of actions to reflect 
environmental changes is essential for effective crisis management. In addition that 
leadership perception is important in influencing whether an organisation is crisis 
prone or prepared. Furthermore it was argued that crisis decision making was 
different from routine or steady state decisions, and that collaborative decision 
making was the most appropriate way to deal with crises. But to do so successfully 
needs people who have a deep knowledge of the organisation and can consider 
multiple alternatives simultaneously. There is also a link between effective crisis 
management and an organisation having suitable processes and trained staff in place. 
Thus proactive risk management and feedback loops are necessary to enable learning 
from crises experience, but social aspects of the group, such as status and power, 
influence its effectiveness. Therefore, the SCG must develop a collaborative 
environment based on trust to ensure overall effective performance. 
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The following chapters analyse the SCG in detail, so before continuing it would be 
useful to summarise those themes which emerged in the previous chapters.  
 
4.4.1 A Summary of the Emerging Themes  
 
A number of themes relevant to the research have been identified in the proceeding 
chapters. Although there are interdependencies between the themes, to assist with 
clarity, they have been grouped together under three broad areas: organisational 
strategies and policies, such as risk, business continuity and crisis management, which 
it is argued are necessary to achieve an outcome of resilience; organisational 
structure, including coordination and communication; and organisational culture, in 
particular the importance of leadership and decision-making in ensuring an 
organisation is crisis prepared. 
 
Underpinning each of the groupings is the need for an organisation to learn from its 
experiences to enhance its crisis capability. Therefore, an essential element of 
achieving resilience is for an organisation to have mechanisms which not only 
identifies early warning signals of potential crises but also empowers those within the 
organisation to take action to avoid the crisis, or if necessary to respond appropriately 
and manage the crisis. Furthermore, the organisation must then learn lessons from the 
crises and change not only its procedures but also its way of thinking in relation to the 
circumstances that resulted in the crisis. In other words the organisation should 
experience a fundamental shift in culture reflecting how it now understands the post-
crisis environment. 
 
4.4.1.1 Organisational Strategies, Policies and the Outcome of Resilience  
 
Resilience has many meanings in academic discourse. However, in relation to 
organisations, it was argued that resilience is an outcome influenced by a dynamic 
complex combination of environmental factors, including the organisational risk 
culture. Therefore, resilient organisations quickly capture and adapt to environmental 
information by changing their behaviours and structures.  
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It is suggested that to achieve the outcome of complete resilience an organisation 
should incorporate risk management in an effort to foresee and prevent the crisis 
occurring, crisis management to cope with the disruption should it actually happen, 
and business continuity to ensure the organisation was able to prioritise its recovery 
effectively. If such organisational policies for risk, crisis and business continuity 
management were in place and effective, organisations would be crisis prepared and 
able to deal with crises through enhanced resilience. However, fundamental to such 
policies being effective are mechanisms that ensure that learning occurs at both an 
individual and organisational level. 
 
A key element of collaborative networks and adaptive capability is having sufficient 
trained resources to deal with crisis. But the skills required for emergency and crisis 
response are both distinct and different. Crisis requires a level of flexibility in 
management and decision-making skills distinct from problems associated with 
ordinary events. Moreover, the unique nature of crises may require individuals and 
organisations to apply their learning and training in situations which they have not 
experienced before.  Therefore, innovation and creativity are essential skills for 
effective crisis response.   
 
A crucial element in developing skills for effective crisis response is feedback, 
together with critical self reflection, both at an individual and organisational level. 
Failure of organisations to have such mechanisms in place may result in missed 
opportunities to learn and enhance organisational resilience. In other words, 
organisations that do not recognise and adapt to threats or changes in their 
environment by changing their procedures and policies will become crisis prone. 
 
4.4.1.2 Organisational Structure, Coordination and Communication 
 
The literature review identified that potential tensions were inherent between the two 
types of organisational structure relevant to the SCG, namely hierarchical 
bureaucracies and networks. It was argued that rigid hierarchical structures are ill 
suited for innovative and flexible response necessary to deal with crisis. Instead 
collaborative policy networks, characterised by reciprocity, representation, equality, 
participatory decision making, and collaborative leadership were more effective.  
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However, effective policy networks require leaders to organise structures, resources, 
and interactions to ensure the multi-agencies worked together successfully. It was 
argued that interaction within the network was an appropriate measure of the 
effectiveness of the network. That is the extent the network facilitates interaction 
between the participants and the degree to which the network supports related 
processes. 
 
Furthermore, to achieve effective coordination within a multiagency structure it was 
identified that understanding roles and responsibilities was essential. Otherwise there 
is potential for confusion and misunderstanding of participants from different 
organisations or from different parts of the same organisation coming together 
towards a common cause. In such collaborative networks effectiveness was dependent 
on shared understanding and situational awareness to achieve interoperability. 
 
Communication and the use of informal channels and ‘boundary spanners’ were 
identified as a means to potentially improve interoperability, by bringing policy 
makers together strengthen the organisation and minimise tensions. A key component 
to overcoming barriers to understanding was use of common language, terminology 
and structures, together with multi-agencies being willing to shift their own 
perceptions to achieve shared and acceptable solutions. Such flexibility and common 
understanding had also the potential to minimise policy or jurisdictional disputes. 
However this was dependent on the culture developed within the network. 
 
4.4.1.3 Organisational Culture and the Importance of Leadership and Decision-
Making 
 
Organisational culture was highlighted as the most important element in achieving 
effective crisis management. It influenced organisational norms and values in relation 
to crisis response. For example it was argued that crisis prepared organisations can be 
distinguished from crisis prone organisations, by the level of investment to ensure 
integrated crisis planning, together with flexible and adaptive structures. Moreover, 
crisis prepared organisations will have a realistic attitude that their organisation will 
likely experience some sort of crisis and prepare accordingly. 
 
133 
 
 
 
However, the key to an organisation becoming crisis prepared is for organisational 
leaders to ‘institutionalise’ crisis preparedness throughout the organisation. This may 
be demonstrated through overt executive commitment to an organisational culture that 
values safety and risk management, while ensuring sufficient trained and competent 
resources.  
 
Resources were directly linked to status within collaborative network structures. It 
was found that having access to resources could influence both the individual and 
organisational status within the group. This in turn was related to the influence in 
decision-making within the network; those with resources, together with power and 
status had most influence, as opposed to those with relevant expertise. It was also 
highlighted that in the context of crisis management decision making is a potential 
source of error and that problems of increasing complexity require more collaboration 
to resolve effectively. To achieve this crisis decision-makers must have deep 
knowledge of their organisation and be able to maximise decisions within time 
constraints by considering several alternatives simultaneously. 
 
The emerging themes identified in the preceding chapters are analysed in the 
following chapter. 
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Chapter 5 – An Initial Analysis of the Emerging Themes 
 
This chapter considers the inner core of the Onion Model, the individual perceptions 
of those within the organisation. It considers data from interviews, observations and 
the relevant crisis management and resilience literature. The individual emerging 
themes from the data are analysed and variances between the theory and reality 
highlighted and explained. The chapter is structured to enable focus on a number of 
specific areas: first, the various strategies and policies in relation to risk, crisis and 
business continuity management necessary to achieve the outcome of resilience; 
second, the organisational structure of the Strategic Coordinating Group, and its 
coordination and communication; and third, the organisational culture of the SCG, 
and the influence of leadership and decision-making. All of which are underpinned by 
the provision of training and exercising to enable members to enhance their 
competencies in dealing with crises. But the chapter highlights that there are a number 
of barriers to learning and lack of formal feedback mechanisms diminish the SCG’s 
adaptive capability. These together with poor risk assessments means the SCG is 
more reactive than proactive and therefore a crisis prone organisation. 
 
5.1 Strategies, Policies & Resilience 
 
The Civil Contingencies Act places risk assessment and business continuity duties on 
all Category 1 responders. Each SCG must publish a Community Risk Register, 
reflecting the individual assessments of the members. The combination of risk, 
business continuity and crisis management will enable resilience (Gibson & Tarrant, 
2010). It is therefore argued that resilience is an institutional or organisational 
outcome founded on effective risk management (Gibson & Tarrant, 2010; Comfort et 
al., 2010). But a common element of organisational failure is when early risk warning 
signals are missed (Fink, 2002). Therefore, successful risk management requires 
components that incorporate: Assessment; Prevention; Preparation; Response; and 
Recovery (Comfort, 1988; Rosenthal, Charles & t’Hart, 1989;; Mitroff & Pearson, 
1993; Scottish Executive, 2007; Boin et al., 2010). Included in the recovery element is 
learning lessons (Stern, 1997; Pearson & Clair, 1998; Boin et al., 2005) which helps 
to generate organisational resilience (Smith & Elliott, 2007). However, the challenge 
is feeding the lessons back into pre-existing policy networks (Boin & ‘tHart, 2007). 
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5.1.1 Risk 
 
With regards to whether SCG is able to assess risk there were differing views. Some 
organisations were seen to have the skills and some did not. However, when specific 
expertise was necessary, for example in dealing with diseases, the medical risk 
experts were thought to be highly competent. Others recognised that the Fire & 
Rescue Service were experts in risk assessment, describing it “as bread and butter to 
them”; similarly those organisations that dealt with sites like Grangemouth Oil 
Refinery, for example, had also built up “huge experience”. This included not only 
the Blue Light services but also the councils. SEPA was also recognised as having 
technical skills in relation to risk assessment. However, there was some doubt about 
other organisations and with general risk assessments; although as one respondent 
said “this isn’t empirical, just an impression”.  
 
The impression that there were deficiencies in risk assessment capabilities was 
supported by a senior police officer concerned about the lack of specific training: “the 
police will do dynamic management so will be fine (with risk assessment). I don’t 
think the others do”. This view was reinforced by a respondent from a local authority 
who said, “I haven’t had any specific training in risk assessment, other than what 
would be applied to the council’s general activity”. The issue was summed up by a 
respondent and expert in risk management: “There’s no training provided [for SCG 
members]. Guidance is handed out. It’s down to who turns up, who’s the most vocal 
and sometimes, who’ll make a decision. There’s just no training”.    
 
In practice risk assessment in SCGs was delegated from strategic for consideration at 
the tactical level, where the relevant working group with appropriate technical skills 
would map and assess risks, using the support by other experts remote from SCG. 
What was important to the SCG was agencies have access to risk experts to explain 
what the situation is. But the critical view was that risk assessment probably was not 
as good as it could be and would benefit from more professionalism. On at least one 
occasion, it was reported that a risk assessment completed at tactical had to be 
completely reconsidered at the strategic level. The assessment process was seen as a 
“driven approach, with people working through ticking boxes - It’s mechanistic”. 
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There was a widely held view that risk assessment should be the basis of the SCGs 
planning process, having identified the main risks and capability gaps in relation to 
them, rather than being produced to satisfy legislative requirements. One respondent 
highlighted that the Community Risk Registers were done quickly simply to meet a 
deadline. It was notable that only one respondent was confident that their SCG had all 
their plans linked to the Community Risk Register. This led one senior fire officer 
(ACFOS2) to describe the CRR as a “coffee table companion”. The implication 
being that it had no further purpose for the activity of the SCG and certainly did not 
inform its strategic planning in relation to risk mitigation and response. 
 
It was also suggested that the Scottish Government failed to understand that 
production of the CRR should be seen as the first step in the risk management 
process, and should be followed by mitigation and identification of the capability gap, 
which currently they do not do. Another, from a large SCG, thought that capability 
gaps should be identified as part of the risk assessment process and action taken to 
address them.    
 
“Due to our size we have capacity. We can be fairly self-sufficient  
for widespread incidents. But it can and should be improved.  
It goes back to risk assessment and the whole process, especially 
 the capability gaps. Instances (where) capabilities are just looked 
 at as resources levels but they need to be trained” (SCGC7) 
 
Furthermore, there was a complaint that the UK Government sets the likelihood for 
use in the CRR which can not be changed. SCG risk assessors are only permitted to 
change the impact scales. This was described as “problematic” because the CRR is 
more fragmented than the UK risk register, being split into council areas. The 
example given was that Strathclyde SCG does not have an oil industry but Grampian 
SCG does so would need to consider it. Consequently SCGs with quite different 
issues still need to assess risks in a manner set by UK Government. Another anomaly 
was that all utilities are classified as category 2 respondents under the Act, but the 
disruption of the critical national infrastructure, which consists of the utilities, is 
classified as high risk in the UK national risk register. 
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5.1.1.1 Cross border 
 
Cross border risks were also cause for concern. It was suggested that SCG risk 
assessment and business continuity need a strategic overview across services. This 
would assist in the matter of cross border risks, for example pipeline linkages from 
one SCG area to another.  
 
“The SCGs tend to work in silos, yet shared risks need  
to be addressed, e.g. Grangemouth refinery would impact  
across Central, Fife and Tayside SCGs” (ACPOS2). 
 
“With risk assessment …some have difficulty getting their head  
round the concept, e.g. pipeline linkages cross border”(ACFOS2) 
 
There was concern about ‘silo assessments’ which did not track risks from end-to-
end. Consequently SCGs might not capture all risk that could impact on them. They 
may also be inconsistent in their approach to the same risk. Strikingly, only one SCG 
said that they consider the neighbouring SCG.  
 
One respondent highlighted the difficulties, using the example of a CRR which still 
had not been officially published after almost two years because they were still trying 
to get risk assessments and action plans in place. 
 
“There needs to be uniformity of approach. What’s the point of  
doing it separately; although that’s easier said than done. For  
example, [council]came up with their own guidance which was  
different from the risk assessment guidance that came out from  
the centre (ACPOS11). 
 
There also seemed to be an assumption that the SCG coordinator would ensure that 
everything was assessed the right way. However, this raises questions about the status 
of the coordinator in the SCG being sufficient to drive the process to a conclusion, 
besides whether sufficient technical skills are possessed.  
 
5.1.2 BCM 
 
More of the respondents were confident about the business continuity management 
arrangements because of the multiple drivers on a number of levels pushing BCM. 
For example, the occurrence of a pandemic was seen as a positive event in that it 
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drove home the need for BCM. One respondent said “there was more done in 6 
months than 6 years!”  
 
However, there were a number of respondents who thought BCM could be better. The 
general view was that BCM was an organisational issue rather than one for the SCGs. 
A respondent, who chaired a SCG, took the view that members’ business continuity 
plans was their organisation’s problem; only becoming an SCG problem if there was 
an issue that had wider implications for the SCG. Therefore, “In such cases the SCG 
cannot be too intrusive”. The explicit point made being that it was not the SCG’s role 
to be inspecting organisational plans.  
 
Many respondents were not convinced that any of the SCGs had robust business 
continuity plans; although one said “we like to think we do”. Speaking from personal 
experience a respondent gave the example of an organisation which used to test its 
standby generator as part of the business continuity, but no longer did so because of 
the potential impact on the organisation’s computer systems. Another though 
generally positive about organisations BCM, particularly among the emergency 
services, health and utilities, thought that in the event of a major disruption or 
dislocation “we’ll all struggle”; giving the example of the lack of bunkered fuel for 
the [emergency] service. A number of other weaknesses were highlighted, particularly 
with the local authorities and health, with one commenting: “it was ok, but the 
council and NHS are a wee bit behind the Blue Lights”.  
 
The lack of appreciation of consequences of interdependency was a particular weak 
point in SCGs. It was also highlighted that there is still doubt among business 
continuity people about whether BCM has any connection with Integrated Emergency 
Management. Highlighting that the links and understanding of them are not as good as 
they could be. Another significant issue was the lack of confidence in plans because 
they had not actually been tested. One suggestion was that the SCG should be testing 
across organisations, which could be done in parallel with wider SCG exercises in 
which specific Business Continuity plan for a related hospital, for example, could be 
tested as well. This would ensure that the assumptions and capabilities within the 
SCG plans were accurate. 
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However, currently most SCG organisations test inwardly rather than involving 
partners. Therefore plans may be in place but whether they would be effective is a 
moot point. One respondent said of their own organisation’s plan “in crisis I’m not 
sure they’d stand up”. Another who expressed confidence about having plans said 
“as far as having BCM is concerned, we’re good. We spend lots of time doing 
plans” although then goes on to say “although I’m not so sure about testing them. I 
don’t think we’ve tested other agency plans”.  
 
A challenge identified was keeping BCM at the top of organisational agendas, despite 
the legislative requirement and sound organisational management reasons for doing 
so. With many SCG organisations working on business continuity only when a crisis 
was imminent: 
 
“The fuel last year and flu this year has made people get engaged.  
Interesting thing is that incidents have all been ‘slow burn’ events 
 that gave us a chance to bring all our partners up to speed. Some 
 just weren’t up to speed because they didn’t have resources and it  
wasn’t high enough up their To Do list (SCGC2) 
 
Fortunately the ‘slow burn’ nature of the crises referred to allowed organisations to 
improve their capability. However, there were also comments regarding differing 
approaches to preparation by individual organisations. An example in relation to 
pandemic preparation was that non Blue Light organisations with 2 years notice and 
preparation gave assurances to the SCG that they had [Business Continuity] plans. 
However, “when the pandemic occurred most were found wanting”.  
 
The general view was that individual organisations responsibility to comply with 
actions agreed at the SCG is weak and an area which could be improved upon. One 
responder recognised the complacency and the different competencies of SCG 
membership, saying:  
 
 “When X happens you need to be good at what you’re doing 
  immediately. The police and fire probably deal with it daily, less  
so the other agencies”  
 
Although even in relation to those who deal with crisis frequently and have explicit 
duties under the Civil Contingencies Act do not seem to be overly concerned about 
business continuity management. Over the 3 days that I maintained observations at 
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Exercise Castle Rock, business continuity was never mentioned at any SCGs 
consequence management meeting.  
 
5.1.3 Resilience 
 
Strategic Coordinating Groups (SCG) were established as the as the principal local 
forum for multi-agency co-operation and the focal point for local resilience building 
and preparing for response to emergencies. Therefore, it is dependent on SCGs being 
able to anticipate, as well as respond to, their changing environment. Interestingly 
despite resilience being a UK policy and key outcome expected from the activity of 
the SCG, all references to resilience focused on resources being available and not 
proactively monitoring the environment or learning lessons from events. 
 
There was a view that staff resilience was an issue for the SCGs, with 
acknowledgement that there is limited strength in depth. A concern was that “the 
same people always turn up but sods law they’ll be away when something happens”. 
Resilience was also undermined by the ‘churn’ of members involved in SCGs. This 
was especially so in the police when local commanders changed fairly frequently, 
which meant there was difficulty in retaining people with experience and knowledge.  
 
 “As a new chief executive I would welcome a chance to meet more  
 regularly for a while. 4 out of the 12 chief executives in the SCG are  
 new in the past year. There is an argument that given the ‘churn’ we  
 should do something different for a year until we’re all up to speed” 
 (LA1) 
 
“Staff turnover, particularly with the emergency services is another issue. 
They tend to move on every couple of years. For example at a nuclear 
exercise we had a new commander who repeated the mistakes of the 
previous guy” (SCGC3) 
 
In recognition of the lack of resilience, particularly if a crisis lasted over a prolonged 
period or that took place over more than one SCG, a responder highlighted that their 
SCG was collaborating with neighbouring SCGs to ensure adequate resources. 
 
“Fife, Tayside & Central SCGs are in the embryonic stages  
of considering how to support each other in case of event which  
lasts over period of time which would result in resource issues  
for the SCGs. If there needed to be more than 1 SCG being set up 
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 would mean that 1 would get less than full representation from 
 some national and other agencies” (ACFOS1) 
 
Another highlighted that to make maximise the available resources from across the 
SCG they established a joint unit. The rationale of the joint unit is similar to the 
collaborative arrangements being considered by Fife, Tayside and Central Scotland 
SCGs above. The need for specialist resources, together with the cross border nature 
of terrorism and lack of interoperability between SCG agencies was also highlighted. 
 
“It depends on the nature of events. Different emergencies demand 
 different types of response… We have gaps in some specialist 
assets … In Scotland only one force (Strathclyde) can respond. A cadre  
can be put in place but it needs resources. Interoperability of resources is 
not in place. Stockwell told us that. Stockwell is driving from the bottom up 
and the Olympics from the top down. Scotland can’t deal with similar 
demands” (Senior Police Officer2) 
 
These actions indicate that in terms of SCG resilience there is a perceived deficiency 
in the current arrangements. It was quite explicitly summarised at the New Salesman 
Exercise, by a chief police officer who was “shocked at the lack of capabilities in 
Scotland” (ACPOS7).  
 
5.1.4 Training 
 
To address resilience issues in relation to staff and deficiencies in plans and planning, 
a number of respondents suggested that a formal system of monitoring should be 
implemented, together with a means to disseminate the lessons learned throughout the 
SCGs. It was envisaged by the Act that lessons learned dissemination would be part 
of the formal SCG training programme, designed to prepare resources for crisis 
response. Because: 
 
“Working closely allows personal working relationships.  ...You  
get to understand how people think. Playing together in more  
stressful exercises is very useful as the experience reduces anxieties  
at real events” (ACPOS7)  
 
There was recognition that the most effective training combined theory and practical 
aspects. It should be an extension of the day-to-day responsibilities of the students. 
The benefits of facilitated learning in a safe environment the lessons of which could 
be applied in the operational environment provide useful experience for the 
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participants to draw upon. However, to be effective training needs to be tested and 
those undertaking it having the skills which enable them to deal with situations that 
are ambiguous.  
 
“The whole principle is the extension of day-to-day duties. The exercise 
environment is key, supported by classroom stuff. On the job, you hope 
doesn’t happen. It’s much faster moving. They have their own dimensions. 
Exercise supported by classroom so building up transferable skills,  
capturing on the job knowledge” (SCGC7) 
 
 “I think that we need to be more proactive with our training;  
 ensuring that those who will attend the SCG are appropriately  
 trained and have the time to commit to such training” (LA3) 
 
It was suggested that an effective means of gaining experience before an incident is 
shadowing experienced people. This not only provided a useful opportunity for 
someone to benefit from the previous experience of others but also limits the 
development of inappropriate habits. It also provides the opportunity to view other 
organisations and enhance understanding of their roles and responsibilities when 
participating in the SCG. Moreover, for those SCG members who are not first 
responders it provides them with an opportunity to experience the various 
considerations that incident commanders deal with. This also enhances the 
understanding of other organisational roles and the constraints that they work within. 
 
 “I allow others to shadow and attend with me at SCG. The only way you  
 can experience an SCG is sitting at the table and being involved at it.  
 People need to do this to make it work” (ACFOS2) 
 
To ensure that all members had a similar level of competency it was suggested that 
accreditation; licensing or even mandatory training should be introduced. The view 
was that mandatory training would compel participation but there was 
acknowledgement that there were practical aspects which made this difficult. These 
included actual responsibility and focus of the training, given that different roles 
within the SCG had different training requirements, and government crisis teams were 
not formal components of the SCG. Moreover, the question of sanctions should a 
SCG member fail to become involved was problematic. But there are no sanctions 
available to deal with such reticence. 
 
  “People at that level have their own training (in their own 
  organisations) which is valuable. But it is used as an excuse, 
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  e.g. at our recent CPD training a chief officer didn’t play ball.  
 The others tried to persuade him it’s about coming together  
 with others and where the authority of SCG lies and where it doesn’t.  
 Training is essential …Unless it’s mandatory within the service,  
 as part of command training in own service plus SCG training it won’t 
  happen. People will shy away from it” (SCGC10) 
 
 “As far as CPD I think it’s interesting; the functionality of the 
 role; training and testing. Formalised training? Yes I think  
 all chief executives should either be briefed or trained in functionality 
 and their role in the SCG. They need to know. Because of the  
 infrequency of events people need exposure” (Senior Police Officer1) 
 
 “I think that there should be mandatory CPD but not necessarily 
 accredited or licensed. It’s down to getting the selection process  
for the role right. We don’t need to create an industry around the 
bureaucracy” (ACPOS5) 
 
There was strong resistance by some to the suggestion that SCG members should 
undertake CPD or other forms of accreditation on an individual basis. It was 
highlighted that as chief executives or equivalent the individuals have skill sets 
necessary for the role of the SCG. Moreover, the process of accreditation would 
become another aspect of bureaucracy discouraging participation in the SCG activity. 
  
 “With regards to CPD – it would be another set of boxes to  
 tick. It’s not realistic. Sitting on the SCG goes with the job.  
 There aren’t many organisations who would assign it to anyone  
 but chief executive. There are skills related to the post. You bring  
 skills to the table. Can’t see it being fine to be a chief constable but  
 can’t get license for SCG. That’s way over the top” (LA4) 
 
 “What are you saying no accreditation no SCG! I think the SCG is  
common sense application by strategic members based on advice from 
experts. Introducing accreditation will be a switch off, just a tick in the box.  
I think it has to be voluntary, so they recognise the value of the training. 
You must encourage them to see the value.” (SCGC1) 
 
 “Absolutely not. This is strategic decision making. This is about people  
 at the strategic level in their organisations. It’s not about training people  
to be experts in civil contingencies” (SCGC4) 
 
Rather than individual accreditation one respondent expressed support for the 
collective SCG being evaluated, rather than the individual. However, there are no 
baseline performance measurements or mechanisms to conduct such evaluations. 
 
 “I don’t think accreditation or licensing is do-able. It’s sod’s law 
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  that a new chief executive will be in place when something happens.  
 There needs to be a clearer understanding about what’s required.  
…There should be periodic opportunity to be evaluated but as a collective 
SCG” (GOV2) 
 
The observation undertaken provided opportunities to see numerous participants take 
part in large scale exercises. However, the effectiveness of these exercises for some is 
questionable. For example, during Exercise Ancient Mariner many from the tactical 
level which feeds the decision making capability of the SCG were underused. This 
was also an issue for the many resources during the nightshift at Exercise Castle 
Rock. Two forces participating raised the issue of redundant or underused resources, 
expressing disappointment at having arranged their availability at a cost the resources 
were not used appropriately. 
 
Moreover, at Exercise Green Gate one of the recommendations was the development 
of single and multi-agency training and exercising requirements. But one of the 
challenges is that as membership of the SCG is for chief executives or equivalent, so 
will be competent at strategic decision making. The training at such a level must 
recognise competency levels for the post and provide awareness. The primary benefit 
for executives is the opportunity to build relationships and increase group 
cohesiveness, rather than specific skills development. 
 
5.1.5 Learning Lessons & Barriers to Learning 
 
One of the key responsibilities of an SCG is to ensure that lessons from incidents are 
captured and incorporated into future activities. However, the evidence highlights that 
organisational learning and development is something SCGs are not good at. It was 
recognised that SCGs get consumed by the here and now, by focusing on the 
immediate activity in the response phase. Once the urgency of the initial phase is over 
there is a tendency for everyone to shut up shop and go home after the event. The 
inference was that the SCGs pay lip service to lessons learned.  
 
 “We don’t learn lessons. There are repeat events. We go through the  
 same logistical issues, usually equipment and comms. We don’t sit down  
and incorporate them properly” (Senior Police Officer3) 
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It was highlighted that SCGs did not revisit previous incidents or ensure that the 
outcomes from exercises, particularly multi-agency ones, were actioned and 
incorporated into doctrine timeously. Even when dealing with terrorism the lessons 
learned took a long time to be acted upon, with one senior chief constable describing 
the process as ‘torturous’: 
 
 “There’s a general problem with training and exercises that it  
 takes an awfully long time to convert lessons into practice. With  
 CT it’s about 18 months; a long and torturous path” (ACPOS1) 
 
However it was acknowledged that there were difficulties in determining whether 
organisations benefited from training and exercising. One responded highlighted that 
whether or not the organisation benefited from learning lessons, at an individual level 
these would improve performances of people whenever involved in responding to a 
crisis. 
 
 “It is difficult to assess whether the organisation has learned  
 from training certainly in the context of the SCG. But training  
 along with exercises will improve the level of effectiveness of  
 SCG members when they respond to a multi-agency event” (SCGC3) 
 
Despite the advantages of learning lessons and the frequent use of the terminology 
only the one Fire & Rescue Service, together with the MOD had formal systems in 
place for capturing and disseminating lessons learned.  Although the MCA had a 
system that people can send anonymous lessons learned back to the centre. That said 
there some respondents were explicit about the lack of formal dissemination of such 
learning: 
 
 “Training is a big issue. It’s not focused enough, not coordinated.  
 The tail’s wagging the dog. The objectives are not clear. Lessons must  
 be fed back in. It’s an issue in every area not just here” (SCGC6)  
 
Training and planning routinely was described as “money in the bank” in the event of 
a crisis and that it needs to be recognised that planning can make one’s response 
easier.  Experiencing a crisis helps with planning and assists with interoperability 
because training events break down barriers between different organisations. But 
there was recognition that the infrequent nature of crises and training meant that 
participants were not able to develop enough experience to confidently deal with the 
response demands:  
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  “Generally good but within the organisation and the SCG we 
  need to do more of it. We are currently drip feeding the training.  
 The frequency is not enough to make it second nature” (LA1) 
 
 “In an emergency you need to get from ‘forming’ to ‘performing’ 
 really quickly. That’s why we need to have regular meetings to get  
 the group dynamics effective. As an illustration of a life and death  
 situation – when I worked in intensive care as part of my training  
 I would stand back and consider the situation. Others would just  
 charge in confidently (with potentially dangerous consequences).  
 I think it’s about ‘appropriate confidence” (NHS1) 
 
Moreover, it is not always understood that there are different skills needed for 
training, planning and crisis management which have to be intrinsically linked.  
 
 “Although it’s difficult to maintain levels of commitments, you  
 can’t argue with the SCG philosophy. It should be trained and  
 assessed. But there’s a difficulty in balancing accreditation with  
 experiential learning. It needs instruction, exercising, application… 
  crisis are more difficult than the consequence management phase  
because of their imprecise situation. Moving from imprecise to precise is 
where you are tested and there’s not enough training for that”  
(Senior Police Officer2) 
 
The lack of reflection or feedback during training events was highlighted. Moreover 
feedback was closely linked to practice. It was recognised that critical feedback was 
important to gauge competency levels and improvements (ACFOS1). Without 
feedback effectiveness was difficult to determine as too often exercises and training 
were held for the sake of it without having an explicit procedure and action plan 
linked to the feedback process (SCGC9).  
 
 “It would be useful to have more time to consider strategic  
 decisions and debate topics. The contents of Exercise Debriefs,  
 especially lessons learned would be useful” (MCA2) 
 
Generally the barriers to learning identified during the interviews reflected Smith’s 
(2006) levels of barriers to learning, namely the individual, organisational and 
systems levels. At the individual level there were examples relating to perception, 
assumptions, core beliefs, shaped behaviour and ‘sense making’. For example: 
 
 “Arrogance; some people think that they know it all. However, we 
  don’t have a means of systemising the learning in [area]. Case  
 of could do better” (NHS1) 
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“There are gatekeepers. Those who don’t think it’s worthwhile” 
 (Senior Police Officer3) 
 
 “needs greater awareness at senior manager level” (NHS2) 
 
 “Being pulled in many directions at once; they (SCGs) are all double  
 hatted and have got day job” (MOD1) 
 
“I think there’s an element of self-protection, we don’t want to  
admit what went wrong. We don’t want to highlight that there are  
lessons to be learned. An example is the terrorist incident. We were  
told it was good but in certain areas wasn’t. It’s mixed messages” 
(ACPOS11) 
 
The second level of barriers operated at the organisational or group level within the 
organisation. These highlighted how the organisation works and how it can be 
affected by management style and organisational culture, especially in establishing 
the organisational norms. It was noticeable that many of the emergency services 
expressed the view that they dealt with a crisis and then moved on.  For example: 
 
 “There was a culture of just getting on with it. Deal with something  
 and move to the next thing. There’s now an appreciation that we need 
  to learn as an organisation, so we can constantly improve” (ACFOS1) 
  
 “Not taking enough time to reflect. We move on quickly. Perhaps  
 more focus on reflection. After a successful operation we move on 
 quickly. The key points for improvement we don’t always pick up on them” 
(ACPOS3) 
 
Other identified aspects of organisational behaviour likely to increase an 
organisation’s vulnerability to crises (Smith, 2005), include the tendency to scapegoat 
or blame something else for the crisis. Crucially, the absence of a no-blame culture 
will discourage honest reporting of potential crisis signals (Horlick-Jones, 1996). 
Moreover, where the risk has not been experienced before by the organisation it will 
lack validity and make it difficult to change organisational thinking to pre-empt the 
crisis (Smith, 2005). In other words, defence mechanisms will be used to ‘distort the 
external reality’ and resist organisational change (Mitroff et al., 1989). Or the 
organisations will rationalise that crisis is not that important (Mitroff & Pearson, 
1993). For example: 
 
“There’s a fear of failure being a hierarchical organisation. People  
will swan about but won’t put themselves up for anything”  
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(Senior Police Officer2) 
 
“Sometimes the organisation struggles with information, if it 
  hasn’t happened. If we haven’t experienced it we have difficulty  
 operating from a written report…. The crisis won’t happen.  
 The, it won’t happen here culture” (ACPOS2)  
 
 “I see parts of the organisation but I think that operationally we 
learn our lessons more than strategically. It takes events  
(e.g. UPS failure) before we take things seriously” (ACPOS11) 
 
 “Complexities of schedules are a barrier. Finding time or priority  
 of those things to get round the table and discuss. Crisis don’t happen 
  every day of the week so unless the organisation gives it importance,  
e.g. if it’s on the risk register you’ll do it. Perhaps we should make crisis 
management a single issue on the risk register” (ACPOS6) 
 
The third level set of barriers exists at the systems level and includes structural and 
environmental aspects that influence or constrain the organisation. These include 
technology, complexity and external factors that require the system to adapt. The 
interviews reflected the view that crises destroy formal structures and communication 
generally degrades (Smallman & Weir, 1999). For example: 
 
 “There are still issues with communications, so this has an adverse 
  impact on learning lessons” (SAS1) 
 
Another area for improvement was the lack of energy and commitment showed by 
some members of the SCG. The lack of buy-in translates into a reduction in the 
priority of the SCG within organisations. Because chief executives do not make it a 
high priority and actively engage with it others within the organisation do likewise. 
The lack of commitment is evidenced by the non-attendance by the chief officers. 
This leads to general scepticism at other levels of the SCG.   
 
 “There are degrees of competence and interest levels at SCG.  
 The Blue Light people are generally better. It is fairly critical but 
  there’s a lack of understanding. I think the lead is taken from the  
 chief executive representation, it sends a signal. I’ve written two  
 letters (regarding failure of appropriate representation at SCG) it  
 makes it happen. Although I wouldn’t go as far as sanctions, more 
  gently pressed. Government should make it an expectation. After all 
  it’s not a huge commitment when you look at the meetings and  
 exercises” (ACPOS6). 
 
 “There are different priorities in different organisations. We need 
  coordinated learning points from a multi-agency point of view. 
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 Currently, we’re not mature enough to sit round the table and have 
ambulance say we expected police to do that, for example. All dirty  
washing is done in private, inside each organisation” (SCGC6) 
 
 “There may be a cultural issue. Getting people to realise that  
 although such crisis/emergency events are rare we still need to  
 get senior management to train. Unfortunately, I think that some  
 senior managers think because it is so rare they do not need to  
 train. However, I’m sure that if you asked them most would acknowledge 
 that it is important. But if you asked them when they last trained they  
 won’t have done so. There is a gap but unless it is seen as relevant I  
 think we will get people training under protest” (LA3) 
 
Moreover, another particularly important aspect in the current economic crisis is the 
levels of funding that organisations receive to maintain their own resilience and assist 
in its wider application. This reflects the tensions within organisations about 
priorities, which reflects the rationalisation that hinders organisational crisis 
management identified by Mitroff and Pearson (1993: 25) that ‘crisis management is 
like an insurance policy: you only need to buy so much’. The challenge for SCGs is to 
determine in the current climate, ‘how much is enough?’  
 
“One of my concerns is that this will be really tested over the next 
 4 to 5 years with budgets getting tighter. There was a growth following 
 the legislation that can’t be sustained” (ACPOS3) 
 
 “I think there’s a natural antipathy to change. You know, there’s 
  enough going on not concerted opposition. We’re fairly healthy. 
  As good as we can be. Barriers (to learning) would be finance and 
  parochialism” (ACPOS1) 
 
“I don’t think we’ve ever really looked at the skills people need.  
There’s an assumption that because you’re a director you’ve got it.  
We’re too concerned with budgets” (NHS1) 
 
The theme that SCGs are not good at organisational learning and development but are 
focused on the immediate; and experienced barriers to learning was also identified 
during the observations. For example at Exercise Green Gate a senior detective chief 
superintendent asked directing Staff 
 
“This is a familiarisation exercise! Who captures the lessons? Who actions 
them? For multi-agency participants there should be included in pre-read 
material: Do you know your role? What do you want from this? Did it 
deliver?” (Detective Chief Superintendent) 
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At the same exercise I raised the use of incident command logs by one of the Fire & 
Rescue services in relation to their effectiveness in learning lessons. The Assistant 
Chief Fire Officer from the service involved explained that the service had introduced 
a process of dip sampling to ensure that the logs were completed. However the results 
had been disappointing because you get “101 excuses why they’re not done” 
(Assistant Chief Fire Officer). 
 
The inability to learn lessons was also observed at Ex Short Sermon where during the 
debrief it was highlighted that a key lesson in relation to notifying the appropriate 
nuclear authorities identified during the exercise had actually been identified at the 
previous exercise held in 2006. Table 4 summarises the main arguments in relation to 
strategies and policies within the SCG: 
 
Practice 
 
Consequence 
Risk assessment – there are concerns about the 
lack technical skills, especially at the strategic 
level. The risk assessment process is seen as a 
box ticking exercise. The Community Risk 
Register is not linked to the SCG strategic 
planning process, and cross border risks are not 
generally considered. 
 
SCGs have no effective early warning system 
and also lack clarity about actual threats in its 
area. Therefore, it is unable to prepare an 
effective and cohesive response.  
BCM – is not considered a core function of 
SCG. Therefore, Business Continuity Plans not 
tested routinely by the SCG. 
The SCG cannot be confident of member 
organisations’ resilience and availability to 
participate in the event of crisis. Nor can it be 
confident in effectiveness of plans which have 
not been tested. 
 
Staff resilience – there is a lack of trained staff, 
exacerbated because SCG member 
organisations are reluctant to commit resources 
for mutual aid. 
 
SCGs would struggle with resource capability 
in the event of prolonged crises.  
Training – suggestion that training be 
mandatory for all SCG members. 
SCG members are organisational leaders. 
Therefore, there are practical constraints 
regarding mandatory training. But there is still 
no means to deal with those who do not 
participate in SCG training. 
 
Learning lessons & barriers to learning – there 
is a focus on dealing with the immediate crisis. 
Once the ‘emergency’ phase is dealt with 
emergency services move on. There is also a 
lack of formal feedback at individual and 
organisational level. 
 
Lessons are not learned and disseminated 
throughout SCG. Therefore, mistakes are 
repeated from one crisis to the next and 
organisations and individuals do not improve 
because there is no critical feedback on 
performance.  
Table 4 – Summary of the Main Arguments in Relation to SCG Strategies and 
Policies 
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It has been argued here that while a resilient organisation would seek to foresee and 
adapt to risks before they actually occur, the SCG risk assessment and the related 
publication of the Community Risk Register was seen as a ‘box ticking’ exercise 
completed to meet a deadline rather than assist in improving the SCG crisis 
management capability. There are concerns regarding the assessment skills available 
to the SCGs and whether all SCGs considered risks that crossed borders. Generally, 
there is an apparent lack of urgency and responsiveness in linking the risks identified 
to the further strategic planning activities of the SCG. Furthermore, there were 
concerns about business continuity management; especially that such activity was not 
seen as a core function of the SCG but one for each individual organisation. 
Consequently, there was very little confidence in the assumptions that such plans 
were built on. Moreover, most the plans had not actually been tested and so only one 
respondent was positive that all their organisation’s plans were linked to the SCG. 
 
Despite resilience being an outcome of the SCG and a UK government policy, it was 
found that most references were about the lack of suitably trained staff. There was 
insufficient strength in depth with knowledge lying with too few people. 
Consequently, learning and training opportunities were necessary to ensure sufficient 
personnel. However, some organisations were reluctant to commit such resources and 
there was a suggestion that training should be mandatory. There were strong views on 
this issue with many acknowledging that it would assist members’ awareness but 
there were many practical constraints, including the point that SCG members are 
organisational leaders presumed to have sufficient knowledge to deal with the 
activities of the SCG.  
 
In relation to learning lessons, it was highlighted that there are challenges within 
SCGs in ensuring that barriers to learning are overcome. But the focus of the SCG, 
especially the emergency services, is on dealing with the immediate aspect of the 
crisis, essentially put the fire out and move on. The consequence is that lessons are 
not learned and mistakes are repeated. Therefore, the lack of formal feedback 
mechanisms at both an individual and organisation level adversely impacts on the 
SCGs adaptive capability. Thus diminished adaptive capability together with poor risk 
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assessment is likely to result in the organisation being crisis prone, and being more 
reactive rather than proactive. 
 
5.2 Organisational Structure, Coordination & Communication 
 
The SCG has been described as a collaborative policy network the effectiveness of 
which rests upon every member's awareness of the role, responsibilities and 
capabilities of network partners. This requires structures, resources, and interactions 
which effectively bring together participants with different authority, motivations, 
interests, skills, and access to information (Moynihan, 2005). In this section the data 
from the interviews and observations in relation to structure, coordination and 
communication is considered in relation to the relevant literature.  
 
5.2.1 Structure 
 
A theme from the literature review was the potential tension because of the emergent 
demands of crisis and the bureaucratic procedures of the typical emergency response 
agencies (Schneider, 1992; Comfort, 1990). The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 
intended to provide a single civil protection framework that is “generally not a 
hierarchy” to “reinforce partnership working at all levels” (Scottish Executive 
2007). That is collaborative partnerships working in multi-agency networks that were 
flexible and loosely coupled configurations, and therefore more effective in crisis 
(Neal & Phillips, 1995). 
 
A number of respondents referred to the SCG structure being proven at live events 
such as the fuel strikes and flu pandemic, where it proved effective in providing an 
operational response. Over a third of the respondents identified that the SCG structure 
and the introduction of specific legislation had created a collective response which 
was not only effective but had also overcame barriers between organisations. 
 
“I think it’s an effective structure. The Civil Contingencies Act  
has led to us collectively tackling disasters and major incidents.  
We’ve become very effective. It meant that barriers have been  
broken down and people are working together. It’s still relatively 
 new and will get better” (Police Chief Superintendent). 
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However, observations undertaken as part of the research revealed that many 
members were not particularly familiar with the structure beyond their own area of 
interest. This was despite the view that understanding the complexities and dynamics 
of multi-agency networks is important to enable participants to adapt their activities to 
achieve the desired outcome (Gidron et al, 1992; Waugh & Streib, 2006).    
 
Familiarity with the structure was tested at the Strategic Crisis Managers CPD. The 
opening session on both days involved the delegates working in groups to identify the 
component parts of the SCG structure illustrated in the guidance Preparing Scotland, 
as well as provided in the pre-read material for the course. This resulted in much 
debate between the delegates but unfortunately none of the groups were able to 
correctly complete the structure. Moreover, there were two recommendations from 
Exercise Green Gate regarding the structures; specifically to review the multi-agency 
command and control functions and priorities, as well as the arrangements for the 
provision of scientific and technical advice.  
 
5.2.1.2 Complexity of Linkages between Partner Agencies 
 
The main criticism of the SCG structure was the complicated linkages between the 
various partner agencies, especially for those that do not have hierarchical structures 
similar to the emergency services, which were also referred to as the ‘blue lights’. 
These comments were interesting and seemed to indicate a lack of understanding that 
the envisaged SCG structure is that of a collaborative network characterised by 
equality and representation (deLeon & Varda, 2009) rather than a hierarchy of 
organisations with differing levels of responsibility, power or influence. 
 
One of the key differences between hierarchy and network, namely spans of control 
with hierarchy of authority in relation to decision making, is indicated in the 
following comment from a member of the emergency services. The multiple linkages 
between the member organisations had previously been like ‘a spider’s web’. 
Consequently there had been difficulties working across organisations, especially 
when trying to determine who should make what level of decision. Another 
commented: 
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“The structure is well established and understood in emergency  
services. But it doesn’t fit with local authorities or health…Councils  
work on functional lines and looser hierarchies. It doesn’t necessarily  
mesh…It’s okay for police, fire and ambulance but needs to be interpreted  
for others” (SCGC10) 
 
This tension between network and the apparent desire for the certainty of hierarchy 
became a recurring theme. It was particularly common in relation to the desire for 
‘command and control’ characterised by top-down management relationships 
(Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004) by the emergency services but especially senior police 
officers. Examples are provided in later sections of this chapter.   
 
There were also concerns that the government arrangements with regards to the SCGs 
were unsuitable and required to be updated. It was also suggested that the government 
should oversee the activities of all the SCGs and impose a level of standardisation to 
improve their effectiveness.  
 
“In the past government structures have been found wanting…The  
role of government needs to be clearer. Partners expect a lead, since 
government are putting effort to collectively get standardisation”  
(ACPOS2) 
 
The imposition of standardisation is obviously contrary to the perceived benefits of 
decentralisation and devolved decision making for adaptive capability and flexibility 
in response. That it was a view expressed by a senior police officer may indicate a 
preference for hierarchies with decision making being made at the top and 
implemented by those lower down the structure. In other words a ‘command and 
control’ structure. 
 
Observations from the Strategic Crisis Managers CPD provided evidence of the 
confusion that SCG members can experience from complex linkages. For example, a 
chief executive highlighted that multiple boundaries of other organisations had 
practical implications for the council area. It was highlighted that there were a number 
of Health Boards in the council area, each of which issued different advice on how to 
deal with a particular health matter. Consequently rather than devise a single council 
policy for the topic, the council applied the Health Boards advice separately. So 
schools in the different health board areas but within the same council got different 
advice through the council to ensure that it reflected the Health Board policies.  
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A similar example was also provided by a chief executive of a council. On this 
occasion it related to schools in the council area receiving two sets of advice in 
relation to pandemic flu. The school staff, who were employees of the council, were 
advised by the council. But advice for the pupils was provided by the NHS. 
Unfortunately the advice for each was different.  
 
Another expected aspect of a collaborative network was mutual dependency (Benson, 
1982; Hakansson & Johanson, 1993). However, during observations at the Command 
and Control workshop chief constables expressed a reluctance to provide resources 
for the Scottish Police Information Coordination Centre (SPICC), highlighting that 
once released they had no control over the resources and would have to bid for them if 
their own force area required them. A similar concern about sharing resources by 
neighbouring councils was observed at the Strategic Crisis Managers CPD. There a 
chief executive, in response to discussions about why councils do not share assets, 
such as salt and road gritters, especially in severe weather conditions stated that: 
 
“There are challenges with cross border cooperation, for example  
to salt the neighbouring council roads is not done because of  
complaints (from council tax payers)” (Chief Executive) 
 
Another area of difficulty observed in relation to resourcing the complex structures 
were the additional groups needed to deal with terrorist incidents. For example a 
Scottish Government representative at the Strategic Crisis Managers CPD highlighted 
that: 
 
 “There are challenges around who attends the various groups in 
 relation to CT (counter terrorist) incidents. For example chief constable  
is at CT SCG and DCC (deputy chief constable) is at Consequence 
Management SCG. There are difficulties for other agencies in resourcing  
the structure…At a recent SCC (Strategic Coordination Centre) there were 
250 people involved. It’s the sheer scale of the structure that brings 
challenges” (Scottish Government Representative) 
 
Not only does the comment highlight issues with resourcing, it also illustrates that the 
SCG has a hierarchical aspect. The fact that the chief constable is at the Counter 
Terrorist SCG and the deputy is at the Consequence Management SCG immediately 
indicates different levels of power and responsibility, not to mention access to 
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resources that each of these ‘SCGs’ has. It appears that not all SCGs are therefore 
equal.  
 
Existing challenges around resourcing and structures were also heard at the Counter 
Terrorist Workshop. There another Scottish Government representative highlighted 
that the structures as set out in the guidance manuals “had not been agreed” making 
reference to the discussions which had taken place between the chief constables and 
others at the New Salesman Exercise. Furthermore, he reported that: 
 
 “resource issues have been expressed by 4 forces regarding using 
 the doctrine set out in the manual (Preparing Scotland)” (Scottish 
 Government Representative)  
 
The resourcing issues for counter terrorist operations were exacerbated because of the 
need for covert as well as overt aspects of investigation and response. Another change 
is the recent introduction of the Counter Terrorism Police Operation Room (CTPOR), 
which is chaired by an assistant chief constable to deal with covert direct intervention. 
This component was subject to discussion at the CPD event and also the Counter 
Terrorism Workshop, and first implemented at Exercise Castle Rock. I would make 
the observation that as soon as the CTPOR is activated, the SCG becomes redundant. 
This point was reinforced when the Exercise Director announced the end of the 
exercise (ENDEX) almost 35 minutes after a successful intervention by CTPOR. It 
transpired that CTPOR had assumed that ENDEX had occurred when they stopped 
immediately after the intervention. Highlighting a key issue about who is actually in 
overall command. 
 
In fact the issue of overall command structure was subject to lengthy consideration at 
the New Salesman Exercise. It was recognised that the conventional response should 
result in each SCG area affected by the incident establishing its own response 
structure. However, in reality that would be complex and confusing, therefore 
collaboration would be necessary to effectively manage such problems (Milward & 
Provan, 2006). Consequently it was decided that the dynamic nature of the event 
would necessitate one SCG at the first location with other chief constables being 
responsible for the response in their area but without the need to establish an SCG.  
 
“It would be dangerous to recreate structures for a series of  
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incidents. The first chief constable is lead. The SCG initially  
set up remains the primary structure. The chief constable (is  
accountable) for incidents in area but it is unnecessary to set  
up SCG for each” (Exercise Director)         
 
This was supported by the findings of the Counter Terrorism Command & Control 
workshop where a single strategy and structure was emphasised. 
 
 “Need to link threat and risk to single strategy and avoid 
 ‘stove pipe’ structures. Gold commanding ‘their’ silver etc 
 replicated in a number of areas” (Facilitator) 
 
The complexities of cross border incidents considered at the New Salesman Exercise 
resulted in much discussion Highlighting that such cross border arrangements are not 
already agreed and in place. But the first recommendation from the day was to have: 
 
“ACPOS to consider the need for a policy or doctrine regarding 
the governance of cross force command of terrorist incidents” 
 
Despite the discussions at the New Salesman Exercise about only the first force area 
establishing an SCG, at Exercise Castle Rock 3 SCGs were established. One SCG was 
activated in each of the force areas participating, with primacy supposed to rest with 
the force which had the first incident. However, during Exercise Castle Rock this 
arrangement led to a number of issues around coordination. At one of the SCGs the 
chair was asked to establish the parameters of such an arrangement with the chair of 
the primary SCG because it was adversely impacting on the communication flow.  
 
“We’re butting against the issue of multiple sites… Does primary  
mean responsibility?” (SCG Member) 
 
The arrangements also resulted in 3 Scientific & Technical Advisory Cells (STAC) 
being established, one for each of the SCGs in play. This was despite the agreement at 
the command and control workshop that chief constables should “avoid 
‘stove pipe’ structures”. As predicted by Kapucu (2005) the inter-organisational 
relationships adversely affected the coordination and communication between the 
STACs, because each STAC was making decisions without consulting with the 
others. The result was each provided parochial advice based on the circumstances of 
its particular SCG area, and not on the wider aspects involving the other areas. This 
resulted in one STAC lead saying, “Should be one big meeting rather than 
bastardised version – it’s not working”. 
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Another element of complexity in the SCG structure was the distinct and separate 
Scottish legal system, headed by the Lord Advocate. In relation to the Lord 
Advocate’s role there was a debate at the Counter Terrorism Workshop; in particular 
with attending the Executive Liaison Group. It was apparent that there was a lack of 
understanding about the role of the Lord Advocate, which undermined the resilience 
associated with Weick’s (1993) ‘virtual role system’. The representative for the Lord 
Advocate indicated that the office of Lord Advocate has a constitutional position 
regarding investigating deaths and directing investigations and therefore would attend 
the meeting of the ELG for a specific input but would not wish to be involved in the 
decision making process.  
 
The reluctance of the Lord Advocate or other members of Crown Office & Procurator 
Fiscal Service (COPFS) to become involved in specific decisions was reiterated at 
Exercise Castle Rock. There the SCG COPFS representative was asked about precise 
responsibilities regarding actions intended to be taken by the SCG in relation to the 
public’s right to be informed of the potential risk from anthrax. The chief constable 
asked the COPFS representative directly “is it sufficient, defensible?”  However, the 
response was unhelpful, namely, “I can’t be drawn into decision process. But there 
needs to be a clear audit trail of decision making process”. Not only does this 
indicate an absence of understanding about roles and responsibilities, but it also seems 
to be an obvious example of bureau-politics (Rosenthal et al. 1991), where the legal 
requirements and related responsibilities of the Lord Advocate in Scotland means that 
there is a barrier between COPFS and the other members of the SCG. Despite the 
efforts to establish a common purpose and understanding to minimise the impact of 
such differences (Hillyard, 2000).  
 
Devolution provided another example of bureau-politics. As a consequence of the 
introduction of a devolved government in Scotland which has powers over some 
issues while others are retained at UK level, there was the confusion around what 
issues can be dealt with locally and what has been retained as a reserved matter by the 
UK Government. This is an important matter when dealing with counter terrorism.  
 
“With Regards to cross border issues at the Scottish end people  
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need to be more confident in what’s reserved and devolved. That 
varies still. There is a tension with the CT (counter terrorist) side  
and Westminster” (Senior Police Officer2). 
 
Another issue raised was how multiple site events should be managed, particularly 
those that occur across a number of SCGs. The point was made that chief constables 
have statutory responsibility and are accountable for the policing in their areas, so 
there were difficulties in managing cross-border incidents. It was suggested that 
government should drive such incidents through central oversight.  
  
“There’s rigidity in current structure. The lack of linkage,  
coordination and sharing across SCGs needs to be tackled.  
Although I would acknowledge that it is a strength that a lot of 
 remedies are local and SCGs know the local context, e.g. people,  
assets, geography etc. But it needs central overview for multi-site  
issues and events” (ACPOS2) 
 
How that oversight would be structured was not stated. But in emergent environments 
it is argued that the conventional command and control model is inappropriate 
(Dynes, 1983; 1994, 2003; Neal & Phillips, 1995; Schneider, 1992) because of 
ambiguous authority and responsibility (Waugh, 2000). Instead of command and 
control hierarchies, Haddow and Bullock (2003) suggest the coordination model is 
better for bringing together a number of organisations that may have overlapping 
responsibilities. 
 
Furthermore, it was suggested that the lack of legal status of the SCG as a corporate 
body, undermined its effectiveness when acting collaboratively. Therefore, should be 
given power to compel its members to act, rather than relying solely on persuasion 
which may limit the effectiveness of its crisis management response.  
 
“The SCG should have legal status. This would compel them  
to act collectively and compel them in times of response to act 
 as a collective” (GOV1) 
 
This view of compelling action is contrary to that of the collaborative network 
approach. The network interaction brings together participants, who have different 
motivations and interests, to work together for a common goal. Those involved share 
experience, information and resources (deLeon & Varda, 2009; Moynihan, 2005). But 
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the notion of compelling resources is more closely associated with administrative 
authority of hierarchical bureaucracies, rather than collaborative networks. 
 
5.2.1.3 Disparate Sizes of SCGs and Resource Availability 
 
In relation to resources, there were also difficulties encountered by UK and Scottish 
agencies servicing all 8 SCGs. Particular issues include the variations in the number 
of meetings held by the different SCGs, which those organisations with a Scottish or 
UK remit are expected to attend.  
 
“The SCG system can be poor for national / UK organisations, as  
there are 8 SCGs in Scotland, planning and exercising effort can be 
duplicated and resources can therefore be used inefficiently”  (SAS2) 
 
The capability of UK and Scottish organisations to provide adequate resources for all 
elements of the SCG was challenging. Consequently not all SCGs get appropriate 
representation from these bodies. There was a view that this situation would be 
exacerbated in the event of a multiple site incidents across a range of SCGs.  
 
“If there needed to be more than 1 SCG being set up would  
mean that 1 would get less than full representation from some 
 national and other agencies” (ACFOS1) 
 
The disparate sizes of the 8 Scottish SCGs and the availability of resources within 
each were commented on. Some respondents highlighting that the differences were 
such that it raised the question of what the national structure should be. The current 
SCGs range from Strathclyde SCG with 12 local authorities to Fife SCG which is a 
unitary authority with coterminous boundaries for the local member organisations.  
 
“Although there needs to be a balance with any other structure  
and the current locally based one. It’s the same old issue. One  
group has half the country and one is small. What’s the national 
 structure?” (ACPOS1) 
 
However, there were respondents supportive of the small SCGs. Suggesting that the 
small SCGs benefited because they did not have competing priorities and its members 
were able to develop personal relationships with other members because of the other 
close working opportunities.  
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“I think D&G are very good …It’s maybe because it’s a unitary  
authority. In contrast Strathclyde is very large, lots of change  
with chief executives…Sometimes small is beautiful. (SEPA1) 
 
However, the disadvantage of the smaller SCGs was that they had limited response 
capability. The larger SCGs with a number of local authorities and multiple agency 
boundaries had far more members in attendance; while this led to complexity it 
ensured sufficient resources for most incidents. A mid-size SCG, such as Lothian & 
Borders, was seen as a positive asset in that it was big enough to draw resources but 
could still retain the local knowledge aspect of its members.  
 
A number of suggestions were made regarding how the SCGs could be re-structured. 
For example developing regional SCGs based on a North, South, East and West 
model. 
 
“More generally, it’s the old joke…you wouldnae want to start  
from here! The SECG (Strathclyde SCG) and D&G SCG, given 
 the population differences 2.5 million and 190,000, one must be 
 accurate as a model but they’re radically different, so one must  
be wrong. Government, SCG, Cat 1 responders (is the model) But 
 disparate sizes of the SCGs is not good idea. Either disaggregate  
Strathclyde or band together the others, e.g. West Model, North  
Model and East Model” (SCGC4) 
 
It was suggested that the SCG size could also be adjusted, either by bringing the 
smaller SCGs such as Dumfries and Galloway into larger SCGs or by combining a 
number of mid-range SCGs to form a larger one. This would enable the SCGs to have 
resilience and response capability, in terms of resources and personnel. Conversely, 
smaller SCGs were also suggested, increasing the number of SCGs by grouping the 
appropriate local councils together to form coherent but smaller SCGs focused on 
geographical areas, such as Ayrshire, Greater Glasgow or Lanarkshire.  
 
5.2.2. Coordination 
 
Respondents referred to the good business relationships and how business was 
conducted by consensus and cooperation, which meant working well together. These 
were enhanced through the development of personal or professional network relations 
leading to use of informal ad hoc channels for exchange and communication (Granot, 
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1999). The participants indicated a willingness to share information and collaborate, 
which are important factors for successful networks (Kapucu, 2006). 
 
While there was cooperation through personal contacts it was recognised that the size 
of an SCG had a direct impact on the communication opportunities between members. 
For example, unitary authorities provided opportunities for members to meet and get 
to know each other more frequently because the same participants attended other 
meetings outwith the SCG. The view was that this made it easier to work together 
within the SCG because members had a greater understanding of each others roles 
and organisations. Moreover, there was evidence of ‘boundary spanners’. That is 
those who link their own organisation with partner agencies (Mulford, 1984; Burt, 
1992; Granot, 1999; Williams, 2002). The following comment highlights the 
advantage of informal meetings in generating other opportunities to discuss matters, 
as well as identifying and involving other stakeholders that may have an interest in the 
SCG activity. 
 
 “[unitary] authority means that there are good strong formal links 
 through police and fire committee. It also brings into play other council 
sources such as environment. Meetings of this committee also generate 
informal meetings, which take the agenda items and work behind 
scenes…Very important. It means that the SCG is hugely effective  
because you can hit ground running. It means you are already aware  
of how people work rather than jostling for position. This brings with 
 it a more informal atmosphere where you can be more relaxed and can 
bounce ideas off one another without being measured or judged” 
(ACFOS1). 
 
Despite the positive comments about informal networking and boundary spanners, the 
majority of the respondents were critical of other partners. For example a government 
representative acknowledged that the government did not have a good reputation 
when it became involved in times of crisis because it had not built sufficiently wide 
and robust networks of trust, tending to focus only on the chair of the SCG as its point 
of contact:  
 
 “There are phone calls constantly. I’m in contact with SCG  
 coordinators. I try to build strong links with the coordinators,  
 whereas most of the Scottish Government focus on the Chair.  
 I’ll meet other members at local authority forums and ACPOS,  
 although I’ve good relationship with Chair…Hugely important  
 in getting the wider business done. In times of crisis it’s the levels  
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 of trust and competence, not personal agendas. The Scottish  
 Government suffers there. It does not have a good reputation. It’s 
  more important to build links” (GOV1). 
 
It was suggested that it could be as many as half who do not understand the SCG. This 
diminishes the potential for achieving network resilience and survival through 
understanding the network (Granatt & Paré-Chamontin, 2006; Ehrhardt, et al., 2008). 
But there was a desire for more training in the structures and how organisations fit 
within the SCG structure. 
 
“In relation to other partners understanding there’s a big  
chunk, more than 50% who aren’t. Some could bore for Europe  
but others not. At a recent event the feedback was for more stuff  
on structure. A lot don’t know (GOV2). 
 
The main criticism was that outwith the emergencies services there was a lack of 
understanding about Integrated Emergency Management generally and of the SCG 
structures and roles specifically.  
 
“General understanding of SCGs varies greatly across Scotland  
and at different levels. There is still some way to go about the  
principles of Integrated Emergency Management (IEM) and Business 
Planning being seen as part of the day-to-day agenda” (GOV3) 
 
“With regards to other partners understanding, I think the fire  
service and ambulance are okay. The local authorities are a bit  
lost and Category 2 and voluntary responders have difficulty in  
following the format. They appreciate that there is a structure in  
place but don’t replicate it in their own organisations so don’t know  
who the appropriate person is to attend” (SCGC1). 
 
The evidence from the observations supports that there is not a wide understanding 
and clarity around roles and responsibilities. During Exercise Ancient Mariner it was 
clear that many of the participants from outwith the emergency services were unsure 
of what was expected of them or how their organisation fitted within the SCG 
structure. Consequently, one of the key lessons from that particular exercise was the 
need for further clarity on roles, relationships and jurisdiction. Moreover, it was 
suggested that future exercises should focus on the SCG strategic aims and objectives 
to ensure that all participants were fully aware of the situation and the needs 
associated with it. The lack of awareness of roles was best illustrated by a chief 
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executive who asked “who normally Chairs SCG meetings?” at the Strategic Crisis 
Managers CPD.  
 
The distinction made between those organisations used to dealing with command and 
control and those who are not was echoed by a chief constable, as well as a local 
authority chief executive and director. The references by police regarding command 
and control emphasise their desire for a hierarchical approach. Whereas the SCG is 
supposed to be a network of equal partners, instead it seems that one organisation, the 
police, tell others what they can and cannot do; albeit it is recognised that the police 
have appropriate crisis training: 
 
“In police you’re used to command and control, so you can tell people 
 what to do. With others the role is function based with responsibility  
for the function, so council people take up post but crisis management 
 is not part of the day job. Crisis happens. It’s an add on. They’re not 
 properly trained” (ACPOS3) 
 
 “How do you manage the switch from inclusive democratic to  
 command and control? You’re acting out of character. Police 
  officers have years of training. Is there a toolkit or set of steps  
 to move you from your natural environment to crisis mode?  
 That would be useful” (LA1) 
 
5.2.3 Communication 
 
As the SCG is a heterogeneous organisation, involving public, private and voluntary 
organisations, some with rank hierarchies and some with functional responsibilities, 
all acting together in crisis response, communication is an essential component in 
achieving effective response.  However, Smith and Elliott (2007) identified 
ineffective communication and information difficulties as organisational barriers to 
learning. 
 
There is evidence that communication and information sharing within the SCG could 
be improved. Communication lines were described as bureaucratic. It was highlighted 
that “the SCGs tend to work in silos” (ACPOS2) and communication generally was 
described as “still in a bunker. It’s not mainstreamed enough”. Furthermore, “the 
government takes a scatter gun approach”, when demanding information during the 
pandemic flu. Another example given was the fuel strike. It was said that when 
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nothing much was happening there were lots of information being provided and 
requested and that you “almost got the feeling it was generating reports for the sake 
of doing something”. This is obviously some distance from what Weick (1993) 
described as ‘respectful interaction’ and more likely to be a significant barrier to 
preparedness (Guelke, 2005). 
 
A further hindrance to effective communication and information sharing was that 
representatives of member organisations did not communicate or consult within their 
own organisation. Consequently, one coordinator expressed the view before an SCG 
met, “It’s not uncommon that they’ve looked at papers the night before and haven’t 
consulted with anyone”. Another example of silo or stovepipe mentality; evidenced 
by their personal self-interest being put before the organisational goals (Wisner, et al., 
2004; Stone, 2004).  
 
However, more positively, all responders gave examples of informal links and rated 
them as (important, vital, immeasurable invaluable, critical, crucial or essential) in the 
business of the SCG. A number indicated that the informal meetings were far more 
important than formal meetings of the SCG and it was recognised that 
 
  “You don’t build relationships during a crisis’ you rely on  
 the personal relationships build up before them” (ACPOS5)  
 
One assistant chief constable was proactive and visited the key sites in the force area 
and used it not only to build relationships but also as a means to identify early 
warning signals that may need to be addressed.  Surprisingly there was little reference 
to the early identification of emerging threats by other respondents. 
 
  “It’s crucial but sometimes we don’t put enough effort into it.  
I personally went round every site in my force …to build up a personal 
informal network. During the visits we would review plans and chat with 
bosses. This improved relationships, which helped during the SCG. It also 
meant that I could identify any issues early” (ACPOS2) 
 
The advantages of such informal links were supposed to be an improved 
understanding of each others roles and knowing strengths and weaknesses. It also 
enabled the participants to build trust, relationship and understandings, which could 
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be extremely useful in overcoming structural challenges, as well as easing the mutual 
aid process or pre-empting the need to wait for a formal response to a request.  
 
“Communication is the most important aspect of dealing with  
emergencies. If you know the person you can phone directly or  
better still speak face-to-face. If you know them you get to know  
their sense of values and their organisation’s sense of values”  
(NHS1) 
 
The key aspect of such informal networking and awareness is a broader focus beyond 
the immediate needs of the member. 
 
“It helps if you know the people…‘Cap Badge rivalry’ is  
what the chief quotes but I think more like ‘Cap Badge Silo’,  
being less concerned of others. Now we have an awareness  
of others and are working towards common objectives, rather  
than just focusing on your bit” (ACFOS2) 
 
Another advantage is that it helps overcome any organisational tensions, especially 
when there has been a recent change in roles or responsibilities.  
 
 “In the 1980s there was tension between Fire and Ambulance.  
 There was a poor relationship ‘as bad as any professional relationship’  
 I’ve experienced. This existed at both leadership and the sharp end. Since 
 then I have made it my business to pursue and check any hint of tension 
between services. My experience is that [SCG]is excellent. I think that 
recently there was some local difficulty in [other region]between the police 
and fire when fire overstepped the mark regarding dealing with a road 
collision (which the fire service now have statutory responsibility for). 
However, this has been addressed with greater awareness of the change in 
roles” (ACFOS1) 
 
“good partners but not so good about partnership. We’re still very 
parochial” (ACPOS6) 
 
During the observation there were numerous examples where informal networks were 
used to expedite actions. Their importance was emphasised at the New Salesman 
Exercise, when a Chief Superintendent highlighted that 
 
“Crisis is not the time to be building networks, but it will highlight how  
successful you’ve been in building them” (Chief Superintendent) 
 
This was illustrated during Exercise Castle Rock when during a SCG it was 
highlighted that coordination difficulties were due to “different personalities, there’s 
been a change of staff in [another SCG]”. The importance of relationships in 
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stressful situations, such as crises, was reinforced the exercise debrief. It was noted 
that “the relationships formed early assisted in ensuring a successful exercise”. 
 
Another example of the use of informal networks was SCG Consequence 
Management having more up to date information than the officer in overall charge. 
When clarification of the information was sought by the chair of the SCG the 
response was, “coming direct to me from STAC. It’s the relationships working 
rather than communication process”. The information discussed was subsequently 
confirmed as accurate during the meeting. However, it is obvious that access to such 
information has the potential to cause confusion. In fact concerns about generating 
confusion through use of information obtained informally were observed at another 
SCG. During the exercise a chief constable instructed the deputy chief constable not 
to use such informal network communications to task resources. The point that it had 
the potential to disrupt the exercise and was completely inappropriate was made 
emphatically. 
 
The adverse impact of an ill judged communication flow was also observed at a 
number of exercises. For example, at Exercise Double Six, the chair acknowledged 
that not all decisions and discussions had been communicated appropriately. The 
deficit of information diminished the effectiveness of the response. Conversely the 
result of information overload was cited as at both Strategic Crisis Manager CPD and 
Exercise Castle Rock as a casual factor when things start to go wrong. In particular 
the volume of information traffic at Castle Rock resulted in about 50 actions 
outstanding.   
 
The potential for when such overload occurs is for essential information to be lost and 
a loss of confidence in resulting decisions. This point was highlighted by a council 
chief executive at the CPD, who disclosed that because of the duplications of 
information being demanded by SCGs, government and the health organisations 
during the pandemic, which was far too much it was deleted without being read. 
 
The same issues were echoed at Exercise Short Sermon. The result was a 
recommendation for a review of communication links between various components 
including UK government, the Scottish government and the NHS.  
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Another aspect was the challenge in improving the information flow because of 
tensions in the way different organisations operate. This was specifically referred to 
during Exercise Castle Rock, where as a consequence of tensions between SCGs one 
chair commented, “it’s taken half a day for the strategic position to come from 
[other SCG] but it’s now similar to ours. We are now on the same page!” 
 
Other examples observed during that exercise included media statements being 
circulated by one SCG despite objections having been raised about its content by 
another SCG. There were also significant time lags in communication with one 
example of a document taking almost 15 hours to travel from one SCG to another.  
 
During the observations at Exercise Castle Rock there were tensions between the 
Scottish and UK governments, as well as with other organisations. One Scottish 
Government representative commented that it was quite a difficult process which 
lacked clarity. He was of the view that this perhaps affected what [communication] 
was actually going out. This view was mirrored by one chief constable who 
emphasised that the Scottish Government, other forces, the investigators, and SGoRR 
had all indicated that the communication outcomes were not effective.  
 
These incidents occurred despite a protocol being signed by all chief officers involved 
and the almost ritualistic statements that communication needs to be improved from 
every SCG. Such communication lags are more characteristic of hierarchical 
structures rather than networks (Ackoff, 1967; Carroll, 1998).  
 
5.2.3.1 Information Sharing 
 
Information sharing and effective crisis communication requires interoperability. That 
is an appropriate structure and technology that allow agencies to communicate using a 
common language and system (Kapucu, 2006).  
 
The essential need for a common understanding of terminology and language was 
seen during Exercise Castle Rock. The word ‘victim’ caused confusion during the 
exercise because it meant different things to different organisations. For example to 
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health it means someone still alive but to the police it meant dead. A lengthy debate 
around the meaning of ‘victim’ was observed at one of the SCGs. In addition, 
throughout the exercise all organisations and each of the 3 SCGs had difficulty in 
establishing the accurate number of people affected by the exercise incident. This was 
only cleared up towards the end of the exercise when there was realisation that 
different definitions were being used. Eventually a representative from Health 
Protection Agency (Porton Down) clarified what confirmed, probable and possible 
meant with regards to diagnoses of symptoms. But because it was not identified 
earlier a lot of time was spent double checking and seeking clarity.  
 
The lack of technical means to share and post information both within and between 
SCGs and for the public was seen as another area which constrained effective 
communication. A particular issue was that some organisations had to use fax to share 
sensitive information because they did not have access to a secure network. There is 
also a related issue of security clearance for staff receiving such sensitive information.  
Consequently, it was identified that a better interagency operational communication 
framework for real time information sharing would assist communication and 
information sharing between the SCGs, as well improving the effectiveness of 
response. 
 
A source of tension during the interviews was the restrictions on information being 
communicated when organisations are being asked to provide resources, but are 
excluded from the discussion and decision in relation to the situation. This issue 
resulted in much discussion and disagreement about the vetting levels applicable to 
gain access to particular meetings. Consequently a recommendation from the New 
Salesman Exercise was to have ACPOS and COPFS review the current policy. 
 
It also had a bearing at Exercise Castle Rock because the Scottish Government was 
initially excluded from COBRA, which resulted in the Government Liaison Officer 
apologising at the SCG. Furthermore when an SCG member asked about a specific 
incident, the response from the SCG chair was “we’re sharing as much as we can”. 
A similar occurrence happened in another SCG when the chair of that SCG responded 
to a question from Health representative “not in a position to talk about it in public 
domain”. This caused particular difficulties for the health organisation involved, 
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especially in relation to the advice it could communicate. But probably more 
importantly it raised the issue of what is the public domain and who gets to decide 
whether a member of the SCG should not receive sensitive information? Table 5 
summarises the main arguments in relation to the SCG structure, coordination and 
communication: 
 
Practice 
 
Consequence 
SCG fragmented boundaries, disparate sizes, 
and lack of legal status. 
8 separate SCGs is challenge for organisations 
to resource for Scottish and UK organisations. 
Also SCG resources available to respond are 
linked to its size. However, coordination is 
more effective in smaller SCGs. 
 
SCG network versus hierarchical structures Emergency services have preference for 
command and control rather than network 
coordination, which creates tensions between 
organisations. 
 
Current SCG structure lacks responsiveness 
 
SCG takes too long to establish in case of 
spontaneous incident. 
Evidence of silo working remains SCG members do not fully understand the 
constraints member organisations face, which 
undermines the effectiveness of the network 
structure. 
 
No common means of secure communication Time lags in communication and limitations in 
sharing sensitive information with those who 
do not have secure technology 
 
Table 5 – Summary of the Main Arguments in Relation to the SCG Structure, 
Coordination and Communication 
 
It has been argued here that the current SCG structure has some deficiencies, e.g. 
fragmented boundaries, disparate sizes and no legal status, which may undermine its 
coordination effectiveness. Moreover, the communication channels are complex and 
may experience time lags in crisis response. The heterogeneous nature of the SCG 
means a complex organisational structure, with multiple linkages between partners. 
The complexity of which was exacerbated by the devolved Scottish Government and 
Scotland’s distinct and independent legal system. Furthermore, the multiple 
boundaries, with SCG member organisations serving local, Scottish and UK wide 
areas, while supporting 8 separate SCGs was a resource challenge for many 
organisations. In addition, SCGs capability was related to their geographical size, 
which also influences coordination and communication effectiveness.  
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It also appears that there is a preference by members of the emergency services for 
command and control hierarchical structures rather than network and that the structure 
lacked the necessary responsiveness to deal with spontaneous, cross border dynamic 
crisis. Despite that the willingness of those within the SCG to build relationships and 
interact in a positive manner was seen as a potential means to eradicate silo working 
and gain a greater understanding of the other SCG member roles, responsibilities and 
constraints. But the evidence indicates that silo working is still prevalent. Finally, 
effective crisis communications are undermined by the lack of technology accessible 
to the entire SCG system. Consequently there were difficulties in transferring 
sensitive information between partner agencies. This was a particular issue when 
involving intelligence sources and the reluctance to share it with those who had not 
been previously vetted to the appropriate level. Furthermore, there were challenges 
around the use of common terminology among the various agencies, which result in 
misunderstanding and distraction during crisis.    
 
5.3 Culture, Leadership & Decision-Making  
 
Key components of a resilient organisation are organisational culture (Mitroff et al., 
1989; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001), leadership (Smits & Ally, 2003; Kelly, 2007) and 
decision making (Frederickson & LaPorte, 2002). But a particularly important aspect 
of the organisational culture of the SCG was the frequency and willingness for 
multiagency working. This collective action to avert common threats was also 
identified as being a suitable success criterion for a policy network (Klickert, et al., 
1997; Scharpf, 1978; Glasbergen, 1995). There was wide recognition by the 
respondents that the SCG provided numerous opportunities for members to interact 
and meet both on a formal and informal basis, enabling them to work together to 
achieve common outcomes. In this sense the SCG met the success criterion for a 
policy network.  
 
The theory opines that multiagency collaboration results in greater understanding of 
the different organisations involved, especially in relation to an appreciation of the 
different organisational cultures, priorities, needs and constraints that partner agencies 
have (Weick, 1993; Cotton, 1993; Crichton, et al., 2005). Furthermore, that 
multiagency working leads to greater integration and the breaking down of silos, 
 
172 
 
 
which brings with it greater awareness of the roles and responsibilities of all 
participants of the SCG. However, there was a view that partner organisations were 
guilty of being insular rather than seeing the overall picture, with particular criticism 
of the local authorities. One Scottish government respondent who had worked across 
a number of SCGs and various member organisations highlighted the tendency of 
organisations to learn in silos, which resulted in a lack of understanding between 
organisational roles and responsibilities.  
 
“If you learn in silos, which you’ll do if you only know your  
own organisation, you’ll reflect that organisational culture.  
…. There’s a lack of understanding across the board about  
roles and responsibilities… The lack of awareness and  
understanding applies to the local authorities, especially”  
(GOV1) 
 
The development of relationships and networks, through getting to know colleagues 
and counterparts in other organisations was considered to very important 
organisational cultural aspect promoting respect, confidence and trust. 
 
“We still have a tendency to work in silos. Decisions can be made in 
isolation. For example at live play exercise there was a breakdown in 
communication between the executive and operational levels. It was not 
malicious or deliberate but reflected training, experience, infrastructure 
and assumptions about the organisation, which were wrong. That’s why I 
think it’s important to build relationships. It will lead to improvements” 
(SAS1) 
 
However a potential difficulty in forming close knit groups is that some stakeholders 
will be excluded. The potential is for ‘groupthink’ to develop. Essentially a form of 
extreme cohesion where the actions of the group are about consensus and protecting 
the image of the group rather than considering other appropriate courses of action 
(Janis, 1983; Turner & Pratkanis, 1997). This seemed to be a concern expressed by a 
chief executive referring to the close working relationships that council emergency 
planning officers had formed:  
 
 “The emergency planning managers interact together. They have  
 a ‘cosy club’ that could act against us. We need to ensure that they 
 don’t exclude those not involved on a daily basis, i.e., the chief executives” 
(LA1) 
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5.3.1 Leadership of SCG Brings Experience & Knowledge? 
 
The respondents acknowledged that the SCGs had access to members with experience 
and knowledge, particularly those with expertise in specialist areas, who could come 
together at fairly short notice and the SCG work well. Moreover, because of the local 
nature of SCGs it was recognised that members would know the area covered and the 
risks within it. This local knowledge base was essential in the planning process and 
that the people who draw up SCG plans being the same as those who respond to them 
was also a positive aspect of the SCG system. A practical example of the use of local 
knowledge was given by one responder. During the foot and mouth when pyres for 
livestock were being set the responder’s organisation was involved in assessing the 
sites. On one occasion it was set over a gas pipe fortunately this was identified and 
prevented because of local knowledge. However, a theme from all the observations 
taken was the need for explicit separation of responsibilities between each of the 
levels of management. In fact, Exercise Ancient Mariner found that there was a need 
for clearer identification of leadership responsibility at each stage of the incident, as 
well as clarification of who should be Chair of the SCG.  
 
The context for crisis decision making within the SCG was identified a ‘real world 
setting’ characterised by time pressure, uncertainty, ill-defined goals, high personal 
stakes, and other complexities (Orasanu & Connolly, 1993; Lipshitz, et al 2001). 
When operating in such an environment, over half the respondents indicated that their 
day-to-day experience underpinned by their organisational training, rather than 
training specifically related to crisis management that had influenced their abilities: 
 
 “I think is less to do with training and more to do with experience.  
 Dealing with this on a daily basis at a high level” (ACPOS6)  
 
 “I would say that regards to (ability to assess situations) you may  
 come across a new situation that training has not prepared you for.  
 You need to accept you won’t know the answer straight away.  
 Being able to deal with ambiguity is important” (ACPOS1)  
 
It was striking that the members of the police service referred to the need to be able to 
make decisions when there is a lack of clarity and limited information. This was 
identified as a key characteristic of crisis management (Boin & ‘tHart 2007). 
However, it was recognised that leaders had the potential to undermine group 
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cohesiveness. In the following example, not only is there reference to command and 
control approach adversely affecting police inclusiveness, but it also starkly 
demonstrates the danger of a leader adopting the wrong leadership style and failing to 
understand the different requirements of the organisations that make up the group 
membership, even during a simulation: 
 
“There was a recent exercise where the chief constable involved  
lost it because of attitude and an aggressive manner. Because  
of the command and control approach, we’re not always good at being 
inclusive. We’re more used to flipping between command and control and  
 steady state, than some of our partners” (ACPOS7) 
 
It was also finding from Exercise Ancient Mariner that the police ‘suffer’ from a can 
do attitude. The use of language in describing this is in itself interesting. ‘Suffer’ 
tends to indicate an adverse or negative aspect. It would perhaps be more relevant to 
refer to the benefiting from a can do attitude.   
 
“When crisis hits we likely prove ourselves as good as we 
 need to be. We could always improve. The reliance on ‘can do’  
mentality of the Blue Light services is no bad thing” (ACPOS6) 
 
It was suggested by one chief constable that the involvement of the police imposed an 
appropriate response structure for the command and control of the incident. 
 
“We’re the emergency response side. In peacetime SCG is chaired 
 by the chief executive of the local authority. When live activation  
its different …We bring a discipline to the role with structure and  
command and control. We can start to task and increase the pace”  
(ACPOS3) 
 
This comment indicates demarcation between an emergency response and steady state 
management, implying that the need for police powers to deal with the emergency or 
crisis was the determining factor on whether the chief constable assumed the chair of 
the SCG. It is notable that of the 8 SCGs all but 1 are routinely chaired by the local 
chief constable. However, even with the exception which is chaired by the chief 
executive of the council, in the event of an ‘emergency’ the chief constable will take 
the chair. 
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5.3.2 Reluctance to Chair SCG 
 
With regards to chairing the SCG it was highlighted that an effective chairperson 
needs to be inclusive and make use of all the experience and perspectives around the 
table. But the assumed existence of SCG members’ knowledge seemed to be 
contradicted when in a separate event a council chief executive exclaimed that in 
relation to having full information 
 
 “Chief Executives are not necessarily well informed [they’ll be]  
reciting only their brief which they’ll have received one hour before”   
(Council Chief Executive) 
 
Moreover, one chief constable who declined to take part in the research explained that 
although he held the chair of the SCG, he had been automatically appointed by virtue 
of his rank but did not actually have any experience of an SCG operating. However, it 
was highlighted that there was occasional reticence to chair SCG from those beyond 
the police and fire service.  
 
 “The chair must have suitable knowledge and experience. The  
 police, for example, deal with crisis management on a daily basis 
 and in my experience they still include everyone around the table.  
 An effective chair is one that is inclusive recognising the range of  
 experience and skills around the table” (SAS1) 
 
“… there is a reticence to take the chair by others outwith the  
blue lights. They rotated the chair at [recent] training event 
and that was quite interesting how others reacted. But we’ve moved  
and appreciate the multi-agency input” (ACFOS2) 
 
A consequence of a lack of capability in relation to those SCG members who do not 
routinely deal with crises is a reluctance to assume the responsibility of chairing the 
SCG. According to a Scottish government representative: 
 
 “The key skill of the chair of the SCG is to be inclusive 
 and be aware of organisational culture when all hell’s 
 broken loose” 
 
Examples of a reluctance by those not routinely involved in  crises in taking the chair 
when it would be more appropriate for their organisation to do so were observed on a 
number of occasions. During Exercise Ancient Mariner the chief constable chairing 
the SCG suggested after the initial emergency phase was over, i.e. once the strategy 
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was in place and it became obvious that it was primarily a public welfare issue, that it 
would be more appropriate that the chair was assumed by another agency. However 
all declined. In fact one participant from the appropriate agency to assume the chair 
was standing at the time and actually took a step back. 
 
A similar incident was observed during the Strategic Crisis Managers CPD when the 
police chairman offered the chair to the NHS because of health issues arising in the 
scenario. The obvious reluctant reaction from the NHS representative was such that 
there was laughter around the room. The chair was then declined and remained with 
the police.  
 
A delegate at Exercise Green Gate had also experienced this, when during the flu 
pandemic, the chief constable offered the chair to another agency but was declined. 
Furthermore, at Exercise Short Sermon when the chief police officer chairing the 
SCG concluded that the exercise was entering the recovery phase and should be 
chaired by the council chief executive there was some confusion because it seemed to 
be a lack of awareness and preparation for such a transition by the chief executive.     
 
In addition to the variable quality of the individuals, organisational cultural issues 
become apparent, with references being made to police ‘telling people what to do’ and 
being task driven with a ‘can do’ attitude which contrasts with other organisations 
who are perhaps reluctant to volunteer or may not deliver on time. This highlights one 
of the challenges with a network, namely holding individual people to account for 
collective action (Knoke & Kuklinski, 1993). In contrast, with a hierarchy it is 
possible to employ a large number of people and preserve unambiguous 
accountability for what they do (Jaques, 1990). It is therefore perhaps unsurprising 
that the emergency services indicate a preference for command and control structures, 
where it is clear who should have done what. 
  
“With other partners at chief executive level it’s generally good.  
I’m less convinced at more junior levels with local authorities. There 
 doesn’t seem to be any consistency. Some are at the top of their 
 game and others don’t seem to provide resources. There’s insufficiency  
of focus; police are task driven but partners are more relaxed. There’s 
 a question of desire and degree of integration. They get caught up in  
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legalise… They don’t volunteer which is difficult. You almost have to 
embarrass people to take tasks and they don’t deliver enough” (ACPOS4)  
 
I think it needs to sit with the police for administration,  
otherwise nothing gets done. That’s the culture. (Senior Police Officer1) 
 
A more critical view was that some of the strategic partners were not sure of their role 
or what purpose they were supposed to serve on the SCG. 
 
At strategic level I think some partners are very poor. They  
generally struggle with simple things like what they’re there 
for, e.g. strategy and outcomes. The attitude, what’s it got to  
do with me?” (GOV1) 
 
For some organisations it is simply the wrong level of attendee for the SCG. 
 
“there have also been complaints at the strategic that on some  
occasions the wrong level of people attended. That is those who  
are not executive decision makers” (MCA2) 
 
“The other partners it varies across agencies and across individuals.  
Strategic is improving and the tactical mostly do. Strategic don’t all  
attend, that’s why the Regional Resilience Advisor is now in place.  
It’s the level of understanding – some don’t give two hoots. One  
local authority continuously sent a tactical rep to strategic group,  
which rejected rep. The local authority don’t see it as their role and  
haven’t attended since 2007” (SCGC8) 
 
The lack of commitment is evidenced by the non-attendance by the chief officers. 
This leads to general scepticism at other levels of the SCG.   
 
 “There are degrees of competence and interest levels at SCG.  
 The Blue Light people are generally better. It is fairly critical but 
  there’s a lack of understanding. I think the lead is taken from the  
 chief executive representation, it sends a signal. I’ve written two  
 letters (regarding failure of appropriate representation at SCG) it  
 makes it happen. Although I wouldn’t go as far as sanctions, more 
  gently pressed. Government should make it an expectation. After all 
  it’s not a huge commitment when you look at the meetings and  
 exercises” (ACPOS6) 
 
These critical views are not just held by the ‘blue lights’ but across the SCG 
membership. It highlights that networks are not characterised solely by collaboration 
(Granovetter 1985; Powell 1991; Hakansson & Johanson 1993) but also need to be 
able to resolve disputes (Knoke & Kuklinski, 1993; Termeer & Koppenjan, 1997). In 
terms of the SCG, there are no effective sanctions available should a member either 
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absent themselves or show limited commitment to the SCG. Therefore, it is suggested 
that government should encourage or ‘gently press’ for full and committed 
engagement by all stakeholders. 
 
5.3.2.1 Lack of Clarity re Politicians’ Role 
 
Despite the legislation, guidance and objectives related to the SCG, there was still a 
lack of clarity about the role and responsibilities of elected representatives. There 
were examples given that in many occasions politicians did not understand the 
limitation of their political role in the operational environment and that their requests 
for information and decision making were seen as distractions from the effectiveness 
of the SCG.  
 
 “Politicians. How do we stop them interfering unnecessarily?  
 How do we get them to stop criticising? Their prime objective 
  is to get re-elected their use of ‘scapegoats’ impacts on public 
  confidence. I could spend my working day chasing questions  
 for politicians rather than getting on with my day job. I’ve 
  personally been misquoted by a politician but fortunately I had  
 an audit trail” (NHS1)   
 
The use of the term ‘scapegoat’ in this comment reflects Smith’s view that post-crisis 
key actors may seek to protect themselves and generate disinformation as the process 
of scapegoating begins (Smith, 1990). That, together with the description of ‘chasing 
questions’, from which it could be inferred that the politician’s questions are not 
central to the issue, echo Turner’s (1976; 1978) concept of peripheral inquiry and 
decoy phenomenon, which Smith and Elliott (2007) identified as being barriers to 
learning from crises. Perhaps indicated by the politician’s subsequent misquote, is a 
difficulty with sensemaking in relation to the crisis (Weick, 1993). 
 
Despite concerns about politicians, particular complaints were made about their 
reluctance to become involved in the programme of exercises which is run, which 
perpetuated their lack of understanding of the SCG structures, roles and 
responsibilities. 
 
“Getting politicians to play (in exercises) is virtually impossible. 
Even in national counter terrorist experts national (UK wide)  
politicians will send senior civil servants to deputise for them. In  
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the event of an incident the politicians don’t understand their role.  
They blur political and operational decisions and start intruding. They  
are surprised to find when it’s a police decision rather than the politician’s. 
That applies right across the UK. If they attended training, they would be 
confronted with the issue in a safer environment” (ACPOS1) 
 
Political interference but it’s the chief constable or chief executive that 
carries the can. Central Government needs to be clear about its supportive 
role. WithCT it’s slightly different CT is national responsibility but the 
consequence management response is devolved, e.g. Glasgow Airport there 
were some difficulties in who was doing what” (ACPOS3) 
 
These issues were summarised by a representative of the Scottish Government 
speaking about the issue of ‘political management’ at the New Salesman Exercise. It 
was highlighted that “politicians are capable of helping or hindering” and while 
they would respect reserved or devolved boundaries they were “more about trust and 
relationships and less about manuals and guidance”. This raises the point that 
without an understanding of the guidance it is inevitable that politicians would 
misunderstand their role.  
 
This was echoed by a representative from the Cabinet Office who acknowledged that 
the relationship between central and devolved government during the terrorist attack 
at Glasgow airport had not been as effective as it should have been. In particular, it 
was highlighted that “the UK government didn’t really understand the role of the 
PF (Procurator Fiscal)”.  
 
This lack of understanding by politicians was referred to again at the Strategic Crisis 
Managers CPD event. On that occasion a senior police officer involved in the incident 
opined that “political wrangling between London and Scotland caused a 12 hour 
delay to ‘feed the beast’ (of the media) which was obviously an error”. This was a 
dispute about media strategy, with the UK government wishing to adopt a ‘say 
nothing’ approach which contrasted with the Scottish Government strategy to disclose 
information.  
 
The lack of understanding and the adverse impact which politicians can have on the 
effectiveness of the police investigation was also raised at the Counter Terrorism 
Workshop by a senior detective who was involved in the investigation. In this case it 
was given as an example of the tensions created by politicians that interfered with the 
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police being able to deal effectively with the incident itself. The dispute resulted in a 
chief constable opining that: “The UK and Scottish Governments should go and sort 
that out separately and allow the police to deal with the incident”. 
 
Another example of government’s lack of understanding about the difficulties 
between theory and practical application was observed at Exercise Green Gate. A 
representative from the Fire & Rescue Service informed me that in relation to mass-
contamination set up in response to a CBRN incident that “this has never been done 
for real, but according to the Home Office model, everyone will be done in 6 
hours”. The message which was emphasised was that logistically it was just not 
possible. 
 
It was suggested by the Cabinet Office representative that such tensions and 
misunderstandings could be overcome by cross border exercising involving 
politicians. Notwithstanding earlier comments about how difficult it actually is to get 
politicians to participate in crisis training in a safe learning environment, this was 
done during Exercise Castle Rock. The Exercise involved both UK and Scottish 
government participants; although the Scottish Government was unable to participate 
in the opening day because of a Cabinet meeting.  
 
But the unavailability of Scottish Government in an exercise which took over a year 
to plan could be interpreted as a lack of priority to the notion of practise. If 
government are unable to provide resources for the opening day of the exercise, it 
begs the question about commitment and how government could be expected to 
‘gently press’ others to fully commit, as suggested earlier by a chief constable who 
had difficulties ensuring all SCG members attended and fully participated in its 
functions. 
 
When the Scottish Government did become involved in day 2 and 3 of the exercise, it 
highlighted another difficulty expressed by SCG members about politicians, namely 
the lack of understanding between political decision making and the independence of 
chief constables in operational policing matters. In fact the Scottish Government 
minister wanted to be “more proactive” and asked to be “copied into the 
investigation”. This was an example of a politician overstepping the demarcation 
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between political issues and policing; notwithstanding the role of the Lord Advocate 
and Procurators Fiscal to direct the investigation.  
    
Evidence of further blurring of the role of politicians became apparent during 
Exercise Castle Rock when it was announced that the UK Government’s crisis 
committee “COBRA had met and set tactical parameters” and later when the 
Government Liaison Officer informed the chief constable that COBRA “were looking 
for the chief constable to ‘give up the date’ (in relation to an aspect of the 
investigation) to the media”. On both occasions the chief constable did not comply. 
 
Moreover, the actions by UK and Scottish governments within the exercise were 
praised by a representative of the Office of Security and Counter Terrorism at the 
Exercise debrief. In particular it was highlighted that although busy Ministers 
participated in “the strategic level of play”. This raises questions about who is 
actually in charge and where does strategic responsibility lie, with the Strategic 
Coordinating Group or with Ministers. One chief constable was explicit, 
“Government needs to be clear about its supportive role” (ACPOS3). 
  
5.3.3 Decision Making within the SCG  
 
The Strategic Crisis Managers CPD events highlighted the perceived distinction 
between command and control organisations and those with less hierarchical 
structures. For example a local authority chief executive suggested that not only were 
the structures different but the way decisions were made within the SCG was also 
effected. The nature of the SCG in dealing with crisis decision making would appear 
to be at odds with the preferred method of decision making in local government. It 
appears that local government are more comfortable and perhaps more cautious 
preferring to take time and have full information when making decisions.  
 
“there’s a difference in management styles, the police are command  
and control but local government have a softer style. The speed of  
decision making also brings tensions” (Council Chief Executive) 
 
At a practical level there were a number of comments that indicated deficiencies in 
decision making processes currently in place with SCGs. The crises that the SCG 
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were activated for are complex and difficult to conceptualise and analyse (Chisholm, 
1998) and will not have an obvious cause to justify triggering procedures (Lagadec, 
1993; Boin & ‘tHart 2007). Therefore there is difficulty in making the decision as to 
when to shift from steady state management into crisis mode. Such decisions are 
made more difficult if it happens to be outside core office hours and involves a local 
or central government department. Making reference to the ‘bird flu’ scare which had 
recently occurred one chief police officer said, “When to go into crisis mode is the 
key? The police were left holding the dead swan because it happened after 4pm on a 
Friday” (ACPOS2).  
 
In relation to decision making by the SCG, there were some reservations about 
everyone being involved in the decision and pressures within the group to agree rather 
than take a contrary position.  
 
 “Sometimes I think there can be too many leaders, especially higher 
  up in the organisation. Perhaps we can be too structured. We need  
  to realise that all the answers won’t come from person of rank every 
 time, nor should we decide by committee. We need to get somewhere in 
between. We need a succinct and focused process to drive activity.   
Everyone doesn’t need a voice. Eventually you get to the point when  
you say this is what’s happening and everyone should get behind it” 
(Senior Police Officer2) 
 
Interestingly this comment indicates a characteristic attributed to High Reliability 
Organisations, namely deference to expertise where decisions are delegated to those 
not necessarily in command but with the most appropriate knowledge applicable to 
the circumstances (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001) and goes on to recognise that in crisis 
quick decision making is important (Pearson & Clair, 1998). Concluding that once a 
decision is made it should be supported; although implied in the ‘process to drive 
activity’ is that should the circumstances change again so will the decision; an 
attribute of those organisations such as the police and military who routinely deal with 
crisis (Flin 1996; Weick, Sutcliffe & Obstfeld, 1999; Klein, 2001).  
 
The downside to group decision making in dynamic situations such as crises, is that 
some may find themselves under pressure to agree to achieve consensus within the 
group, rather than express a contrary view based on the individual’s expertise; in other 
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words, groupthink (Janis, 1982). Turner (1994b) linked groupthink to ‘sloppy 
management’, which has the potential to increase the vulnerability of the SCG.  
 
 “Being assertive; sometimes something needs to be said. There can  
 be undue pressure to go with the flow. There is an unequal basis of 
  teams” (GOV3) 
 
There was also a perception that the SCG was driven by the practitioners, such as the 
emergency planning officers. This occurred because the practitioners met more 
frequently and tend to have more day-to-day involvement than the Strategic level of 
management within the SCG. This reflects the view made earlier by a council chief 
executive who referred to the emergency planning officers as ‘a cosy club’. 
 
“In my view it is clear that most decisions tend to be taken at 
operational level. At the strategic level I’m concerned about  
policy and legislative issues” (LA2) 
 
It was a concern expressed by a local authority chief executive at the Strategic Crisis 
Managers CPD that the “SCG has no statutory power”. Furthermore at the New 
Salesman Exercise it was highlighted that organisational chief executives remain 
accountable for their own organisation’s actions. In relation to suggestions made 
about having one ‘super gold’ commander in a cross border event, one dissenting 
chief constable emphasised that “you can’t get away from personal liability and 
accountability of chief constables” (in relation to being responsible for all policing 
within their force areas). This viewpoint had implications of the structures used to 
deal with a terrorism incident. But was echoed by another chief constable who said 
 
 “Two golds: who’s in charge? Who links to the First Minister? What  
does an engagement model look like?” (Chief Constable) 
 
In dealing with terrorism another group which is not included on the published 
structures is the Executive Liaison Group (ELG). The role of the ELG was subject to 
discussion at the Counter Terrorism Workshop, especially in relation to the chief 
constable’s accountability. Those sitting on the ELG would include any force affected 
by public risk. The group would also include other stakeholder specialists such as the 
Lord Advocate, who has the power to direct investigations. The ELG would provide 
strategy and forces would simply make tactical choices in line with the ELG strategy. 
 
 
184 
 
 
However, it was acknowledged that the constitutional position of the chief constable 
is such that should he/she disagree with the strategy the ELG would have to 
compromise. It was also confirmed at this event that ‘super gold’ commanders have 
no basis in law. The event facilitator informed the chief officers in attendance: 
 
 “Scottish forces affected by public risk will sit at the ELG…tactical 
 choices will go to individual forces. (With) regards accountability 
 there’s no legal basis for super gold. If disputed by local chief 
 constable the wider plan from the ELG would have to be re-worked 
 to take account of chief constable’s position”  
 
The lack of clarity around the legal position highlights the difficulties of decision 
making bodies in dealing with crises. The existence of the ELG and its role in setting 
strategy, in relation to terrorism incidents, undermines the statutory function of the 
SCG. The notion that the SCG has specific duties but is also expected to implement 
tactical options from other strategic groups such as the ELG or government constrains 
the decision making of its members. It also blurs accountability and has the potential 
to create tensions within the group who may simply see their presence as the provider 
of resources, rather than strategic decision maker. 
 
During Exercise Ancient Mariner the chair had difficulty in keeping the SCG business 
focused on strategic issues. The same issue was highlighted at the Strategic Crisis 
Manager’s CPD event where participants had to be reminded that strategic decisions 
should consider the longer term and should not drift down to tactical or operational 
levels. Likewise at Exercise Short Sermon the chair of the SCG had to remind 
members on a number of occasions that it dealt only with strategic issues and referred 
topics raised to the appropriate tactical level group. Although there were also 
complaints by other members of the tactical group at Exercise Short Sermon that the 
separation between strategic and tactical was too great.  
 
The challenge in matching decision making to the appropriate structure was observed 
at a number of exercises. For example at Exercise Ancient Mariner a decision about a 
set of options presented by the key utility company were presented at the tactical level 
group in the first instance. Thereafter, they were sent to strategic which should have 
decided the options in the first place. From there strategic sent them to the Scientific 
and Technical Advisory Cell (STAC) for consideration. STAC then sent them back to 
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strategic for consideration. From there they were sent to tactical to implement. In 
essence the strategic decision arose from the tactical group. It was delayed by being 
sent round a number of forums only to return to the originators to implement some 
hours later. 
 
A similar issue of strategic being given information but not making decisions was 
highlighted both at Exercise Double Six and Strategic Crisis Managers CPD events. 
In the former the strategic group simply noted all actions undertaken at the 
operational level. It did not make any decisions itself and resulted in twin sites taking 
quite different decisions regarding evacuation. The latter involved an aspect of the 
scenario similar to Exercise Ancient Mariner. In this case the SCG reflected that it did 
not actually make a decision. The decision had actually been made by the utility 
involved, not the SCG. The view of the chief executive was, “We didn’t make 
decision – [utility] made decision. We shared lots of information”. When this 
observation was made the representative from the utility responded that to the utility 
organisation the outcomes and safety margins were obvious: “but decision making in 
multi-agency environment not as clear cut. Organisations don’t respond at the 
press of a button. There is more complexity in an SCG”. This comment highlights 
the challenge in crisis requiring quick decisions (Pearson & Clair, 1998) while 
deferring to expertise (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001) in a network environment where 
there are difficulties in attaching direct actions to accountability (Knoke & Kuklinski, 
1993). 
 
Furthermore, during the discussion around this issue a chief executive from a local 
authority tried to elicit information about the practicalities of the options, which 
would have assisted with the outcome. However, the group discussion talked over the 
question and it was not returned to. It did though lead to a discussion within the group 
about how to deal with decisions that did not have the unanimous support of the 
group. The question arose about what the decision was and whose decision was it 
actually to make. This indicated that the SCG did not see itself as a collective decision 
making body but still saw its business in silos; particularly who should be responsible 
for what. 
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The discussion finished with a telling incident when the facilitator asked how the 
group would deal with contentious issues with which the representative was at odds 
with the group. The responses included “vote on it!” and “go to the media!” While 
the responses raised much hilarity among the group it also notably caused some to 
become quite uncomfortable, mainly those whose organisations had been subject to 
media scrutiny. It was finally agreed that in the event of a fundamental disagreement 
the organisational representative would simply “argue your case and have it minuted 
if you disagree”. Unfortunately the group were unable to reconcile organisational 
disagreement with the need for the organisation to carry out a particular action. That 
was left unresolved. 
 
The lack of decision making was also observed at Exercise Castle Rock. There a 
senior member of the Exercise Staff was exasperated when he declared. “They’re 
having meetings about strategy rather than dealing with things. People are dying in 
the street. They just have meetings”. Similar criticism was directed at the Scientific 
and Technical Advisory Cell during the same Exercise and was summarised by the 
umpire who said 
 
“Crisis decision making NOT! Could be better, for example 
STAC’s like being thrown an exam question; they kept going 
round and round. 45 minutes is not an urgent decision! There 
are a few prima donnas” (Umpire Ex Castle Rock) 
 
These comments highlight a number of issues in relation to multiagency decision 
making. The most obvious is the lack of ability to make decisions quickly. But 
decision making processes are critical when dealing with the high tempo of crisis 
demands (Frederickson & LaPorte, 2002). The perception of those on the outside was 
that there was a sense of ‘dither’ or lack of action. It indicates that those in the group 
were perhaps waiting for more information and were detached from the sense of 
urgency.  
 
Another aspect within the STAC is the strength of personalities and the impact on 
decision making (Feldman, 2001; Robbins, 2005). The inference from the umpires 
comment is that a decision was being blocked by those with strong personalities. The 
absence of a mechanism to deal with dissent exacerbates the delay.  
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An observation that could be made about the STAC is its prestigious position because 
it is composed of those with detailed specialist knowledge and skills. However, my 
observation would be that they are not decision makers. The STAC is an advisory 
group to the decision makers in the SCG. This seems to have been misunderstood. 
 
The power of perception and the challenge of making decisions remotely from the 
operational sphere were starkly illustrated by the example given at the Strategic Crisis 
Managers CPD by a senior fire officer. During the terrorist attack on Glasgow Airport 
it became apparent that there was the potential for further explosive devices and 
because the fire services could not be given such assurances that there were no further 
devices their procedures dictated a tactical withdrawal to a safe area. However, during 
the incident the world media had arrived and began broadcasting, so despite the 
procedures instructing withdrawal the fire and rescue services decided to remain 
because of the understanding that perceived retreat would have to the wider world. 
The key arguments in relation to the SCG’s culture, leadership and decision-making 
are summarised in Table 6 below: 
 
Practice Consequences 
 
Despite the SCG members acknowledging the 
importance of multiagency working it is still 
insular. 
 
Undermines network performance and creates 
silo working, which results in barriers to 
preparedness.  
The network structure of the SCG means there 
is a lack of accountability for outcomes 
The lack of accountability indicates a lack of 
trust which undermines the collaborative 
culture necessary for the SCG, and encourages 
emergency services to revert to command and 
control to ensure decisions are implemented. 
 
There is a lack of clarity between the SCG and 
politicians in relation to strategic management 
responsibility. 
 
Frustrations experienced by both have the 
potential to erode trust and effectiveness 
within the network. 
Not all SCG members are comfortable with 
quick decision making necessary in crisis. 
Most SCGs chaired by police chief constables, 
which reinforces the view that those outwith 
emergency services are supporting players. 
Consequently, there is reluctance by non-
police to chair the SCG when it is appropriate. 
 
Table 6 – Summary of the Main Arguments in Relation to the SCG Culture, 
Leadership and Decision-Making 
 
In summary, it was identified that the key components of a resilient organisation are 
organisational culture, leadership and decision making. Leadership was essential in 
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creating the environment for successful crisis management in a network and a 
measurement of success in relation to the SCG as a policy network was proposed. 
That is, because of the strategic nature of the SCG, the opportunity to work together 
to achieve common outcomes was the appropriate measurement rather than the 
attainment of specific goals which is a measurement suitable for the operational level 
of activity. There was wide recognition by the respondents that the SCG provided 
numerous opportunities for members to interact and meet both on a formal and 
informal basis. Therefore, the SCG met the success criterion for a policy network.  
 
The importance of multiagency working, especially for greater integration and the 
breaking down of silos was acknowledged. In particular how it engenders greater 
awareness of the roles and responsibilities by participants of the SCG. Despite this, 
there was evidence that partner organisations were guilty of being insular rather than 
seeing the overall picture, with particular criticism of the local authorities. 
Furthermore, the challenge of accountability for outcomes within the network 
environment was identified. As was the preference by senior police officers for 
hierarchical command and control structures to ensure clarity about who has actually 
done what. But it was found that there are no effective sanctions available to the SCG 
should a member either absent themselves or show limited commitment. A proposed 
solution was that the government should ‘gently press’ backsliders. The suggestion 
for more government intervention was contrary to the view of others that government 
actually had a supporting role and needs to be clear where the demarcation is between 
it and the operational aspects of the SCG.  
 
It was also highlighted that the quick nature of crisis decision making needed in the 
SCG appears is a daily part of the emergency services job. But seems to be at odds 
with the preferred method of decision making in government, which is more 
comfortable and perhaps more cautious preferring to take time and have full 
information when making decisions. This may explain why of the 8 SCGs all but 1 is 
routinely chaired by the local chief constable, and the exception is only chaired by the 
council chief executive in the absence of crisis. 
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5.4 Chapter Conclusions  
 
This chapter detailed the data from interviews, observations and the relevant crisis 
management and resilience literature. With regards to the various strategies and 
policies in relation to risk, crisis and business continuity management necessary to 
achieve the outcome of resilience, which are underpinned by the provision of training 
and exercising, the chapter identified barriers to learning which diminish the SCG 
adaptive capability. The SCG risk assessment process was seen as a ‘box ticking’ 
exercise completed to meet a deadline rather than assist in improving the SCG crisis 
management capability. Moreover, there were limited assessment skills available to 
the SCGs and findings were not used for strategic planning. Furthermore, there were 
concerns that business continuity was not a priority or core function of the SCG. 
Consequently, there could be little confidence in such plans, which were generally not 
tested. 
 
There was too few trained staff. Despite resilience being an outcome of the SCG and a 
UK government policy, it was found that most references were about the lack of 
suitably trained staff. There was insufficient strength in depth with knowledge lying 
with too few people. But some organisations were reluctant to commit resources and 
there was a suggestion that training should be mandatory, although there were 
practical constraints, the most obvious being that SCG members are organisational 
leaders presumed to have sufficient knowledge to deal with the activities of the SCG. 
In relation to learning lessons, because the focus is on dealing with the immediate 
crisis lessons are not learned and mistakes are repeated. The lack of formal feedback 
mechanisms at both an individual and organisation level adversely impacts on the 
SCGs adaptive capability. This together with poor risk assessment capability results in 
the SCG being a crisis prone organisation being more reactive rather than proactive. 
 
In relation to the organisational structure of the Strategic Coordinating Group, and its 
coordination and communication it found the current SCG structure has some 
deficiencies, such as fragmented boundaries and disparate sizes. It also lacks the 
necessary responsiveness to deal with spontaneous, cross border dynamic crisis and 
resource availability is determined by the geographical area of the SCG. Despite the 
intention of a network structure for coordination, members of the emergency services 
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tend towards command and control hierarchical structures. Furthermore, there is 
evidence of silo working within the structure, with many participants being unaware 
of the roles and responsibilities of other network organisations. This together with the 
complexity of the structure undermines the communication and coordination during 
crisis. Effective crisis communications were undermined by the lack of technology 
accessible to the entire SCG. Consequently there were difficulties in transferring 
sensitive information between partner agencies, due to inadequate equipment, vetting 
concerns, and the lack of common terminology among the various agencies, which 
resulted in misunderstanding and distraction during crisis.    
 
The organisational culture of the SCG and the influence of leadership and decision-
making were identified as key components in multiagency working, especially for 
greater integration and the breaking down of silos. Despite this, there was evidence 
that partner organisations were guilty of being insular rather than seeing the overall 
picture, with particular criticism of the local authorities. This highlights the challenge 
of accountability for outcomes within the network environment. But it was found that 
there are no effective sanctions available to the SCG should a member either absent 
themselves or show limited commitment. Crisis decision making is part of the 
emergency services role, but others preferred a more cautious approach. Consequently 
leadership is essential in creating an environment in which everyone can contribute to 
ensure successful crisis management. The SCG provides numerous opportunities for 
members to interact and meet both on a formal and informal basis, which is an 
appropriate measure of success for a policy network.  
 
Having considered the data at an individual and organisational level, in the next 
chapter systems models are applied to the SCG. The purpose of the chapter is to 
compare ‘ideal’ systems models to ‘real’ world evidence and identify any variances, 
which potentially undermine the organisational resilience of the SCG and could even 
result in failure.   
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Chapter 6 – Analysing the SCG by Applying Systems Models 
 
In this chapter system models are applied to the SCG. The first model, the Formal 
Systems Model (FSM), developed by Fortune & Peters, (1994 & 2005), focuses on 
common areas of failure within systems. Thereafter, the Viable Systems Model 
(VSM), developed by Beer (1979, 1981 & 1985), is used as an additional level of 
organisational analysis to determine whether there are any specific areas which could 
be addressed to improve the effectiveness of the SCG in delivering crisis 
management. By applying ‘ideal’ systems models to ‘real’ world evidence a number 
of variances are identified which may result in constraints or even failure. The gap 
between the ideal situation and the reality is analysed in the next chapter using 
Gouldner’s (1954) concept of ‘mock bureaucracy’. The process is illustrated in Figure 
11 below: 
 
 
Figure 11 A Notional View of the Systems Failures Method (Source: Fortune & 
Peters, 1995: 17) 
 
The dynamic process illustrated is applied in this research using the 5 steps of the 
failures method (Fortune, 1993) as follows: 
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1. Pre-analysis – in which the various viewpoints, situations, techniques and 
perspectives are brought together and rendered into a useable form. To gather 
data for the pre-analysis I conducted a literature review (Hart, 1998), and 
interviewed key personnel involved in SCGs, as well as take observations. 
This enabled me to identify emergent themes which provided apparent failures 
for further analysis. 
 
2. Select Apparent Failure – having considered the various pre-analysis 
elements a decision is taken on what should be the precise subject of the 
analysis. These were drawn from the emergent themes including: the 
strategies, policies and functions of the SCGs; the structure of the SCG as an 
organisation and how effective it was in relation to coordination and 
communication; and the culture of the SCG, especially the influence of 
leadership on decision-making and learning within the SCG organisation 
whether they were effective in delivering resilience.  
 
3. Consider System Boundaries – experiment with the appropriate system 
boundary, bearing in mind those variations will influence the outcomes. In 
conducting the analysis I decided that the system boundary would be the 
Strategic Coordinating Group, to which I applied the various models. 
 
4. Select System – this will allow comparison with the selected paradigm. The 
unit of analysis I selected was the SCG as an entity. I examined how it 
interacts with its environment, including government, legislation and 
experiences of crises, to determine whether it has sufficient adaptive capability 
to learn and enhance its crisis preparedness. 
 
5. Establish System - describe the various components until a level of 
understanding of its interactions and outputs are established. Having examined 
the SCG and the various components that influence it I was able to reach a 
greater understanding of how it operates as a system in an effort to manage 
crises and ensure resilience. 
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The findings from the models enabled me to gain a greater understanding of the 
complex system of the SCG and its various components, especially how they interact 
to produce an outcome. From these results I was able to consider what was effective 
within the SCG and what areas could be improved upon. Thereafter I considered how 
I could explain why some elements were more successful than others. I decided that 
Gouldner’s (1954) concept of ‘mock bureaucracy’ was a useful means of explaining 
why despite legislation, regulations, guidance and government policy the outcome of 
resilience and the effectiveness of the SCG was not wholly successful. Mock 
bureaucracy has similarly been used to study: police bureaucracy (Jermier et al. 
1991); a foreseeable and avoidable mining disaster (Hynes & Prasad, 1997); and UK 
soccer industry (Elliott & Smith, 2006).   
 
The question of how the SCG coordinates and communicates to ensure that it has 
sufficient information to deal with task requirements and the control of the crisis is 
central to this research. Therefore, before applying the system models it would be 
useful to restate exactly what the SCG task requirements are. 
 
The Strategic Coordinating Group is the principal multiagency forum, which enables 
all Category 1 and 2 responders to meet their statutory obligation to cooperate. The 
SCG is also a conduit for information flow between local responders and central 
government in preparation and response, review, training and exercising. It has a 
specific responsibility regarding central government policy initiatives in the area of 
civil protection, as well as encouraging close working across organisations which 
have an important role in civil protection but are not Category 1 or 2 responders, 
according to local circumstances. 
 
The tasks the SCG is responsible for include preparing for planned response to crises 
affecting its area, and adopting a systematic, planned and co-ordinated approach to 
risk management on which to base the production of a Community Risk Register. It 
has a duty to establish an annual programme for maintenance and development of 
local arrangements, and review lessons learned from multiagency incidents and 
exercises held at a local, Scottish, UK and international level (Scottish Executive, 
2007:10-11). 
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6.1 An Analysis of the SCG using the Formal System Model 
 
A Formal System Model of the SCG within the Integrated Emergency Management 
response framework is detailed below. Each level of the IEM framework is fractal. 
That is contains all the components of the FSM, namely the system comprising a 
decision-making subsystem, a performance-monitoring subsystem and a set of 
subsystems that carry out tasks of the system and effect its transformations by 
converting inputs into outputs.  
 
The influence within the SCG system is from the top downwards: strategic, to tactical, 
to operational, and can therefore be considered hierarchical. Once the ascending 
levels are established they have the mandate to influence the activity on the 
subordinate level by controlling the allocation of resources and setting the task 
priorities. The downward influence from the SCG to the subordinate levels is 
indicated by the single arrows on the left side of the diagram. 
 
The communication channels between each level are represented by the double 
arrows on the right side of the diagram. The establishment of communication links 
between levels, as well as its coordination across the level, is a primary task of 
response. However, while the arrows represent the existence of the information flows 
within the SCG, they do not guarantee the effectiveness of any communication 
channels established. 
 
In the illustration at Figure 12 below, to better represent the tiered model of the SCG 
in the IEM, it is suggested that strategic coordinating group (Gold) is the wider 
system, and tactical (Silver) and operational (Bronze) within the system boundary.  
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Figure 12 An Illustration of Integrated Emergency Management in the FSM 
 
Within the FSM, the SCG is placed within the wider system because according to the 
model it is the wider system which is responsible for formulating the initial design of 
the system, providing resources, legitimating the area of operation, making known the 
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expectations and receives performance information from the subordinate subsystems. 
In relation to the SCG, each is each considered in turn below. 
 
The SCG does not have direct responsibility for the initial design of the system. The 
design of the IEM response framework is predetermined and subject to national 
agreement by those involved in integrated emergency management. Therefore, any 
system design of the SCG will reflect the agreed tiered approach of the IEM; 
however, within that framework the SCG does determine which organisations are to 
be involved to deal with the particular circumstances faced by the group. Therefore, 
there is flexibility in applying the system so that it best matches the crisis faced.  
 
The SCG is the ultimate decision making body within the IEM framework. It sets out 
the policy and strategic objectives which give direction to all activity within the 
structure. Another aspect of the SCG, which is reflected in the FSM, is the 
responsibility for legitimating the area of operation. This is a further responsibility of 
the wider system in the FSM, that in addition to the provision of resources, it 
legitimates the area of operation. In the SCG, the combination of strategic policy 
setting the operational parameters and provision of resources legitimises the area of 
operation for those working within the system.  
 
In terms of providing resources, when comparing the FSM and the SCG within the 
IEM framework, it is clear that the SCG has ultimate responsibility for the provision 
of resources. It is a condition of membership of the SCG that each member has the 
authority to commit resources on behalf of their own organisation to tackle whatever 
crisis being faced without referring back to the parent organisation. This meets the 
criteria of the wider system in the FSM. 
 
The wider system of the FSM also receives performance information. In relation to 
the SCG, the effectiveness of its strategic policy is communicated back to it via the 
subordinate subsystems. The objectives and operational parameters are set by the 
wider system and communicated to the subordinate subsystems. These enable the 
SCG to set the tactical and operational parameters for the entire multiagency 
response, thus making known the expectations of the wider system to the systems. In 
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return it receives information about how well the subsystems are meeting the 
objectives set by the SCG.  
 
Performance information regarding the effectiveness of the response is sent upwards 
from the operational subsystems in the form of requests for resources to tackle the 
crisis. Information is also communicated downwards by the decision making system 
to the subsystem via the prioritisation of tasks being taken and communicated to the 
operational or transformational subsystem. Similarly the feedback loop from both 
operational and tactical provides the performance-monitoring subsystem for both of 
them and for strategic; indicating whether the objectives at each level are being met or 
not, thus allowing for corrective actions if necessary.  
 
In the FSM, the wider system deals with the disturbances from the environment and 
also tries to influence it. When considering the SCG as the wider system it would be 
expected to deal with the environment disturbances from the media, government 
departments and various other bodies. Therefore, in the FSM diagram above, some of 
the interconnected components which are active in the SCG environment are 
included. These illustrate some of the additional complexity that the SCG needs to 
manage, particularly in relation to the variety of communication linkages and 
responsibilities involving the Scottish and the UK Governments.  
 
In the FSM model the UK Government arrangements are represented on the right of 
the model. The main component of which is the Cabinet Office Briefing Room 
(COBR). This represents the UK Government’s crisis response team, usually chaired 
by the Home Secretary or Prime Minister. The Scottish Government’s arrangements 
are on the left of the diagram. The main component is the Scottish Government 
Resilience Room (SGoRR), where the government manages its response to crisis. The 
UK Government’s Scotland Office provides the link between the SGoRR and COBR. 
Other support systems would also be activated, including the Scottish Police 
Information and Coordination Centre (S-PICC), which assists in resource deployment 
for mutual aid. 
 
Therefore, rather than being focused solely downwards to the incident, the SCG also 
needs to look upwards and outwards in an effort to influence the environment. This 
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would include the SCG seeking actions by others to assist with the initial incident, as 
well as longer term actions, such as seeking changes in legislation or dealing with 
formal enquiries. It also needs to manage the media demands which are an inevitable 
consequence of crises. 
 
Following the comparison of the FSM and the SCG a number of variances were 
identified. These have been categorised using the five common failures of systems 
identified by Fortune & Peters (1994): 
 
1. Deficiencies in the apparent organisational structure such as a lack of a 
performance measuring subsystem or a control decision system 
2. No clear statements of purpose supplied in comprehensible form from the 
wider system 
3. Deficiency in the performance of one or more subsystems 
4. Subsystems with ineffective means of communication 
5. Inadequately designed subsystems (which in relation to this research focuses 
on training inputs) 
 
6.2 Structure  
 
The ‘deficiencies in the apparent organisational structure’ considered the initial 
design of the system structure and whether it’s flexible enough to respond to crises; or 
indeed has the capability to provide adequate resources for such response; importantly 
where accountability for response and resourcing lies within the structure; and what 
the effect of the lack of coterminous organisational boundaries is on the effectiveness 
of the response; and finally how the structure is funded and the effect this has on the 
SCG capability for crises response.  
 
6.2.1 Initial Design of SCG System and its Effect on Flexibility 
 
In the FSM ideal model it would normally be expected that the wider system, in this 
case the SCG, would play a part in the initial design of the system structure. However, 
because the Integrated Emergency Management response framework is predetermined 
the wider system does not actually formulate the initial design of the system in 
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response to the circumstances. Instead the response structure is activated in line with 
the IEM framework. Therefore, it has been suggested that rather than being involved 
in the initial design, the SCG “exercises a degree of purposive choice in seeking to 
apply it to a given set of circumstances” (Pearce & Fortune 1995: 185). The 
implications for the SCG having a predetermined structure are that, by only exercising 
a degree of purposive choice, it may not have the flexibility necessary to deal with the 
particular situation of crisis.  
 
Another aspect of SCG inflexibility in relation to initial design is the time it takes to 
establish. This limits its effectiveness in situations of spontaneous incidents which 
require immediate actions or have dynamic cross border elements. The implication for 
the SCG is that it may be the structure is better suited to predetermined events or 
prolonged incidents, rather than for crises situations with associated time pressures.  
 
Moreover, the SCG has the same format for crisis response and steady state 
management. It does not vary the response structure for crisis, so does not seem to 
recognise that crisis and steady state are quite different environments, which require 
different skills to deal with them. This infers that the SCG has expectations that its 
membership will be able to deal with both. The implication of this structure is that to 
be effective participants need to have awareness of the differences and be able to 
operate along the continuum from steady state to crises. The SCG response structure 
is based on the emergency services command and controls 3 tier structures. However, 
not all organisations represented on the SCG have such internal hierarchies with a 
matching rank structure. Furthermore, the escalating police and fire services 
command structure means the highest rank officer takes charge, which seems to 
indicate that there is an assumption of rank rather than expertise in relation to decision 
making responsibilities.  
 
6.2.2 Resources 
 
In relation to resources, in an ideal system, such as the FSM, the wider system is 
responsible for their provision. The responsibility for resource provision also lies with 
the SCG. However, in the real world the availability of resources, especially in the 
initial stages of response, is constrained by the capability of the individual member 
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organisations. In the event of an incident escalating and exceeding available resources 
each SCG would need to rely on the activation of mutual aid requests, which are not 
formalised or enforceable by the SCG.  
 
Another area which could be problematic is the funding structures of the SCG. 
Beyond central funding for SCG coordinators, the SCGs do not receive specific 
organisational funding. The funding for resources is down to each partner 
organisation spending to meet its own requirements, rather than to meet the needs of 
the SCG. Consequently there is the potential for disparity in capability, especially in 
relation to specialised resources. The implication for the SCG is that the lack of clear 
funding structures and the tightening of public sector funding may undermine the 
potential for SCGs to improve effectiveness. 
 
Moreover, the resource capability is dependent on the size of the SCG. Relevant staff 
expertise needs to be recognised to ensure that all responding members of the SCG 
have sufficient resource to call upon in the event of a crisis, while having enough 
redundancy to deal with the impact on their parent organisation. Therefore having the 
capability to resource both SCG and their own crisis management teams is a challenge 
for partner organisations, especially in times of shrinking budgets. Furthermore the 
current arrangements lead to inequitable distribution of the available resources among 
the 8 SCGs, and do not necessarily reflect the risks within the SCG area. Despite the 
issues resources, the SCGs do not make full use of all those available. For example, 
the use of voluntary groups in the SCG is limited, especially in the planning and 
decision making processes. More importantly there is no oversight of the structure 
and the commitment of partner organisations to ensure effective and committed 
responses. 
 
Consequently, there are three implications for the SCG. One is whether it is 
unrealistic to expect UK and Scottish agencies to provide adequate resources for all 8 
SCGs. The second is whether there is a need to rationalise the number of SCGs to 
enable the enhancement of resource collaboration during the planning and response 
processes. The third is the lack of oversight and monitoring of partner agencies to 
ensure that each is providing adequate resources in an effective manner. 
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6.2.3 Accountability 
 
In addition the availability of resources, another aspect which impacts on the 
effectiveness of the SCG is the availability of members with the confidence and 
competency to chair the SCG. Consequently, responsibility for the occupancy of the 
chair of the SCG is not always clear and may simply fall to the chief constable by 
default, rather than the representative from the more appropriate organisation. This 
raises the issue of accountability within the SCG. However, because the SCG is not a 
legal entity, although established by legislation, it is difficult to determine areas of 
responsibility. Nor are there clear mechanisms for dealing with dissent within the 
SCG. If a partner organisation fundamentally disapproves of a suggested course of 
action, there is no facility to deal with it. As a coordination network, the SCG does 
not have the mandate to compel partners to carry out a particular piece of work or 
engage with the process. It is not a democratic structure but one that relies on 
cooperation and shared action. The implication for the SCG is that responsibility for 
the overall outcomes maybe dependent on a number of specific actions, which are the 
responsibility of several of the agencies; while executive responsibility for each 
partner organisation remains with the respective chief executive, each sitting on the 
SCG. 
 
Another issue regarding accountability and resourcing is the requirement that the 
representative on the SCG should be the chief executive, or equivalent. In practice 
this would mean that the organisation is without its chief executive, which in times of 
crises may bring additional vulnerability to the chief executive’s organisation. This 
may result in tensions between having the desire to serve on the SCG and the 
responsibility for one’s own organisation.  
 
Moreover, in terms of accountability the ascending activation of the IEM response 
structure may result in pressure being put on the strategic level to endorse the strategy 
initially implemented at subordinate levels. Whether the strategic level would have 
the time to reconsider the strategy or not in a dynamic situation is a key aspect of the 
effectiveness of response. However, potentially the SCG could become a ‘rubber 
stamp’ for tactical decisions or strong local leadership. 
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6.2.4 Organisational Boundaries 
 
Further tensions may also arise because of the network structure of the SCG and the 
numerous organisations involved. The multiple organisations within the system means 
there are complex linkages between organisations at different levels which could lead 
to difficulties. Also, the multiple agencies involved in IEM means a fragmented and 
complex boundary map, with the potential for duplication or omission.  
 
Moreover, the multiple links to and from the various government departments, at a 
Scottish and UK level lack clarity, which could hinder the effective functioning of the 
SCG. This is exacerbated with the lead department arrangement. The identification of 
the lead department is dependent on the nature of the crisis, therefore may not be 
immediately clear when the SCG is initially established. In addition, the distinct and 
separate Scottish Legal System brings another layer of complexity for UK wide 
agencies. This could lead to confusion and diminished performance. Therefore, the 
SCG function of coordination and communication with partners, including 
government, could be undermined. Furthermore, too large an SCG will increase the 
complexity and require greater numbers in attendance at meetings, with the resultant 
administrative and decision making challenges. Conversely, too small an SCG might 
mean more effective business processing, but also brings limited resources and 
capability. 
 
It is argued that when the FSM is applied to the SCG that there are a number of 
variances in relation to the first common cause of system failure identified by Fortune 
& Peters (1994), namely ‘deficiencies in the apparent organisational structure such as 
a lack of a performance measuring subsystem or a control decision system’ when 
comparing the SCG to an ideal system. The key differences between the FSM and the 
SCG have been identified. For example, the predetermined design of the IEM 
structure reduces the influence of the SCG in its initial design, which also limits the 
flexibility of the SCG system design. Furthermore, the ascending nature of the IEM 
structure also brings the potential for the SCG to simply rubber stamp decisions made 
by subordinate levels. In relation to resource provision, the SCG capability is 
constrained, being dependent on contributions from each member organisation. The 
absence of direct funding for the SCG also means that each is dependent on the 
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provision of resources by its membership. Moreover, there is also potential for chief 
executives to experience tensions between serving on the SCG or their own 
organisation at a time of crisis was also identified. Likewise, that there are no 
oversight mechanisms to compel full and effective commitment from the participant 
organisations. Another deficiency is the lack of legal status of the SCG, as a collective 
decision making body, which has implications for its accountability. There area also 
fragmented and complex communication channels and linkages between and within 
different organisations, which are inherently different. All of which may undermine 
the potential for SCGs to respond to crises in an effective manner. 
 
6.3 Objectives 
 
The second of the common failures of system identified by Fortune & Peters (1994), 
is that there are ‘no clear statements of purpose supplied in comprehensible form 
from the wider system’. When comparing the SCG to the FSM the ‘clear statement of 
purpose’ was interpreted as the existence of organisational objectives within the 
system, as well as the various roles and responsibilities of those operating within the 
system. In the FSM this is how the wider system makes known its expectations to the 
subsystems. However, the comparison between the SCG and the FSM identified a 
lack of clarity around responsibility for setting the objectives, in addition to the 
exclusion of key partners from the legislation which underpins the system.  
 
The effectiveness of any system is dependent on the provision of clear statements of 
purpose being communicated by the wider system to the other components within the 
system. In the SCG the expectations are made known via the strategic objectives. The 
Civil Contingencies Act and related guidance sets out common objectives, which 
provide the baseline objectives for the SCG. These are then adjusted by the SCG as 
the circumstances of the crisis evolve. The advantage of such dynamic objectives is 
that it focuses responders on the specific nature of the event and enables the 
development of a shared mental model. However, the setting and agreeing of 
objectives once the SCG is formed is a collective responsibility, which the chair 
should facilitate. But it is unclear who should be specifically responsible for them or 
how disagreements should be dealt with. This may result in a lack of clarity from the 
SCG in making its expectations known to the other subsystems. Another challenge for 
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the SCG as a group is to create the objectives broad enough to capture all participant 
activity, while being focused enough to be meaningful and helpful in guiding 
activities.  
 
6.3.1 Key Partners Excluded from CCA 
 
In the FSM, clarity of roles and responsibilities and awareness of the processes and 
channels would enable those within the system to act cohesively without pre-
relationship. Similarly, in the SCG if all participants are clear about their individual 
and organisational roles and responsibilities they would act more cohesively, 
increasing effectiveness. However, given the number of organisations involved and 
the potential complexities in an SCG, one implication would be that it is not feasible 
for all participants to understand their own role and the roles of other organisations. 
Consequently, this may lead to confusion, for example, around responders’ statutory 
operational decisions and political decisions.  
 
A further cause of confusion around roles and responsibilities is that there are key 
SCG partners not recognised as such under the CCA. The Ministry of Defence 
(MOD), Crown Office & Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS) and both the Scottish 
and UK Government, are not listed in the Act as members of the SCG. However, they 
each have important roles. In particular in Scotland the COPFS has a legislative 
responsibility in relation to the investigation and prosecution of crimes. Moreover, in 
the event of a major incident, the Procurator Fiscal will attend the site and issue 
instructions regarding the investigation.  
 
Here it is argued that in an ideal system such as the FSM the wider system must make 
its expectations known to the subordinate subsystems to ensure clarity and cohesion. 
In the SCG the existence and understanding of strategic objectives will have a key 
part to play in the delivery of an effective response in a crisis situation. Understanding 
roles and responsibilities within the SCG will influence the performance not only at 
an individual level but also at an organisational level. However, there are deficiencies 
in relation to the SCG, particularly in relation to responsibility for the development of 
objectives in dynamic situations such as crises. Moreover, key components have been 
excluded from the legislation and guidance, which sets out the roles and 
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responsibilities within the SCG. All of these undermine the effectiveness of the SCG 
as an ideal system. 
 
6.4 Performance 
 
In considering whether there is ‘deficiency in the performance of one or more 
subsystems’ when comparing the FSM and the SCG, it was identified that there is no 
specific performance subsystem within the SCG system, and that there is the potential 
for organisational cultures to undermine performance. Finally the absence of a formal 
process to identify lessons learned and ensure that they are actually implemented 
following crises is a significant gap in the effectiveness of the SCG’s crisis 
preparedness. 
 
6.4.1 Baseline Measures 
 
Outwith the strategic objectives for the immediate response to a crisis, a performance 
monitoring guide for the SCG is included as an annex to the guidance Preparing 
Scotland. Consequently at an organisational level there is a baseline level of activity 
which the SCG can be measured or compared against to determine whether it is 
effective and efficient in its activities. Measured against the guide it is possible to 
determine whether a particular SCG is performing effectively, and to compare the 
performances of different SCGs. However, a formal inspection mechanism to make 
such assessments has not been established. Furthermore, at an individual level, there 
are no formal measures setting out expected performance levels, either in crises or 
steady state management. Therefore it is not possible to determine whether an 
individual is a competent member of the SCG. It is therefore argued that the absence 
of explicit performance inspection mechanism has implications for SCG 
effectiveness, as it means that it is not possible to ensure that each individual member 
and each organisation are contributing to the overall performance of the SCG. 
 
6.4.2 Organisational Cultures 
 
Furthermore, when applying the FSM to the SCG, it is not clear whether the SCG 
considers organisational cultures of its member organisations, or indeed, its own 
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organisational culture, and the potential effect that it could have on its performance 
levels. The focus on strategic response objectives referred to in the previous section, 
raises potential concerns about performance within the SCG being focused on crisis 
response. The consequence of such a focus is that it will be concerned with the 
activities of the initial responders, who will mainly be from of the emergency 
services. This may result in the exclusion of contributors from other multiagency 
partner organisations, which are not part of the emergency services. It also means that 
the SCG does not consider the performance levels expected in steady state 
management. The implications for the SCG in focusing on crisis response and those 
most closely associated with it, namely the emergency services, are that other partner 
agencies will be excluded or their contribution less valued because they do not have a 
direct input to that phase. This has the potential of creating a status hierarchy within 
the SCG system. 
 
6.4.3 Lessons Learned & Barriers to Learning 
 
A key aspect of performance is learning lessons from previous incidents or exercises. 
This is achieved through a feedback loop. In the FSM the feedback loop is from the 
performance subsystem to the decision making subsystem, which also responds to 
disturbances from the environment and in turn tries to influence it. This closes the 
loop. However, in relation to the SCG system, the SCG as an organisation has 
responsibility for learning lessons, but so has the Scottish Resilience Development 
Service (ScoRDS), which is part of the Scottish Government; although, beyond the 
commitment to do so, neither the SCGs or ScoRDS has formal links or processes to 
capture, analyse and communicate lessons from local, Scottish, UK or international 
incidents to the SCGs.  Likewise there are no formal processes to ensure that all SCG 
plans are viable and compatible with all member organisations. The implications for 
the SCG system is that, not only is there an absence of formal benchmarking, auditing 
or monitoring of performance of SCGs, but there is no effective process to capture 
lessons learned or share them across the SCGs. The potential is that lessons will not 
be learned and that there will be misplaced confidence in untested plans, which may 
not be effective. 
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It is argued that when comparing the SCG as a real world situation against the ideal 
system of the FSM, there is ‘deficiency in the performance of one or more 
subsystems’. In particular it was identified that the SCG does not have an explicit 
performance subsystem within its system, beyond the strategic response objectives 
initially set for a crisis. Furthermore, the focus on crisis response in relation to 
performance brings the potential that those partner organisations from the SCG less 
involved in this aspect would be excluded, or at least seen as less influential within 
the group, leading to a hierarchy of influence within the SCG system. Moreover, it 
was found that the SCG feedback loop is deficient and may result in lessons not being 
learned, because the system does not have formal processes capable of capturing, 
analysing and communicating such lessons throughout the SCGs. Finally the absence 
of a formal process to ensure the viability of all plans means a significant gap in the 
effectiveness of the SCG as a crisis response system. 
 
6.5 Communication 
 
In any organisation effective communication is essential. The common systems 
failure considers ‘subsystems with ineffective means of communication’. It 
highlights that the FSM simplifies the complexity of communication within the SCG 
to ease comprehension, while acknowledging the increased vulnerability of 
communication in crises compared to steady state. Finally it identifies that because 
the strategic level of the SCG system is rarely activated its arrangements are not as 
satisfactory as the subordinate levels.  
 
In the FSM communication is represented by the connecting arrows between each of 
the subsystems. When comparing the SCG system to the FSM, communication is a 
two way process between levels. The arrows also represent communication within 
organisations and between them. The current SCG has complex information channels 
between the different levels and organisations which exacerbate deficiencies in 
communication and coordination. The fragmented nature of the responder 
organisations within an emergency environment and the different means of 
communications may lead to particular communication difficulties. However, the 
FSM necessarily simplifies the linkages, which given the number of organisations 
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within the SCG are complex; although it does not reflect that in crisis communication 
channels are more susceptible to failure, than when operating in steady state.  
 
The SCG system response structure requires clear communication channels between 
each component and subsystem. However, the intention to have a communication 
channel operating between the different subsystems, or the existence of such a 
channel, does not provide any indication on whether the communication is actually 
effective through that particular channel. For example, experience has shown that, 
whilst the tactical and operational elements of the response plans are regularly used, 
there has been concern that the “arrangements at strategic level are not entirely 
satisfactory, particularly where a major incident spans local boundaries and/or 
there is a requirement for those involved in the emergency response to work 
together” (HMSO, 1994: 47). 
 
Here the comparison of the SCG and the FSM has identified that there are some 
issues in relation to communication effectiveness, which may adversely impact on the 
SCG crises response. In particular the complexity of the communication network 
necessary to link the fragmented organisational network which comprises the SCG is 
considerable. Moreover, not all organisations have similar structures and the technical 
means to communicate between their own staff and the other organisations. In 
addition, some organisations with hierarchical communication structures may be more 
vulnerable to crisis compared to networks. This together with the infrequent 
establishment of the top level of the SCG means that its response can be less effective 
than the more practised subordinate levels.  
 
6.6 Design of a Subsystem (Training)  
 
Finally, the common system failure identified by Fortune & Peters (1994), namely 
‘inadequately designed subsystems’ is considered in relation to the training inputs to 
the subsystems. Consequently, the findings in this section are implicit in four previous 
system failures referred to above. Therefore, when comparing the SCG and the FSM 
there is not a specific subsystem in relation to training, but rather training is seen as a 
means to improve the effectiveness of all activity within the system. For example, 
even if effective communication channels are in place, a number of other issues will 
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influence the effectiveness of the communication during an incident. These include: 
leaders and team members knowledge, skills, attitudes, styles & behaviours; 
experience as a team, cohesion, structure/roles and size; decision making processes; 
organisational culture; and familiarity of task demands (Flin, 1996). 
 
Each of the examples identified by Flin (1996) has implications for the various 
subsystems within the SCG.  For example the knowledge, skills, leadership and 
experience levels, whether of individual’s or groups, within the system will correlate 
to the effectiveness of the system. Moreover, experiences at both the individual and 
group will improve decision making processes enabling the use of heuristic models, 
as well as improve group cohesion based on the shared experiences faced together. 
Such previous experience also reduces the stress experienced by those within the 
system and therefore improves competency in response. Finally those who have 
worked together and formed levels of trust will have gained a greater understanding 
of their own roles and responsibilities along with the other group members, which will 
help understanding of organisational cultures and even engender a distinct 
organisational culture for those within the SCG. 
 
It is argued that when considering training as a key input to the design of any 
subsystem, including the SCG would improve its effectiveness with adequately 
trained resources in sufficient numbers to enable the system to function effectively. 
However whether all the SCG resources are adequately trained and distributed to 
ensure an effective crisis response, can not be determined from the FSM model of the 
SCG. Except in the limited sense of the achievement of strategic response objectives 
there are no other baseline performance measures for comparison. Moreover, it is not 
possible to determine if the current training and exercising is effective or indeed 
supported or valued at the strategic level.  This has implications for the effectiveness 
of the SCG system, unless it has the capability to respond to crises it will be unable to 
fulfil its primary function. 
 
6.7 FSM Conclusion 
 
The comparison of the FSM and the SCG highlighted a number of variances, which 
were categorised using the five common system failures identified by Fortune & 
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Peters (1994), summarised in this research as structure, objectives, performance, 
communication and training. It is argued that the structure of the 8 SCGs has 
formalised deficiencies (e.g. fragmented boundaries, disparate sizes, no legal status, 
financing) and complex information channels which exacerbate deficiencies in 
communication and coordination, especially with governments and national 
responders. It also seems to have a bias towards rank based decision making, rather 
than expertise. Furthermore, the SCG structure lacks the flexibility to respond to 
dynamic events, such as terrorism, and is better suited to predetermined events or 
prolonged incidents. Moreover, the SCG does not recognise that there is a distinct 
difference in the skill set required to deal with steady state and crisis and expects its 
membership to deal with both. There are also significant deficiencies in the SCG 
decision-making process. It is dominated by the emergency services and lacks a 
suitable mechanism for dealing with dissenting views. Moreover not all participants’ 
are clear about their own role and the wider role of the SCG. Finally it does not have 
formal performance structures in place to determine whether, as an organisation, one 
SCG is using available resources and responding as effectively as it could be. A 
comparison of FSM Theory and SCG practice is summarised in the following table: 
Table 7 Summary of FSM Theory and SCG Practice 
FSM Theory 
 
SCG Practice 
Structure  
Wider system would formulate design SCG is predetermined, lacks flexibility and takes 
time to establish, so is not suitable for 
spontaneous incidents. It also requires members to 
deal with both steady state and crises, and reflects 
emergency service structure which is not relevant 
to other organisations.  
 
Wider system is responsible for provision of 
resources, including funding 
SCG is dependent on member organisations to 
provide resources. Mutual aid is not formalised or 
enforceable. Also the size of the SCG is linked to 
the quantity of resources available. Many Scottish 
& UK organisations have difficulty resourcing 8 
SCGs. There is no central funding other than for 
SCG coordinators, which results in disparities 
between SCGs. 
 
FSM makes the decision-making subsystem 
accountable  
With the SCG it is difficult to determine where 
responsibility lies, as each member organisation is 
responsible for the actions of their personnel, to 
deliver collective outcome. Accountability is 
difficult because SCG is not a ‘legal’ entity and 
there is no clear mechanism to deal with dissent. 
The requirement for Chief Executives or 
equivalent in the SCG leaves individual member 
organisations vulnerable during crisis and creates 
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tension between SCGs and member organisations. 
Also the ascending activation may result in SCG 
endorsing decisions made at subordinate levels. 
 
FSM demarcates functions to create subsystems 
boundaries 
SCGs reflect police areas but multiple 
organisations making up membership means 
complex and fragmented boundaries within SCG 
which could lead to gaps or omissions. This is 
exacerbated by political arrangements and 
devolution. 
 
Objectives  
FSM provides clear statement of purpose SCG has common strategic objectives that are 
adjusted to suit circumstances. But it is unclear 
who determines final objectives or how 
disagreements are dealt with, which potentially 
results in lack of clarity throughout the system 
and undermines cohesiveness.  
 
Effectiveness of FSM dependent on 
understanding of Roles & Responsibilities 
Complexity of SCG with numerous organisations 
makes it difficult for participants to understand 
the roles and responsibilities of all in the network, 
which may lead to confusion. A situation 
exacerbated by the omission from the Act key 
SCG partners, e.g. military, prosecutors, and 
Scottish and UK government. 
 
Performance  
In the FSM performance is monitored by a 
specific performance monitoring subsystem 
The SCG has no explicit performance 
management mechanism or baseline measures for 
individuals to evaluate their performance. The 
SCG focus on initial responders excludes others, 
as well as diminishes the importance of steady 
state management. This has the potential to create 
status hierarchy in SCG. 
 
In the FSM feedback loops ensure that lessons are 
learned, enabling the system to adapt to its 
environment or identify existing barriers to 
learning 
Individual SCGs are responsible for learning 
lessons but they have no process to capture, 
analyse and communicate lessons from local, 
Scottish, UK or international incidents. Nor do 
they have any formal benchmarking, auditing or 
monitoring processes. Therefore, they are unable 
to identify barriers to learning. 
 
Communication  
FSM simplifies communication linkages SCG communication is complex requiring both 
inter and intra-organisational communication. But 
not all member organisations have similar 
structures or technology. Also the infrequency of 
strategic level activation means it is less practised. 
 
Training Subsystem  
FSM identifies that an inadequately designed 
subsystem may cause the entire system to fail. 
Therefore, training to enhance knowledge, skills, 
attitudes will improve cohesion and performance 
of the whole system 
SCG membership does not mandate training 
participation. Therefore, except in the limited 
sense of the achievement of strategic response 
objectives there are no other baseline performance 
measures for comparison. So it is not possible to 
determine if the current training and exercising is 
effective or indeed supported or valued at the 
strategic level.   
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Having applied the Formal System Model to the SCG, which identified a number of 
issues which have been categorised under the 5 common system failures, the 
following section will consider the SCG using the Viable System Model, to achieve a 
further diagnosis of the SCG organisational structure.  
 
6.8 An analysis of the SCG using the VSM 
 
Every viable system must have the capability to adapt to its environment. The success 
of the adaptation is determined by the quality of the intelligence and availability of 
appropriate resources. However, crisis occurs when the homeostatic relationships 
governing one or more of the essential variables are overwhelmed. The environment 
of the SCG includes all the elements that are outside of the SCG system. Those which 
could disturb or influence the viability of the SCG would include the Scottish and UK 
governments, media, public, and regulations and legislation. Other influences on the 
system environment include changes in the risk environment, such as reduced fuel 
availability or variations in terrorist tactics. Moreover, the availability of technology 
and improvement in communication resulting in increased information flows and 
demands would also impact the SCG.  
 
6.8.1 System 1 (Implementation/Primary Purpose) 
 
The SCG can be viewed as a recursive system with each system 1 a viable system in 
its own right. By zooming into the SCG it would be possible to contract the system 
boundary to focus on a single response organisation carrying out its own functions 
while still reflecting the VSM. However, for this research the boundary is drawn at 
the multiagency strategic level rather than at the individual organisational response. 
 
In the SCG the system 1 primary activity is what gives the SCG organisation its 
purpose. The level of System 1 in the SCG focuses on the two primary activities of: 
 
(i) Creating Resilience and 
(ii) Crisis response  
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The first S1 reflects the initial planning undertaken by the SCG members when it is in 
steady state. The planning process should respond to environment to maintain its 
currency. The second S1 is the activity of the SCG when responding to a crisis. In this 
S1 it is responding to crisis and planning the long term return to normality. The 
balance between operations and the environment is the first aggregate homeostat in 
the VSM. The aim in the VSM is to achieve synergy between the S1s, which should, 
as far as possible, exercise autonomy.  
 
6.8.2 System 2 (Coordination/Conflict Resolution/Stability) 
 
With more than one system 1 operating in the SCG there is a possibility that they will 
get out of synch and destabilise the overall system. In the SCG instability could 
happen if there is disequilibrium between the S1 resilience planning activities at the 
expense of the S1 crisis response activity. To prevent this system 2 coordinates the 
common services which dampen the oscillations caused by system 1s. In this sense 
System 2 absorbs a lot of variety so that people have commonly understood 
expectations of one another and do not have to reinvent the wheel for each member 
organisation or for every incident. Once established, System 2 does not require a lot 
of executive attention unless there is a significant change in the environment. Typical 
coordination mechanisms are common standards, protocols, operations scheduling, as 
well as a common language and shared cultures that ease communication between 
operational units. Within the SCG coordination of multiagency activities is achieved 
through legislation (CCA, 2004), generic guidance (Preparing Scotland) together 
with local and national exercises and training events. Whether the coordination and 
conflict resolution element is sufficiently embedded in the organisations and 
individuals is a moot point. In the SCG structure there are a number of shared areas of 
activities and responsibilities may result in conflict. However, currently, there is no 
formal means to impose a desired outcome on an SCG member or deal with 
dissenting views.  
 
6.8.3 System 3 (Control/Cohesion/Internal Regulation/Optimisation/Synergy) 
 
With system 3 there are executive decisions to be made. This equates to silver or 
tactical level of management in Integrated Emergency Management. The viable 
 
214 
 
 
system will run for the benefit of the whole, which may at times disadvantage some of 
the system 1s. System 3 deals with resource bargaining among system 1s, so that 
demands can be met, opportunities seized and threats avoided. Once the policy and 
parameters have been set, the S3 prioritises and allocates resources, available to S1.  
 
To ensure the control/cohesion of S1 activity on a day-to-day basis and to supervise 
the coordination activity of S2, where the focus is on the short term and immediate 
management needs, such as the allocation of resources, the SCG tactical level of 
management are empowered to make such decisions as necessary. In the case of the 
SCG, resources are allocated to each separate organisation to prepare separately for 
responding, although there may be participation by some in multiagency exercises. In 
event of an actual incident the resources available are allocated according to need and 
priority at the tactical level of management. But their availability is dependent on 
them being made available to the SCG by their chief executive in the first instance. 
 
6.8.4 System 3*(Monitoring/Audit) 
 
System 3* fulfils the need for an audit channel which enables the management levels 
to delve into detail without taking over and micro managing. At a simplistic level this 
is ‘management by walking about’. With the SCG formal monitoring is through the 
meetings structure and reporting to and from the various levels of responsibility. The 
meeting structure allows the S1 to report on activities and bid for resources. It also 
allows the tactical or S2/3 to ask ‘Is it working?’ However, in practice there are no 
routine formal audits of SCG activities undertaken. This has the potential to affect the 
viability of the SCG. 
 
Taken together the management function systems 1, 2, 3 and 3* account for the inside 
and now of an organisation, operating in the present tense. The only direct connection 
to the environment is the linkage between it and system 1 operations. This focus on 
the present rather than long term planning will be an important issue for the SCG, as 
there may be conflict between this and the longer term planning necessary for the 
recovery phase which Gold/Strategic is responsible for. 
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6.8.5 System 4 (Intelligence/ Adaptation/ Forward Planning/ Strategy) 
 
Organisations need to anticipate the future and prepare for it. System 4’s role is to 
observe the anticipated future environment, so it can offer alternative paths from the 
present S3 to the future. This ensures the organisation remains viable by adapting to 
its environment. In the SCG this intelligence function should be reflected in the 
planning stage by ensuring tactics, resources, training etc are amended to reflect the 
potential threats and opportunities in a changing future environment. This would 
involve adopting a systematic, planned and coordinated approach to risk management, 
addressing risks in accordance with members’ functions, as well as reviewing lessons 
learned from incidents and exercises at local, Scottish, UK and international levels. 
 
A successful S4 will ensure that the current SCG has adequate resources to effectively 
respond to the potential threats. It is within this system that the risk assessments 
should be signalling necessary adjustments for the S1. However, whether the 
feedback loop is effective in the SCG is doubtful. SCG resources are the 
responsibility of disparate organisations. Moreover, there are other constraints such as 
funding that limit effective strategic planning. 
 
6.8.6 Systems 3 / 4 Homeostat  
 
Maintaining a good balance between system 3’s concern with the day-to-day running 
of affairs and system 4’s concentration on the anticipated future is a challenge for 
every organisation. It is difficult because the balance is not the same for every 
organisation, the same organisation at every time or part of the same organisation. In 
terms of the SCG this will be an added challenge, given the variety of organisations 
and different perceptions of all those involved. 
 
6.8.7 System 5 (Policy/Ultimate Authority/Identity) 
 
System 5 equates to gold or strategic level and reflects the ethos, identity and purpose 
of the organisation. It brings coherence to the system and underwrites the viability of 
the whole. Its active job is to monitor and adjust the three/four homeostat. That is, 
taking strategic decisions to match current reality to future needs. However, the 
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identity of the SCG is strongly linked to the ‘emergency services’. There is an 
emphasis on the emergency response, to the exclusion of the longer term recovery 
aspects. Consequently, outwith the emergency service responders, SCG member 
organisations are seen as supporting functions. This is reinforced given that all SCGs, 
bar one, are chaired by chief constables. 
 
For the SCG S5 sets the policy framework and the strategic objectives for the 
planning and also the actual response. However, it is in times of crisis that the 
organisational values will be tested. The absence of cohesiveness among the 
multiagency members and their organisations will undermine the existence of 
common values within the SCG. Experience of crises at organisational and individual 
levels, will assist to build cohesiveness and increase the effectiveness of the SCG 
overall. A potential consequence of low cohesiveness is a weak system 5, which could 
collapse, along with system 4, into system 3, depriving the organisation of its ability 
to act with intelligence. This may result in the SCG rubber stamping those decisions 
made at the subordinate level. Or even the misuse of power by an autocratic S3. 
 
The other problem system 5 faces is to determine when to intervene in response to 
activity within the system. To alert the system of a threat or opportunity which has 
implications for the whole there is an ‘algedonic’ signal. It signals the need for a rapid 
response and can come from any part of the system at any level of recursion. The 
existence of early warning signals is an important element of effective crisis 
management. However, there is no obvious mechanism in the SCG to pick up early 
warning signals. The risk assessment process would be expected to identify threats 
and mitigate them, but in practice the risk register is completed in isolation of the S5, 
usually by a subgroup specifically tasked to deliver it. Importantly the SCG is not 
compelled to take remedial action. There is also some doubt whether all risks 
identified are adequately integrated into the planning process. Therefore, the SCG is 
focused on the initial reaction to a spontaneous event.  
 
6.9 VSM Conclusion 
 
It is argued that the SCG can be viewed as a recursive system and the VSM applied to 
it. But in a viable system the adaptation is dependent on intelligence and resources, 
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which within the SCG the variety of organisational members, all with different 
perceptions makes viability more challenging.  
 
Crisis may occur when there is an imbalance with the homeostatic relationships 
within a viable system. But while the need for an early warning detection system is 
recognised as necessary for effective crisis management, whether it actually exists in 
an effective form within the SCG is doubtful. In relation to the SCG adaptive changes 
to the risk environment and increasing information demands are examples which 
could cause crisis due to homeostat imbalance. One other area would be imbalance 
between the planning and the response systems, which forms link the SCG to its 
environment. To prevent this coordination is used to dampen the potential 
oscillations, through legislation, guidance and common training and exercising to 
embed shared experiences. However, there is no means to impose sanctions on SCG 
members that fail to comply. Furthermore, the management of resource demands is 
made more challenging because resources are allocated according to strategic 
objectives by the tactical managers to operational functions. But resources remain 
under the executive command of their own organisational executive. Moreover, in the 
SCG the formal monitoring system is limited to meetings and reporting. There is no 
formal audit process of the SCG.  Finally the identity and ethos of the viable system is 
strongly influenced by the emergency services, which reinforces the power and 
influence of their representatives, especially since 7 of the 8 SCGs are chaired by 
chief constables. Consequently the viability of the SCG system is diminished. A 
comparison of VSM Theory and SCG practice is summarised in the following table: 
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VSM Theory SCG Practice 
 
System 1 – enables a system to identify its 
primary purpose. S1 also provides the system’s 
sole connection to environment. 
The SCG creates resilience when in steady state 
or provides crisis response when necessary. The 
SCG risk assessment process should identify any 
changes to the system environment.  
 
System 2 – coordinates the activities of the 
various System 1s. 
The SCG uses standard operating procedures and 
protocols to coordinate and ensure common 
understanding and expectations. 
 
System 3 – makes decisions about resource 
allocation to ensure overall system cohesion. 
The SCG sets policy and allows the tactical level 
to determine task and resource priorities in the 
allocation of resources for System 1 activities. But 
this activity is constrained by the availability of 
resources, which are controlled by the individual 
organisations of the SCG. 
 
System 3* - enables the viable system to monitor 
exactly what is going on, so it can determine 
whether it is achieving its aims. 
 
In the SCG monitoring is via meetings and 
requests. But there are no routine formal audits of 
SCG, which makes performance comparisons 
difficult. 
System 4 – enables the system to strategically 
plan and adapt to the changing environment. Its 
actions are based on the information provided by 
system 1.  
The SCG risk assessment process should enable 
strategic planning and adaptation to changes in 
the environment in response to potential threats. 
However, the SCG does not have effective risk 
assessment processes to pick up early warning 
signals, nor is it flexible enough to respond to its 
changing environment.  
 
System 5 - provides the ethos and identity of the 
organisation. It brings coherence to the whole 
system. 
The SCG sets the policy response framework, sets 
objectives and makes strategic decisions. In 
reality it strongly reflects emergency services, 
with 7 of the 8 SCGs chaired by chief constables.  
 
Table 8 VSM Theory and SCG Practice 
 
6.10 Chapter Conclusion 
 
In this chapter both the Formal Systems and Viable Systems Models were used to 
analyse the structure and processes of the SCG. The models enabled a holistic 
examination of the key processes, communications and information flows in the SCG 
and the relationships between them.  Consequently a number of variances between the 
‘ideal’ system and the ‘real’ world were identified. Initially the variances were 
categorised using the five common system failures identified by Fortune & Peters 
(1994), namely structure, objectives, performance, communication and training.  
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The FSM identified formalised deficiencies in the SCG structure, including 
fragmented boundaries, disparate sizes, no legal status, financing, and complex 
information channels. There was a bias towards rank based decision making reflecting 
the emergency services’ key role in crises. But it lacks a suitable mechanism for 
dealing with dissenting views. Moreover not all participants’ are clear about their own 
role and the wider role of the SCG. The SCG structure also lacks the flexibility to 
respond to dynamic events such as terrorism, so is better suited to predetermined 
events or prolonged incidents, with a longer lead in time. Nor does it have formal 
performance structures in place to determine whether, as an organisation, one SCG is 
using available resources and responding as effectively as it could be. 
 
Using the VSM a viable organisation requires adaptation dependent on intelligence 
and resources. This is challenging in the SCG because of the variety of organisational 
members, all with different perceptions. In relation to the SCG adaptive changes to 
the risk environment and increasing information demands are examples which could 
cause crisis due to homeostat imbalance. To prevent this coordination through 
legislation, guidance and common training and exercising is expected to embed 
shared experiences. But there is no sanctions should members fail to participate. 
Moreover, to ensure that the organisation does not experience crisis there is a need for 
an early warning detection system. However it does not exist in an effective form 
within the SCG; nor is there a routine formal audit process. These diminish the 
adaptive capability of the SCG.  
 
Collectively these raise a number of concerns about the SCG and its crisis 
management effectiveness. These are reviewed in the following chapter using the 
crisis management framework and Gouldner’s (1954) concept of ‘mock bureaucracy’ 
discussed previously. 
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Chapter 7 - Discussion & Recommendations 
 
This chapter brings together the emerging themes from the literature (summarised in 
chapter 4), the empirical evidence, (summarised in chapter 5), and the findings from 
the analysis of the SCG using the FSM and the VSM detailed in the previous chapter. 
The effectiveness of the SCGs is discussed in the context of whether they achieve the 
original intentions set out in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. The findings are 
organised using the components of Integrated Emergency Management: Assessment; 
Prevention; Preparation; Response; and Recovery (Scottish Executive 2007), the 
components of which were described as analytically useful (Comfort, 1988; 
Rosenthal, Charles & t’Hart, 1989; Boin et al., 2010), and which reflect the 5 phase 
crisis management framework suggested by Mitroff and Pearson (1993). Gouldner’s 
(1954) Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy ‘Mock Bureaucracy’ is used as an analytical 
lens to explain why there are variances between the theoretical or ‘ideal’ and the ‘real’ 
world findings.   
 
7.1 Mock Bureaucracy as an Analytical Lens 
 
The research explored the capability of SCGs, in particular whether the current 
Scottish crises management infrastructure and training arrangements were effective in 
ensuring that the SCGs were best prepared the current threats faced. Having compared 
the ‘real’ world data to the ‘ideal’ systems model it was identified that there are a 
number of variances. To describe the collapse of rules in an organisation, as means of 
explaining why despite legislation, government policy and guidance the SCGs do not 
fully comply with their task requirements the concept of ‘mock bureaucracy’ 
(Gouldner, 1954) is applied. 
 
It was argued in chapter two that organisations that fail to comply with safety 
regulations, especially when there are few consequences for non-compliance, may 
generate conditions for crisis incubation (Smith, 1990; Turner, 1994b; Reason, 1990; 
Perrow, 1984). Moreover, such organisations will fail to realise that it is their culture 
of non-compliance that contributes to the crisis generation.  
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Gouldner’s (1954) study identified a number of bureaucratic patterns in relation to 
rule compliance. He highlighted that despite rules enforcing regulations, many were 
disregarded because neither mangers nor workers considered them legitimate. Mock 
bureaucracies develop because of a complete lack of legitimacy of certain rules; 
which have little intrinsic value and few consequences if not complied with (Jermier 
et al., 1991; Hynes & Prasad, 1997; Elliott & Smith, 2006b). This concept is applied 
to the SCG as an analytical lens to determine whether rules in relation to safety 
culture enshrined in the legislation, government policy and guidance for SCGs are 
complied with or not, and if not what are the implications for the SCG and resilience.   
 
7.2 SCG & Resilience 
 
The desired outcome from the legislation was responders having the capability to deal 
with the full range of crises. This was to be achieved by: 
 
1. Delivering a single framework for civil protection in the United Kingdom 
designed to meet the challenges of the 21
st
 century 
 
2. Improving the UK’s ability to deal with the consequences of major disruptive 
incidents by improving the planning process at a local level, building better 
contacts between agencies and improving the link between local areas and 
central government 
 
3. Clearly identifying the roles and responsibilities of local responders, ensuring 
consistency in civil protection activity and enhancing performance (Cabinet 
Office, 2004) 
 
The specific role of the SCGs was to ensure the effective delivery of those duties 
under the Act that need to be developed in a multiagency environment through acting 
as the focus for civil protection and preparing response, adopting a risk management 
approach and producing a Community Risk Register, and making effective response 
arrangements. In addition, the related guidance specifically highlights that SCGs 
should review lessons learned from incidents and exercises, as well as coordinate 
multi-agency exercises and training (Scottish Executive, 2007: 10-11). 
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To achieve the outcome of resilience, the SCG adopts an Integrated Emergency 
Management approach to its planning. It incorporates 5 stages necessary for effective 
risk and crisis management: assessment; prevention; preparation; response; and 
recovery (Comfort, 1988; Rosenthal, Charles & t’Hart, 1989; Mitroff & Pearson, 
1993; Boin et al., 2010). This approach reflects Gibson and Tarrant’s (2010) 
integrated functions model, which considers organisational resilience an outcome of 
many environmental factors, including risk, business continuity and crisis 
management. A key component in achieving resilience is the organisation having the 
appropriate risk culture, which would anticipate and prepare for crisis and their 
consequences (Gibson & Tarrant, 2010; Comfort et al., 2010). Importantly, resilience 
requires risk and resources to be balanced, which can be achieved by developing a 
systematic approach to risk and crisis management. Wood (2005) suggests an 
appropriate measure of resilience is the ability of organisations to anticipate and adapt 
to the changing shape of risk, before failure and harm occurs. Using the stages set out 
above, each will be considered in detail to determine whether there are gaps between 
the theoretical ‘ideal’ system and the actual ‘real’ world in relation to the SCG and 
resilience.  
 
7.2.1 Assessment  
 
The Civil Contingencies Act, 2004 introduced risk assessment and business continuity 
for category 1 responders, namely, the emergency services, local authorities, health 
boards and the Scottish Environment and Protection Agency. It is now a duty for 
category 1 responders to have in place arrangements to ensure they can continue to 
function and deliver their core services in the event of an emergency. Essentially this 
places a duty on every category 1 responder to develop and implement a business 
continuity management programme for their organisation. The legislation also 
introduces a duty to assess the risk of an emergency occurring and each SCG must 
maintain a community risk register. However, in Gouldner’s terms there were 
indications that risk assessment process and Community Risk Register was a ‘mock 
bureaucracy’. The evidence suggests that rules were not followed or enforced by 
either management or staff, indicating that they were not seen as legitimate or in line 
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with the SCG values. Furthermore, there was no obvious consequence for non-
compliance. 
 
Risk assessment is the first step in the emergency planning process and is considered 
essential to ensure that local responders have a common and realistic view of the 
potential disruptions they face, that is a shared situational awareness (Endsley et al., 
2003). Resilient organisations seek out signals that may indicate potential crisis by 
creating an awareness of vulnerability (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001; Hale et al., 2006). 
Failure to recognise and act upon early warning signals identified though risk 
assessments may result in a drift towards failure (Turner, 1976, 1978; Rasmussen, 
1997; Woods, 2005). In other words, one of the main reasons that crises occur is 
organisations fail to recognise risk warning signs or their significance (Fink, 2002). It 
is when organisations do not have effective risk management that crises can occur. 
Therefore, resilient organisations are those that quickly capture and adapt to 
environmental information through assessment and amend their plans and structures 
ensuring that all relevant information is shared with others in the organisational 
system (LaPorte, 2006). In Scotland, the Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) is the 
hub for such information sharing. It commissions the local risk assessment process 
and determines its management arrangements and reviews its outcomes.  
 
However, there were differing views as to whether SCG is able to assess risk. Some 
organisations were seen to have the skills, such as the ‘blue lights’ and environment 
agency, and some did not. Despite its fundamental importance to achieving resilience 
the evidence exposed doubts about the effectiveness of the assessment process. 
Although described as “just an impression” by one interviewee, it was supported by a 
number of others who highlighted that most SCG members had little or no training 
regarding risk assessment and there was a lack of commitment to participating in the 
process. The issue was summed up by a respondent and expert in risk management: 
“Guidance is handed out. It’s down to who turns up, who’s the most vocal and 
sometimes, who’ll make a decision. There’s just no training”.  The lack of training 
for those undertaking the assessment together with the absence of commitment, 
indicated by absenteeism of group members, and that non compliance has no obvious 
consequences in relation to punishment because its an ongoing situation known by the 
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SCG members, highlights that the rules around risk assessment have not been 
legitimated by the SCG members, in terms of their own values.  
 
Moreover, there were concerns that the assessments did not take into account cross 
border risks, such as pipelines or neighbouring SCG assessments, as only one SCG 
said that they considered the neighbouring SCG in its assessment process. This means 
that the same risk could be assessed differently depending on the SCG area it was in. 
The lack of strategic consideration can be explained because generally the risk 
assessment in SCGs was delegated from strategic to the tactical level for 
consideration. If this was done because of the level of risk assessment expertise at that 
level, it could be seen as an example of deference to expertise, a characteristic 
associated with so called High Reliability Organisations (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). 
However, in reality there were significant doubts about the effectiveness of the 
completed risk assessments, and in at least one case the assessment had to be re-
considered at the strategic level because of its poor standard. Therefore, rather than 
indicate ‘deference to expertise’, the delegation of risk assessments indicates a lack of 
priority or value in the finished assessment and certainly the strategic view of risk 
assessment.  
 
Furthermore, SCG plans were not generally linked to the assessments carried out for 
the completion of the Community Risk Register. Consequently, the lack of intrinsic 
value attached to the assessment process and its finished product, the CRR, led to it 
being described as a “coffee table companion”. The implication being that it had no 
further purpose for the activity of the SCG and certainly did not inform its strategic 
planning in relation to risk mitigation and response. This is in stark contrast to the 
view that organisations that are crisis prepared recognise the dynamic nature of crises 
so continuously review their situational assessments and amend them as new 
information or evidence becomes available (Weick, Sutcliffe & Obstfeld, 1999). The 
lack of priority given to the assessment process indicates that the SCG has not 
developed an organisational culture that encourages and values the continuous review 
of situational assessments, which would enable the organisation to amend its actions 
to reflect environmental changes. 
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Another issue in relation to the risk assessment process was that it was initiated and 
imposed by the UK Government. Moreover, it was inflexible so could not be adapted 
to local needs. Consequently one council developed its own guidance which differed 
from the official UK Government version. The imposition by an outside agency, the 
UK government, of the risk assessment process that did not reflect local needs, 
reinforced the view that the assessment process was not legitimate in terms of the 
SCG members’ values. One respondent highlighted the resulting difficulties using the 
example of a CRR which still had not been officially published after almost two years 
because they were still trying to get risk assessments and action plans in place. In 
Gouldner’s terms the imposition of rules in relation to the risk assessment process 
meant that the SCG members did not identify with them or their establishment. 
Consequently, the rules had no legitimacy and enforcement of them would violate the 
values of the SCG members, which excused non-compliance.   
 
7.2.2 Prevention 
 
The second phase is prevention, where agencies identify risk areas and these are 
addressed with the aim of eliminating or at least minimising the potential outcome of 
the risk. Preparing Scotland describes prevention of crises in terms of being “nipped 
in the bud” (Scottish Executive, 2007: 27). The examples given, fire fighters stopping 
a fire from spreading and highways authorities closing a road or a bridge in the face of 
imminent collapse, indicate not prevention but actions taken in response to the crisis 
once it becomes apparent. Moreover, SCGs cannot be compelled to act or undertake 
remedial works, such as flood defences, which might prevent a possible emergency at 
some future date. Although it must be acknowledged that many of the mitigation 
actions required, such as flood defences are the responsibility of individual councils 
or the Scottish Government, rather than the SCG. But all are stakeholders in the SCG 
so collaborating to implement mitigation measures would seem to be a practical 
means to achieve resilience and a fundamental duty of a policy network. This seems 
to be at odds with the view that crisis prepared organisations invest in both crisis 
prevention and response capability. It indicates that the SCG is reactive rather than 
proactive (Mitroff et al., 1989; Mitroff & Alpaslan, 2003; Mitroff, 2004).  
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The disparity between the expectation of prevention and the limitations imposed on 
the SCG by the Government to mitigate strategic risks seems to be an example of 
‘mock bureaucracy’. The establishment of rules and bureaucratic cues to enforce the 
rules, including legislation, guidance and training by the government can be held up 
as efforts to create a safety culture. But in reality, because effective preventative 
measures are not required or enforced the rules have no legitimacy and can be 
ignored. This undermines a safety culture and implicitly signals to the SCGs that their 
preventative measures should be reactive. This has implications for the SCGs and 
resilience. 
 
7.2.3 Preparation 
 
The third stage, preparation, is where agencies ensure that individually and 
collectively their systems and structures are sound enough to provide an effective 
response to any incident. Preparation includes having the appropriate policies, 
structures and resources in place that are essential to deal with unforeseen crises. The 
SCG seeks to implement the resilience policy through having risk, crisis and business 
continuity plans in place. These identify the appropriate response structures and 
resources necessary for effective crisis management. The preparation planning 
involves two elements, namely generic SCG multiagency plans and organisational 
business continuity plans. The generic plans are the building block of IEM. They set 
out the agreed management structures for control and coordination of the crisis, 
identify specific roles and responsibilities, communication and call-out arrangements. 
The business continuity plans remain the responsibility of the individual 
organisations.  
 
The findings of the risk assessment stage include the preparation and testing of 
contingency plans for specific sites and events. Planning is an important component 
of an effective crisis response (Banerjee & Gillespie, 1994; Pearson & Clair, 1998). It 
reduces organisational vulnerability and assists staff to cope with the challenges of 
response (Chong, 2004). But plans need to be tested and it has been suggested that 
SCGs have misplaced confidence in their plans, especially as the majority had not 
been put to the test (Buckle, Coles & Marsh, 2006). This point is illustrated by a 
respondent who expressed confidence about having plans saying “as far as having 
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BCM is concerned, we’re good. We spend lots of time doing plans”. Unfortunately 
then rather undermined the confidence by going on to say “although I’m not so sure 
about testing them. I don’t think we’ve tested other agency plans”. In fact the 
responses in relation to business continuity reflected the rationalisations identified by 
Mitroff and Pearson (1993) as hindering crisis management. It certainly seemed that 
business continuity planning was a luxury and not a priority for most organisations. 
The fact that it required a pandemic to drive the organisations to actually complete 
what was a statutory duty reinforces this, with one respondent saying “there was 
more done in 6 months than 6 years!” But despite that “when the pandemic 
occurred most were found wanting”.  
 
The lack of commitment to the business continuity planning process by organisations 
suggests that effective crisis management has not been embedded in the core 
organisational values (Elwood, 2009). Instead the SCG has business continuity 
planning at the superficial level of the organisation, and therefore displays signs of 
being a crisis prone organisation because in relation to crises it has few plans, high 
rationalisation and denial (Mitroff et al., 1989). This approach to business continuity 
can be seen in terms of a ‘mock bureaucracy’. The SCG knows the rules, which are 
set out in legislation, policy and guidance, but does not enforce its members to 
comply with them. Despite that failure to comply may have adverse consequences for 
the effectiveness of the SCG. The reluctance to ensure compliance was illustrated by 
one respondent, who chaired an SCG, and took the view that “the SCG cannot be too 
intrusive”. But given the potential impact business continuity compliance failure 
could have on the SCG and its community, it begs the question, who should be 
responsible for ensure compliance, if not the SCG.  
 
Even if there is a tested plan in place, it needs to be recognised that crises have the 
potential to escalate beyond existing contingency plans and capability of the SCG for 
dealing with ‘normal’ crisis (Smith, 2005). Capability in dealing with such unforeseen 
crisis is the real challenge (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). But the SCG undermines its 
ability to deal with ‘unforeseen crises’ because its guidance stresses responders 
should maintain a “realistic perspective” on the events and exclude events that are so 
low that planning cannot be justified (Scottish Executive, 2007: 122). It could be 
argued that given the complexity of the SCG infrastructure and the tendency of 
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managers to minimise the risks they face there is a potential that weak signals from 
unexpected sources will be missed leading to the incubation of unforeseen crisis 
(Turner, 1976; 1978). Or conversely, by introducing subjective ‘taken for granted’ 
assumptions about what is ‘realistic’ into the planning process constrains it (Hopfl, 
1994); either because of the politicised environment such decisions are taken in 
(Sagan, 1993) or because the lack of evidence in relation to the risk will mean it has 
no validity in relation to planning (Smith, 2005).  
 
For crises that extend beyond the local SCG, such as foot and mouth disease or fuel 
protests, it is envisaged that the complementary arrangements made in each SCG area 
and by the Scottish Government, will form the basis of a multi-level generic plan for 
Scotland and its links with UK level plans. However, there are practical difficulties in 
managing cross-border crises. “The lack of linkage, coordination and sharing across 
SCGs needs to be tackled…it needs central overview for multi-site issues and 
events”.  Despite being identified as a crucial area for improvement in 2006 (Buckle 
et al., 2006; Walford, 2009) these difficulties persist, as was seen in relation to 
extreme weather where issues identified in 2005 were repeated in 2009 and 2010.  
 
The complexity of the SCG structure obviously brings with it some difficulties. For 
example, the Cabinet Office Exercise ‘Winter Willow’, based around a ‘flu pandemic 
scenario, highlighted the need for improved linkages and communication, as well as 
clarity between strategic and tactical levels of incident management (Dept of Health, 
2007).  But such an integrated approach is difficult in practice because of the 
fragmented nature of UK political systems and the spread of political decision making 
authority over different levels of government (Drennan & McConnell, 2007). Barriers 
include professional and cultural challenges and confusion over accountability (Ling, 
2002).  
 
The SCGs seek to overcome such barriers by ensuring that members know their role, 
especially how their skills and expertise contributes to the overall response and how it 
is integrated with other partners within the plan. But the evidence suggested that “in 
relation to other partners understanding, there’s a big chunk, more than 50% who 
aren’t”. In fact many members of the SCG see crisis management as a ‘bolt on’ to 
their day-to-day responsibilities. That is despite a planning process that is supposed to 
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include consultation about risk assessment, objectives, actions and responsibilities 
before a plan is agreed. Furthermore, plans are supposed to be embedded through 
dissemination to stakeholders and training key staff. Finally plans should be validated 
through exercise, and thereafter, reviewed and revised as necessary (Scottish 
Executive 2007). However, the research indicates that this is more aspirational 
because current arrangements are not yet embedded. Most plans are not tested nor 
staff exercised or trained. The lack of trained staff capable of dealing with a 
prolonged crisis or one which involved more than one SCG had encouraged SCGs to 
collaborate through joint units to maximise trained resources. But the situation was 
summarised by a chief police officer, who was “shocked at the lack of capabilities in 
Scotland”. A point reinforced when two exercises that arrangement had been made to 
take observations had to be cancelled because of the lack of capability to deal with the 
exercise and preparations for the potential flu pandemic. Moreover there is no 
effective feedback mechanism to ensure that all participants are fully competent and 
confident to fulfil their roles within the planning arrangements.  
 
At the strategic level executive experience appears to be more valued in ensuring an 
effective response than the training currently available. The fact that SCG 
membership is drawn from chief executives or the equivalent enables them to bring a 
wide range of experience in dealing with organisational challenges. However, despite 
this experience, the SCG has not diminished silo working among the responding 
organisations. The evidence suggests that there is a need to improve the effectiveness 
of a large proportion of the responders and ensure that they have a clear understanding 
of the SCG roles and responsibilities. For example, there is a lack of clarity about the 
role of the politician and the distinction between operational and political decisions. 
Clarity of roles and responsibilities and awareness of the SCG processes and channels 
would enable responders to act cohesively without pre-relationship and enhance 
resilience (Ginnett, 1990; Weick, 1993; Smith, 2005).  
 
One reason for this lack of understanding in relation to roles and responsibilities may 
be the lack of crisis management as part of the regular business activity in many of the 
non-emergency services. In other words crisis management is a ‘bolt on’ to day-to-
day responsibilities. Consequently beyond the blue lights most of the responders are 
seen and see themselves as having a supporting role, which in turn may adversely 
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impact on the effectiveness of response. It may also explain the reluctance of some 
partners to volunteer or commit resources to what is clearly a crisis response. The 
view that crisis management is a ‘bolt on’ to those outwith the emergency services 
indicates that the responsibility has been imposed and is not legitimate in terms of the 
non-emergency service’s organisational values. As a result there is a lack of 
commitment to the rule, which manifests itself in a reluctance to train and commit 
resources to crisis management; in other words a ‘mock bureaucracy’. 
 
7.2.4 Response 
 
The fourth phase is response. The SCG is a heterogeneous organisation involving 
public, private and voluntary organisations. Coordinating a response is, therefore, a 
challenge because of the uncertainty as to the cause of crises, time pressures and 
confusion about who should make decisions (Brecher, 1979; Drabek, 1985; Janis, 
1989). Moreover, bureaucratic organisations are not well designed to manage threats 
that emerge rapidly in unforeseen and often undetectable ways (Boin et al., 2010). To 
overcome such challenges it is suggested establishing a common purpose and culture 
(Hillyard, 2000) and exercising them before they are needed (Granot, 1999).  
 
In an effort to establish a common purpose with the SCG, during the response phase it 
works towards a set of common objectives, which are set out in the guidance. These 
are to preserve life, property and the environment; to minimise the harmful effects of 
the event; to prevent its escalation; and to facilitate the investigation into its cause. 
While the initial response aims to deal principally with immediate effects, it will also 
incorporate suitable collaboration arrangements. The response phase is normally 
coordinated by the police but in the event of slow onset or less localised crises other 
organisations may be required to take the lead, for example a pandemic response 
would be led by health agencies.  
 
In relation to culture, the view of the Scottish Government is that effective 
cooperation must be founded on collaborative partnerships (Scottish Executive, 
2007). This has led to the establishment of networks where decision-making and 
coordination responses emerge from various sources rather than a single leader 
(‘tHart, Rosenthal & Kouzmin, 1993). The collaborative network culture is reinforced 
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by legislation and guidance which establish regular meetings with specific 
organisations. The intention is for the SCG to engender an organisational culture that 
can switch from routine steady state management to crisis management. In other 
words from formal hierarchical operating procedures to informal network norms 
where there is greater latitude in decision-making and communication (Reason, 2000; 
LaPorte, 1996, Rochlin et al., 1987).  
 
However, in reality SCG members still worked in silos and decisions were still made 
in isolation. “If you learn in silos…you’ll reflect that organisational culture”. Many 
organisations expressed the view that the ‘blue lights’ benefited from crisis training 
and therefore it was easier for them to move between steady state and crisis 
management. But for others it was out of character, asking “how do you switch from 
inclusive democratic to command and control?” All responders from the local 
authorities indicated that they operated in a supporting role with a focus on the 
recovery phase of an incident. As one police respondent said, “Other agencies see 
themselves very much in support and turn to the Blue Lights”. This indicates that 
non-emergency services deferred to the expertise of the ‘blue lights’ in relation to the 
response phase of the crisis. The research also indicated that many of the police 
officers favoured command and control rather than collaborative structures. Perhaps 
unsurprising since chief constables can draw on previous experience (Klein, 1993, 
1995; Grint, 2005), and their own existing command and control structure and 
resources to implement decisions immediately. Therefore, collaboration with other 
agencies is necessary only when external resources are required to deal with the 
problem.  
 
However, it also means that there is a perception the SCG is dominated by the ‘blue 
lights’. For example, in the aftermath of the London bombings there was some 
confusion over roles and responsibilities of responders and once the emergency 
service chiefs were in place they reverted from an SCG to conventional ‘emergency 
services’ Gold level meetings (London Resilience, 2006). The perception that ‘blue 
lights’ dominate SCGs has meant that other members see inequality. More 
importantly, there may be elements of ‘groupthink’ (Janis, 1982), which has the 
potential to increase the vulnerability of the SCG. One government representative 
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found the need to be assertive because “sometimes something needs to be said. There 
can be undue pressure to go with the flow. There is an unequal basis of teams”. 
 
The dominance of the ‘blue lights’ is a likely consequence of the response phase 
normally being coordinated by the police, with all bar one SCG routinely chaired by 
chief constables, and the expectation with the one exception being that in crisis that 
SCG will be chaired by the chief constable. Moreover, that the ‘blue light’ services 
have additional powers specifically for use in emergencies, together with resources 
that can be deployed immediately and experience of previous crises, which confers 
status (Feldman, 2001; Robbins, 2005). Those with high status in groups may become 
more assertive, which can stifle creativity because lower status members tend to be 
less active participants in group discussions limiting their expert contribution (deLeon 
& Varda, 2009). The result may be that non-emergency services see instructions being 
imposed on their own organisation, rather than being part of the collaborative and 
shared decision-making process, and so failing to comply. Examples of such non-
compliance include the non-attendance or non-participation of member organisations.  
In terms of ‘mock bureaucracy’ failing to comply may actually enhance the status of 
the non-emergency organisation.  
 
In addition, the current structure of the SCGs with variances in size and resources 
means there are significant differences in capability, which create difficulties in 
coordinating responses. The need for rationalisation of SCG organisational boundaries 
was evident as a number of SCGs were already collaborating and pooling resources as 
part of their planning process. “Disparate sizes of the SCGs is not a good idea. 
Either disaggregate Strathclyde or band together others”; a comment reflecting that 
Strathclyde SCG serves a population of 2.5 million whereas Dumfries and Galloway 
SCG serves only 190,000. Furthermore, the lack of legal status of the SCGs means 
that they have no power to compel partners to carry out a particular piece of work or 
engage with the process. SCG effectiveness is further undermined by the lack of clear 
funding structures and the reduction of public sector budgets. Together these may 
undermine the intention of having a truly collaborative network characterised by 
reciprocity, representation, equality, participatory decision-making, and collaborative 
leadership (deLeon & Varda, 2009). The challenges of being truly collaborative, 
especially in sharing resources was highlighted by specific examples by the police and 
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councils reluctant to release resources for use outwith their own area and, in the case 
of the council, the criticism it generates from their constituents.  
 
The communication and information sharing structures have been used in large scale 
crisis, such as the flu pandemic and fuel strikes. But the evidence suggests that 
information exchanges could be improved. They were described “not being 
mainstreamed” and “still in a bunker”. In other words silo working, rather then 
taking a broad strategic view. A particular example was the limited information 
sharing between SCGs; although it is recognised that information sharing would result 
in ‘good collective knowledge’. Moreover, there were issues around sharing sensitive 
information with other members of the same SCG, illustrated by the comment “we’re 
sharing as much as we can”. This was a particular issue when dealing with the UK 
and Scottish Governments in relation to terrorist incidents, especially when SCG 
members denied information were being asked to provide resources. This indicated an 
institutionalised lack of trust between network members. It is also contrary to 
successful network coordination, which is dependent on sharing information, 
willingness to collaborate and shared values (Kapucu, 2006).  
 
The issue of trust and shared values was highlighted in relation to roles and 
understanding. There was significant criticism that many of the SCG members had 
limited understanding of the roles and responsibilities of other organisations. This has 
the potential to undermine network resilience because “the network’s organisations 
must be capable of understanding the network” (Granatt & Paré-Chamontin, 2006). 
The lack of understanding could diminish the establishment of shared values and 
trust, as well as the effectiveness of the SCG response. Particular criticism was 
levelled at the Scottish Government, for its excessive demands of information, 
resulting in the view that it was “generating reports for the sake of doing 
something”. The damage of such perceptions taking hold is lost trust within the 
network leading to a significant barrier to preparedness (Guelke, 2005).  
 
In contrast there was wide spread recognition that informal channels and ‘boundary 
spanners’ could improve interoperability (Mulford, 1984; Burt, 1992; Granot, 1999; 
Williams, 2002). Many members highlighted well developed networks that they used 
to circumvent the slower formal channels. A number opined that informal networks 
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were more important than formal meetings of the SCG, because “during a crisis you 
rely on the personal relationships built up before them”. Moreover it enabled 
network members to develop greater trust and working relationship because, “if you 
know them you get to know their sense of values and their organisation’s sense of 
values”. Therefore, boundary spanning enables participants to build trust and 
understanding, which will lead to improved shared knowledge. Such relationships can 
assist in overcoming existing structural challenges during crisis.  
 
In summary, as the SCG system matures common values, policies, and incentives 
should to ensure staff cohesiveness, which would also allow relationships and trust to 
be established. But in the SCG there is no explicit effort to build common values and 
culture. With the SCG it is implicit that involvement in the structure and its activities 
will achieve this. However, without compulsion some of those organisations that 
should be involved do not fully participate. The implication is that for the 
heterogeneous SCG it will have members pursuing different goals or at the very least 
different levels of commitment to the shared goals. In relation to the SCG one of the 
elements not included are the incentives for participation by the members. This has 
further implications for the overall success of the system. If there are no incentives for 
those participating there is greater potential for deviant behaviour, such as failing to 
attend meetings. Furthermore, the research evidence indicates that the culture and 
decision making in the SCG is dominated by the blue-light or emergency services. 
Moreover, responsibility for decision making tends to be associated with rank rather 
than expertise. But there is no formal mechanism for dealing with dissenting views 
within the SCG and some had experienced pressure to agree rather than take a 
contrary position. 
 
7.2.5 Recovery 
 
The fifth and final stage, recovery, addresses the broader impact of the event. During 
the recovery phase lessons must be learned about the causes and effects of the 
response (Mitroff, 1988; Mitroff & Pearson, 1993; Stern, 1997). Turner (1976, 1978) 
suggests the result will be a readjustment of organisational culture to reflect the 
lessons learned. But there are barriers to learning (Smith & Elliott, 2007), including 
the rigidity of an organisation’s core beliefs, values and assumptions, and ineffective 
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communication. Furthermore, the ‘politics of crisis management’ can affect the 
learning process (Boin et al., 2010).   
 
Currently, it is expected that SCGs have a documented process for capturing and 
taking forward lessons identified (Scottish Executive 2007). But this is undermined 
because the current culture focuses mainly on the response element of any crisis. The 
view is that SCGs “don’t learn lessons. There are repeat events…we don’t sit down 
and incorporate them properly”. Moreover, when lessons were identified it took “an 
awfully long time to convert lessons into practice”. There are a number of 
explanations for this. First it indicates an absence of double loop learning because 
despite the detection of the issue requiring change it does not result in a change in 
governing values (Argyris, 1980; Senge, 1992). Second self-protection was 
highlighted, reflecting the absence of a ‘no-blame’ culture within the SCG. A 
consequence of which is that near misses or mistakes will not be reported (Horlick-
Jones, 1996). Third was cultural. Previously, the emergency services saw their role in 
dealing with the crisis and then moving on so did not always pick up the key points 
for improvement.  
 
So while the SCG superficially encourages capturing lessons, and other isomorphic 
learning, within the organisations expected to do so there is a resistance to change. 
For example, the fire and rescue service found that in response to the introduction of 
logs to capture lessons, the results had been disappointing because you get “101 
excuses why they’re not done”. The resistance to change indicates that the process is 
not considered important or been embedded into the core values of the organisation 
(Mitroff et al., 1989; Mitroff & Pearson, 1993). This is exacerbated at the systems 
level because difficulties in communication and information sharing, together with 
different levels of commitment and priorities within the member organisations. It was 
said that “all the dirty washing is done in private, inside each organisation”, rather 
than engaging in a mature discussion about what is required to be done to improve the 
over all effectiveness of the SCG. This indicates the existence of the ‘politics of crisis 
management’ (Boin et al., 2010) and a ‘mock bureaucracy’ (Gouldner, 1954). The 
elements of the SCG indicating crisis prepared and crisis prone are summarised in the 
following table. 
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Table 9 Summary of SCG Crisis Prepared and Prone Elements 
 Crisis Prepared Crisis Prone 
Assessment  
 
Risk Assessment & Business Continuity 
statutory duty for SCGs. 
Community Risk Registers published. 
Guidance provided by UK Government 
SCG lacks necessary risk assessment 
skills & commitment to process. 
Cross border risks not considered & risk 
registers are not linked to strategic 
planning. 
Guidance does not reflect local needs. 
 
Prevention Establishment of SCG policy network. 
Risk assessments used to mitigate risks. 
 
Examples of prevention given in 
guidance are reactive. 
SCGs cannot be compelled to take 
preventative action.  
Preparation SCG multiagency plans. 
SCG organisations have business 
continuity plans. 
UK Government provides 
complementary arrangements for wide 
area events. 
Lead Government Department protocol. 
Training provided by SCGs to ensure 
participants knows their roles and 
responsibilities. 
Not all plans are tested & 
rationalisations are expressed by 
organisations.  
BCM not a priority & the planning 
scope restricted to ‘realistic 
perspective’. 
SCG has no means to pick up weak 
signals. 
Lack of linkage and coordination for 
cross border crisis. Complex structures 
lead to confusion & many do not 
understand their roles. 
Crisis management is seen as ‘bolt-on’ 
rather than core function & there is a 
lack of trained staff. 
 
Response SCG has common objectives. 
Networks have been established. 
SCG reflect local police and fire 
services areas. 
UK & Scottish Governments support 
SCG activity. 
Silo working persists & the SCG is 
dominated by emergency services.  
There is a preference for command & 
control structures rather than 
collaborative networks by police. 
Evidence of ‘groupthink’ and pressure 
on members to ‘go with the flow’. 
Disparate SCG sizes & resource 
availability means significant 
differences in response capabilities.  
Members cannot be compelled to 
participate or take particular course of 
action. 
Reluctance to share sensitive 
information undermines trust in 
network. 
Governments generate excessive 
demands for information. 
 
Recovery Documented process for learning 
lessons 
Focus is on response element, not 
aftermath. 
Lessons are not incorporated into future 
plans & the same lessons repeated. 
Reluctance to have frank discussions to 
share and learn within the network. 
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It seems that organisations in the SCG engage in ‘mock bureaucracy’; acknowledging 
legislation, regulation and guidance but continue to act as they did before it was in 
place. There is an obvious intention based on the legislation and guidance, together 
with an expectation that SCG would capture information and act on it. However, in 
reality the evidence for actual activity is minimal. Therefore, it is unable to provide 
timely feedback to enable changes to be made to plans. This omission is linked to 
another gap in the SCG, no incentives. Currently there are no consequences for 
compliance failure.  
 
The evidence highlighted that SCGs tend to focus on the immediate crisis rather than 
post incident analysis. Most of the SCG member organisations do not have a formal 
process to capture lessons learned, and when exercises result in actions to amend 
processes there is a significant delay, even in relation to terrorist matters. There is also 
evidence that the same lessons are repeatedly ‘learned’. The existence of barriers to 
learning includes time constraints and lack of commitment, together with 
organisational aspects such as fear of failure and denial. Importantly there is no 
performance measurement mechanism to alert an SCG to the effectiveness of its 
activities in both the steady and crisis state. 
 
It is, therefore, argued that although the IEM and the SCG structure provide a single 
framework for civil protection there are some areas which could improve the 
effectiveness of the structure. For example the complexity of the components within 
the framework means that it is not as flexible or agile necessary to deal with 
spontaneous dynamic events. Moreover, there are concerns about cross border or 
multiple site crises and how these would be coordinated effectively.  
 
The question as to whether the SCG arrangements have improved the UK’s ability to 
respond is mixed. The familiarity of the structures and networks formed, together with 
the number of high profile events during which the framework was tested has 
undoubtedly improved the overall response ability. Moreover, the joint working by 
multi-agencies working together towards common goals, especially in the planning 
process will have improved, especially informal liaison among stakeholders with 
mutual concerns. Although there is still some doubt whether the resultant plans are 
used to drive the activities of the SCG.  
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However, one area which has not been as successful is in improving communication 
links between the UK and Scottish governments and SCGs. The complexities of the 
framework, together with the concept of ‘lead’ government department which means 
that an SCG may not know where the appropriate liaison should be with undermines 
the effectiveness of response. Moreover, the role of the elected politicians and the 
impact of devolved government, together with the separation of responsibilities for 
local responders and terrorist incidents. The Scottish government has responsibilities 
for the former and the UK government for the latter. 
 
To overcome these challenges it is recognised that there is a requirement for SCG 
members to be clear about their own roles and responsibilities, as well as those of 
other partner organisations. However the evidence clearly indicates that this requires 
further development. Moreover, the desire to ensure consistency in civil protection 
activity and improved performance is fundamentally flawed because the current 
framework does not have performance monitoring mechanisms or measurements, 
which means that it is not possible to accurately determine whether an SCG is being 
as effective and efficient as they could be, nor is it possible to compare the activities 
across the different SCGs. Closely linked to the delivery of effective improvements 
would be the establishment of a feedback process at both individuals and 
organisational level. 
 
The foregoing indicates that the current structure of the Strategic Coordinating 
Groups may not have the capability to prevent, to respond to, or to recover from crises 
effectively. A number of gaps have been identified, including that some members of 
the SCG are not fully confident about their roles and responsibilities and therefore 
may undermine the effectiveness of the SCG during their participation. However, 
comparison is difficult because of the absence of performance monitoring and 
feedback mechanisms to enable SCGs and their members to learn from incidents and 
change their practices.   
 
7.3 Conclusion & Recommendations 
 
This research set out to determine whether the SCGs were successful in improving 
resilience and crises management in Scotland.  The research focused on the various 
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SCG strategies and policies in relation to risk, crisis and business continuity 
management necessary to achieve the outcome of resilience; the organisational 
structure of the SCG, and its coordination and communication; the organisational 
culture of the SCG, and the influence of leadership and decision-making; and the 
perceptions of the individuals which form the core of the organisation and influence 
the crisis effectiveness of the SCG. It argued that a key element of resilience is the 
SCGs adaptive capability, to enable it to learn lessons from crises experience.  
 
However, the evidence indicates that SCGs are not as effective as they could be. 
Resilience is diminished by the ineffectiveness of the risk assessment process within 
the structure, which is seen as a means to produce a risk register rather than as the 
basis of strategic planning by the SCG. In addition, the SCG is limited in its 
preventive activity and is not expected to take pre-emptive action that could mitigate 
future crisis but is only expected to develop plans to deal with the consequences. But 
resilience is further undermined by the lack of commitment to produce tested and 
validated business continuity plans. The consequence of not committing to testing and 
exercising plan is a lack of competent and confident personnel throughout the SCG to 
ensure multiple site crises could be supported over a prolonged period of time. 
 
Furthermore, the current organisational structure of the SCG is complex and 
cumbersome, and heavily weighted towards the needs of the emergency services. 
Despite the desire for a network structure there is a tendency towards hierarchy by the 
emergency services. Therefore, other SCG partners are not truly equitable within the 
structure. This has consequences for resilience and network management because they 
are not wholly committed in terms of sharing resources or completing tasks quickly. 
Moreover, the whole structure lacks a formal feedback mechanism to ensure SCGs 
are capable of adapting quickly to changes in their environment and ensuring that 
training and tactics are adjusted accordingly to reflect the new situation.  
 
This situation arises despite legislation, regulation, guidance and government policy. 
The research found that in many cases failure to comply with the resilience policy 
could be explained using the concept of ‘mock bureaucracy’. That is because the rules 
were imposed from outside the organisation they simply are not considered legitimate 
and are not in line with the values of the organisations involved. A situation which is 
 
240 
 
 
able to continue because there is no sanction for failing to support the SCGs, nor 
indeed any mechanism for ensuring every member fully participates. Consequently an 
organisational culture within the SCG has developed where lack of commitment is 
met by the chair writing letters reminding organisations of their responsibility but no 
further sanction.  
 
In summary the SCG organisational structure is undermined because of the lack of 
monitoring and feedback mechanism, which inhibits adaptive capability. Therefore, 
SCGs do not learn to the extent that the lessons reach their core values and defence 
mechanisms. Instead the lessons remain at a superficial level. SCGs therefore are 
crisis prone organisations, which are not wholly fit for purpose. In other words, they 
are an example of ‘mock bureaucracy’. To address this, I make the following 
recommendations, which reflect the four organisational layers of Pauchant and 
Mitroff’s Onion Model (1992), namely strategies, policies and procedures; structure, 
coordination and communication; culture; and core defence mechanisms of 
individuals. 
 
7.3.1 Recommendations 
 
1. Use Community Risk Registers for Strategic Planning and Audit Plans 
 
The legislation and non-statutory guidance provides clear strategies, policies and 
procedures for the SCGs. But the SCGs were not as effective as they could be because 
the strategies were not embedded throughout. For example, while all SCGs had 
developed Community Risk Registers they were not necessarily used in the strategic 
planning process. Moreover, the risk assessment processes used to develop CRRs was 
not consistent across the SCGs. Some cross border risks were not tracked end-to-end 
through respective SCGs, due to a lack of coordination and oversight. In addition 
CRRs do not adequately document all hazards, so potential risks are not captured or 
planned for perhaps because of political sensitivity or challenges in resourcing 
responses to some issues. To improve the assessment process the Scottish government 
should specify acceptable risk appetites for the SCGs to base planning assessments 
on.  
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The plans in relation to member organisations business continuity have been mostly 
left to the individual organisation, rather than been driven and coordinated by the 
SCG. Consequently SCGs could not be sure that supporting organisations were able 
to participate at the expected levels, particularly in relation to providing expert 
resources. Moreover, there is a discrepancy between the resources necessary to 
support SCG recovery plans and the actual levels of resources available for allocation 
by the SCG.  
 
Furthermore, plans for incidents on multiple sites occurring simultaneously were 
underdeveloped. SCGs still focus on a single issues, e.g. during the pandemic total 
focus was on that to the exclusion of any other activities. This increases vulnerability 
for the SCGs. Moreover it is apparent that many plans have never actually been tested 
or staff exercised. Therefore, the effectiveness of the plans is unknown. Nor is there 
confidence of staff being aware of roles and responsibilities during the activation. 
These issues should be addressed by a formal audit of SCG planning, including the 
preparedness of participating organisations in relation to their business continuity 
arrangements. Part of this audit process would ensure staff participation in suitable 
exercises and that plans are robustly tested. 
 
2. Simplify the response framework and rationalise the number of SCGs 
 
At the structural level, the legislation and guidance clearly sets out how the SCG 
should operate as a collaborative network. Therefore, the SCG model currently 
provides a sound foundation for resilience arrangements. However, it is suggested that 
the introduction of a revised and simplified response framework may alleviate the 
difficulties that some partner organisations have in relation to fitting within the 
response model. Complexity of SCG members’ organisational boundaries impacts on 
SCG coordination, especially when dealing with multiple simultaneous events. So 
there is a need to achieve a common vision or approach in relation to SCG activity 
attaining common goals. The need for broad awareness of multiagency structures is a 
necessary component of effective resource deployment and coordination. But 
disparate organisational cultures, together with those of each individual, create 
barriers which could manifest as poor performance.  
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These barriers create an environment in which there was the potential for 
jurisdictional disputes between participating organisations. A particular area of 
concern is the lack of clarity between the SCG’s operational response decisions and 
politicians and governments making political decisions. This highlights the difficulties 
of determining ‘strategic’ levels when an incident goes beyond a single SCG and how 
accountability for decisions and policies is tracked, and what are the specific 
limitations SCGs and politicians. Such lack of clarity highlights the need for a 
common approach across all SCGs, especially an understanding of terminology, 
which would improve cohesion and interoperability for multiagency networking.  
 
Furthermore, the disparate size of SCGs is directly linked to the availability of 
resources to deal with incidents within the SCG area. To address this it is suggested 
that the number of SCGs be reduced to ensure equitable and adequate resource 
allocation in each to deal with significant crisis. Public sector organisations are 
altering boundaries and introducing shared services so there is an opportunity to 
rationalise the SCGs and clarify roles and responsibilities to eradicate duplication.  
 
The SCGs should be overseen by a Scottish level coordination unit, which should 
facilitate extraordinary resourcing or mutual aid from neighbouring SCGs or 
coordinate crises which occur across a number of SCG areas, when required. 
Moreover, there is a need to introduce a formal system of performance monitoring 
into the SCG structure to enable every SCG to analyse its performance after each 
incident. Analysis through formal independent performance monitoring would allow 
comparisons between SCGs and their effectiveness in their use of resources. Such 
independent monitoring would facilitate a continuous and accurate recording of 
Scottish crisis preparedness and resource capability.  
 
Improved performance would require the SCG to ensure that barriers to learning at 
both an individual and organisational level were identified and eradicated. Therefore, 
the revised model should incorporate feedback channels to individuals, participating 
organisations, as well as the SCG itself. To ensure use of such feedback channels a 
formal process of independent monitoring and recording activities during events could 
be introduced. However, an identified failing is that lessons identified are frequently 
not actioned or disseminated beyond the initial small group of participants. A 
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formalised system of feedback channels would ensure that lessons are captured and 
cascaded throughout the resilience community. This should be the responsibility of a 
separate independent Scottish level coordination unit.  
 
A key element of an amended model is to put the SCG on a statutory footing to ensure 
legitimacy around its decisions and actions. The likelihood of an inquiry after large 
scale crises must be recognised, given the nature of incidents that SCGs are activated 
for, and therefore, it is essential that the SCG acts with legitimacy at all times. 
Moreover, putting the SCG on a statutory basis would enable the roles of the MOD, 
Governments and politicians to be specified in law. Such a revision would bring 
clarity to the governance structures of the SCG, and provide an opportunity to embed 
decision-making structures based on expertise rather than rank. 
 
Currently, SCG expenditure is unclear, as many resources are funding by individual 
member organisations rather than by the SCG. Consequently, there is disparity 
between SCGs and, more importantly, some expertise may be lost or diminished 
because an organisations limited funding inhibits full participation in SCG activities. 
As part of a revised and simplified response framework, central funding and 
procurement programmes should be established for the SCGs. This would address 
concerns regarding funding arrangements, which in the current financial climate is 
unlikely to remain at existing levels. One example is the voluntary services, which are 
an important component of the SCG but are not funded accordingly.  
 
3. Develop Protocols to Ensure Consistent Approach and a Shared Culture of 
Understanding 
 
Currently there is a deficiency of shared understanding in the SCG. In other words the 
SCG has not developed a fully mature organisational culture in which everyone is 
clear about their and others roles and responsibilities, or indeed what constraints the 
SCG and member organisations face. Some activities within the SCG need 
clarification because the clearly undermine relationships and trust. For example levels 
of vetting and security classifications were prohibitive to effective response by SCG 
members. The suggestion is for protocols to assist in a consistent approach across all 
SCGs. Protocols should provide guidance about access to data during crises, which 
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would normally be restricted, to ensure effective data flows and decision-making. 
Another example where protocols could be applied is the arrangements and trigger 
points for mutual aid coordination and allocation. Such protocols could also define the 
Scottish government’s priorities to ensure that all SCGs allocate resources 
appropriately to ensure a consistency across the country. They could also be used to 
clarify the roles and responsibilities with regard to policy and decision making by the 
government and the SCG members. This would enable a process to ensure that SCGs 
complied with guidance and related procedures. Such a consistent approach would 
also allow performance benchmarking for each SCG. 
 
Barriers to joint working adversely impact on the ability of SCGs to respond 
effectively to incidents. Coordination is diminished because of the lack of 
understanding and appreciation of other member organisations capability. It is 
suggested that if all members of the SCG had awareness of the roles and 
responsibilities of the other organisations there would be improved coordination, as 
well as a greater appreciation of the need to adjust from hierarchical working to 
network working when moving from the parent organisation into SCG activity. One 
way to achieve such levels of understanding is to encourage the participation in joint 
working among the responding organisations. Collaboration would also improve 
cross-border relationships, as a consequence of enhanced understanding and 
appreciation of other organisational matters. It may also assist in the identification of 
additional resources not currently involved in the SCG through access to extended 
supply chains or networks, e.g. private sector or voluntary sector resources. The 
development of a shared organisational culture would also lead to improvements with 
the SCG cohesion. This would not only improve performance but would also limit the 
likelihood of representatives dropping out and delegating to lower level attendees for 
whom the responsibilities of the SCG are in addition to their day-to-day 
responsibilities.   
 
4. Enhance SCG Members’ Capability through Standardised Training 
 
At the core of Pauchant and Mitroff’s Onion Model (1992) is the argument that 
individual perception and defence mechanism is a key determinate in whether an 
organisation is crisis prepared or crisis prone. Currently there are many members of 
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the SCG who use rationalisations to avoid the necessity of preparing for crisis. This 
manifests itself through lack of commitment to the SCG and its activities. But it is 
possible to change these perceptions and therefore shift the SCG along the continuum 
towards crisis prepared. This can be achieved through multi-agency training, which 
would also improve interoperability and the overall effectiveness of the SCG. There is 
potential to develop an effective crisis management training programme to provide 
standardised training for all SCG participants. Such training would enhance SCG 
capability and improve the coordination of large scale events or incidents, especially 
those across multiple sites or SCG borders. The opportunity to participate in such 
training would allow participants to enhance their leadership and decision-making 
skills, as well as engendering a shared understanding of terminology and structures of 
all SCG member organisations.  
 
However, it is recognised that there is a disparity between some organisational 
managers capability to deal with crises as opposed to steady state management. Those 
from the emergency services consider crisis as part of the day job and incidents were 
simply a matter of scale. In contrast others have less experience with crisis 
management. This manifests itself through the reluctance of some SCG members to 
assume the responsibility of chairing the SCG. Consequently, there is a need to ensure 
that all members have the capability and confidence to deal with steady state and 
crisis management, as both are necessary within the SCG. Furthermore, to ensure 
enough suitable resources future training strategies should be matched to potential 
demands identified in the community risk registers.  
 
In addition to improved capability, such training would ensure that there were 
sufficient resource capacities to off-set staff turnover, as well as ensure both the SCG 
and the member’s parent organisation had sufficiently trained resources to serve the 
SCG and maintain business as usual in their own parent organisation.  As part of such 
a programme it would be possible to determine the overall capability of SCGs, 
particularly in relation to the minimum baseline levels of skills and specialisms 
necessary to ensure a reasonable level of effective response. Currently the absence of 
baseline measurements makes such calculations no more than speculation. A 
systematic approach to resource capability would also identify areas where 
collaborative working could improve SCG resilience and ensure an equitable 
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distribution of resources among SCGs to ensure that all were equally capable of 
responding effectively. It would also ensure that each SCG was capable of dealing 
with the actual demands placed on it by legislation and government.  
 
7.4 Reflections on Learning 
 
This section outlines my reflections and learning resulting from my study. The 
research is underpinned by the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, which as a recent piece 
of legislation provided a clear basis for the undertaking. The establishment of the 
SCGs marked a profound shift in Government policy and was, therefore, worthy of 
extensive study. Importantly, the recent introduction of the legislation meant that the 
research was conducted at a key moment in the evolution of civil contingencies in 
Scotland.  Most participants had experience of what it was like before the legislation 
was introduced so could speak with authority about the changes that they had 
experienced as a consequence of the Act. The participants could reflect on their 
experiences and make direct comparisons with their current circumstances. The 
legislation may in fact be the high point of activity and focus on civil protection, as 
the impact of shrinking budgets and radical restructuring in the public services is 
likely to be reflected in fewer resources in this area. The potential is obviously a 
reduction in crisis management capability and resilience. 
 
Theory 
 
In using the systems approach I was able to gain a greater understanding of the 
interdependencies and constraints that can adversely impact on an organisation like 
the SCG. Network management theory combined with the systems approach enabled 
a greater understanding of the SCG as a multi-organisational network working to 
deliver Government policy. However, I became aware there can be a danger with 
systems models of the researcher becoming too abstract and detached from practical 
issues, or data being made to fit the model rather than the model explaining or 
contextualising the data. Moreover, deciding on what actually constitutes the system 
boundary is itself challenging. For example, when researching the SCG is it the ‘gold’ 
team, the entire structure or the geographical area that should be considered. When I 
referred to the SCG it meant the entire response structure and the interdependencies 
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within it. Such clarity is important especially when dealing with a number of 
interviewees with different perspectives of the SCG.  
 
The theory in relation to crisis management and learning from crisis is well 
established. But in this research I was able to revisit the theory and apply it freshly to 
the SCG, a recently created organisational form expected to be able to deliver 
effective crisis management capabilities and resilience. In particular the concept of 
Gouldner’s Mock Bureaucracy (1954) provided a useful lens to explain the findings. 
Being an established framework previously used by distinguished academics, 
enhanced its validity in this research. Moreover, being able to link it to the systems 
approach and Pauchant & Mitroff’s Onion Model (1992) enabled me to achieve a 
coherent narrative, which was challenging given the volume of data.  
 
Methodology 
 
In relation to the data analysis, the numerous sources available publically from SCGs 
and Scottish and UK Governments ensured that there was access to enough 
information to establish a broad understanding of the topic. But conversely it leads to 
a vast amount of information for the researcher to examine; consequently important 
points could easily be overlooked. My research approach was based on my police and 
project management experience, without this the scale of the undertaking, especially 
the administration of data, would have proved daunting. To avoid some of these 
difficulties researchers should give consideration to using a software package to 
manage the data. That said using a software package only assists with the technical 
aspects of managing large amounts of data. The analysis still requires the researcher’s 
critical eye. 
 
An important aspect of this research was the prior knowledge that I had of the SCG. 
This led me to consider whether having knowledge of an organisation facilitates or 
hinders the research. I was acutely aware being a serving police officer allowed me 
far greater access than would normally be the case, especially in relation to sensitive 
documents, discussions and exercises in relation to counter terrorism methods. My 
view was that ultimately effective research is based on an understanding of the 
organisation and context of data gathered. To obtain a deep understanding of the 
hidden elements of an organisation’s culture prior knowledge is useful. However, it 
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also brings with it the danger of preconceived notions. Overcoming these, a researcher 
with interpersonal skills can build rapport and engender trust with interviewees. This 
enables the gathering of rich data, the quality of which could not be replicated without 
such a combination. In my case, I was able to build a rapport so that people were not 
only helpful, but their levels of frankness surprised me; although all expressed a 
desire to improve the system.  
 
This study has highlighted to me the importance for researchers to take cognisance 
that complex organisation have distinctive elements within it. Therefore, they need to 
be clear about where the question can be answered. This requires knowledge of 
organisational interdependencies. How does the organisation actually work in practice 
as opposed to how it should theoretically work? For example, the dislocation between 
what the SCG publically profess in their strategies and policies is quite different from 
what actually happens. Especially enlightening was the power of individuals to 
subvert the stated intention of the executive level strategy. This dilemma was 
illustrated by Pauchant and Mitroff’s Onion Model (1992). 
 
Main Contributions 
 
The research identified that SCGs present several conceptual challenges. The SCGs 
must be understood as a network of organisations, with the elements of the network 
being heterogeneous. The SCGs include public and private sector organisations with 
differing goals and objectives, variable operating environments and funding structures 
as well as differing degrees of politicisation in the decision making process. As such, 
understanding the SCG requires both a holistic or systems perspective, and an ability 
to consider the individual elements (organisations) that comprise the network.  
 
The specific role of the SCGs is to ensure the effective delivery of those duties under 
the Civil Contingencies Act that need to be developed in a multiagency environment. 
A key component is the adoption of a risk management approach and the production 
of Community Risk Registers. The SCGs also have a responsibility for reviewing 
lessons learned from incidents and exercises, as well as coordinating multi-agency 
exercises and training (Scottish Executive, 2007: 10-11). 
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The UK government’s policy of resilience marked a profound shift from responding 
to crises to ‘preventing’ crises. To achieve an effective resilience capability requires 
an integrated system which includes effective risk assessment, business continuity 
planning and sufficient competent resources. This research considered the 8 Scottish 
SCGs as policy networks and their effectiveness in delivering a crises capability and 
resilience across Scotland, as envisaged by the Scottish and UK Governments. The 
research has explicitly established that there are clear gaps between the theoretical 
view of the SCGs set out in the legislation and guidance and how it operates in reality. 
In other words there is a discrepancy between what should happen and what actually 
does happen. 
 
The research established that there are common issues, across all eight SCGs, in 
relation to network management and performance that need to be addressed. The 
thesis, for the first time, applied theory in relation to network management, crises and 
systems and critically reviewed how these combined in the multiagency environment 
of the SCGs. The research intention was to critically examine the theory and its 
practical application in the challenging environment of the SCGs and crises response. 
In doing so was able to make recommendations to improve Scotland’s resilience and 
crisis management capabilities. More particularly, in the context of the SCGs the 
research has contributed by: 
 
 Applying relevant crisis management literature to the new organisational form 
of the SCGs, in particular in particular analysing the SCGs and identifying the 
continuing existence of barriers to learning  
 Critically reviewing the SCG structure and highlighting performance issues 
that need to be addressed 
 Using systems theory and models make a comparison of the ‘real world’ SCGs 
and the ideal state 
 Evaluating the impact of the SCGs on the UK Government’s Resilience Policy  
 
These are each considered in more detail below: 
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1. Crisis Management Literature  
 
The introduction of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and the establishment of 
Strategic Coordinating Groups (SCGs) within an integrated emergency management 
framework were intended to provide Scotland with an effective crisis response 
structure and resilience. The Act sets out policies and functions of the SCG, including 
risk, crisis, emergency and business continuity management, which are intended to 
achieve the outcome of resilience. The research indicated that the approach 
established in legislation and supporting guidance is an effective means to ensure 
crisis management. The key components of the Integrated Emergency Management 
approach clearly reflect the phases necessary for effective crisis management 
(Comfort, 1988; Rosenthal, Charles & t’Hart, 1989; Mitroff & Pearson, 1993; Boin et 
al., 2010). Moreover, the approach is systematic, with the intention of preventing 
crises from occurring, but if that is unsuccessful will enable them to respond 
effectively (Mitroff & Pearson, 1993; Pearson & Clair, 1998).  
 
The view that this combination of components when institutionalised in an 
organisation such as the SCG will result in resilience is supported by those who argue 
that resilience is an outcome influenced by a dynamic complex combination of 
environmental factors (Gibson & Tarrant, 2010; Comfort et al., 2010). However, one 
factor affecting the outcome of resilience is an organisation’s risk culture. This 
research established that the SCGs do not have an effective risk culture; especially in 
relation to their commitment to dynamic risk assessments. A particular gap identified 
in the research was that risk registers and other risk analyses are not routinely used for 
strategic planning within the SCG. Consequently this omission will undermine crisis 
training and plans, because they are not based on the most recent risk environment 
and diminish resilience. 
 
A key aspect of resilience is the ability of the SCGs to learn from previous 
experiences. For an organisation to be truly crisis prepared crisis management activity 
needs to reach beyond the superficial aspects of the organisation through to its core 
identity and defence mechanisms. This requires an organisational culture which 
values crisis management activities and adapts to its changing risk environment. 
However, the research has established that despite years of research suggesting that 
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organisations will experience such cultural readjustment following crises (Turner, 
1976) and other studies highlighting how barriers to learning need to be identified and 
addressed (Smith & Elliott, 2007), in SCGs lessons learning from crises is deficient. 
There seems to be a lack of understanding that just saying that lessons are learned and 
creating a process in a document does not make it so; there is a need to get to the very 
core of beliefs so that they see the value in changing behaviours. 
 
Organisations that do not recognise and adapt to threats by changing their procedures 
and policies experience ‘failure of hindsight’ (Toft, 1992). Turner (1978) opined that 
failures provided an opportunity for organisational learning. Despite this, learning 
lessons is one of the most underdeveloped aspects of crisis management (Lagadec, 
1997; Stern, 1997). A key gap identified in the research was that the lessons identified 
from crises were not subsequently fed back into the policy network (Boin et al., 
2007). Thus there was no second loop learning, manifesting itself in a cultural 
readjustment and a change to plans, training and individual and organisational beliefs.  
 
The use of Gouldner’s (1954) concept of ‘mock bureaucracy’ provided a useful means 
to explain the need for shared values embedded at an individual and organisational 
level to achieve compliance with the components needed to ensure effective 
resilience. Such a culture is also essential in overcoming barriers to learning. This 
research has highlighted that its absence will undermine effective crisis management 
and resilience. 
 
2. Organisational Structure & Performance of SCGs 
 
The enactment of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 resulted in the establishment of 
the SCGs as a new organisational form. The Act sought to provide a single framework 
for civil protection to “reinforce partnership working at all levels” (Scottish 
Executive 2007: 56). The SCGs marked a move from hierarchical structures, 
characterised by top-down management and command and control relationships 
(Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004), towards networks characterised by a horizontal style of 
management, shared leadership and decisions made on the basis of expertise rather 
than positions. However, the research established that there were tensions between the 
emergency services hierarchical ‘command and control’ structure and partnership 
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working in a collaborative policy network configuration, such as the SCG. Moreover, 
by applying network theory to the SCG the research highlighted difficulties of 
process, obstacles to performance, and difficulties between the relationship between 
bureaucracy and multi-organisational arrangements, which may undermine SCG 
effectiveness in delivering resilience. Particularly problematic were the need for 
information sharing, willingness to collaborate, and shared values, all previously 
identified as essential for effective networks (Kapucu, 2006). 
 
The research also recognised that crisis management activities were rooted in 
organisational structure, culture and policies (Carmeli & Schaubroeck, 2008). 
Therefore, Pauchant & Mitroff’s (1992) Onion Model was particularly useful as 
analytical tool. It enabled analysis of the SCGs through the four organisational layers 
of the model: namely, Strategies and Policies in relation to crisis management and 
resilience; Organisational Structure, Coordination & Communication; Culture, 
Leadership and Decision-Making; and Individual Perceptions, Beliefs and Values. 
Moreover, the research was able to illustrate that unless the SCGs perform well 
through all four layers it will tend towards crisis prone rather than being crisis 
prepared. 
 
3. Use of Systems Theory and Models to Analyse the SCGs   
 
The research highlighted that crisis management and organisational resilience are 
dominated by systems thinking and a general systems approach (Stead & Smallman, 
1999). Organisational resilience was identified as an emerging systemic property, 
resulting from a complex interaction of social, technical and managerial aspects of the 
SCG. In other words resilience was an emerging property of complex systems (Paries, 
2006).  
 
The research used Checkland’s Systems Thinking, Systems Practice (1993) as an 
overarching analytical approach to the SCG. The application of systems theory to the 
SCGs had not been done before. The application of systems theory enabled the 
examination of the SCGs organisational effectiveness (Checkland, 1993 & 2000). 
Moreover, the use of the two systems models, namely: The Formal Systems Model 
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(Pearce & Fortune, 1995; Fortune & Peters, 1995 & 2005) and the Viable Systems 
Model (Beer 1979, 1981 & 1985) is also a new contribution.   
 
The analyses of the SCG using the FSM (Fortune & Peters, 2005) enabled the 
identification of a number of elements that had the potential to cause failure within the 
SCG. Moreover, it provided an analytical framework to describe the failures and 
explain why they occurred (White, 1995). The further analysis using Beer’s VSM 
(1979, 1981 & 1985) enabled the examination SCGs relationships and their diagnosis 
which assisted in identifying where the SCG was not viable. The combined use of the 
models resulted in a greater understanding of the SCGs. This enabled 
recommendations on the redesign of the SCGs to make them more viable and 
adaptive to their environment. For example, the recommendation to have an audit 
function in recommendation 1 and a Scottish Coordination Unit in recommendation 2 
flow specifically from the application of the models.   
 
The research also reviewed the incubation of crises in systems (Turner, 1976, 1978; 
Perrow, 1984, 1999; Reason, 1990, 2000; Smith, 1990) and applied them in the 
context of the SCG. The application of the systems approach to the SCGs brought 
greater understanding of the potential for crises pathways being generated only to 
emerge as an organisational failure in the SCG. It also highlighted that unless a 
systems or holistic view of the crisis is taken there is a danger that opportunities to 
learn from crisis will be missed (Turner, 1976, Mitroff, 1988; Frederickson & 
LaPorte, 2002; Toft & Reynolds, 2005). 
 
4. Evaluating the impact of the SCGs on the UK Government’s Resilience 
Policy  
 
The UK Government’s response to its perceived capability deficit in relation to its 
“experience of severe emergencies in the UK and the changing threat from 
international terrorism” (Civil Contingencies Bill para 2), was the introduction of 
legislation and a national ‘resilience’ policy. The research established that the policy 
of resilience marked a profound shift in the UK Government’s approach to crisis 
management. Previously it had adopted a piece-meal approach, enacting legislation to 
deal with specific incidents or threats. However, the Resilience Policy went further 
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and introduced a proactive element. The policy incorporated not just planning, 
preparation, maintenance, response and recovery but also prevention of such extreme 
events through learning from previous experiences (Cabinet Office, 2004). The 
research highlights that the UK Government policy chimes with the need in relation to 
organisational learning to anticipate, prepare for and respond to crises, and thereafter 
adjust practices to reflect the lessons learned from the crisis to ensure greater 
resilience in future (Turner, 1978; Mitroff, 1988; Frederickson & LaPorte, 2002; Toft 
& Reynolds, 2005).  
 
The research also critically reviewed whether the policy and legislation actually 
achieved its desired outcome of responders having the capability to deal with the full 
range of crises by: 
 
a) Delivering a single framework for civil protection in the United Kingdom 
designed to meet the challenges of the 21st century 
 
The research established that there are elements within the framework of the SCGs 
which on balance indicate that they are more crisis prone than crisis prepared. While 
the SCGs provide a single framework for civil protection there are some areas which 
could improve the effectiveness of the structure. For example the complexity of the 
components within the framework means that it is not as flexible or agile necessary to 
deal with spontaneous dynamic events. Moreover, concerns about the cross border 
issues have been an on-going concern since 1994 “arrangements at strategic level 
are not entirely satisfactory, particularly where a major incident spans local 
boundaries and/or there is a requirement for those involved in the emergency 
response to work together” (HMSO, 1994: 47). 
 
b) Improving the UK’s ability to deal with the consequences of major disruptive 
incidents by improving the planning process at a local level, building better 
contacts between agencies and improving the link between local areas and 
central government 
 
The evidence also highlighted that the SCGs tend to focus on the immediate crisis 
rather than post incident analysis and that most of the SCG member organisations do 
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not have formal processes to capture lessons learned. Consequently when crises or 
exercises result in actions to amend SCG processes there is a significant delay, even 
in relation to terrorist matters. The research identified that there were still areas of 
improvement in relation to the communication links between the UK and Scottish 
governments and SCGs. 
 
c) Clearly identifying the roles and responsibilities of local responders, ensuring 
consistency in civil protection activity and enhancing performance (Cabinet 
Office, 2004) 
 
In relation to the awareness of roles and responsibilities, it was established that there 
is a significant gap in appropriate knowledge. Moreover, while there is an obvious 
intention based on the legislation and guidance, together with an expectation that SCG 
would capture information and act on it; the SCG is unable to provide timely feedback 
to enable changes to be made to plans, because the current framework does not have 
performance monitoring mechanisms or measurements. Consequently the research 
established that it is not possible to accurately determine whether SCGs are being as 
effective and efficient as they could be, nor is it possible to compare the activities 
across the different SCGs. 
 
This research set out to determine whether the SCGs were successful in improving 
resilience and crises management in Scotland. The research focused on the various 
SCG strategies and policies in relation to risk, crisis and business continuity 
management necessary to achieve the outcome of resilience; the organisational 
structure of the SCG, and its coordination and communication; the organisational 
culture of the SCG, and the influence of leadership and decision-making; and the 
perceptions of the individuals which form the core of the organisation and influence 
the crisis effectiveness of the SCG. It argued that a key element of resilience is the 
SCGs adaptive capability, to enable it to learn lessons from crises experience.  
 
However, the research indicates that SCGs are not as effective as they could be. The 
principal finding is that the current structure does not ensure effective organisational 
learning and therefore Scotland’s resilience is diminished. The SCG organisational 
structure is undermined because of the lack of monitoring and feedback mechanism, 
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which inhibits adaptive capability. Therefore, SCGs do not learn to the extent that the 
lessons reach their core values and defence mechanisms. Instead the lessons remain at 
a superficial level. SCGs therefore are crisis prone organisations, which are not 
wholly fit for purpose. In other words, they are an example of ‘mock bureaucracy’. 
 
Future Research 
SCGs as currently designed are crisis prone so need to improve. However, the on-
going restructuring of public services, together with the establishment of single police 
and fire services in Scotland in 2013, present opportunities to fundamentally reshape 
Scotland’s crisis management and resilience capability. As an integral part of this 
change a study should be undertaken to evaluate whether the restructuring leads to 
significant improvement. The findings contained in this thesis provide a baseline 
measure of the current structure to determine whether the changes are effective. 
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Appendix A 
National Emergencies & Civil Defence Legislation 
Legislation General Powers 
 
Emergency Powers Act 1920  Passed to deal with major industrial disruption and civil 
disorders 
 Set parameters for the proclamation of an emergency 
 Provided power to make regulations to deal with the 
emergency 
 
Regional Commissioners 
Act 1939 
 Coordinated and tested the capabilities of emergency 
services  
 
The Civil Defence Act 1939 
(suspended by the Civil 
Defence (Suspension of 
Powers) Act 1945) 
 Imposed duties on local authorities and public utilities 
to provide public shelters 
 Granted local authorities powers to undertake civil 
defence works 
 Central government had duties to offer guidance to 
occupiers and employers 
 
Civil Defence Act 1948  
 
 Duties on local authorities to make contingency plans 
against war risks 
 Provided for a government support grant 
 Enacted preparations for emergency administration to 
enable the functions of central and local government to 
continue and to resume as near normality as possible 
after a nuclear attack 
 Formation of an ‘organisation of volunteers trained in 
essential tasks of fire fighting rescue, care of homeless, 
emergency feeding, communications and control’  
 It became ‘part of the functions of the designated 
Minister to take such steps as appear to him from time 
to time to be necessary or expedient for civil defence 
purposes’ 
 Imposed further civil defence duties on police forces, 
fire brigades, and employees of local authorities, as 
well as police authorities 
 Stipulated that training duties were obligatory for 
constables, firemen, and members of the civil defence 
forces and services 
 
Civil Defence (General) 
Regulations 1949 and the 
Civil Defence (Public 
Protection) Regulations 
 Made councils responsible for collecting and 
distributing information about possible attack, 
controlling and coordinating counteraction, including 
evacuation and emergency care and housing and 
rescue, protecting against ‘the toxic effects of atomic, 
biological and chemical warfare’, and advising the 
public 
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Emergency Powers Act 1964 
 
 Widened the causes of ‘emergency’ to include events 
of such a nature as to disrupt the life of the community  
 Allowed, without any need to declare a state of 
emergency, the use of armed forces in direct 
employment in ‘agricultural work or other work, being 
urgent work of national importance’ 
 
The Civil Defence 
(Planning) Regulations 1974 
 Laid down a duty to plan for the continuance of 
essential services in wartime 
 
Drought Act 1976  Gave government powers to help meet deficiencies in 
water supplies, e.g. hosepipe ban 
 
Energy Act 1976  Gave government emergency powers to regulate or 
prohibit the production, supply and consumption of 
energy 
 
Fatal Accidents and Sudden 
Deaths Inquiry (Scotland) 
Act 1976 
 A statutory public inquiry into the circumstances of a 
death held in the Sheriff Court at the instance of the 
Procurator Fiscal 
 The findings of a FAI are not legally binding 
 
The Civil Defence (General 
Local Authority Functions) 
Regulations 1983 
 Provided duties not only to devise plans but also revise 
them, as well as dealing with equipment, control 
centres, training and exercises 
 
Civil Protection in 
Peacetime Act 1986 
 Permitted use of resources in responding to 
emergencies not connected with hostile attack 
 Encouraged planning for an emergency or disaster 
involving destruction of, or danger to, life or property 
 
Local Government Act 1972 
(amended 1989) 
 Allowed local authorities to incur expenditure on 
making and exercising contingency plans as well as for 
dealing with emergencies in their areas 
 
Civil Defence (General 
Local Authority Functions) 
Regulations 1993 
 Reiterated the duty of councils to make, review and 
revise plans, to train and exercise them in more 
appropriate terms than those focusing on hostile attack 
and nuclear consequences 
 
Civil Contingencies Act 
2004 
 Local arrangements for civil protection 
 Sets out related emergency powers 
 Redefines what constitutes an emergency to include 
threats to human welfare and the environment, as well 
as damage to security 
 
 
 
 
 
288 
 
 
Terrorism Legislation 
 
Legislation General Powers 
The Northern Ireland 
(Emergency Provisions) Act 
1973 
 Persons involved in terrorism in Northern Ireland 
excluded from the Province or the UK.  
 The police could detain suspects for 48 hours on their 
own authority 
 
Prevention of Terrorism 
(Temporary Provisions) Act 
1974 
 Proscribed organisations involved in terrorism 
 Gave the police powers of arrest, search and detention 
without warrant of people where there was a reasonable 
suspicion that they belonged to a proscribed 
organisation 
 Created the offence of withholding information from 
the police about future acts of terrorism, or people 
involved with terrorism 
 
The Prevention of 
Terrorism (Temporary 
Provisions) Act 1989 
 Defined terrorism as ‘the use of violence for political 
ends, and includes any use of violence for the purpose 
of putting the public or any section of the public in 
fear’ 
 
Prevention of Terrorism 
(Additional Powers) Act 
1996 
 Extended the police powers available in Northern 
Ireland to the police in Great Britain, including powers 
to stop and search pedestrians within designated areas 
for terrorist items 
 Empowered police to cordon off areas and impose 
temporary parking restrictions in response to perceived 
threats, and search non-residential premises, such as 
lorry parks and lock-up garages, as well as 
unaccompanied freight at ports 
 
Criminal Justice (Terrorism 
and Conspiracy) Act 1998 
 Power to forfeit the assets of those convicted of 
terrorist activities 
 Allowed the opinion of a police officer’s evidence 
regarding membership of a proscribed organisation to 
be admissible in court 
 Rights of courts to draw inferences from suspect’s 
refusal to answer questions during an investigation into 
their membership of a terrorist organisation 
 Created the offence of conspiring in the UK to commit 
a terrorist act abroad  
 
Terrorism Act 2000.  Definition of terrorism was widened but restricted to 
terrorism connected with the affairs of Northern Ireland 
or Irish and international terrorism 
 Recognised terrorism may have a religious or 
ideological as well as a political motivation 
 Non violent may have a devastating impact to society, 
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e.g. interference with water or power 
 Specifically covered the disruption of key computer 
systems 
 Provided extraordinary powers of stop and search to 
police officers for the purposes of preventing terrorism 
 Police detention of suspect without charge for up to 7 
days with court approval 
 
The Anti-Terrorism, Crime 
& Security Act 2001 
 Extended the Terrorism Act 2000 regarding seizure of 
terrorist cash 
 Strengthened the protection and security of aviation 
and civil nuclear sites and the security of dangerous 
substances held in labs and universities 
 Ministers get power to detain without trial foreign 
nationals who were suspected of terrorist links where 
there was insufficient evidence to prosecute (later 
overturned by Law Lords) 
 
Criminal Justice Act 2003  Police detention of suspect without charge with court 
approval extended to fourteen days 
 
Prevention of Terrorism Act 
2005 
 Introduced control orders imposing obligations on 
subjects to protect members of the public from a risk of 
terrorism 
 
The Serious Organised 
Crime and Police Act 2005 
 Introduced restrictions of movement and protest for 
half a mile around the Houses of Parliament, GCHQ, 
Ministry of Defence at Whitehall, Downing St and 
Chequers 
 
Terrorism Act 2006  28 day detention period without charge introduced 
 Outlawed the encouragement or glorification of 
terrorism through the publication of statements or 
internet activity that could result in the commission or 
preparation of acts of terrorism or convention offences 
 Prohibits training or being present at a place where 
terrorist training was taking place 
 
Counter-Terrorism Act 
2008 
 Powers for Security Services to gather and share 
information 
 Creation that a crime is aggravated by reason of having 
a terrorist connection which must be reflected in 
sentence imposed 
 Imposes notification requirements and travel 
restrictions on persons in respect of certain terrorist 
offences 
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Counter-Terrorism Act 
2008 (Foreign Travel 
Notification Requirements) 
Regulations 2009 
 
 Requires specified individuals to notify travel details 
when leaving the UK for 3 days or more 
 
 
Health & Safety Legislation 
 
Legislation General Powers 
Health and Safety at Act 
1974 
 To ensure ‘so far as reasonably practicable’ that 
employees and the public are not exposed to risks to 
their health and safety from the employer’s undertaking 
or business 
 
Management of Health & 
Safety at Work Regulations 
1999 
 
 Impose a general requirement upon employers to carry 
out a ‘suitable and sufficient’ risk assessment  
 Employers are required to have appropriate 
arrangements for the effective planning, organisation, 
monitoring and review of these risks 
 Employers have a duty to provide employees with 
comprehensive and relevant information on the risks to 
their health and safety identified by the assessment, the 
preventative and protective measures and procedures 
and any nominated safety personnel 
 Employers are also required to put in place 
arrangements for dealing with foreseeable emergencies 
 
Health and Safety (First 
Aid) Regulations 1981 
 Requirement to provide adequate medical equipment 
and trained first aiders or appointed persons and 
information on first aid facilities and equipment to staff 
and others 
 
Confined Spaces 
Regulations 1997 
 Requires that where it is necessary for persons to work 
in confined spaces, employers must have suitable and 
sufficient arrangements for their rescue in an 
emergency 
 
Carriage of Dangerous 
Goods by Road Regulations 
1996 
 Imposes a duty on operator of a container, vehicle or 
tank to provide information to others engaged in the 
handling of emergencies or accident situations 
 
The Reporting of Injuries, 
Diseases & Dangerous 
Occurrences Regulations 
1995 
 Imposes duty on employers to report to the enforcing 
authority, which is usually the Health & Safety 
Executive, certain types of accidents, including fatal 
accidents, major injury accidents, and dangerous 
occurrences 
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Combined Code of the 
Committee on Corporate 
Governance (Turnbull 
Report, 1998) 
 UK companies to have a system of internal control so 
that the Board could identify and control its exposure 
to significant risks, including health and safety risks 
 The Board of Directors is responsibility for internal 
control and is required to carry out an annual 
assessment and make a statement in its annual report 
and accounts 
 The system of internal control should include control 
activities, information and communication processes 
and processes for monitoring its continued 
effectiveness 
 
Corporate Manslaughter 
and Corporate Homicide 
Act 2007 
 
 New offence of corporate manslaughter to be called 
corporate homicide in Scotland 
 Applies to companies and other incorporated bodies, 
Government departments and similar bodies, police 
forces and certain unincorporated associations 
 
 
 
Legislation Enacting EU ‘Seveso’ Directives 
Legislation General Powers 
Control of Industrial Major 
Accident Regulations 1984 
(CIMAH) 
 Placed requirements on both the onshore major hazard 
industry and the national and local government bodies 
that dealt with them 
 Introduced need for emergency planning 
 Duty on the local authority to prepare and keep current 
an off-site emergency plan 
 Duty for information sharing between the 
manufacturer, local authority and those who could be 
affected by a major accident at the site 
 
Control of Major Accident 
Hazard Regulations 1999 
(COMAH) 
 Covers both industrial activities and the storage of 
dangerous chemicals  
 Requires preparation and implement a Major Accident 
Prevention Policy (MAPP) 
 Operators must take all necessary measures to prevent 
major accidents and limit their consequences, ensuring 
design, construction, operation and maintenance of the 
establishment are adequate 
 Sites subject to Seveso II must notify their existence to 
the competent authority 
 Major accidents to be reported the competent authority 
as soon as practicable 
 Prepare safety report which demonstrates on-site plans 
are in place; that local authorities have been provided 
with off-site plan for land use and planning purposes; 
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that environmental risks are adequately covered; and 
that safety report is available to the public  
 Groups of establishments should be identified where 
the consequences of a major accident may be increased 
because of their location and proximity to each other 
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Appendix B 
 
Strategic Coordinating Groups in Scotland Roles, Responsibilities & Borders 
 
 
The purpose of this Appendix is to describe the organisations that comprise SCGs and 
their roles and responsibilities in relation to response
9
. It will also map the boundaries 
of the organisations, highlighting that the environment that the organisations work 
within is complicated by the lack of coterminous boundaries.  
Police 
Scotland’s first constables were appointed in 1617 in the reign of James VI but city 
and burgh police forces were not established until the 19th century, largely replacing 
town guards of citizens or old soldiers; although a small but short-lived professional 
police force had been established in Glasgow in 1778. However, the UK's first Police 
Act was the Glasgow Police Act of 30 June 1800 and another eleven Scottish cities 
and burghs established police forces under individual police Acts of Parliament before 
Peel's Metropolitan Police was established. The Burgh Police (Scotland) Act of 1833 
gave powers to Scottish burghs to establish police forces, if they had not already done 
so. The Act meant that each burgh did not need to seek an Act of Parliament to form a 
police force, but many had done so in the preceding 33 years (Donnelly, 2008). 
The Police (Scotland) Act 1967 sets out the current legislation in relation to policing 
in Scotland. Each force is maintained by a police authority or joint board, which 
consist of elected representatives of each council in the force area. Joint Police Boards 
now maintain 6 of the Scottish forces: Northern Constabulary, Central Scotland 
Police, Grampian Police, Lothian & Borders Police, Strathclyde Police and Tayside 
Police. Only Dumfries & Galloway and Fife Constabularies are directly administered 
by the councils for their geographical areas. 
The police forces are subject to a tripartite system of governance, consisting of The 
Government, the Police Authority or Joint Police Board, and the Chief Constable. 
However, the chief constable has operational independence. While police authorities 
appoint the chief constables (subject to the approval of the Secretary of State), neither 
police authorities nor the Secretary of State have power to direct chief constables on 
enforcement of the law or on the deployment of police officers. The chief constable 
has a duty to comply with instructions from the Lord Advocate, the sheriff principal 
or the appropriate prosecutor in relation to offences and prosecutions. Efficient and 
effective use of the resources placed at his disposal by the police authority is a matter 
for the chief constable. 
The roles and responsibilities of the police are to: 
 
 Co-ordinate the activities of local responders and others acting in support at 
the scene of an incident except when HM Coastguard co-ordinate search and 
rescue in a maritime incident 
                                                 
9
 http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/243492/0067754.pdf accessed 
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 Treat the affected area as a crime scene, in parallel to the general response, 
unless it is obvious that the emergency is caused by a natural event; 
 Act under the direction of the Procurator Fiscal and, where appropriate, 
facilitate the inquiries carried out by bodies such as the Health and Safety 
Executive, Rail, Air or Marine Accident Investigation Branches of the 
Department for Transport 
 Process casualty information including the identification of deceased and 
removal of the dead on behalf of the Procurator Fiscal; and 
 As host force, co-ordinate the response to, and investigation of, major 
accidents on the rail network in Scotland 
 
As of 30
th
 June 2010 Scotland’s 8 forces, excluding BTP, have a total of 17, 424 
police officers
10
.  
 
Strathclyde Police (8,410 police officers) 
Strathclyde Police is responsible for the 
council areas of Argyll and Bute, City of 
Glasgow, East Ayrshire, East Dunbartonshire, 
East Renfrewshire, Inverclyde, North 
Ayrshire, North Lanarkshire, Renfrewshire, 
South Ayrshire, South Lanarkshire and West 
Dunbartonshire.  
Until 1996 the police area was also the local 
government region of Strathclyde. It is the 
largest of the eight Scottish police forces. It is 
the second largest in terms of area in Scotland, 
after the area covered by Northern 
Constabulary. Strathclyde Police was created 
on May 16, 1975 from the merger of City of Glasgow Police, Lanarkshire 
Constabulary, Renfrew & Bute Constabulary, Dunbartonshire Constabulary, Argyll 
County Police, Ayrshire Constabulary and a small portion of Stirling and 
Clackmannan Police.  
Lothian & Borders Police (3,007 police officers) 
Lothian and Borders Police is responsible for the council areas of 
the City of Edinburgh, East Lothian, Midlothian, Scottish 
Borders and West Lothian.  Lothian and Borders Police was 
formed on May 16 1975 by an amalgamation of Berwick, 
Roxburgh and Selkirk Constabulary, Edinburgh City Police and 
The Lothians and Peebles Constabulary. 
 
                                                 
10
 http://data.gov.uk/dataset/police_officer_strength_statistics_scotland - An Official Statistics 
Publication for Scotland (7 September 2010). 
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Grampian Police (1,557 police officers)  
Grampian Police is responsible for the council 
areas of Aberdeenshire, City of Aberdeen and 
Moray, which was the former Grampian 
Region created in 1975. The Force area covers 
some of the North Sea, giving Grampian Police 
the responsibility of policing the oil and gas 
platforms of the North East. Grampian Police 
was formed on May 16, 1975, from a merger 
of the Scottish North Eastern Counties 
Constabulary and the Aberdeen City Police. 
The North Eastern force had itself been formed 
on May 16, 1949, by the merger of 
Aberdeenshire Constabulary, Banffshire 
Constabulary, Kincardineshire Constabulary 
and Moray and Nairn Constabulary. 
Tayside Police (1,220 police officers) 
Tayside Police covers the Scottish council areas of Angus, City 
of Dundee and Perth and Kinross. It was formed on May 16, 
1975, with the region of Tayside, as an amalgamation of the 
Perth and Kinross Constabulary, Angus Constabulary and City 
of Dundee Police 
 
 
 
Fife Constabulary (1,082 
police officers) 
Fife Constabulary is 
responsible for the council 
area of Fife. The force was 
established in 1949 following the amalgamation 
of the originally independent Fife County, 
Dunfermline City and Kirkcaldy Burgh police 
forces.  
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Central Scotland Police (853 police officers) 
Central Scotland Police is responsible for the council 
areas of Stirling, Falkirk and Clackmannanshire, which 
was previously known as Central region. The Force 
Headquarters is in Stirling. The force was created on 
May 16, 1975, with the Central Scotland region, as a 
successor to the Stirling and Clackmannan Police, 
together with the south-western portion of the Perth and 
Kinross Constabulary area.   
 
 
 
Northern Constabulary 
(785 police officers) 
The Northern Constabulary 
is responsible for the 
Highland council area along 
with the Western Isles, the 
Orkney Isles and the Shetland Isles, which comprise most 
of the Highlands and Islands area. It is the police force 
covering the largest geographical area in the United 
Kingdom, equivalent to the size of Belgium, but is one of 
the smallest in terms of officers. 
The current police force was formed on 16 May 1975 as a 
merger of the pre-existing Northern Constabulary, the Ross 
and Sutherland Constabulary (itself a merger of Ross and 
Cromarty Constabulary and Sutherland Constabulary) and 
the Inverness Constabulary (a merger of Inverness Burgh 
Police and Inverness-shire Constabulary), along with the northernmost portion of the 
Argyll County Police area, and the Nairn part of the Scottish North East Counties 
Constabulary. The previous Northern Constabulary had been created in 1969 by the 
merger of the Caithness Constabulary, Orkney Constabulary and Zetland 
Constabulary. 
The new Northern Constabulary was created at the same time as local government 
reorganisation created the Highland Regional Council and the islands councils of the 
Western Isles, the Orkney Isles and the Shetland Isles. The rest of the Argyll County 
Police was merged into the Strathclyde Police, and the rest of the Scottish North East 
Counties Constabulary into the Grampian Police.  
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Dumfries & Galloway Constabulary (511 police 
officers) 
Dumfries and Galloway Constabulary is responsible for 
the council area of Dumfries and Galloway.  
The police force was formed in 1948 as an amalgamation 
of the previous police forces for Dumfriesshire, the 
Stewarty of Kirkcudbright and Wigtownshire, and 
preceded the creation of the former Dumfries and 
Galloway Regional Council by 27 years. 
 
 
 
 
 
British Transport Police (BTP)
11
 
The British Transport Police (BTP) polices 
those railways and light-rail systems in 
Great Britain for which it has entered into 
an agreement to provide such services.  
It was formed by the British Transport 
Commission Act 1949 which combined 
the already-existing police forces inherited 
from the pre-nationalisation railways by 
British Railways, those forces having been 
previously formed by powers available 
under Common Law to parishes, 
landowners and other bodies to appoint 
constables to patrol land and/or property under their control. This is distinct from the 
establishment of a police force by statute, as applicable to the Metropolitan Police in 
1829; BTP did not have jurisdiction on a statutory basis until the enactment of the 
Transport Police (Jurisdiction) Act 1994 which was subsequently amended by the 
Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003.  
Since 2007 BTP also has jurisdiction for the Glasgow Subway. 
BTP has a total establishment of 2,835 police officers and 1,455 support staff. 
Scotland 231 police officers and 28 support staff. 
                                                 
11
 http://www.btp.police.uk/ accessed 20/09/10 
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Fire & Rescue Services
12
 
The Fire (Scotland) Act 2005 is the primary legislation controlling the provision and 
maintenance of fire-fighting and fire-prevention services. Since the establishment of a 
devolved Scottish government in 1999, national control is the responsibility of the 
Cabinet Secretary for Justice in the Scottish Government. Local control is the 
responsibility of a local Fire Authority or Board, consisting of elected councilors from 
the council areas covered by the service.  
The current Scottish Fire & Rescue Services are still broadly based on the Regional 
Council areas of local government in use from 1975 to 1996. The Fire & Rescue 
Service areas are coterminous with the police force areas and the related SCG 
boundary.  Currently, there are now eight Scottish Fire and Rescue Services, 
combined they have a total of 8,558 firefighters and control room staff
13
. The 
distribution of firefighters is as follows: 
 Strathclyde     = 3,216 firefighters and control room staff 
 Highland & Islands = 1,715 firefighters and control room staff 
 Lothian & Borders  = 1,086 firefighters and control room staff 
 Grampian  = 873    firefighters and control room staff 
 Tayside     = 703    firefighters and control room staff 
 Fife      = 520    firefighters and control room staff 
 Central Scotland = 445    firefighters and control room staff 
 Dumfries & Galloway = 351   firefighters and control room staff 
The roles and responsibilities of the fire and rescue services are to: 
 Rescue people from fire, flood, transport incidents, machinery and collapsed 
structures 
 Fight fires and prevent the spread of fire in open and enclosed spaces on or next to 
land 
 Render humanitarian assistance 
 Protect and mitigate damage to property and the environment from the effects of 
fire and by dealing with hazmat incidents 
 Management of the inner cordon 
 Manage incidents involving hazardous materials 
 Provide qualified scientific advice in relation to hazmat incidents and damage 
control 
 Assist in mass decontamination of casualties following a CBRN/hazmat incident 
at the request of the Scottish Ambulance Service; and 
 Investigate the causes of fire. 
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Scottish Ambulance Service
14
 
The Scottish Ambulance Service (SAS) is part 
of NHS Scotland, and serves all of Scotland. It 
is a Special Health Board funded directly by 
the Scottish Government Health Department. 
The roles and responsibilities for the Scottish 
Ambulance Service are to: 
 
 Save life and provide immediate 
care for patients at the scene of the 
incident and in transit to hospital 
 Alert Hospital Services and other 
relevant NHS agencies 
 Manage decontamination of people 
affected by hazardous substances 
prior to their evacuation from the 
scene 
 Evacuate the injured from the scene in order of medical priority 
 Arrange and ensure the most appropriate transport for the injured to the 
receiving hospital 
 Supply patient care equipment to the scene of a major incident 
 Transport vital medical staff and their equipment to the scene 
 Alert the British Red Cross and St Andrew’s Ambulance Association and 
co-ordinate their work in support of SAS 
 Provide and maintain communications equipment for medical staff and 
voluntary organisations at the scene; and 
 Restore service normality 
 
It also operates three Special Operations Response Teams (SORT) based in the North, 
East and West of Scotland. These teams are specially trained and equipped to deal 
with major incidents of any kind as well as chemical, nuclear or radiological 
incidents.  
The national headquarters are in Edinburgh and there are five divisions within the 
Service, namely:  
North - Highlands, Western Isles, Grampian, Orkney, Shetland 
East Central - Fife, Forth Valley, Tayside 
West Central - Greater Glasgow, Lanarkshire 
South East - Edinburgh, Lothian and Borders 
South West - Argyll, Argyll islands, Clyde islands, Ayrshire, Dumfries and Galloway 
The Scottish Ambulance Service has 4,161 staff, including 2,330 paramedics and 
technicians. 
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Maritime & Coastguard 
Agency
15
 
The Maritime and 
Coastguard Agency 
(MCA) is a UK executive 
agency working to 
prevent the loss of lives at 
sea and is responsible for 
implementing British and 
International maritime 
law and safety policy. 
This involves 
coordinating search and 
rescue (SAR) at sea 
through Her Majesty's 
Coastguard (HMCG), 
The MCA is structured 
into three Search & 
Rescue Regions (SRR):  
1. Scotland & Northern 
Ireland Region 
2. Wales & Western 
Region 
3. East of England 
Region 
The region which covers Scotland, Northern Ireland and the Scottish Isles 
encompasses 6 Coastguard Rescue Co-ordination Centres and 5 Marine Offices, some 
of which are collocated. There are 207 smaller properties, which house Auxiliary 
Teams and their 21 Sector Managers. The region directs 2 Coastguard Emergency 
Towing Vessels (ETVs), one of which is stationed in the Minches and the other in the 
Fair Isle Channel.  
 
The Region’s oil-related responsibilities include Search and Rescue (SAR) for in 
excess of 90 Mobile Rigs and over 100 Production Platforms; over 15,000 Personnel 
work offshore in its area. In total, the Region employs 264 permanent staff and 1,310 
Auxiliary Coastguards. 
 
The roles and responsibilities of MCA are to: 
 
 Initiate and co-ordinate civil maritime search and rescue by mobilising, organising 
and dispatching resources to assist people in distress at sea, in danger on cliffs or 
shoreline and in certain inland areas 
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 Be national co-ordinator of all civil maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) activities 
by utilising its own facilities and those made available by others (e.g. military 
helicopters and Royal National Lifeboat Institution (RNLI) lifeboats) but will also 
seek assistance from any source likely to make an effective contribution 
 If specifically requested, assist emergency services and local authorities during 
emergencies, such as flooding 
 The Counter Pollution and Response Branch deals with pollution at sea and assists 
local authorities with shoreline clean-up. 
 The Secretary of State for Transport’s Representative (SOSREP) is co-located 
with the MCA. The SOSREP is empowered to intervene on behalf of the 
Secretary of State for purposes relating to the safety of ships or pollution from 
ships, offshore oil or gas installations. SOSREP has the power to give directions 
UK wide the MCA employs 1,200 people who are supported by 3,500 volunteer 
Coastguard Rescue Officers. 
Maritime Incident Response Group (MIRG) 
The UK Fire & Rescue Service Maritime Incident Response Group (MIRG) was 
launched in April 2006. The MIRG consists of fifteen strategically located shore 
based FRS who provide a 24/7 response to incidents at sea where there is a risk of life 
or high environment risk for which fire fighting, chemical hazard and/or rescue teams 
may be required. 
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Councils
16
 
The Local Government 
etc. (Scotland) Act 1994 
created the current local 
government structure of 
32 unitary authorities 
covering the whole of 
Scotland. It abolished the 
two-tier structure of 
regions and districts 
created by the Local 
Government (Scotland) 
Act 1973 which had 
previously covered 
Scotland except for the 
islands council areas. 
The Act came into effect 
on 1 April 1996.  
The reorganisation of 
local government areas 
also led to changes in 
policing and fire 
services, which had been 
organised in 1975 to 
correspond to one or 
more regions
17
. The 
Police (Scotland) Act 
1967 was amended to allow for the reconstitution of police areas and appointment of 
joint authorities. Similarly fire services and authorities were reconstituted.  
There are now only two unitary councils, namely Fife and Dumfries & Galloway, 
which have their police and fire and rescue services, and their health boards with 
coterminous boundaries.  All the others have a number of councils within the local 
authority area. For example, Strathclyde Police has 12 councils and three health 
boards within its force area and Grampian Police has three councils and a single 
health board.  
The roles and responsibilities of the local authorities are: 
 Support the emergency services and those assisting them 
 Provide a variety of support services for the local and wider community 
 Maintain normal services at an appropriate level 
 Provide a wide range of social care and welfare services, working alone or 
with public, private and voluntary organisations. Services include care for 
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people, rest centres, temporary accommodation, re-housing and practical 
support for victims 
 Access a wide variety of specialist, scientific, environmental and 
communications expertise 
 Represent the diverse interests of local people and, in so doing, maintain close 
links with communities through elected members, Community Councils, 
Community Planning and other formal partnerships 
 Have powers to take action to preserve community wellbeing; and 
 Lead the longer-term recovery and regeneration of affected communities. 
 
 
 
Crown Office & Procurator Fiscal 
Service (COPFS)
18
 
The Crown Office and Procurator 
Fiscal Service provide the 
independent public prosecution 
service for Scotland, and is a 
Ministerial Department of the 
Scottish Government. The 
department is headed by Her 
Majesty's Lord Advocate, who 
under the Scottish legal system is 
responsible for prosecution, along 
with the area Procurators Fiscal.  
Under Scottish criminal law the 
responsibility not only for 
prosecution but also the 
investigation of crime lies with 
COPFS. The role of the police is to 
gather evidence and undertake 
enquiries on behalf of the procurator 
fiscal but “the fiscal retains primacy 
at all times” (HMICS, 2000: 1719). 
This is different from England and Wales, where the Crown Prosecution Service 
(CPS) has no investigative role (Donnelly & Scott, 2005
20
).  
In 2002, COPFS was restructured to correspond largely with police force areas. It was 
divided into 11 areas each headed by Area Procurator Fiscal. These areas generally 
coincide with the boundaries of the eight Scottish police forces. The exception is 
Strathclyde, which has 4 COPFS areas namely Argyll & Clyde, Ayrshire, Glasgow 
and Lanarkshire.  
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The realignment was part of a progress to enhance the links between the police and 
Crown Office. The aim was improved operational effectiveness through increased and 
improved liaison (Donnelly & Scott, 
2005).   
Health Boards
21
 
The service was founded by the National 
Health Service (Scotland) Act 1947 (since 
repealed by the National Health Service 
(Scotland) Act 1978). In 2005 the Argyll 
& Clyde Health Board was scrapped 
because of financial difficulties and its 
responsibilities delegated to NHS Glasgow 
and NHS Highland
22
. Current provision of 
healthcare is the responsibility of 14 
geographically-based local NHS Boards 
and a number of National Special Health 
Boards. These are: 
1. NHS Ayrshire and Arran 
2. NHS Borders 
3. NHS Dumfries and Galloway 
4. NHS Western Isles 
5. NHS Fife 
6. NHS Forth Valley 
7. NHS Grampian 
8. NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde 
9. NHS Highland 
10. NHS Lanarkshire 
11. NHS Lothian 
12. NHS Orkney 
13. NHS Shetland  
14. NHS Tayside 
The roles and responsibilities of the Health Boards are: 
 Ensure health representation at multi-agency strategic and tactical level 
meetings 
 Ensure co-ordination/support arrangements are in place between all health 
services, including Community Health Partnerships and other Primary Care 
services, involved in emergency response within the NHS Board/Strategic 
Coordinating Group area 
 Ensure that the NHS within its area has clear command and control structures 
and facilities 
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 Ensure that direct healthcare resources can be mobilised quickly to support 
local hospitals or to sustain patients in the community, should hospital services 
be reduced or compromised for a period 
 Work with other NHS Boards as the “lead” NHS Board, or to act in support of 
a nominated “lead” Local Health Board 
 Work with support from Scottish Government Health Directorates 
(SGHD)/Health Protection Scotland, to monitor and safeguard the health of 
the local population for the duration of an emergency 
 Disseminate health advice to the public if required 
 Liaise with and provide situation reports to the Emergency Support, and 
Emergency Action Teams, or SGHDs’ Performance Management Division 
and with NHS 24 
Health Protection Scotland
23
 
Health Protection Scotland (HPS) was established by the Scottish Government in 
2005 to strengthen and co-ordinate health protection in Scotland. HPS is a division of 
NHS National Services Scotland. In particular, Health Protection Scotland work 
alongside the NHS providing specialist support in communicable disease and 
infection control, and emergency planning. 
Health Protection Agency
24
 
The Health Protection Agency (HPA), originally established as an NHS special health 
authority in 2003, it is now a non-departmental public body charged with protecting 
the health and well-being of United Kingdom citizens from infectious diseases and 
with preventing harm and reducing impacts when hazards involving chemicals, 
poisons or radiation occur. On April 1, 2005, the Agency was established as a non-
departmental public body, replacing the HPA SpHA and the National Radiological 
Protection Board (NRPB). 
SEPA
25
 
The Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) is Scotland’s environmental 
regulator and is a non-departmental public body (NDPB), accountable, through 
Scottish Ministers, to the Scottish Parliament. SEPA was established in 1996 by the 
Environment Act 1995 and is responsible for the protection of the natural 
environment in Scotland. It is also responsible for delivering Scotland's flood warning 
system, helping to implement Scotland's National Waste Strategy and controlling, 
with the Health and Safety Executive, the risk of major accidents at industrial sites. 
SEPA has 1,300 employees in range of specialist areas including chemistry, ecology, 
environmental regulation, hydrology, engineering, quality control, planning, 
communications, and business support and management functions.  
 
The roles and responsibilities of SEPA are to: 
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 deploy appropriate staff to meet local co-ordination arrangements 
 provide advice on all aspects of environmental impact, protection and 
recovery 
 assist in determining the footprint and movement of any contamination 
 give advice about implications to the environment, containment, storage, 
transportation and disposal of contaminated liquid or solid waste; and 
 maintain operational links with Scottish Water, Local authorities, 
Environmental Health Departments and Health and Safety Executive 
 
Additionally, SEPA has powers to prevent, minimize or reduce pollution of the 
environment and enforces environmental legislation. SEPA: 
 
 regulates the treatment, storage, movement and disposal of waste 
 provides, as flood warning authority, regularly updated information on flood 
warnings (Floodline) across Scotland 
 administers jointly with the Health and Safety Executive the Control of Major 
Accident Hazards (COMAH) legislation; and 
 regulates the disposal of radioactive waste and manages Scottish interests in 
the Radioactive Incident Monitoring Network (RIMNET) 
 
Scottish Utilities Contingency Planning Group (SUCPG)
26
 
 
The SUCPG is a forum to consider and share best practice and information with the 
aim of improving the resilience capability of the utility sectors in Scotland. It seeks to 
establish and consolidate linkages between Government and utility companies, as well 
as encourage participation of utility involvement in exercises within Scotland. The 
SUCPG has no legislative power. Membership of the SUCPG consists of 
representatives of the following organisations: 
 
Scottish Water 
British Telecom 
Scotia Gas Networks 
Scottish Power 
Scottish and Southern Energy 
O2  - representing Mobile Phone Companies 
Scottish Government 
Scottish Water
27
  
Scottish Water is a statutory corporation in Scotland that provides water and sewerage 
services. Unlike in England and Wales, water and sewerage provision in Scotland 
continues as a public corporation accountable to the public through the Scottish 
Government. Scottish Water operates under a regulatory framework established by 
the Water Services etc. (Scotland) Act 2005. 
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MOD
28
 
One of the principal responsibilities of any government is the defence of the realm. In 
the UK there is a distinction between the defence of the UK against military threats, 
and the safety and security of the citizen. The safety and security of the population 
within the UK itself is always the responsibility of the Home Secretary, delivered 
through the Police and other emergency services and local authorities. However, 
where local services find that the scale or nature of events puts the situation beyond 
the capacity of their own resources, their recourse is usually to mutual aid 
arrangements. 
Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA) is the collective term used by the 
Ministry of Defence of the Government of the United Kingdom to refer to the 
operational deployment of the armed forces of the United Kingdom in support of the 
civilian authorities, other government departments and the community as a whole. 
MOD support must always be at the specific request of the civil authorities, and 
requires the specific authorisation of Defence Ministers. Any MOD support is subject 
to civil primacy. There are 3 criteria for the provision of MACA: 
1. Military aid should always be the last resort. The use of mutual aid, other 
agencies, and the private sector must be otherwise considered as insufficient or 
be unsuitable.  
2. The Civil Authority lacks the required level of capability to fulfill the task and 
it is unreasonable or prohibitively expensive to expect it to develop one.  
3. The Civil Authority has a capability, but the need to act is urgent and it lacks 
readily available resources.  
MACA supports the civil authorities in the fulfilment of civil objectives, principally 
in peace. It is conducted because the Armed Forces’ national structure, organisation, 
skills, equipment and training can be of benefit in time of emergency to fill civil 
authority capability gaps. MACA is subdivided into 3 categories: 
 
1. Military Aid to other Government Departments. Military Aid to other 
Government Departments (MAGD) is the assistance provided by the Armed 
Forces on urgent work of national importance or in maintaining supplies and 
services essential to the life, health and safety of the community. 
2. Military Aid to the Civil Power. The provision of military assistance (armed 
if appropriate) to the Civil Power (MACP) in its maintenance of law, order 
and public safety using specialist capabilities or equipment, in situations 
beyond the capability of the Civil Power. It includes capabilities such as 
Explosive Ordnance Disposal. 
3. Military Aid to the Civil Community. Military Aid to the Civil Community 
(MACC) is the provision of unarmed military assistance: 
 
(i) To the civil authorities when they have an urgent need for help to 
prevent or deal with the aftermath of a natural disaster or a major incident. 
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(ii) To civil sponsors, either by carrying out special projects of significant 
social value to the community or by attaching individual volunteers full-
time for specific projects. 
 
All operations must be conducted within both civil and military law. Failure to 
comply with this principle may result in criminal and/or civil law proceedings being 
brought against individuals or the MOD. Unlike the Police and some other civil 
agencies, members of the Armed Forces have no powers over and above those of the 
ordinary citizen. They have the same personal duty as anyone else to abide by the law 
at all times.  
UK Government
29
 
Within UK central government, departments deliver their responsibilities (generally 
through local agencies) and are accountable to Parliament for their effective delivery. 
This includes providing, where appropriate, strategic decision-making and oversight 
for emergencies affecting their responsibilities.  
 
In the event of a significant emergency one department, the Lead Government 
Department (LGD), will take overall responsibility for assessing the situation, 
ensuring that its Ministers and other relevant Ministers are briefed, handling media 
and parliamentary interest, and providing coordinated policy and other support as 
necessary to local responders. Other government departments will provide support to 
the LGD to ensure a coordinated response; however, individual departments will 
remain responsible, including to Parliament, for their particular policy areas. 
 
Where the UK Government lead is unclear, it is the responsibility of the Cabinet 
Office to make a judgement and advise the Prime Minister’s Office on the most 
appropriate LGD.  
Counter Terrorism
30
 
The Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) was established in 2003 by the 
government as the UK's centre for the analysis and assessment of international 
terrorism. It sets threat levels and issues warnings of threats and other terrorist-related 
subjects. The establishment of JTAC brought together counter-terrorist expertise from 
the police, key government departments and agencies.  
Counter-Terrorism policy is reserved to the UK Government. However, many aspects 
of preparation, prevention and dealing with the consequences of a terrorist act in 
Scotland would be managed and controlled by the Scottish Government and local 
agencies. The response to a terrorist incident in the UK relies on a coordinated 
approach between those responding at a local level, including emergency services and 
local authorities, and the central government departments with a key role to play. 
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To establish an effective link between the national and local response, a government 
liaison team (GLT) will be established as a single point of contact. This team will 
include relevant representatives from government departments. The GLT is headed by 
a Government Liaison Officer (GLO) and will support the police Gold/strategic 
commander for the duration of the incident. The GLO will report back to central 
government to ensure that all decisions made at both the local and national level are 
based on accurate and up-to-date information, and take into account both operational 
and political implications. 
The Home Office is the UK Government Department responsible for keeping the UK 
safe from the threat posed by terrorism. In a terrorist attack the Home Secretary leads 
the government response to the incident, as the Minister responsible for counter-
terrorism in England, Wales and Scotland.  While the Home Office always leads the 
government response immediately following a terrorist attack, depending on the 
nature of the attack, lead responsibility may be transferred to another department 
during the response phase. For example, if there has been lasting damage to transport 
infrastructure, it may be appropriate to transfer lead responsibility to the Department 
for Transport. 
The Office for Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT) is responsible for activating 
and coordinating the Home Office response. The overall government response is 
through a cross-departmental crisis committee, COBRA (named after the room it 
meets in Cabinet Office Briefing Room A). In a terrorist attack COBRA could be 
chaired by the Prime Minister or the Home Office and will include representatives 
from other government departments and agencies. The aim of COBRA is to provide 
effective decision-making and rapid coordination of the central government response 
to the terrorist attack. 
It should be noted that because a terrorist attack is a crime it is a matter for the Chief 
Constable in whose area the offence has been committed. Therefore, regardless of any 
help or support provided by government, the Chief Constable will have operational 
control at the scene. 
The police will normally activate a Strategic Coordination Centre (SCC), where the 
SCG will be situated. SCG responsibilities will include controlling any spontaneous 
incidents, consequence management, resilience, reassurance and restoring normality.  
In the event of a terrorist attack the SCG will always be chaired by the Police ‘Gold or 
Strategic’ Commander, appointed by the Chief Constable. With other types of non-
terrorist events the SCG may be chaired by other agencies, for example Chief 
Executive of the Council. 
Scottish Government
31
 
The Scottish Government was known as the Scottish Executive until the name was 
changed in September 2007. 
Scotland was granted devolution by the passing of the Scotland Act in 1998 which 
means that Scotland has a parliament with ‘devolved’ powers within the United 
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Kingdom. Any powers which remain with the UK Parliament at Westminster are 
reserved.  
 Devolved powers include matters such as education, health and prisons 
 Reserved powers include decisions mostly about matters with a UK or 
international impact such as national security and terrorism  
The devolved administration in Scotland will, within its competency, play a full role 
in the response to and recovery from an emergency. The role will depend on two 
things: whether the incident affects Scotland and whether the response to the 
emergency includes activity within the competence of the administration. For 
example, whilst national security is a reserved matter, the emergency services and 
NHS in Scotland are the responsibility of Scottish Ministers and the investigation and 
prosecution of crime, including terrorist crime, is a devolved responsibility of the 
Lord Advocate. 
 
The devolved administration will mirror many of the tasks of the UK central crisis 
mechanism. The precise balance of activity will depend on the competence of the 
devolved administration involved. That is the terms of the devolution settlement and 
the nature of the incident. 
 
In areas of reserved responsibility, the UK Government Lead Department will lead 
the response and recovery in the devolved areas working closely with the relevant 
devolved administration. In practice, even where formal accountability rests with UK 
ministers, the Scottish Government will expect to be briefed on developments where 
these significantly affect their territory. Likewise, Ministers of the Scottish 
Government will be expected to comment by national and local media necessitating 
close cooperation and information sharing between UK departments and their 
counterparts in the Scottish Government.  
 
If the emergency takes place in Scotland and relates to a devolved matter, the Scottish 
Government will assume the lead. If the emergency occurs in England but has cross 
border implications for devolved issues the Scottish Government will lead on this 
aspect within Scotland and provide advice and support as necessary to the UK 
government. 
 
The devolved administrations maintain their own facilities to support their response to 
and recovery from emergencies within their competence or affecting their territory. In 
Scotland, these include: 
 Scottish Resilience32 
Scottish Resilience is part of the Scottish Government and provides advice to Scottish 
Ministers on all aspects of civil contingencies. It brings together civil servants and 
professionals from the fire, police and ambulance services, and local government and 
health partners. Its staff are based in Edinburgh, Perth and Glasgow, and at the 
Scottish Fire Services College. 
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 Resilience Advisory Board for Scotland (RABS)33 
The Resilience Advisory Board for Scotland (RABS) advises Scottish Ministers and 
the wider civil contingencies community on strategic policy development, to ensure 
that Scotland is prepared to respond effectively to major emergencies. RABS brings 
together senior representatives from frontline responder organisations and other 
subject matter experts, under the chairmanship of the Scottish Government's director 
general of Justice and Communities. Members provide objective advice based on their 
own personal expertise and knowledge of their sector. 
 ScoRDS34 
The Scottish Resilience Development Service (ScoRDS) is part of Scottish 
Resilience. It provides training, exercising and other knowledge development 
opportunities to the emergency services and other responder agencies, to ensure that 
Scotland is prepared to respond to any major emergency. In order to achieve this 
ScoRDS will: 
 co-ordinate multi-agency training and exercising across Scotland and help to 
ensure that lessons are learned from incidents and exercises and applied 
 provide opportunities for individual and organisational learning and 
development within the civil contingencies community 
 develop and foster a knowledge culture within the civil contingencies 
community to collate and analyse information and enable practitioners to share 
knowledge, good practice and lessons learned 
 through ScoRDS sponsored events, support the process of consultation and 
communication within the civil contingency communities 
 
The common areas of responsibilities are summarised in the following table: 
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Summary Table of Common Areas of Responsibility  
Agencies  Common Areas of Responsibility & Potential Tensions 
Police & MCA Coordination - Police have the responsibility for coordinating the activities of local 
responders and others acting in support at the scene of an incident. However, MCA initiate 
and coordinate civil maritime search and rescue by mobilising, organising and dispatching 
resources to assist people in distress at sea, in danger on cliffs or shoreline and in certain 
inland areas 
 
Police, Fire & 
Ambulance 
Scene Management - The police have the responsibility to treat the affected area as a crime 
scene, unless it is obvious that the emergency is caused by a natural event. However, Fire & 
Rescue have responsibility for rescuing people from the scene. Whereas Ambulance 
responsibility is to save life and provide the immediate care of those at the scene 
 
Police & Fire  Cordons & Security - The police have responsibility for ensuring that the incident site is 
secure. However, the Fire & Rescue Service is responsible for management of the inner 
cordon 
 
Police/COPFS, 
Fire & 
Ambulance  
Casualty Management - The police have a responsibility to process casualty information 
including the identification of deceased and removal of the dead on behalf of the Procurator 
Fiscal. However, the Fire & Rescue Service have a responsibility to manage the inner cordon 
and render humanitarian assistance. The Ambulance Service provide transit to hospital 
 
Police/PF, Fire  Investigation - The responsibility, not only for prosecution, but also the investigation of 
crime lies with COPFS. The police act under the direction of the Procurator Fiscal. However, 
the Fire & Rescue Services are responsible for investigations into the causes of fire 
 
Police & BTP Rail Incident Management - The host police force has responsibility to coordinate the 
response to, and investigation of, major accidents on the rail network in Scotland. However, 
BTP is responsible for the policing of railways and light-rail systems in Scotland, including 
the Glasgow Subway 
 
Fire, Councils 
& SEPA 
Scientific Advice - The Fire & Rescue Service have a responsibility to manage incidents 
involving hazardous materials and provide qualified scientific advice. However, the Councils 
have a responsibility to access a wide variety of specialist, scientific, environmental and 
communications expertise. Moreover, SEPA also provide environmental advice and 
administers COMAH with HSE 
 
Fire & 
Ambulance 
Decontamination - The Fire & Rescue service have a responsibility to assist in mass 
decontamination of casualties following a CBRN/hazmat incident at the request of the 
Scottish Ambulance Service. However, the Ambulance Service manages decontamination of 
people affected by hazardous substances prior to their evacuation from the scene. The Fire & 
Rescue Service also manage the inner cordon 
 
SEPA, MCA, 
Fire & 
Councils 
Flood Responsibilities - SEPA is Scotland’s flood warning authority and provides, as 
regularly updated information on flood warnings. The MCA, if specifically requested, will 
assist emergency services and local authorities during emergencies, such as flooding. The Fire 
Service rescue people from flood, as well as fire, transport incidents, machinery and collapsed 
structures. Moreover, Councils have a responsibility to provide practical support for victims, 
as well as other social and welfare services 
  
MCA & Fire Water Rescue - The MCA initiate and coordinate civil maritime search and rescue by 
mobilising, organising and dispatching resources to assist people in distress at sea, in danger 
on cliffs or shoreline and in certain inland areas. Whereas Fire & Rescue are responsible for 
rescuing people from flood  
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MCA & 
Councils 
Shorelines - The MCA’s Counter Pollution and Response Branch deals with pollution at sea 
and assists local authorities with shoreline clean-up. Councils take the lead the longer-term 
recovery and regeneration of affected communities 
 
MCA, Police & 
PF 
Instructions to Responders - The Secretary of State’s Representative (SOSREP) to the 
MCA is empowered to intervene on behalf of the Secretary of State for purposes relating to 
the safety of ships or pollution from ships, offshore oil or gas installations, and has the power 
to give directions. However, in Scotland the police act under the direction of the Procurator 
Fiscal and, where appropriate, facilitate the inquiries carried out by bodies such as the Health 
and Safety Executive, Rail, Air or Marine Accident Investigation Branches of the Department 
for Transport 
 
Council, 
Police, Fire & 
Ambulance 
Provision of Support - The Councils are responsible for supporting the emergency services 
and those assisting them. However, under the terms of the CCA the Chief Executive of the 
Councils can chair the SCG. They also represent the diverse interests of local people, 
maintain close links with communities through elected members, Community Councils, 
Community Planning and other formal partnerships, as well as having powers to take action 
to preserve community wellbeing, and lead the longer-term recovery and regeneration of 
affected communities 
 
Council & 
Health 
Community Wellbeing - The Councils have powers to take action to preserve community 
wellbeing. However, Health also have responsibility to monitor and safeguard the health of 
the local population for the duration of an emergency 
 
Health, Police 
& Council 
Public Advice - The police have a responsibility to coordinate the activities of local 
responders and others. Whereas Health Boards are responsible for ensuring the coordination 
and support arrangements are in place between all health services. They also are responsible 
for monitoring and safeguarding the health of the local population for the duration of an 
emergency. However, the Councils have powers to take action to preserve community 
wellbeing 
 
Scottish Water 
& Scottish 
Government 
Responsibility for Water - Scottish Water is a public corporation accountable to the public 
through the Scottish Government. However, Scottish Water is a member of SUCPG, which 
seeks to establish and consolidate linkages between Government and utility companies 
 
Military & 
Police 
Use of Military Aid - Military Aide to the Civil Authority (MACA) is conducted because the 
Armed Forces’ national structure, organisation, skills, equipment and training can be of 
benefit in time of emergency to fill civil authority capability gaps. However, it can only be 
called upon as a last resort, in an urgent situation when the civil authorities lack capacity. 
However, unlike the police, the military have no powers over citizens and are not members of 
SCG 
 
UK & Scottish 
Governments 
Who Leads? Counter-terrorism is reserved to the UK government and the response to a 
terrorist incident in the UK relies on a coordinated approach between those responding at a 
local level and the central government. However, the devolved administrations maintain their 
own facilities to support their response to and recovery from emergencies. Moreover, Lord 
Advocate responsible for prosecuting terrorist crimes in Scotland and Chief Constables are 
operationally independent and responsible for all policing in their area, including counter-
terrorism 
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Timeline of Selected Changes 
Date Comment 
1617 Scotland’s first constables appointed 
1778 First short lived professional police force established in Glasgow  
1800 Glasgow Police Act 1800 – The UK’s first police act passed. 12 Scottish 
police forces before Peel’s Metropolitan Police 
1833 The Burgh Police (Scotland) Act 1833 – Scottish Burghs were able to 
establish police forces 
1947 National Health Service (Scotland) Act 1947 – established NHS in Scotland 
1948 Dumfries & Galloway Constabulary formed 
1949 Fife Constabulary formed 
1949 British Transport Commission Act 1949 – formation of British Transport 
Police 
1975 Local Government (Scotland) Act 1973 – created regions and district local 
government structure 
1975 16 May 1975 – Strathclyde, Lothian & Borders, Grampian, Tayside, Central 
Scotland and Northern forces formed 
1994 Transport Police (Jurisdiction) Act 1994 – BTP jurisdiction moved to 
statutory basis 
1996 Local Government (Scotland) Act 1994 – created current 32 council areas 
(relevant police & fire services Acts amended) 
1996 Environment Act 1995 – led to establishment of Scottish Environment 
Protection Agency 
1999 Scotland Act 1998 – Scotland granted devolution and establishes Scottish 
Parliament 
1999 Scotland’s Cabinet Secretary for Justice assumes responsibility for police and 
fire following devolution 
2002 Crown Office Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS) restructures to correspond 
with police force boundaries 
2003 Health Protection Agency established as NHS Special Health Authority (NHS 
SpHA) 
2003 Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) formed 
2004 Civil Contingencies Act 2004 – Formalised establishment of SCGs 
2005 Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Contingency Planning) ( Scotland) 
Regulations 2005 – enacts CCA 2004 in Scotland 
2005 The Fire (Scotland) Act 2005 - broadened fire and rescue services 
responsibilities and emphasised fire prevention 
2005 14 Health Boards – following removal of NHS Health Board Argyll & Clyde 
2005 Health Protection Scotland established by Scottish Executive 
2005 Health Protection Agency reformed as non-departmental public body 
replacing NHS SpHA and National Radiological Protection Board 
2005 Water Services etc. (Scotland) Act 2005 – Scottish Water established as a 
statutory corporation answerable to Scottish Parliament 
2006 The UK Fire & Rescue Service Maritime Incident Response Groups formed 
2007 Responsibility for Glasgow Subway transferred from Strathclyde Police to 
British Transport Police 
2007 Scottish Executive now known as Scottish Government 
2007  ScoRDS established by Scottish Government 
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Appendix C 
Research Information Sheet 
 
Introduction 
 
This information concerns a project in which you are being invited to 
participate. If you consent to assisting in the research you may be interviewed 
or observed during training exercises. It should be noted that no personal data 
will be reported and all communications will be treated in the strictest 
confidence. 
 
Information 
 
The researcher is a serving police officer with Strathclyde Police currently 
undertaking doctoral research at the University of Glasgow. The project is 
being supervised by Professor Denis Smith and Dr Moira Fischbacher and 
because of its sensitive nature it is restricted. The key areas of research are 
crisis management, organisational culture and multi-agency integrated 
emergency management.  
 
Research Title 
 
The research topic is ‘Crisis management training in the public sector – is 
it effective for the current threat?’ 
 
The questions the study seeks to answer are: 
 
1. What is the capacity of Strategic Coordinating Groups to respond to, to 
recover from and to prevent emergencies and disasters? And 
 
2. Are public sector multi-agency crisis management teams adequately 
trained to provide an effective and integrated response in time of 
crisis? 
 
The study follows a report in to the capabilities of Scottish agencies to deal 
with civil contingency threats concluded that further research was needed into 
ways in which the various Strategic Coordinating Groups could respond to 
and recover from crises (Buckle et al., 2006). Moreover, a lesson identified 
from the terrorist events in London on 7th July 2005 was the need for common 
training in the Gold [or strategic] role for all agencies (LRSF, 2006).  
 
This research seeks to explore the capacity of the strategic coordinating 
groups, which are essentially the top level crisis management teams. In 
particular it will explore whether the current civil contingencies infrastructure 
and training arrangements are effective in ensuring that crisis management 
teams are best prepared for such incidents. 
 
Proposed methodology 
 
It is intended that this research will: 
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 Review the structure and organisation of integrated emergency 
management in Scotland 
 Analyse current theory in relation to crisis management, in particular 
the dynamics and decision making process in teams 
 Study the proposed and actual multi-agency approach to selecting 
crisis management team members 
 Examine training provision in relation to crisis management teams 
across the multi-agencies 
 Assess whether the current approach is suitable in light of the threat 
from ‘new’ terrorism 
 Consider the impact of the Civil Contingencies Act and other legislation 
on multi-agency arrangements 
 Determine any areas that the overall integrated emergency 
management and resilience framework could be improved 
 
Risk Assessment 
 
There is no risk attached to the research. Interviews will be conducted in the 
participant’s normal place of employment. Observations at SCG exercises will 
be conducted as part of the formal Observer Programme related to the 
exercise. All such exercises will reflect the normal activity associated with the 
participants’ role in the organisation which they represent at the SCG.   
 
Data Security & Subject Confidentiality 
 
Any data gathered will be secured on police premises as confidential in line 
with the Government Protected Marking Scheme. No information disclosed by 
the participants will be attributed to them and will be treated in the utmost 
confidence. I will be the only one with full access to the data.  My supervisors 
will be able to read transcripts (if appropriate) and analysis of the interviews 
as they will have appropriate levels of security clearance. 
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Research Consent Form 
 
 
I have received a personal copy and read the Research Information Sheet 
relating to Kevin Pollock’s doctoral studies entitled ‘Crisis management 
training in the public sector – is it effective for the current threat?’ 
 
I am aware that the study seeks to consider the following questions: 
 
 What is the capacity of Strategic Coordinating Groups to respond to, to 
recover from and to prevent emergencies and disasters? And 
 
 Are public sector multi-agency crisis management teams adequately 
trained to provide an effective and integrated response in time of 
crisis? 
 
 
I acknowledge that I have been informed that: 
 
 I may withdraw my consent to participate at any time  
 
 I may refuse to be observed by the researcher while participating in an 
exercise at any time 
 
 Any information communicated as part of the research will be treated in 
the strictest confidence 
 
 Any comments made by me will not be directly attributed in any 
publication 
 
 
Consent 
 
Having read the foregoing, I agree to participate in the research project.  
 
 
 
Name:        Date: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Researcher Contact Details 
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Appendix D 
Semi-Structured Interview Format 
 
Thank you for taking the time to see me and for answering these questions. Your 
responses to these questions will be treated in strict confidence and they will not 
be attributed to you in any way. 
 
1. What is your Professional Background and experience in terms of emergency 
management/contingency planning?  E.g. police, council, military, emergency 
services, health care, etc.  
2. How long did you spend in this occupation (if the respondent has experience in 
multiple occupational settings then ask them to be specific in terms of the length of 
time spent in that organisation) 
3. How long have you spent in SCG or other involvement in crisis management or 
similar  
4. What training/qualifications have you undertaken in this area? Please distinguish 
between personal development and training that has been required by your employer 
5. What memberships of professional bodies do you hold 
6. In your opinion, what has been the usefulness (or otherwise) of the 
training/qualifications that you have undertaken 
7. What value has that training been in terms of subsequent application in SCG or other 
crisis management situation 
8. What has been your frequency of attendance or involvement in crisis/emergency 
events and over what time period has this taken place 
9. What sources of guidance do you use for IEM / crisis management? Please be 
specific in terms of written guidance, internet information etc 
10. With regards to the SCG from your personal knowledge could you please comment 
on the following: 
 
a. How often has it been activated for live incident? 
b. How often has it been activated for exercise? 
c. How often does it meet for routine meetings? 
 
11. What is your organisation’s primary role in the SCG? 
12. Describe the formal linkages between your organisation and the other agencies 
involved. Please be specific in terms of the FORMAL linkages that are required by 
legislation 
13. What informal links exist between your ORGANISATION and other agencies 
involved? 
14. To what extent are INFORMAL links at the PERSONAL level important in this regard? 
15. With regards to the following, outline your understanding of the SCG’s: 
 
a. Structure – strategic, tactical & operational 
b. Objectives – prevent loss of life, prevent escalation etc 
c. Processes – communication, consultation, risk assessment & BCM 
d. Functions – distinguish between training/planning & crisis management 
 
16. In your view list 3 strengths of the SCG that are central to its performance 
17. How would you rank those in terms of importance 
18. Likewise detail 3 areas which could be improved 
19. Again, can you rank those in terms of their importance 
20. Do you have any comments regarding the effectiveness of the current SCG / IEM 
structure? 
21. Are their any STRUCTURAL changes that you think would be important 
22. How effective would you consider the training that you have undertaken? 
23. What do you consider to be the most useful component of the training you have 
received? 
a. Why do you think that it is important? 
 
24. How important do you consider the following elements to effective training? 
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a. Provision of a simple, robust conceptual scheme of crisis/incident command 
b. Opportunity to actively practise crisis/incident command in a setting that 
adequately simulates the psychological demands on the commander 
c. Provision of feedback about the effectiveness of command and control 
decisions and actions 
d. Opportunity for guided reflection and self-appraisal 
 
25. Why do you think that these factors are important? (Detail them back to the 
respondent) 
26. What skills would you look for in terms of the membership of a Crisis Management 
Team? 
27. Do you feel that your training and experience to-date has influenced your: 
 
a. Ability to assess situations 
b. Deciding on a course of action 
c. Implementing a plan of action in line with operational constraints 
d. Monitoring the operation thereafter 
 
28. What skills to you feel that you need in order to improve your own capabilities as a 
crisis team member? 
29. Is there anything else in relation to your training, experience or developmental 
opportunities that could add to your leadership ability? 
30. How do you incorporate the lessons from the training that you have received into your 
day-to-day working practices? 
31. Have you experienced any difficulties in doing so?  
32. Do you think that your organisation has learned lessons from the training that you 
(and others) have received to-date? 
33. If you think that the organisation has not learned then what are the reasons for this 
i.e. are there barriers to learning? 
34. In your view what is the best way to learn about crises. Is it in a classroom, exercise 
environment or on-the-job? 
35. Supplementary question re mandatory training? 
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